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SUMMARY 
 
The available sources on the dependency action in South Africa do not mention the 
presence or absence of traditional values. This study was prompted by a simple 
curiosity to discover the traditional legal values of the dependency action for loss of 
support. Accordingly, the study critically examines the action of dependants for loss of 
support and other related losses in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho from an 
African perspective. It then compares this to its application in Australia, a country that 
is known for its recognition and inclusion of indigenous Australian customary law. The 
study recommends that traditional values should be preserved in the records of the 
legal system, as it might stimulate a discussion, which could lead to the culmination of 
a single dependency action tailored to fit the whole nation and all its different cultures 
and religions. 
 
KEY TERMS: 
African law; “Banna ba diphiri”; “Bjala bja di garafo”; Cultures; Customary law; 
Common law; Dependency action; Funeral expenses; “Go ila”; “Go tsoša hlogo”; 
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Loss of support; “Molato ga o bole”; Non-patrimonial loss; Post-burial cleansing 
ceremonies; Prescription; “Seila”; Tort law; “Ukuzila”; Wrongful death. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter presents a general overview of the study. It introduces the 
reader to the topic of the research, helps explain to the reader how the fulfilment of the 
research aims and objectives will contribute to legal knowledge, discipline and practice. 
To achieve this, the thesis begins with the objectives1 of the research by highlighting 
the importance of and rationale for the research. It then provides a background to the 
study’s comparative perspective,2 and focuses on the problem statement,3 by 
predicting problems and outcomes, suggesting progression, and planning for 
alternatives and interventions. It also gives a brief description of the study’s approach 
towards the proposed research method.4 The introductory chapter ends with an 
exposition of the chapters in the thesis5 and an explanation of a few terms6 that are 
used throughout the study. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study aims to offer a comparative exploration of the action of dependants for loss 
of support and other related losses such as funeral expenses and non-patrimonial 
losses in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Australia. In South Africa, a 
dependency claim arises when a breadwinner is killed by the wrongful and negligent 
act of another (the wrongdoer) and, as a result, the deceased’s dependants suffer, first 
                                            
1  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.2 hereunder. 
2  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.3 hereunder. 
3  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4 hereunder. 
4  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.5 hereunder. 
5  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.6 hereunder. 
6  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.7 hereunder. 
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and foremost, loss of support,7 but there are also other potential losses the dependants 
could suffer and these would be included under the dependency action.8 This is also 
an accurate version of the dependency action under the laws of Botswana,9 Lesotho10 
and Australia.11 This study addresses and highlights complicated questions that are 
associated with the action of dependants for loss of support and other related losses, 
particularly within an African context. The South African law on dependants’ action 
generally reveals nothing about the presence or absence of traditional values in 
African/customary/indigenous law pertaining to the dependency action.12 This is an 
oversight in our legal system, and adding the customary law perspectives will assist in 
the fair and consistent application of the dependency action. The correct use of the 
word “customary law” in this study is important. Juma, a legal author, states that the 
term “customary law” is used interchangeably with “African law.” Both encompass the 
regimes of law variously described as “indigenous law”, “African customary law”, “tribal 
law”, “local law”, “native law”, “primitive law”, and “folk law.”13 In Mabuza v Mbatha,14 
Hlophe JP referred to this system as “African customary law”. In Bhe v The Magistrate 
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; Human Rights Commission v President of Republic of 
                                            
7  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict (2017) par 3.5.1; 
Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) paras 12 54 96 & 197; Jameson’s Minors v Central South 
African Railways 1908 TS 575; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; Millward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 (A); 
Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A). 
8  For example, funeral expenses and non-patrimonial losses. 
9  Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
10  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 114; Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70; R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 
130. 
11  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002, s 18(1); Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(5); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1944 (NSW), s 2(5); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 9(1); Succession Act 
1981 (Qld), s 66(4); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 6(1); Administration and Probate 
Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(9); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(5); Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 
13. 
12  The South African law is still largely dominated by Western laws: Rautenbach “The phenomenon 
of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach, Bekker & Goolam (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2015) 6-
7. 
13  Juma 2007 Speculum Juris 88-90. 
14  2003 7 BCLR 43 (C). 
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South Africa,15 Langa DCJ applies the term “customary law”, whilst in the same case, 
Ngcobo J uses the word “indigenous law.” In Alexkor Ltd and another v Richtersveld 
Community and others,16 the Constitutional Court refers to the expression “indigenous 
law”, but in Shilubana and others v Nwamitwa,17 the court speaks of “customary law”. 
In this study, “customary law” is preferred, but is used interchangeably with “African 
law” and “indigenous law”. 
 
Despite the dependency action being an increasingly topical theme in South Africa, no 
in-depth research has as yet collectively taken all the observations and critical legal 
problems into consideration, and delivered a legal structure for effective incorporation 
and application of traditional value in the dependants’ action for loss of support.18 
Essentially, the traditional values under customary law concerning the dependency 
action have never been published in South Africa. The application of customary law 
must reflect the legal, political and social cosmology in which it operates within its own 
indigenous frame of reference.19 The writing of this thesis is in particular fuelled by a 
simple curiosity to discover traditional values related to the dependency action under 
the customary law system. Does customary law possess legal rules to deal with the 
action of dependants? The determination, knowledge and understanding of these 
                                            
15  2005 1 BCLR 580 (CC). 
16  2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC). 
17  2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC). 
18  Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2009 2 SA 278 (SCA); Minister of Safety & Security v Van 
Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Dlikilili v 
Federated Insurance Co Ltd 1983 2 SA 275 (C); Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Zulu v Minister of 
Justice 1956 2 SA 128 (N); Pasela v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika 1967 1 SA 
339 (W); Fosi v RAF 2008 4 SA 560 (C); Langemaat v Minister of Safety & Security 1998 3 SA 312 
(T); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 
(CC); 2006 1 SA 524 (CC); Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 50-51 available at 
https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 18 March 2015); Neethling 2009 
THRHR 297-299. 
19  Ndima Re-imagining and re-interpreting African jurisprudence (2013) iii. 
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traditional values would be a valuable addition to our legal knowledge. It would 
undoubtedly provide insight into the resolution of problems that might be encountered 
under customary law in respect of the action. It would also be easier to appreciate the 
incorporation of the traditional values into the existing eccentric dependency action, 
which may eventually culminate in a single dependency action tailored to suit the whole 
nation and all its different cultures. 
 
Consequently, the primary focus in this study is on establishing the traditional values 
in the action of dependants under customary law, and assessing the extent to which 
the affirmation of indigenous values in the dependency action is being effected by the 
South African courts and the legislature, thereby providing a basis for the incorporation 
of traditional values of the action of dependants into our legal system. This study 
addresses whether or not African traditional legal rules and values, when established, 
should be integrated with the common law dependency action. In this study, a 
determination of whether or not there is a need to Africanise this delictual action is 
made. 
 
Most countries in Africa are still developing, and the Southern African societies 
researched in this study still adhere to strong traditional values. Some of these values 
have not yet been adopted or recognised by legislation or judicial decisions, nor have 
they been recorded in writing.20 However, they became binding over time through their 
observation by the communities themselves.21 Africa prides itself on having a rich 
cultural diversity, which has to be reflected in the legal system.22 Therefore, when we 
                                            
20  Ngcobo v Ngcobo 1929 AD 236; Fosi v RAF 2008 4 SA 560 (C); Seleka v RAF 2016 4 SA 445 
(GP). 
21  Gibson Wille’s principles (1977) 9. 
22  Maithufi & Bekker 2009 OBITER 170. 
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develop the law, in particular the dependency action for loss of support, we must 
incorporate these “traditional values”. The aim is to preserve the “traditional values” on 
the dependency action in customary law within the legal system. Therefore, it is 
imperative to explore the heart of Africaness in more depth, as well as to determine 
whether comparative law has anything to offer in this respect. This study seeks to 
investigate to what extent there is unity and/or diversity amongst African and 
Westernized countries in the rules concerning the dependency action for loss of 
support, and compensation for such loss. As an example of a developed, Westernised 
country, this study investigates whether Australia has successfully managed to 
incorporate any traditional values into its legislated framework for dependants’ claims. 
 
In South Africa, the dependency action is also an area where the influence of 
constitutional values has been palpable.23 The South African Constitutions24 raised the 
position of African law to the similar status as common law, and had a notable impact 
on the action of dependants for loss of support. Consequently, reference is made 
throughout this study to customary law and the provisions of our Constitutions, in order 
to emphasise significant concepts. Contrary to Australia,25 South Africa has no 
                                            
23  Langemaat v Minister of Safety & Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis 
v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 1 SA 
524 (CC). 
24  The interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (hereinafter, the “interim 
Constitution”) and the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (hereinafter, 
the “Constitution”). 
25  Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); but there 
are other potential losses they could suffer too and would be included under the dependency action 
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); Compensation to 
Relatives Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (Northern 
Territories); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); s 83 of the 
Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 (Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality of 
Status) Act 2003 (Western Australia); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto 
Relationships Act 2003 (Northern Territory); s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); 
sch 1 of the Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); sch 2.3 of the 
Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales); ss 23 & 28(2) of 
the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory). 
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legislation dedicated to regulating the dependency action. In general, there is no 
unified legislative approach to dealing with the dependency action. The road thus far 
has been characterised by piecemeal legislative recognition.26 The absence of a clear, 
single, steadfast and all-inclusive legislative policy on the South African dependency 
action presents some problems, not all of which have been resolved.27 Although there 
are cases and studies, which provide some guidance, there is still uncertainty 
regarding a number of issues, ranging from basic principles to questions of detail. 
 
The practical application of the action of dependants is not without difficulty, and has 
at times given rise to considerable confusion. This study scrutinises the perplexity of 
the underlying principles of modern statutes,28 which contain various sections 
conferring upon the dependants the rights and action for recovery of loss suffered as 
a result of the unlawful and negligent killing of their breadwinner, as well as the 
apparent inability to distinguish between the vested rights thus given29 by the action. 
The form in which these legislations have been cast seems to be destined to tax legal 
writers, academics and judicial minds for some time to come. These provisions have 
not been expressed in simple and clear terms. The wording of various legislations30 
                                            
26  For instance, Civil Union Act 17 of 2006; Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; 
Marriages Act 25 of 1961; Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956; Black Law Amendment Act 
76 of 1963; Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969; Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993; Nuclear Energy Act 131 of 1993; Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996; 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 
2005; the proposed Road Accident Benefit Scheme (RABS) Bill, 2017 - Government Gazette No. 
36138; Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
27  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4 hereunder for the list of the issues/problems/confusions. Their 
nature and scope will be discussed in greater detail throughout the study. 
28  See fn 26 above. 
29  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad 
(1987) 348; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 19; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 
814 (A) 837-838; Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575 583-585; 
Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C), 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97-98 100; Union 
Government (Minister of Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202 220-222; Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 
(A) 471-472; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas 
Health Board 1965 1 SA 545 (W) 55; Lambrakis v Santam 2000 3 SA 1098 (W) 1113; De Vaal v 
Messing 1938 TPD 34. 
30  See fn 26 above. 
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has, in general, left it to the courts to exercise their judgment. These misperceptions 
even reign within our case law.31 It seems as if our courts are still in the dark and base 
their decisions on the Judge’s individual understanding of the dependants’ action. 
Consequently, many critical and complicated questions in respect of this action remain 
unaddressed,32 but the state of the dependants’ action, which could well be described 
as unsettled,33 has also seen development. 
 
If there is one area of the law where courts have to be watchful of the prevalence of 
legal fees, for fear that, rewards of damages could be reduced by the expense of 
fruitless attempts to achieve theoretical perfection, it is in the field of the action of 
dependants for loss of support. As a result, this study attempts to examine, criticise 
and distinguish these unsettled issues34 and seemingly conflicting decisions on this 
subject. It also proposes a way forward for unanswered problems35 regarding the 
action, and motivates for a more comprehensive approach in enacting legislation that 
focuses specifically on the action of dependants for loss of support, expressly providing 
for the traditional values in respect of the dependency action. 
 
This study also examines the legal issues surrounding the action of dependants as a 
whole. It looks at the reasons for the action; the legal standing of the action; and the 
past, present and future application of the dependants’ action from an African 
                                            
31  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Brooks v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A); Constantia 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Victor NO 1986 1 SA 601 (A); Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56; 
Plotkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-395; Erdmann v Santam Insurance 
Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C); De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34; Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 
2009 2 SA 94 (SCA). 
32  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4 hereunder. 
33  Pont 1940 THRHR 164; Price 1952 THRHR 61; Boberg 1971 SALJ 424; Claasen 1984 THRHR 
440; Neethling 2003 TSAR 783; Carpenter 2003 SAPL 258; Dendy 1990 SALJ 156; Burchell 1999 
SALJ 730; Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 3; Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 12 
March 2015). 
34  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4 hereunder. 
35  Ibid. 
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perspective. The underlying objectives of this study are fourfold: firstly, it provides a 
brief historical background to the need for the action for loss of support, thereby 
creating a powerful tool for understanding the protection of the dependants and the 
inevitability of the action. Secondly, the study establishes the traditional values in the 
action of dependants; assesses the extent to which the South African courts and 
legislature have provided an affirmation of indigenous values in the dependency action; 
and provides a basis for the incorporation of the traditional African values of the action 
of dependants into our legal system. Thirdly, it provides a detailed examination of the 
action for loss of support on a comparative level, as well as the various provisions that 
regulate this remedy. Finally, the study considers some important principles that South 
Africa should bear in mind in its development of the action’s jurisprudence within a 
comparative African context. 
 
1.3 Comparative perspective 
Since the action of dependants for loss of support does not appear to have been 
comprehensively researched by a wide judicial and legislative interpretation in South 
Africa recently,36 this study provides an opportunity to compare South Africa with two 
developing countries within the Southern Africa region, namely Botswana and Lesotho, 
as well as a developed country such as Australia. This is important because it is 
imperative to note certain principles established in other countries with regard to this 
action. A comparative analysis is a valuable mechanism for legal harmonisation, in the 
sense that it provides consistent information to be used in formulating new common 
solutions that might attest to be effective in practice. It could also assist to promote a 
                                            
36  The last comprehensive study was conducted by Boezaart (previously Davel): see Davel 
Afhanklikes (1987) 50 available at https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 
15 March 2015). 
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better understanding of the situation in one’s own country and benefit in a proper 
assessment of the system globally. It could also help in the interpretation and 
enforcement of the protection of dependants’ rights. In addition, whenever there is a 
troublesome issue37 within the action for loss of support because of the unlawful and 
negligent death of the breadwinner, such a problem could be resolved by means of a 
comparative study. 
 
The experiences in Botswana, Lesotho and Australia may be useful in informing South 
Africa of the future consequences of dependants’ claims for loss of support. For the 
above reasons, a comparative study of the relevant legal provisions regarding the 
dependants’ action in these three countries is undertaken. The action of dependants 
for loss of support in Botswana, Lesotho and Australia is investigated because like 
South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho have a dual legal system that acknowledges the 
coexistence or simultaneity of both common law and customary law. Akin to South 
Africa, Botswana and Lesotho have a diversity of ethnic or indigenous groups, and the 
indigenous people of both countries are in the majority. The manner in which these two 
systems operate together in Botswana and Lesotho is investigated in this study, in 
order to determine how they are applied in practice and if there is any lesson the South 
African legislature can learn from these systems.38 Similar to South Africa, Australia is 
a multicultural society, and the socio-economic circumstances in Australia and South 
Africa are similar in many respects. Customary law also plays a great role in Australia. 
The study will explore how Australia dealt with the customary law action of dependants 
                                            
37  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4 hereunder. 
38  Quansah https://www.pulapulapula.co.uk/ (accessed on 18 March 2015); Dube 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/lesotho.htm (accessed on 18 March 2015). 
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and whether the Australian approach could be beneficial to the South African 
legislature.39 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
1.4.1 Introduction 
This section addresses and highlights the complexities and problematic aspects of the 
action of dependants for loss of support. It analyses the deficits of the action and 
suggests progression, alternatives and interventions. 
 
1.4.2 Analysis, rationale and motivation for the research study 
This study is motivated by the fact that little in-depth research has recently been 
conducted on this topic, and it is an increasingly topical theme in South Africa.40 
Professor Trynie Boezaart has done groundbreaking work on the historical research 
of the action in the eighties.41 The most recent contributions were made by Professors 
Johann Neethling42 and Trynie Boezaart, in the form of a note publication and keynote 
address.43 They focused on the background of the action and on obtaining an 
understanding of the current application of the action for loss of support. These 
contributions have delivered a very good foundation for moving forward in the 21st 
century, with a better cognizance or an increased awareness of potential difficulties, 
particularly in Africanising the action for loss of support. The writing of this thesis is 
                                            
39  Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fao (accessed on 18 
March 2015). 
40  Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2009 2 SA 278 (SCA); Minister of Safety & Security v Van 
Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Dlikilili v 
Federated Insurance Co Ltd 1983 2 SA 275 (C); Mokwena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Zulu v Minister 
of Justice 1956 2 SA 128 (N); Pasela v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van Suid-Afrika 1967 1 
SA 339 (W); Fosi v RAF 2008 4 SA 560 (C). 
41  Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 50-51 available at https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 
(accessed on 18 March 2015). 
42  Neethling 2009 THRHR 298. 
43  See fn 41 above. 
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also motivated by the following interesting, but sometimes critical, complicated and 
unsolved observations and legal problems/issues in respect of the action for loss of 
support, which are addressed in the study: 
 
1.4.2.1 Problem 1: Vested rights 
The first dilemma concerns the question as to whether a claim for damages for loss of 
support arising out of the unlawful and negligent death of the breadwinner is 
necessarily a dependant’s action, or whether, in some circumstances, such a claim 
must take the form of a breadwinner’s action instead. This is a highly debated question 
within the action of dependants for loss of support. It leads to differences of opinion 
amongst legal writers, court outcomes and other legal systems. This raises the 
following questions: Why are the views and legal systems deviating on this question? 
Can an all-inclusive approach be adopted in this regard? Which possible claimants or 
dependants are excluded if the approach followed is that it is a breadwinner’s action? 
How is this uncertainty managed under customary law? The question of vested rights 
given by the action has not been authoritatively decided. The issue is thus whether a 
claim for damages for loss of support arising out of the unlawful and negligent death 
of the breadwinner is based on the infringement of the rights of the breadwinner or the 
rights of the dependants?44 
 
 
 
                                            
44  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575; Union Government (Minister of 
Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202; Senior NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 
SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 468 (D); Santam v Fondo 
1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis 
v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 
(SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Brooks v Minister of Safety & 
Security 2009 2 SA 278 (SCA); Boberg 1971 SALJ 425; Pont 1940 THRHR 165; Price 1952 
THRHR 61; Claasen 1984 THRHR 441; Neethling 2003 TSAR 785; Carpenter 2003 SAPL 259. 
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1.4.2.2 Problem 2: Injured breadwinner 
Another very important and interesting uncertainty is the question as to whether the 
dependants of a breadwinner who is injured (not killed) in a wrongful and culpable 
manner should be able, as in the case of death, to claim for loss of support with the 
Aquilian action.45 There is a strong division with regard to the judicial pronouncements: 
on the one hand, there are decisions that grant the Aquilian action to the dependants 
of an injured breadwinner, who has a duty to support them.46 The decision in De Vaal 
v Messing47 provides support to the opposite view. The policy reason why the 
extension of liability is sometimes refused where the breadwinner is injured, but not 
killed, is that it would impose an additional burden on the defendant (wrongdoer), which 
would be unwarranted.48 
 
The questions that immediately come to mind are the following: Would the refusal to 
extend the remedy to cases where the breadwinner is injured, but not killed, constitute 
an unjustified limitation of the actions of dependants for loss of support? Would it not 
be in the public interest to pursue a more comprehensive approach to the dependants’ 
action? In other words, is all heads of damage caused to a dependant by reason of the 
unlawful injury of his or her breadwinner actionable by means of the Aquilian action? 
Furthermore, to what extent can liability extend, without imposing excessive burdens 
upon the defendant? From a customary law perspective, the idea of unlimited liability 
is reasonable.49 Can the African perspective of unlimited liability be authenticated in 
light of our constitutional outlook? 
                                            
45  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 22; De Vaal v 
Messing 1938 TPD 34. 
46  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56; Plotkin v Wester Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-
395; Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C). 
47  1938 TPD 34. 
48  RAF v Shabangu 2005 1 SA 265 (SCA) par 18. 
49  Bennett Customary law (2004) 121. 
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1.4.2.3 Problem 3: Classes of dependants 
In South Africa, there is an unlimited circle of persons entitled to sue for loss of support 
where their breadwinner was unlawfully and negligently killed.50 A claim for loss of 
support is based upon the maintenance obligation of the deceased breadwinner in lieu 
of a relationship of dependency.51 Typical examples of such relationships of 
dependency would include parent and child, husband and wife, grandparents and 
grandchildren, and brothers and sisters.52 The law of wrongful death in Botswana, 
Lesotho and Australia tends to define the class of eligible dependants narrowly.53 The 
wrongful death remedy provides for exclusive classes of beneficiaries, thereby limiting 
recovery to those classes of dependants.54 The comparative countries vary in terms of 
who is authorised to be a plaintiff-dependant in the dependants’ action.55 The South 
African judiciary has recently broadened the class of dependants entitled to bring the 
                                            
50  Fourways Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2008 4 SA 150 (SCA) 160 par 
21. 
51  Steynberg 2007 PER 1/PELJ 122 available at https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html 
(accessed on 18 March 2015); Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 51-53 available at 
https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 18 March 2015); Potgieter, 
Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 278 280. 
52  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 293 296. 
53  Steynberg 2007 PER 1/PELJ 122 available at https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html 
(accessed on 18 March 2015); Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 
(Western Australia); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern 
Australia); Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) 
Act 1974 (Northern Territories); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); 
s 83 of the Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 (Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment 
(Equality of Status) Act 2003 (Western Australia); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and 
De facto Relationships Act 2003 (Northern Territory); s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 
(Victoria); sch 1 of the Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); sch 2.3 
of the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales); s 23 and 
28(2) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory). 
54  Perre v Apand (Pty) Ltd 1999 164 ALR 606. 
55  Pannel v Fischer [1959] SASR 77 (FC); Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Assessment 
of damages in personal injury & wrongful death litigation: Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, Section 15C 
Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Report No 45, October 1983) 68–69; Jodaiken v Jodaiken 1978 
1 SA 784 (W); Fourie v Santam Insurance Ltd 1996 1 SA 63 (T); Senior v National Employers 
General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 
468 (D); Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (ZH); Union Government v Warneke 
1911 AD 657; Pike v Minister of Defence 1996 3 SA 127 (Ck); Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-
Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); 
De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34; Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Van Gool 1992 4 SA 61 
(A). 
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action for loss of support.56 In terms of the Black Law Amendment Act,57 a partner in a 
customary union is now entitled to claim damages for loss of support from a person 
who unlawfully and negligently caused the death of the other partner, or who is legally 
liable in respect of the death, provided the partner is not, at the time of death, a party 
to a subsisting marriage. In terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,58 a 
valid customary marriage that existed at the commencement of this Act is, for all 
purposes, recognised as a marriage. There are, however, some doubts whether a duty 
of support is owed to a parent by his or her child in customary law.59 
 
The question that must be answered is whether the expansion of the eligible class of 
dependants has reached its final stages, or whether within an African context, the true 
circle of family spreads so wide that it becomes an open-ended class of persons? On 
the other hand, would this unlimited circle of persons entitled to sue for loss of support 
not lead to a widespread abuse of the action? 
 
1.4.2.4 Problem 4: Damages claimable under the dependency action 
The fundamental function of the dependants’ action for loss of support is compensation 
– an attempt, as far as money can, to place a claimant-dependant in the position that 
                                            
56  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53; Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 
1911 AD 657; Satchwell v President of the RSA 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & 
Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v DG, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 BCLR 
463 (CC); Robinson v Volks [2004] 2 All SA 61 (C); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident 
Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (A); Mlisane v South African Eagle Insurance 1996 3 SA 36 (C); Zimnat Insurance v 
Chawanda 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006; Paixăo and another v RAF 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA). 
57  s 31 of Act 76 of 1963. 
58  s 2(1) & (2) of Act 120 of 1998. 
59  Fosi v RAF 2008 3 SA 560 (C); [2007] ZAWCHC 8; Seleka v RAF 2016 4 SA 445 (GP). See also 
Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 327-328; Jacobs v RAF 2010 3 SA 263 (SE); JT v RAF 2015 
1 SA 609 (GJ) par 26; Petersen v South British Insurance Co Ltd 1967 2 SA 235 (C); Anthony and 
Another v Cape Town City Council 1967 4 SA 445 (A); Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 
1988 4 SA 626 (C) Wigham v British Traders Insurance Co Ltd 1963 3 SA 151 (W); Tutubala v RAF 
[2015] ZAGPJHC 149; Osman v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 517; 2015 6 SA 74 (GP); Gesina v RAF 
[2017] ZAGPPHC 188. 
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he or she would have been in, but for the wrongdoer’s unlawful and negligent act.60 
Despite the fact that loss of support includes all the financial contributions that the 
breadwinner would have made to his or her dependants over his lifetime or that of 
his/her dependants, whichever is shorter, not all damage caused due to the unlawful 
and negligent death of the breadwinner can be recoverable by the dependency action 
for loss of support. Compensation for unlawful deprivation of parental support has 
remained limited to specific loss of financial contributions (patrimonial/pecuniary 
interests only), which the breadwinner would have made to the dependants if he or she 
was alive.61 However, the disadvantage resulting from the unlawful death of a 
breadwinner encompasses more than termination of a restricted source of financial 
maintenance.62 The South African law does not allow a pecuniary claim for loss of 
savings or loss of inheritance to be taken into account in dependency claims, whereas 
Australian law expressly allows loss of savings or inheritance to be taken into 
account.63 Whether the South African dependency action should be developed to 
include loss of savings or inheritance needs to be investigated further. 
 
The awarding of damages covering non-material aspects of parental care is another 
problem relating to the action of dependency that remains unsolved. The ideal 
measure of damages64 is that which leads to the most comprehensive compensation 
                                            
60  De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 
386 393; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
61  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 7.5.4.2; Parker & Zaal 2016 THRHR 146; 
M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
62  Parker & Zaal 2016 THRHR 146; M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
63  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for wrongful death (Issues Paper WP 
No 56 June 2002); De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v 
Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393. 
64  A formula for determining monetary damages or a way to compute damages that are to be awarded 
to claimants: see Webster's New World Law Dictionary (2010) 
https://www.yourdictionary.com/measure-of-damage (accessed on 23 July 2017). Quantum of 
damages appears to be the preferred term in legal circles for the measure of damages, or amount 
of damages, and measure of damages will be interpreted to refer to the method to quantify the 
damages in this study. 
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possible.65 In other words, when assessing damages, concern should be had to all 
losses flowing from the death, including both patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
damage.66 Non-patrimonial losses as a head of damage under the dependency action 
are not recognised in South Africa. Australia, which has similar legislation, expressly 
allows non-pecuniary losses to be taken into account in a dependency claim.67 
Whether there is a need to bring South African law at par with the position in Australia, 
will be investigated. 
 
Furthermore, compensation in this area is by nature hypothetical, necessitating the 
courts to evaluate a deceased-breadwinner’s capability to provide for his or her 
dependants if he or she had not died. The extent of ambiguity lies in the extensive 
variety of possible legitimate opinions about how the future would unfold.68 For 
instance, in relation to loss of future support, the deceased breadwinner’s prospective 
health, life expectancy, duration of working life, future income and possibility of 
promotion or redundancy, personal expenditure and family contributions have to be 
determined by the courts. The mathematical model for the calculation of the present 
value of loss of financial support due to wrongful and negligent death is noticeably 
absent from the statutes (legislative guidelines) for the assessment and calculation of 
the said compensation, which may result in some dependants being under-
compensated.69 
                                            
65  Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer en die “once-and-for-all” reël (1977) 8 46 93 108 125-6 227 242 
250 279 301 304. 
66  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 6.2; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) par 2.3.2. 
67  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for wrongful death (Issues Paper WP 
No 56 June 2002); De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v 
Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393. 
68  Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
69  Burchell Delict (1993) 238; McKerron Delict (1971) 151-153; Howroyd & Howroyd 1958 SALJ 67; 
Boberg 1964 SALJ 149; Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A); Waring & Gillow 
Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W); 
Victor NO v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C) 120C. 
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Heads of damage claimable under the dependency action includes, but is not limited 
to, past loss of income, pre-death medical expenses, non-patrimonial losses, loss of 
support and funeral expenses suffered by both the breadwinner and the dependants. 
For purposes of this study, although the thesis mostly speaks of the dependency action 
for loss of support, the discussion on damage claimable under the dependency action 
will be limited to non-patrimonial damage, loss of support and funeral expenses as they 
are the most commonly occurring damage claimable under the dependency action and 
it is also where recent legal developments have taken place. Although past loss of 
income suffered by the breadwinner and medical expenses due to the injury of the 
breadwinner could sometimes be incurred by the dependants, these heads of damage 
would not be discussed under this study as they do not easily and squarely fit under 
claims by dependants. 
 
1.4.2.5 Problem 5: Social security legislative framework 
Several statutes provide for the recovery of loss of support where the breadwinner was 
wrongfully and unlawfully killed. The current leading social security legislative 
framework covering death claims or dependency action for loss of support in South 
Africa consists of the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF Act),70 Road Accident Fund 
Amendment Act (RAFAA),71 Compensation of Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
(COIDA or COID Act),72 and the proposed Road Accident Fund Benefit Scheme 
(RABS) Bill.73 While the fault-based Road Accident Fund (RAF or Fund) and 
                                            
70  Act 56 of 1996. 
71  Act 19 of 2005. 
72  Act 130 of 1993 as amended by the Compensation of Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Amendment Act 61 of 1997 (COIDAA). 
73  Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017 - Government Gazette No. 36138. The initial RABS Bill, 
called the Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2013 and its Explanatory Memorandum were 
published for comments in Government Gazette No. 36138 dated 08 February 2013 and revised 
following consideration of public comments. The revised Bill, Regulations and Rules were published 
for comment on 9 May 2014. The Minister of Transport intends introducing the Road Accident 
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Compensation Commissioner share their goal of compensating dependants for the 
incredible loss of an unlawful and negligent death with the dependants’ action for loss 
of support, the compensation in terms of the RAF Act, RAFAA and COIDA is limited to 
death as a result of a motor vehicle accident74 and work-related accidents and/or 
diseases,75 respectively.   
 
The methods76 of calculating the loss of support in terms of the RAF legislations and 
COIDA differ from those used in the law of delict, as well as amongst the social security 
legislations and the proposed RABS. The RAF Act was amended by the RAFAA.77 The 
constitutionality and legality of the RAFAA were unsuccessfully challenged in the 
Constitutional Court,78 especially in light of the fact that the victims are required to 
waive their right to litigate against the wrongdoer and to have their compensation 
limited to a prescribed amount. The RAF Act allowed the dependants of the victim of a 
road accident to claim damages from the RAF in full. The RAF (Fund) was liable for 
the unlimited actual loss of support. The wrongdoer was still liable for compensation 
not covered by the RAF compensation system.79 In terms of the RAFAA, the 
                                            
Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017 in Parliament during 2017 in terms of National Assembly Rule No.241 
(1)(b). RABS is intended to “replace the current fault-based system administered by the Road 
Accident Fund (RAF), which often results in extensive and costly litigation, prolonged claims 
finalization and high administrative costs. Under RABS, fault will not be considered on the part of 
the claimant or other persons involved in the road accident. The focus will essentially be on how 
the claimant is immediately assisted. A no-fault scheme will create a new era of socio-economic 
balance and will also remove the unintended negative consequences and financial burden on the 
families of the wrongdoer.” Not much development regarding this Bill has taken place, other than 
to mention that the National Assembly put the Bill to a vote on Tuesday, 4 December 2018 and 
many political parties staunchly opposed it. Consequently, the decision on whether the Road 
Accident Benefit Scheme (RABS) will replace the Road Accident Fund (RAF) was postponed to 
2019 – see Meyer 2018 TimesLive (online).  
74  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 2 16 23. 
75  See s 1(1) of the COIDA. 
76  See RAF v Sweatman [2015] ZASCA 22; [2015] 2 All SA 679 (SCA); 2015 6 SA 186 (SCA). 
77  Act 19 of 2005. 
78  Law Society of South Africa and others v Minister for Transport and another [2010] ZACC 25; 2011 
1 SA 400 (CC); 2011 2 BCLR 150 (CC). 
79  The wrongdoer could still be sued for the balance of the damages of the claimant and for the costs 
of the reparation for the damages to the motor vehicle, etc. 
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wrongdoer is absolved from all liability and the annual loss of support cannot exceed 
the amount published in the Government Gazette. This amount is currently capped at 
R273 86380 per annum per breadwinner,81 irrespective of the actual loss. Subsequent 
to the RAF Amendment Act of 2005, the Minister of Transport published a draft bill for 
RABS,82 which will replace the RAF in the near future. Unlike the RAF legislations, 
RABS is a “no-fault benefit system”, which means, the guilty parties (wrongdoers), their 
victims or dependants of their victims, are all entitled to the same benefits. Regardless 
of who was at fault, if the wrongdoer is injured or killed in a road accident, the 
wrongdoer and his or her dependants will be able to claim, as well as the victim and 
his or her dependants.83  
 
Social security legislations dealing with the dependency action are fragmented and 
lack universality, despite their common objective of protecting the dependants of a 
deceased, who was unlawfully and negligently killed. In South Africa, there is no 
specific statutory law dealing with the dependants’ action for loss of support and funeral 
expenses. Although there is an interrelationship amongst the legislations and they 
address similar issues, major differences exist. There is no uniform approach in the 
assessment of "damage" suffered by the dependants, and the awarding of benefit 
structures and entitlements, is seen as one of the greatest hurdles to overcome in 
addressing this matter. A lack of alignment between the legislations may lead to 
duplication of payments, which could seriously reduce the financial soundness of the 
respective public insurance systems, thereby putting strain on the revenues from which 
                                            
80  As at 31 October 2018, see National Government Gazette vol 297 no 41996, board notice 145/2018 
dated 26 October 2018. 
81  See s 17(4)(c) of the RAFAA 19 of 2005. 
82  Notice 98 of 2013 in Government Gazette No. 36138 dated 08 February 2013. 
83  See Department of Transport's website: https://www.transport.gov.za/ (accessed on 15 March 
2017). 
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social securities are paid. This study evaluates the effectiveness of all three-road 
accident legislations for the common law action for loss of support and the action 
against the Compensation Commissioner. It also examines the impact of the changes 
in terms of the RAFAA, and the proposed changes in terms of the RABS, Bill on future 
claims by the dependants of victims of motor vehicle accidents. It is challenges such 
as those presented above84 which have perplexed and baffled our courts and given 
rise to sometimes eccentric and conflicting decisions, which are the basis of this study. 
This study addresses, in some detail, all of the abovementioned problem questions in 
respect of the action of dependants for loss of support, along with a review of the 
literature in this regard. It also refers to the customary law perspective and the influence 
that the Constitutions85 of all four countries had on the dependants’ action. This study 
does not seek to provide an exhaustive list of all relevant legal sources, but is 
undertaken in the hope that in any future unification of the legal systems, the 
contribution of the customary law of dependency action may be incorporated. 
 
1.5 Limitation underlying the study 
This thesis is limited by being pinioned in African jurisprudence, which has scarce 
written material. Generally, there is little written information available on customary law. 
The scope is also restricted by the fact that the effect of the judicial and legislative 
interventions has been the adoption of common law principles as a way of addressing 
customary law challenges based on the action of dependants and led to the 
assumption that customary law made no provision for the law on the action of 
dependants. 
 
                                            
84  See chapter 1 of this thesis, paras 1.4.2-1.4.2.5 above. 
85  Constitution; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, 1900; Constitution of Botswana, 1966; 
Constitution of Lesotho, 1993. 
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1.6 Research design and methodology 
The methodology followed in this study comprises a comparative, descriptive and 
exploratory research approach that is used and analysed in order to achieve the 
objectives of this thesis. This is the approach commonly applied in the human sciences, 
including law. This study is mainly a literature study based largely on the Constitutions, 
legislation, legal textbooks, journal articles, court decisions and non-legal literature on 
customary law, culture or literature. Yet, it is not constrained to this form of research. 
There is some focus on newspaper articles and information from the World Wide Web 
address. The legal comparative research method sets consistent features of different 
legal regimes into perspective, and is used to obtain new knowledge and insight. 
Literature study 
Insofar as the literature study is concerned, a detailed review of the literature on the 
action of dependants is conducted, in order to be able to outline the existing status of 
the action. The intention of the literature study is to establish a theoretical framework 
for the action, discover basic description of the theory, ascertain and learn the primary 
dimensions of the dependants’ action in the literature, and integrate these dimensions 
into a framework. Literature with reference to foreign countries is also scrutinised for a 
comprehensive study of various applications of the action. The literature study also 
provides an orientation to research already piloted within the field of study, as well as 
a perspective on the most current research pertinent to the dependency action. During 
the literature study, the ideas, views and perspectives of various legal researchers and 
authors are compared and evaluated. Other legal researchers will be able to make use 
of this study due to its investigative, reconnoitre and explanatory nature. The findings, 
recommendations and conclusions in this study may serve as a guide to legal 
practitioners and the judiciary on how to apply the action of dependants correctly. 
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 World Wide Web 
Furthermore, reliable information from the World Wide Web is beneficial to this study, 
as this is a dynamic topic, with developments that took place that are vital to the study. 
To ensure the independence of the study and keep in mind that not all information 
reported by governments may be an accurate reflection of the issues on the ground, 
their reports are tested with information from established institutions, such as research 
papers and publications of non-governmental organisations on the action of 
dependants. 
 
1.7 Exposition of chapters 
On completion of the research and collection of the necessary data, the collected 
material is integrated and coordinated, so that the facts and research can speak for 
themselves. The thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis lays out the contextual, objectives and the research approach 
used in this study by providing an outline for the action of dependants from a 
comparative African perspective. It also contains the problem statement, literature 
review, the assumption raised as well as the research design and methodology. It also 
summaries the chapters that make up this study. Furthermore, this chapter attempts 
to identify the contribution of this study to existing knowledge about the action of 
dependants for loss of support and other related losses from an African perspective. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the origin and history of the action of dependants for loss of 
support in general. One way to shed some light on the action of dependants for loss of 
support is to look at the origin of the rule, as well as how history, legislation and the 
courts have interpreted it. The injustices of the earlier conceptions and confusions of 
the action must be well documented, in order for one to understand its present-day 
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uncertainties. In other words, before one can begin to understand the reasons for the 
action of dependants for loss of support and its application, it is imperative to 
understand why different countries have reached a point where there is a need for the 
action in the first place. The best place to start for an understanding of the action would 
be with a discussion on the origin and history of the dependants’ action. Such a 
discussion helps the reader to understand why the action has become a necessary 
tool to redress and protect the rights of dependants whose breadwinner has been 
wrongfully and negligently killed. This action stems from the Germanic customary 
law.86 
 
In this chapter, a clear understanding of the common law position, how this action 
found application in Germanic customary law, and its incorporation into the South 
African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian laws, is explored. It becomes necessary to 
provide a brief review of the literature and case law of all four countries, as well as the 
position of the common law. Therefore, this chapter lays the foundation for the action 
of dependants for loss of support in common law, Germanic customary law, and the 
law in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Australia. The action of dependants for 
loss of support is a complicated mixture of case law and statutes. In addition, this 
chapter examines in detail a range of legally recognised sources that give rise to the 
action for loss of support, in particular various sections of the Acts in the different 
countries. The reason for this is twofold: firstly, it provides the reader with an 
understanding of various provisions that regulate the dependency action, and 
secondly, it demonstrates where these countries have explicitly provided for the action 
                                            
86  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 
614; Saitowitz v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1962 3 SA 443 (W) 446. 
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in their legislations. Lastly, the influence of the Constitutions of the different countries 
on the action for loss of support is discussed. 
 
In Chapter 3, attention is paid to the principles applicable to the action for loss of 
support. The reality of the action of dependants for loss of support is very complex, 
both in theory and in practice. To make this delicate and heart-rending issue more 
easily applicable, it becomes necessary to distinguish the basic concepts and legal 
rationale of the action from the common law, as well as many specific laws and 
practices that have developed under the action of dependency. A balanced analysis of 
this subject is done using basic knowledge of various aspects relating to the action for 
loss of support. For instance, what is the action for loss of support? What is the nature 
of the action of dependants? What is the purpose of the action? How does the purpose 
of the action intersect with the good of the legal system of the four countries? In other 
words, what is its place in the legal system? Have we reached the stage where this 
legal remedy has outgrown its troublesome past to fit into the structure of the modern 
South African law of delict?87 
 
In addition, this chapter discusses the requirements for a claim for loss of support.88 
The chapter also examines some of the problems relating to the action of dependants 
for loss of support. The language of the action was not well chosen, and its ultimate 
meaning was left largely in the hands of judicial interpretation. As a result, the action 
is enshrouded by several uncertainties. For instance, the question of vested rights 
given by the action has not been authoritatively decided. The issue here is whether a 
                                            
87  See fn 41 above. 
88  Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 430; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Funds 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1326; Du Plessis v RAF 2004 
1 SA 359 (SCA) 370; Metiso v RAF 2001 3 SA 1142 (T) 1148-1149. 
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claim for damages for loss of support arising out of the unlawful and negligent death 
of the breadwinner is necessarily a dependant’s action, or whether, in some 
circumstances, such a claim must take the form of a breadwinner’s action instead.89 
This is a highly debated question within the action of dependants. It leads to differences 
of opinion amongst legal writers,90 court outcomes91 and other legal systems.92 Some 
authors and cases believe that a claim for loss of support is based on the wrongful and 
culpable causing of damage to the dependant himself.93 Other authors and cases hold 
that the claim for the action of dependant is based on a delict committed against the 
breadwinner.94 
 
Another issue that is examined in chapter 3 is whether the dependants of a 
breadwinner who is injured (not killed) in a wrongful and culpable manner should, as 
in the case of death, be able to claim for loss of support with the Aquilian action.95 
                                            
89  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575; Union Government (Minister of 
Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202; Senior NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 
SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 468 (D); Santam v Fondo 
1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis 
v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 
(SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Boberg 1971 SALJ 423; Pont 
1940 THRHR 163; Price 1952 THRHR 60; Claasen 1984 THRHR 439; Neethling 2003 TSAR 783; 
Carpenter 2003 SAPL 257. 
90  Dendy 1990 SALJ 157; Burchell 1999 SALJ 731. 
91  Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A); Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Victor NO 
1986 1 SA 601 (A); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); 
Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Brooks v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA). 
92  Carver QUTLJJ 7; Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 18 March 2015). 
93  Neethling 2009 THRHR 297-299; Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 348; 
Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 278 292; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 19; Gibson 
Wille’s principles (1977) 514; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 837-838; Brooks 
v Minister of Safety & Security 2007 4 ALL SA 1389 (C) 1394-1400; Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 
421 (SCA) 430; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1326; Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 222; s 2(1B) 
of Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
94  Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 50-51; Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 345; 
Boberg Delict: Aquilian liability (1984) 728; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 283 299; 
Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97-98; Plotkin v Western Assurance 
Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394; Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409; 
Harde v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1974 2 SA 109 (E) 114D. 
95  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299-300; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 22. 
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There is a strong division of judicial pronouncements in this regard: on the one hand, 
there are decisions that grant the Aquilian action to the dependants of an injured 
breadwinner who has a duty to support them.96 The decision in the case of De Vaal v 
Messing97 provides support, however, for the opposite view. The policy reason why the 
extension of liability is sometimes refused where the breadwinner is injured, but not 
killed, is that it would impose an additional burden on the defendant (wrongdoer), which 
would be unwarranted.98 
 
A further issue relates to the different classes of persons (dependants) who qualify to 
claim under the action for loss of support. Chapter 3 also scrutinises the circle of 
eligible dependants under the dependency action. The comparative countries vary in 
terms of who is authorised to be a plaintiff in the dependants’ action.99 In South Africa, 
there is an unlimited circle of persons entitled to sue for loss of support where their 
breadwinner was unlawfully and negligently killed.100 A claim for loss of support is 
based upon the maintenance obligation of the deceased breadwinner in lieu of a 
relationship of dependency.101 Typical examples of such relationships of dependency 
would include parent and child, husband and wife, grandparents and grandchildren, 
and brothers and sisters.102 The law of wrongful death in Botswana, Lesotho and 
                                            
96  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56; Plotkin v Wester Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-
395; Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C). 
97  1938 TPD 34. 
98  RAF v Shabangu 2005 1 SA 265 (SCA) par 18. 
99  Pannel v Fischer [1959] SASR 77 (FC); Queensland Law Reform Commission: The assessment of 
damages in personal injury & wrongful death litigation: Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, Section 15C 
Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Report No 45, October 1983) 68–69. 
100  Fourways Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2008 4 SA 150 (SCA) 160 par 
21; s 31 of the Black Law Amendment Act 76 of 1963; s 2(1) & (2) of the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
101  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) 278 280; Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 51-53; Steynberg 2007 PER 1/PELJ 123 available at 
https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2015). 
102  Ibid. 
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Australia tends to define the class of eligible dependants narrowly.103 The wrongful 
death remedy provides for exclusive classes of beneficiaries, thereby limiting recovery 
to those classes of dependants.104 
 
The action of dependants for loss of support has stimulated a continuing discussion 
regarding the legal, moral and economic questions arising from the protection of 
dependants within our society.105 The action is clearly for economic loss as far as it 
relates to dependency. The goal of the dependant action is to provide the dependants 
of the deceased, who was unlawfully and negligently killed, with a sum of money 
sufficient to supply them with material benefits of the same standard and duration that 
they would have received from the deceased, had he or she not been killed in this 
manner.106 The law concerning the recovery of damages occasioned by the death of a 
                                            
103  Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 18 March 2015); Supreme Court Act 
1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (New 
South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (Northern Territories); Fatal Accidents Act 
1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); s 83 of the Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 
(Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 (Western Australia); s 60 
of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto Relationships Act 2003 (Northern Territory); s 
4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); s 1 of the Relationships (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); s 2.3 of the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment 
Act 1999 (New South Wales); s 23 & 28(2) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital 
Territory); Carver QUTLJJ 1-27. 
104  Perre v Apand (Pty) Ltd 1999 164 ALR 606; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 
(CC); Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 2005 5 SA 357 (W) 369. 
105  Rautenbach 2008 EJCL 1 available at https://www.ejcl.org (accessed on 18 March 2015); Davel 
Afhanklikes (1987) 51 available at https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 
18 March 2015); Neethling 2009 THRHR 300; Peart 1983 CILSA 37; Mqeke 1980 De Rebus 597; 
Mafubelu 1981 De Rebus 573; Pienaar 2006 Stell LR 314-316; Clark 1999 SALJ 21; Dlamini 1984 
SALJ 347; Kerr 1956 73 SALJ 405; Mbodla 1999 SALJ 743. 
106  Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97; Victor v Constantia Ins Co Ltd 1985 
1 SA 118 (C) 119; Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 202 220-222; Santam Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 
SA 467 (A) 471-472; Santam Insurance Ltd v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 267; Santam v Henery 
1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 425-426; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission 
for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1324-1325; Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 2003 
3 SA 1098 (W) 1113-1114; Mankebe v AA Mutual Ins Association Ltd 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 198-199; 
Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 
1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 246; Milns v Protea Assurance 
Co Ltd 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1010; Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Verskeringsmaatskappy 
Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O) 463; Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (Z) 131; De Sales 
v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393; 
Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
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breadwinner, whose death was caused by the unlawful and negligent act of the 
wrongdoer, has progressed with economic problems.107 Despite the fact that loss of 
support includes all the financial contributions that the breadwinner would have made 
to his or her dependants over his lifetime or that of his dependants, whichever is 
shorter, not all heads of damage caused by the unlawful and negligent death of the 
breadwinner are recoverable through the action for loss of support. As stated above, 
the South African law does not allow a claim for loss of savings or loss of inheritance 
to be taken into account in dependency claims. 
 
This chapter also examines the mathematical model for calculation of the present value 
of loss of financial support due to the unlawful and negligent death and literature for 
the assessment and calculation of the said compensation. The compensation is 
speculative by nature, requires the courts to assess the deceased-breadwinner’s 
capacity to provide for his or her dependants, had he or she not been killed.108 This 
degree of uncertainty leads to a wide range of possible legitimate opinions about how 
the future could unfold109 and may result in some dependants being under-
compensated. Since Roman-Dutch jurists failed to offer sufficient assistance in the 
general principles of assessment of damage, the South African courts turned to English 
decisions in this regard.110 Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses the assessment and 
quantification of the proper amount of compensation (damages) in terms of the action 
of dependants for loss of support, together with a review of the literature on this topic.111 
 
                                            
107  Waring & Gillow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; De Jongh v Gunther 
1975 4 SA 78 (W); Victor NO v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C) 120C; McKerron 
Delict (1971) 151-153; Howroyd & Howroyd 1958 SALJ 67; Boberg 1964 SALJ 149. 
108  Burchell Delict (1993) 238; Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A). 
109  Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 18 March 2015). 
110  Erasmus 1975 THRHR 363. 
111  Steynberg 2007 PER 1/PELJ 122 available at https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html 
(accessed on 18 March 2015); Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 477-490. 
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Claims for loss of support giving rise to heads of damage have received the attention 
of the legislature. Chapter 5 of this study presents a very brief comparative overview 
of the current leading social security legislative frameworks covering death claims or 
the dependency action for loss of support in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia. Sources on social security policy in South Africa tend to focus on the social 
security aspect of social assistance to the poor, and often neglect the social security 
aspect of social insurance in respect of the dependency action for loss of support. This 
is also an accurate description of the status of discussions on social security policies 
or laws with regard to the dependency action for loss of support in Botswana, Lesotho 
and Australia. 
 
In all four jurisdictions studied, it seems that the only two sets of legislation where the 
dependency action can apply under social security (social insurance) are associated 
with road and workplace-related accidents. The perspective offered is therefore a 
relatively limited one, as the discussion focuses only on the important aspects related 
to a claim for loss of support, as outlined in legislations dealing with road and 
workplace-related accidents. Consequently, this study deals only with the Road 
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAF Act, as amended) and Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA, as amended), as 
examples of South African social security legislations that regulate and has had a huge 
influence on the assessment and quantification of compensation for loss of support in 
terms of the action of dependants. This includes changes brought about by the RAF 
Amendment Act (RAFAA),112 and the proposed Road Accident Benefit Scheme 
(RABS) Bill,113 examining the Bill’s influence on the future claim by the dependants of 
                                            
112  Act 19 of 2005. 
113  See fn 73 above. 
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the victims of motor vehicle accidents. This study also reviews and discusses the social 
security systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Australia, to the extent that they specifically 
relate to the claims for loss of support under the dependency action. Similar to South 
Africa, in Botswana,114 Lesotho115 and Australian law,116 compensation for death arises 
in a number of different areas of the law, including worker’s compensation and motor 
vehicle accidents legislation. The legislations provide for payment of compensation for 
depriving the dependants of support by wrongfully and negligently causing the death 
of their breadwinner either as a result of a work injury or disease, or motor vehicle 
accident. A brief overview of the relevant legislations in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia, providing for payment of compensation either as a result of a work injury or 
disease, or motor vehicle accident, to the extent as they specifically relate to the claim 
for loss of support, is provided and critical comments on these current systems is also 
presented. 
 
Findings and recommendations are often considered to be the most important part of 
a research study. Therefore, chapter 6 is dedicated exclusively to this topic. Chapter 
6 concludes the thesis by summarising the preceding chapters. It also encompasses 
                                            
114  Workers’ Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
115  Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; Order 26 of 1989 (motor vehicle compensation 
legislation); Ailola 1991 CILSA 367. 
116  See Comparison of workers' compensation arrangements in Australia 
https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/.../ComparisonWorkersCompensationArrangementsAusNZ
2011.doc (accessed on 8 August 2016); Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) (1987 Act); 
Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW); Workers 
Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW); Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 
(NSW); Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (MAI Act); s 18 of the Motor Accident Commission 
Act 1992 (the MAC Act) (SA); Motor Accident Commission 
https://www.audit.sa.gov.au/Publications/Annual-reports/2015-Reports/Annual-Report-by-
agency/Motor-Accident-Commission (accessed on 27 August 2016); Motor Vehicle (Third Party 
Insurance) Act 1943 (WA) sets out the scheme details; see Motor Injury Insurance 
https://www.icwa.wa.gov.au/motor-injury-insurance. (accessed on 27 August 2016); Motor 
Accidents Compensation Scheme (NT) https://www.tiofi.com.au/car-insurance/macc/.(accessed 
on 27 August 2016); Motor Accidents (Compensation) (“MAC”) Act (NT) 
https://www.ntmacc.com.au/GeneralInformation.pdf (accessed on 27 August 2016); s 4(3)(e)(ii) of 
Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT); s 5 of Compensation (Commonwealth Government 
Employees) Act 1971 (Cth); Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic). 
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the most important findings and recommendations, as well as conclusions reached in 
respect of the research questions. In addition, this chapter considers some of the 
principles that South Africa should take into account for the proper application of the 
action of dependants for loss of support. The aim of this approach is to provide useful 
guidelines and information to all persons involved in implementing the action of 
dependants for loss of support and other related losses. 
 
1.8 Terminology 
In order to simplify the text, consistent terms are used throughout the thesis. Some of 
these terms are explained in more detail below: 
● African law/customary law/indigenous law: These terms are used 
interchangeably and refer to the indigenous component of South African law that 
has survived through a series of adaptations since pre-colonial time. African law or 
customary law or indigenous law regulates the lives of the majority of African people 
in South Africa, and bears a close resemblance to its counterparts in other Southern 
African countries. Customary law is now legally recognised in South Africa.117  
● Civil union is a legally recognised union, similar to a marriage. Civil unions can 
often be referred to using other terms, such as a registered partnership or civil 
partnership. Civil unions have been established by law118 in many developed 
countries, in order to provide same-sex couples with rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities similar (or identical in some countries) to opposite-sex civil 
marriages. In some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, New Zealand, and Uruguay, 
civil unions are also open to opposite-sex couples. 
                                            
117  ss 33(2) 33(3) 35(3) of the Interim Constitution; ss 9 30 31 211(3) of the Constitution. 
118  ss 1 2(a) & (b) of Act 17 of 2006. 
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● Constitution: The Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa.119 Reference will 
be made to the 1993 interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. 
● Dependency action: A dependency claim arises when a breadwinner is killed by 
the wrongful or negligent act of another (the wrongdoer) and, as a result, the first 
and most common loss the deceased’s dependants suffer is loss of support,120 but 
other losses could also occur, namely funeral expenses, non-patrimonial losses, 
etcetera. 
● Tort Law/law of delict is a body of rights, obligations, and remedies that is applied 
by courts in civil proceedings, in order to provide relief for persons who have 
suffered harm from the wrongful acts of others. The person who sustains injury or 
suffers pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as the result of tortuous conduct is 
known as the plaintiff (dependant/breadwinner), and the person who is responsible 
for inflicting the injury and incurs liability for the damage is known as the defendant 
or tortfeasor (wrongdoer). The terms "delict" and "tort" are synonymous and 
interchangeable, with the only difference being that "delict" is used in European 
systems and those linked to Roman law (like South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho), 
while "tort" is used by systems based on English common law.121 
● Wrongful death is a claim in common law jurisdictions against a person who can 
be held liable for a death.122 The claim is brought in a civil action, usually by close 
relatives, as enumerated by statutes. Under common law, a dead person cannot 
bring a suit, and this created a legal loophole in which activities that resulted in a 
                                            
119  The interim Constitution; the Constitution. 
120  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; 
Millward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 AD; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A). 
121  Stewart & Stuhmacke Tort law (2009) 3-6; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 3-7. 
122  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for wrongful death (Issues Paper 
WP No 56 June 2002). 
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person's injury would result in civil sanction, but activities that resulted in a person's 
death would not. 
 
1.9 Chapter conclusion 
The observation is that more research still has to be done on the topic, and that this 
particular research thesis may become a theoretical foundation for further enquiry into 
the nature of the action of dependants from a comparative African perspective. As 
indicated above, the determination and addition of traditional values in 
African/customary/indigenous law pertaining to the dependency action will assist in the 
fair and consistent application of the dependency action. The knowledge and good 
understanding of these traditional values would be a valuable addition to our legal 
knowledge. It would undoubtedly provide insight into the resolution of problems that 
might be encountered under customary law in respect of the action. It would also be 
easier to appreciate the incorporation of the traditional values into the existing eccentric 
dependency action, which may eventually culminate in a single dependency action 
tailored to suit the whole nation and all its different cultures. 
 
The aim of this chapter was to outline a general overview of the study. It provided the 
background against which the research was conducted, thereby providing reasons for 
undertaking the research study, in the form of a problem statement and study 
objectives. It also discussed the research methodology used, as well as outlining the 
chapters that make up this study. Additionally, this chapter attempted to identify the 
contribution of this study to existing knowledge about the action of dependants for loss 
of support and other related losses from an African perspective. Consequently, the 
successful understanding of the action of dependants for loss of support is vital, and 
the best place to start would be with a discussion on the origin and history of the action. 
 34 
In chapter 2, attention is given to the history of the dependants’ action, as well as a 
range of legally recognised sources that could give rise to the rights and action for loss 
of support in the comparative countries, namely South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia, in order to elaborate on the outline created in this chapter.123 
                                            
123  Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE ACTION OF DEPENDANTS 
 
2.1 Importance of the historical development 
The dependency action for recovery of loss of support due to the unlawful and 
negligent killing of the breadwinner is by no means a twentieth century innovation.124 
Though it is an old legal action, very little can be found in the South African literature 
on its origin and history. Initially, it was denied,125 then it took place informally through 
the years,126 and later it was regulated by laws.127 A proper understanding of the history 
of the action of dependants is essential for the correct approach to problems 
encountered in the interpretation and modern-day application of this action. Much of 
its past application forms the basis of the action’s current application. This chapter 
reviews and discusses the historical background and interpretation of the dependants’ 
action. The aim of this chapter is to redress some of the action’s uncertainties and set 
the record straight. It also analyses the changes brought by the statutes providing for 
compensation in an action for wrongful and negligent death. In the discussion, 
reference is only made to those facts of historical importance and statutes that are 
directly relevant to aspects of the dependants’ action. 
 
2.2 Roman law 
The action of dependants for recovery of loss suffered due to the unlawful and 
negligent killing of a breadwinner was unknown in Roman law.128 There was no cause 
                                            
124  Du Bois Wille’s principles (2007) 1095. 
125  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.2 hereunder. 
126  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.3 hereunder. 
127  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.4 hereunder. 
128  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) par 12; Van 
Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 19; Boberg et al Law of persons and family (1999) 298; Evins v 
Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 837-838. 
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of action by or on behalf of the dependants of the breadwinner to recover for the loss 
sustained by them because of their breadwinner’s death. The deceased’s estate was 
also without a cause of action for the loss resulting from his death.129 The reason 
behind the denial of the dependency claim under Roman law is thought to have derived 
from two old common law maxims, which for centuries prevented any action for bodily 
injuries wrongfully inflicted on a person, and resulting in his death. These principles 
have common characteristics in their effect and are often confused in their application, 
but are not identical. They are in homine libero nulla corporis aestimatio fiery potest, 
meaning that the body of a free man cannot be estimated in money130 and actio 
personalis moritur cum persona, meaning that a personal action dies with the person 
(breadwinner or wrongdoer).131 
 
According to these principles, when a person dies, either suddenly or after an interval 
of time, as a consequence of the unlawful and negligent act of another, the wrongdoer 
could not be held liable by the victim’s estate for damage sustained by the victim before 
death, or for damage to his estate due to loss of life. The wrongdoer could also not be 
held liable by his or her dependants for loss of support resulting from his death.132 
Therefore, in Roman law, the dependants of a breadwinner who had been unlawfully 
and negligently killed could not obtain pecuniary or non-pecuniary redress, nor were 
his heirs or dependants in a better position.133 The negative consequences of the 
application of these principles were very broad and, judged by present standards, very 
                                            
129  Pollack 1931 SALJ 191. 
130  Feenstra 1972 Acta Juridica 227-228. 
131  Gibson Wille’s principles (1977) 513. 
132  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) par 12. 
133  Wessels Roman-Dutch law (2013) 698; Buckland Roman law (1966) 588-589; Palmer Law of delict 
(1970) 111. 
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harsh. In spite of the effect of barring the recovery of compensation for loss of support, 
neither the origins nor the basis of the maxims could be precisely fixed.134 
 
2.3 Roman-Dutch law 
However, a dependency claim for the recovery of compensation for loss occasioned 
by the wrongful and negligent killing of a breadwinner was available to the dependants 
in Roman-Dutch law.135 The exact origin of the action is uncertain and difficult to 
trace,136 but appears to have evolved under the influence of the customary Germanic 
law concerning the institution of zoengeld/manngeld/wergild and the concept of natural 
law, as formulated by medieval and sixteenth-century theologians.137 However, the 
Dutch writers of the eighteenth century overlooked this origin and regarded it as an 
Aquilian remedy extended by actio utiles, even though in Roman law, no compensation 
could be claimed for the life of a free human being.138 It is therefore under the influence 
of Roman-Dutch law that the present-day dependants’ action was developed, as an 
extension of the actio legis Aquiliae in Roman-Dutch law.139 
 
 
 
 
                                            
134  Pollack 1931 SALJ 191. 
135  Van der Merwe & Du Plessis Law of South Africa (2004) 275; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict 
(2015) 293; Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 306-307; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 
1 SA 608 (A); Victor v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C). 
136  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) paras 12 54 & 96. 
137  Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1968) 353; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 
292; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 19; Boberg et al Law of persons and family (1999) 298; 
Feenstra 1972 Acta Juridica 228. 
138  Buckland Roman law (1966) 588-589; Palmer Law of delict (1970) 111; Neethling & Potgieter Law 
of delict (2015) 292. 
139  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575 584-5; Union Government v 
Warneke 1911 AD 657 664-5, 671-2; Victor NO v Constantia Co 1985 1 SA 118 (C) 119; Santam 
Insurance Ltd v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (TkA) 267; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; Millward v Glaser 
1949 4 SA 931 AD. 
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2.4 South African law 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Modern law in South Africa recognises a dependant’s right and action to claim 
damages from the person responsible for his/her breadwinner’s death.140 The South 
African action of dependants consists, broadly speaking, of the system of Roman-
Dutch law, as developed by the decisions of our courts and supplemented by our 
legislatures.141 This right of the dependants to claim for loss of support is regarded as 
a form of relief flowing from an extended operation of the actio legis Aquiliae.142 This 
remedy has continued to evolve in South Africa during the 21st century through judicial 
pronouncements, and has kept abreast of the times.143 It was pointed out in Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund144 that the dependants’ action is a flexible 
remedy that needs to be adapted to modern conditions.145 The action is of a peculiar 
nature, in that it deviates from normal Aquilian principles,146 since the dependants’ 
rights are based on the loss that they themselves have suffered due to the death of the 
deceased-breadwinner, and they do not derive that right from the deceased as heirs.147 
In other words, the action does not derive from the deceased or his estate, instead the 
dependants institute the action in their own names. The action is based on the 
wrongful, culpable causing of damage to the dependants themselves.148 The nature 
and scope of the action of dependants is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this 
                                            
140  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) par 54. 
141  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) paras 12 54 & 96. 
142  Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 221; Millward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 (A) 941; Witham v Minister 
of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (ZH); Boberg et al Law of persons and family (1999) 303. 
143  Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Langemaat v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T) 316; Santam Bpk v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Du Plessis v RAF 
2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA). 
144  1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1325. 
145  Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) par 58(2). 
146  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292. 
147  Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 221. 
148  Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C)/2007 4 All SA 1389 (C) 1394-1400. 
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thesis. In the next section, an overview of the existing dependency action in South 
Africa is provided. 
 
2.4.2 Overview of the existing dependency action 
2.4.2.1 General 
South Africa has a number of dependency action sources149 in place, but these legal 
measures are fragmented, scattered and uncoordinated. One has to glean its nature, 
characteristics, scope and developments from the broad spectrum of legal sources 
existing in the country. The dependency action measures are governed by various 
constitutional, statutory and customary law provisions. These various sources of the 
dependency action are discussed below. 
 
2.4.2.2 Constitutional provisions 
The Constitution150 contains a variety of human rights provisions, and the following 
three fundamental rights are particularly relevant to the present study: 
 
2.4.2.2.1 The right to life 
The South African Constitution provides that everyone has the right to life.151 This 
inherent right is a moral principle based on the belief that a human being has the right 
to live and, in particular, should not be killed by another human being.152 The right to 
life is also contained in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),153 which provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person. Furthermore, Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
reads as follows: “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled 
                                            
149  For example: case law, customary law, legislation and the Constitution. 
150  The Constitution. 
151  s 11 of the Constitution. 
152  Agadoni https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/right-life (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
153  The UDHR is a milestone document in the history of human rights. It was established in 1958. 
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to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of life.” The framers of these two documents154 made a noble beginning in providing 
Africa with a mechanism for ensuring the continental promotion and protection of 
human rights in Africa, by providing a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-
operation among states and human beings. These two documents are referred to as 
worthy of due regard to the promotion of international co-operation, which aims at, 
amongst others, the promotion of respect for humans, especially in South Africa, with 
its previous repressive government during the era of apartheid.155 The system of 
apartheid was introduced in 1948 by the then governing National Party. It implemented 
a doctrine of separate development through legislation that enforced systems of racial 
segregation.156 It also encouraged oppression, hatred and disrespect for the life of an 
African human being or nation. The right to life incorporates the right to dignity, which 
provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected.157 The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the life of each 
individual member of the community is acknowledged, valued158 and treated with 
dignity. Therefore, no person’s life should be taken unlawfully and negligently. In other 
words, the right to life is in one sense antecedent to the dependency action and other 
rights159 contained in the Constitution. Without life, there cannot be a dependency 
action. It would not be possible to exercise the right to claim under the dependency 
action. Consequently, where a life has been taken wrongfully and unlawfully, the 
dependants of the deceased-breadwinner should be protected, secured and duly 
compensated. 
                                            
154  Universal Declaration of Human Rights and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
155  See Acheampong 2001 AHRLJ 185 200. 
156  Wall https://www.sahistory.org.za (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
157  s 10 of the Constitution. 
158  Agadoni https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/right-life (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
159  Bill of Rights - Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
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2.4.2.2.2 The right to social security 
Another important right in the Constitution is the right of access to social security and 
social services, which is expressly contained and provided for in the Constitution.160 
The principal provision is section 27(1)(c), which states that “everyone has the right of 
access to social security including if they are not able to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance”. Section 27(2) goes further to state that the 
government must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to social security 
and social assistance. While the above-mentioned section refers to social security and 
social assistance for everyone, section 28(1)(c) provides for the right of children to 
social services.161 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination puts an 
obligation on the State to afford everyone the right to social security.162 In the 
international context, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Act163 defines social security as the protection which 
society provides for its members through a series of public measures against economic 
and social distress due to the cessation or substantial reduction of earnings resulting 
from sickness, maternity leave, occupational injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age 
and death. These measures include the provision of medical care and subsidies for 
                                            
160  ss 27 & 28 of the Constitution. 
161  See Chapter 2 of the South African Human Rights Commission: Social security, social assistance 
and social services for children https://www.sahrc.org.za (accessed on 8 August 2016).  
162  Article 5(e) (iv) of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965. 
The Convention commits its members to the elimination of racial discrimination and the promotion 
of understanding among all races. The Convention was adopted and opened for signature by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 21 December 1965, and entered into force on 4 January 
1969. As of October 2015, it has 88 signatories and 177 parties. South Africa signed it in 1994 and 
ratified it in 1998. 
163  Act 102 of 1952. 
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families with children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)164 provides 
that every child has the right to benefit from social security, including social insurance. 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides that State parties should recognise the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance.165 The question here is: Can these provisions be invoked 
to protect dependants under the dependency action? The provisions on social security 
relate to the dependency action in the sense that it would be unacceptable for 
dependants of the deceased, who has been unlawfully and negligently killed, to be 
discriminated against with respect to benefitting in terms of the social security 
measures available to persons in the country. The answer is therefore in the 
affirmative. 
 
The South African Constitution appears to endorse the difference between “social 
insurance” and “social assistance”.166 Social assistance is the non-contributory and 
means-tested benefit provided by the State to people with disabilities, elderly people 
and children.167 In South Africa, various grants are available and payable in 
accordance with the Social Assistance Act.168 These include old-age grants, disability 
grants, foster care grants, care-dependency grants, and child support grants.169 Social 
insurance is the joint contribution made by employers and employees to pension or 
provident funds. Government may also contribute to social insurance covering 
                                            
164  The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) was ratified in 1995 by South Africa. 
165  See Chapter 6 - South African Human Rights Commission: Right to social security 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/4th_esr_chap_6.pdf (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
166  Millard 2008 AHRLJ 40; Olivier et al (eds) Social security: A legal analysis (2003) 23. 
167  See Chapter 6 - South African Human Rights Commission: Right to social security 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/4th_esr_chap_6.pdf (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
168  Act 13 of 2004. 
169  Millard 2008 AHRLJ 40. 
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accidents on the road and at work.170 The South African social insurance system has 
a fragmented collection of social protection legislation, which consists of retirement 
schemes,171 health insurance,172 workmen’s compensation,173 unemployment 
insurance (UIF),174 the Road Accident Fund (RAF)175 and the proposed Road Accident 
Benefit Scheme Bill (RABS).176 The various statutes on social security relevant to this 
study are discussed in par 2.4.4 below. Apart from the Road Accident Fund, these 
systems are all employment-based.177 The entitlement to benefits depends mainly on 
employee status.178 As stated, the Road Accident Fund is the only public social security 
scheme in South Africa that is not employment-based. This feature of the South African 
social security system is unique.179 The objective of the Fund, as stated in the Road 
Accident Fund Act,180 is to compensate any victim who sustained bodily injuries or loss 
of support through the negligent and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle. The social 
security provisions relate to the provisions on equality discussed hereunder. 
 
2.4.2.2.3 The right to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination 
Over the past twenty years, our Constitution, in terms of the equality clause,181 has 
supported remedies in dependency claims.182 The action of dependants for loss of 
support, which has long been a crucial mechanism for ensuring that the wrongdoer 
                                            
170  Chapter 6 - South African Human Rights Commission: Right to social security 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/4th_esr_chap_6.pdf (accessed on 8 August 
2016).  
171  Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
172  South Africa is in the process of introducing an innovative system of health care financing designed 
to pool funds to provide access to quality, affordable personal health for all South Africans – 
National Health Insurance: https://www.gov.za (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
173  Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
174  Unemployment Insurance (UIF) Act 63 of 2001. 
175  RAF Act 51 of 1996 as amended by the RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005. 
176  Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017 - Government Gazette No. 36138. 
177  Millard 2008 AHRLJ 41. 
178  Ibid. 
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does not escape accountability when he has violated the rights of dependants and the 
breadwinner, has been at the forefront of the constitutional equality injunctions.183 The 
equality clause in chapter 2 of the Constitution contains strong provisions on legal and 
social equality.184 Section 9 is in line with internationally recognised human rights law, 
but the provision is more detailed than, for example, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.185 Section 9(1) provides that “everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.186 Like the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, this section provides for freedom from discrimination. It provides that the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution should be 
safeguarded without discrimination on any ground, but specifically lists the following 
grounds: “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth”.187 The Constitution prohibits any law from including a discriminatory provision. 
In order to promote the achievement of equality, the Constitution instructs that 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories 
of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be adopted,188 and further that 
national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.189 
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Legislation includes any instrument having the force of law, made in exercise of a 
power conferred by a law, including customary law and any other unwritten rule of law 
or custom. These provisions relate to the right to life and social security, in the sense 
that it would be impossible to exercise equality if there was no human life, and it would 
be unacceptable for persons to be discriminated against by laws with respect to 
benefitting from the social security measures available to persons in the country. This 
provision supplements the provisions on the right to life and social security discussed 
above. In addition, these provisions are of enormous relevance to a large variety of 
social security benefits, such as those determined by reference to familial 
relationships, as such benefits may be challenged for treating different classes of 
parents, spouses and children differently. They may be of importance to widows and 
widowers' insurance benefits, which entitle a surviving spouse to his or her deceased 
spouse's primary old-age insurance benefit.190 
 
Based on equality of treatment, same-sex unions191 have been granted a claim for loss 
of support similar to that arising out of a marriage. The Supreme Court of Appeal has 
taken an incremental step to extend the action for loss of support to partners of same-
sex permanent life relationships, provided that a contractual duty to support the partner 
exists.192 The Civil Union Act193 was enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination 
against parties who are in homosexual relationships and wish to marry. The Act gives 
full recognition, essentially, to homosexual marriages. In Paixăo and another v Road 
Accident Fund,194 the Supreme Court of Appeal extended the dependant’s action to 
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surviving heterosexual domestic partners, and in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund,195 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a widow who had been 
married under Islamic law could claim damages for loss of support. The same applies 
to widows married in terms of customary law.196 In terms of section 31(1) and (2) of the 
Black Laws Amendment Act197 a claim for damages against a wrongdoer for loss of 
support suffered by a party to a customary union due to the wrongful death of such 
party's spouse is enforceable. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act198 was 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination against parties married under 
customary law. The Act gives full recognition to customary marriages, arguably 
rendering section 31 of the Amendment Act superfluous.199 
 
2.4.3 Customary law  
2.4.3.1 Brief history and present status of customary law 
Customary law is the oldest non-legislated form of law known to man.200 It has existed 
in South Africa for longer than any other law or legislation, hence it was the originally 
applicable law in this country.201 People regulated their conduct according to rules that 
they and their ancestors had been accustomed to observing in the past. These rules 
were not recorded in writing, but became binding over the course of time through their 
observation by the communities themselves.202 Today, some of these rules in South 
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Africa have been adopted or adapted and superseded by legislation,203 or recognised 
by judicial decisions,204 and therefore now appear in a different form.205 In spite of 
customary law being the law of African people of this country, there was no equality 
between the common law and customary law.206 
 
Prior to 1994, the common law, which originated in the Western world, enjoyed the 
status of the law of the land in South Africa. On the other hand, customary law, in the 
manner in which it was studied, administered and applied, was considered inferior to 
common law and was tolerated on the same level as foreign law, and only in so far as 
it was not repugnant to Western values and moral standards.207 The Native 
Administration Act208 (later renamed the Bantu Administration Act,209 and later still the 
Black Administration Act)210 placed the African population of South Africa under a 
separate system of inferior justice, which was dispensed by ill-prepared special courts 
operated by Native Commissioners.211 Each of these commissioners had statutory 
authority to strike down from African law any rule, principle, concept or doctrine that 
appeared to be inconsistent with Western moral standards, save for the custom of 
lobola/bogadi.212 
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Customary law was initially ignored by the colonials, then tolerated, and eventually 
recognised,213 albeit with certain reservations and conditions.214 The situation did not 
change much over the years, until the Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa215 
in 1993 finally brought customary law on par with the common law of South Africa, by 
affording it constitutional recognition, but subject to the Constitution’s underlying 
principles and values.216 In other words, the South African Constitutions brought radical 
changes to this unacceptable situation through the recognition of customary law as a 
distinct and original source of law in its own right.217 These Constitutions firmly 
established a place for customary law within the South African legal system. With the 
adoption of the new Constitution218 and introduction of constitutional democracy, 
customary law became a core element of the South African legal system, on par with 
Roman-Dutch law.219 Currently, customary law is no longer subject to any legislation 
other than the rule of constitutional law.220 
 
Sections 33(2), 33(3) and 35(3) of the interim Constitution were instrumental to the 
recognition of customary law. Their significance lay in listing African law alongside 
common law and legislation as sources of South African law. In particular, these 
sections acknowledged the impact of the rights conferred by customary law on an 
equal level with those derived from other sources.221 Section 33(2) of the interim 
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Constitution provided that no law, whether a rule of common law, customary law or 
legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights,222 save as provided for 
in the general limitation clause223 or any other provision of the Constitution. This is 
shown in the case of Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community,224 in which the court 
stated the following: “While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common 
law lens, it must now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law, it depends for 
its ultimate force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be determined 
by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution.” Section 33 of the interim 
Constitution is notable for its emphasis on the equality between customary law rights 
and other entrenched rights. For example, section 33(2) provided that the rights in the 
Bill of Rights may not be limited by customary law rights. Similarly, in terms of section 
33(3), the entrenchment of the rights in the Bill of Rights shall not be construed as 
denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms recognised or conferred by 
common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are not inconsistent 
with the entrenched rights. In the interpretation of any law and the application and 
development of the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.225 Section 35(3) of the interim 
Constitution sealed the equality requirement between customary law and common law, 
by demanding that courts interpreting both systems have due regard to the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
In addition to these provisions, section 211(3) of the Constitution226 expressly obliges 
the courts to apply customary law when it is applicable, in the sense of an authoritative 
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source of South African law.227 This section makes the application of customary law 
mandatory in the courts when conflict of laws rules indicate that it is applicable to the 
facts of a particular case.228 According to the proviso to section 211(3), however, 
customary law must be read subject to the Bill of Rights and any other relevant 
legislation. 
 
Furthermore, the constitutional support for the application of customary law can be 
found in the protection of culture in sections 30 and 31 of the 1996 Constitution, which 
respectively enshrine language and cultural rights, and protect cultural, religious and 
language communities, and the practice of culture and religion.229 However, section 31 
also states that those rights are conditional. This section establishes that the exercising 
of these rights cannot be inconsistent with any other provision articulated in the Bill of 
Rights. In other words, the practice of culture cannot undermine any of the basic human 
rights, as detailed in this Bill. Culture must be practiced in a manner that remains in 
accordance with the sections concerning rights to equality and dignity.230 The 
Constitution as the supreme law231 applies to all laws232 and is expressly intended to 
govern the development of customary law by the courts.233 This has created the 
opportunity for adjusting customary law in its official pretext to changing values and 
practices.234 Theoretically, the Constitution elevated the status of customary law to the 
same level as common law. In practice, however, South Africa’s legislations are 
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struggling to live up to the promise of the Constitution.235 Nonetheless, the Constitution 
has had a notable impact on the action of dependants for loss of support under 
customary law. 
 
2.4.3.2 Action of dependants for loss of support under customary law 
The dependency claim is one area of customary law that has received considerable 
attention from the legal arena.236 The traditional perception that the enactment of the 
Black Laws Amendment Act237 was intended to remedy the potentially unfair position 
of a widow married in terms of customary law, giving such a widow a dependency claim 
for loss of support, paints a wholly deceptive picture. It generates the view that the 
legislature has created a new cause of action that did not exist in customary law. From 
the earliest times, long before the Europeans invaded the Cape,238 the dependency 
claim has always been available in terms of customary law.239 In customary law, it is a 
civil wrong to bring about, intentionally or negligently, the death of another.240 This 
customary action is called go tsoša hlogo or go tsosa hlogo in 
Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho cultures. It is a well-established and recognised practise in 
customary law and has always been part of the legal system of African people of South 
Africa.241 It closely resembles the Roman-Dutch law or common law dependency 
action. In fact, it is of the same breath as the Aquilian action. 
                                            
235  Ndima Re-imagining and re-interpreting African jurisprudence (2013) 7. 
236  Sipongomana v Nkulu 1901 NHC 26; Suid Afrikaanse Nationale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy 
Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Nkabinde v SA Motor & General Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 302 
(D); Ismael v Ismael 1983 1 SA 1006 (A); Zulu v Minister of Justice 1956 2 SA 128 (W). 
237  s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. 
238  Archive 1 “The Arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in the Cape - 6 April 1652” 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/.../arrival-jan-van-riebeeck-cape-6-april-1652 (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
239  Kerr 1956 SALJ 402; Clark 1999 SALJ 20 24; Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Mayeki v Shield 
Insurance Co Ltd 1975 4 SA 370 (C). 
240  Sekese Mekhoa le Maele a Basotho (2009) 60; Duncan Sotho laws and custom (2006) 105; Palmer 
Law of delict (1970) 114. 
241  Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 379; Clark 1999 SALJ 20; Dlamini 1984 SALJ 346; Pasela 
v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W); Joel v Zibokwana 4 NAC 130 
 52 
The Roman-Dutch law or common law decisions are cited authoritatively in customary 
law cases, without the perception of a conflict of laws.242 The variances between the 
common law and customary law are merely distinctions without legal significance. The 
validity and application of the action of dependants by a widow married in customary 
law was overcome by the judicial marginalisation of customary law and practices.243 
The “invented” dispute with regard to a claim by such a widow correlated with an 
interpersonal conflict of laws involving recognition of a duty of support in a different 
system of law.244 The court argued that the duty of support when the husband was 
alive was in terms of a marriage concluded in accordance with a system of law other 
than the South African common law,245 which marriage was potentially polygamous 
and therefore contra bonos mores.246 It was further disputed that a customary marriage 
could not bring about a legal duty of maintenance or support inter partes.247 It is 
submitted that the line of reasoning suggested here was fundamentally unsound. The 
duty to support was thus inextricably linked to the existence of a valid marriage, which 
criterion was laid down by common law.248 The wrongdoer was allowed to escape 
liability, simply because the breadwinner was married in terms of customary law, not 
because the action of dependants for loss of support did not exist in customary law. 
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Numerous attempts in case law to eradicate the prohibition were unsuccessful.249 In 
Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy Bpk v Fondo,250 the court 
held that a claim for damages for loss of support caused by the death of a spouse was 
not allowed where the marriage was in a system of law that permitted polygamy 
because, in its view, polygamy was against public policy. Therefore, a widow married 
according to customary law was not entitled to claim for the loss of support that she 
suffered as a result of the death of her husband. The court came to the same 
conclusion in Ismael v Ismael,251 finding that marriage in terms of Islamic rites was a 
potentially polygamous union, hence unlawful and contrary to public policy. In 
Nkabinde v SA Motor & General Insurance Co Ltd,252 the widow who was married in 
terms of customary law argued that the duty of support between her and the deceased 
arose ex contractu (contractually). She alleged that prior to their marriage, the 
deceased and herself entered into an agreement whereby the deceased (her husband) 
had agreed to be liable for supporting her, in exchange for marrying him. The court 
declined to extend the Aquilian action on the ground that it was against public policy to 
recognise a customary marriage. Research has failed to disclose any South African 
case effectively disallowing the dependency claim because the action was or is 
unavailable in terms of customary law. It was accepted that Black African people had 
“a settled system of law” with regard to dependency claims, except that it was a system 
the then courts could not take into cognisance.253 
 
Closely related to this issue is the then common law rule that a subsequent civil 
marriage with another woman had the effect of dissolving the subsisting customary 
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marriage.254 A man who was married by civil rites was expressly prohibited from 
marrying another woman by customary rites.255 A person could not therefore be a 
spouse in a civil marriage and a spouse of another person in a customary marriage at 
the same time, but same parties could enter into both types of marriages. As the 
customary marriage was dissolved or superseded by a civil marriage, the rights of a 
widow married by civil rites and her children were safeguarded upon the death of their 
spouse or father.256 This was the position until 2 December 1988, when the Marriage 
and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act257 came into operation. The effect of 
this Act was that the position was reversed. This legislation held unpleasant surprises 
for widows in possession of civil/common law marriage certificates.258 
 
Finally, customary marriages were given full recognition on 15 November 2000, when 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act259 came into operation. In terms of this 
Act, customary marriages were given full recognition in South African law. This 
included customary marriages contracted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, 
as well as valid customary marriages that existed at its date of commencement. 
Section 2 of the Act precludes a spouse married by customary rites from contracting a 
civil marriage with another person during the subsistence of the customary marriage. 
Unlike the position before 2 December 1988, that is, before the coming into effect of 
the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act of 1988, a civil marriage 
does not have the effect of dissolving or superseding an existing or previous customary 
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marriage.260 The result is that a civil marriage contracted during the subsistence of a 
customary marriage is null and void ab initio.261 The same holds for a customary 
marriage contracted during the existence of a civil marriage. It is also clear that a 
spouse in a civil marriage262 is precluded from contracting a customary marriage with 
another person during the subsistence of the civil marriage.263 Polygamy, in the same 
manner as before 2 December 1988, is only allowed in respect of customary 
marriages. 
 
The position outlined above applies to the whole of South Africa. Today, in South 
Africa, customary law is expressly recognised under the Constitution264 as a distinct 
and original source of law in its own right. Theoretically, this transformation elevated 
the status of customary law to the same level as common law.265 Consequently, there 
can be no doubt that the dependency action for wrongful death applies under 
customary law and has become a system of legislation. 
 
2.4.4 Legislative framework 
A claim for loss of support as the result of the wrongful and negligent act of another 
may be established by legislation or may function in terms of legislative provisions. 
South Africa has a fragmented collection of dependency action legislations. The 
relevant statutory provisions for dependency claims are briefly explained below (and 
only some examples of substantial practical importance will be considered here): 
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2.4.4.1 Section 36 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act 130 of 1993 (hereinafter COIDA or COID Act) 
The main legislation covering work-related injury, disease or death is the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act,266 also known as COIDA.267 
In South Africa, COIDA came into effect on 1 March 1994.268 It replaced the old 
Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA).269 The COID Act is wider in scope than the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, which it replaced. This Act creates a statutory 
insurance, which entitles an employee and his dependants270 to claim compensation 
from the Director-General for an accident, disease or death that occurred during the 
course of employment.271 COIDA is under the control of the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour, who delegates many of his functions to the Compensation 
Commissioner.272 The dependant of an employee who died in the course of 
employment has the right to claim loss of support through an administrative process 
which requires the Director-General to adjudicate upon the claim, and to determine the 
precise amount to which the dependant is entitled. Payment of compensation is not 
dependant on the employer’s negligence or ability to pay, nor is the amount susceptible 
to reduction based on the employee’s contributory negligence.273 The Act provides 
what is called a no-fault compensation system for workers.274 In other words, the 
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dependants of the employee who died because of occupational injuries or disease 
forfeit the right to sue the wrongdoer for damages, and in return receive some 
compensation for loss of support, whether or not there was any negligence. The COID 
Act enjoys a specific relationship with the Road Accident Fund (RAF) Act,275 as well as 
the Apportionment of Damages Act.276 
 
2.4.4.2 Section 17 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (hereinafter RAF 
Act) 
Section 17 of the RAF Act imposes an obligation on the RAF (Fund) to compensate 
any person (the third party) for loss or damage suffered as a result of any bodily injury 
to himself or herself, or the death of or any bodily injury to any other person, following 
the driving of a motor vehicle by any person at any place within the Republic of South 
Africa. The RAF Act entitles the dependants of a breadwinner who was unlawfully and 
wrongfully killed due to the driving of a motor vehicle to bring an action for loss of 
support against the Fund for the payment of compensation for loss of support.277 This 
Act was recently amended by the RAF Amendment Act (RAFAA),278 which came into 
operation on 01 August 2008. The RAFAA did not change the RAF Act in totality, but 
only amended and deleted certain sections of the Act.279 The most important changes 
relevant to this study are the following: 
 
 Funeral or cremation expenses: The limitation of the Fund’s liability is to pay 
only the necessary actual costs of cremation or internment. 
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 Loss of support: Liability was capped, irrespective of the actual loss, at R160000 
per year in 2008, and currently stands at R276 928280 per annum. This amount 
is increased quarterly in line with inflation. 
 
2.4.4.3 Section 1(1) (a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 
The legal position regarding contributory negligence and its effect on the recovery of 
damages is governed by the Apportionment of Damages Act.281 This Act was 
established to amend our common law position in respect of contributory 
negligence.282 Before the Apportionment of Damages Act came into existence, the “all 
or nothing” principle was applicable in South Africa.283 The no-contribution rule was 
justified by reference to the maxim ex turpi causa non-oritur actio, which means that 
an action does not arise from a wrongful cause.284 This principle can be briefly 
explained as follows: Where the negligence of two persons contributed to the causing 
of a particular result and one or both parties suffered damage as a result, neither party 
could institute an action unless the negligence of one of the parties was the decisive 
cause of the accident. In such an event, the negligence of the other party was 
completely ignored and he could succeed in full with his claim. In order to determine 
whose negligence was the decisive cause of the accident, the courts looked at who 
had the last opportunity of avoiding the accident.285 
 
                                            
280  Government Gazette no 41996, board notice 145/2018 dated 26 October 2018. 
281  Act 34 of 1956. 
282  Du Plooy Analysis of the Apportionment of Damages Act (2015) 34; South African Law Reform 
Commission Project 96: The Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 Report dated (July 2003), 
par 1.1. 
283  Pierce v Hau Mon 1944 AD 175 195; South African Law Reform Commission Project 96: The 
Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 Report (July 2003), par 1.24. 
284  Ibid. 
285  See s 1(1)(a) of Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
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The “all or nothing” principle clearly resulted in unfair decisions being made, and the 
legislature had no alternative but to intervene and apportion damages in cases of 
contributory negligence or joint or several liability.286 In addition, the Apportionment of 
Damages Act did not originally deal with the situation where the dependants sought to 
recover for loss of support where the deceased breadwinner had been contributorily 
negligent. However, the Act was amended in 1971 to deal with this matter.287 Section 
2(1B) of the Act deals with the death of or injury to a breadwinner.288 It provides that if 
it is alleged that the plaintiff has suffered damage as a result of an injury to or death of 
any person, and that such injury or death was caused partly through the fault of such 
injured or deceased person, and partly through the fault of any other person, such 
injured person or the estate of such deceased person, as the case may be, and such 
other person, shall, for the purposes of this section, be regarded as joint wrongdoers. 
 
Section 1(1)(a) provides that where a person suffers damage which is caused partly 
through his own fault and partly through the fault of any other person, a claim in respect 
of this damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant. However, 
damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced by the court to such an extent 
as the court may deem just and equitable, having regard to the degree to which the 
claimant was at fault in relation to the damage. The Act regulates the manner in which 
the amount to be awarded to the dependants for loss of support is to be calculated.289 
In terms of this Act, a dependant's claim for loss of support, being the dependant's own 
                                            
286  McKerron Delict (1971) 309; Randbond Investment (Pty) Ltd v FPS Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W) 619. 
287  Burchell Delict (1993) 243-244. 
288  Du Plooy Analysis of the Apportionment of Damages Act (2015) 34; Klopper 2007 THRHR 441; 
Neethling 1988 THRHR 107-108. 
289  s 2(6)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
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action and not one derived from the deceased's estate, cannot be reduced on account 
of the deceased breadwinner's contributory negligence.290  
 
2.4.4.4 Section 31 of Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 
Section 31 provides for the right of a partner to a customary union to claim damages 
from a person unlawfully causing the death of the other partner: 
“(1) A partner to a customary union as defined in section thirty-five of the Black 
Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), shall, subject to the provisions of 
this section, be entitled to claim damages for loss of support from any person 
who unlawfully causes the death of the other partner to such union or is legally 
liable in respect thereof, provided such partner or such other partner is not at 
the time of such death a party to a subsisting marriage. 
(2) No such claim for damages shall be enforceable by any person who claims 
to be a partner to a customary union with such deceased partner, unless- 
(a) such person produces a certificate issued by a Commissioner stating the 
name of the partner, or in the case of a union with more than one woman, the 
names of the partners, with whom the deceased partner had entered into a 
customary union which was still in existence at the time of death of the 
deceased partner; and 
(b) such person's name appears on such certificate. 
(2A) A certificate referred to in subsection (2) shall be accepted as conclusive 
proof of the existence of a customary union of the deceased partner and the 
partner or, in the case of a union with more than one woman, the partners 
whose name or names appear on such certificate. 
(3) Where it appears from the certificate referred to in subsection (2) that the 
deceased partner was survived by more than one partner to a customary 
union, all such surviving partners who desire to claim damages for loss of 
support, shall be joined as plaintiffs in one action. 
(4) … 
(a) Where any action is instituted under this section against any person by a 
partner to a customary union and it appears from the certificate referred to in 
subsection (2) that the deceased partner was survived by a partner to a 
customary union who has not been joined as a plaintiff, such person may 
serve a notice on such partner who has not been joined as a plaintiff to 
intervene in the action as a co-plaintiff within a period of not less than fourteen 
days nor more than one month specified in such notice, and thereupon the 
action shall be stayed for the period so specified. 
(b) If any partner to a customary union upon whom a notice has been served 
in terms of paragraph (a), fails to intervene in the action within the period 
specified in such notice or within such extended period as the court on good 
cause shown may allow, such partner shall be deemed to have abandoned 
her claim. 
(5) If a deceased partner to a customary union is survived by more than one 
partner to such a union, the aggregate of the amounts of the damages to be 
awarded to such partners in terms of this section shall under no circumstances 
                                            
290  Kleinhans v African Guarantee & Indemnity Co Ltd 1959 2 SA 619 (E); McDonald v RAF [2012] 
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exceed the amount which would have been awarded had the deceased 
partner been survived by only one partner to a customary union. 
(6) A partner to a customary union whose name has been omitted from a 
certificate issued by a Commissioner in terms of subsection (2) shall not by 
reason of such omission have any claim against the Government of the 
Republic or the Commissioner if such omission was made bona fide. 
(7) Nothing in this section contained shall be construed as affecting in any 
manner the procedure prescribed in any other law to be followed in the 
institution of a claim for damages for loss of support.” 
 
The enactment of section 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 has been 
hailed as an important milestone in law reform.291 The writer disagrees with this view, 
however, and reiterates that the traditional perception that the enactment of the Black 
Laws Amendment Act292 was intended to remedy the potentially unfair position of a 
widow married in terms of customary law, where neither of them was a party to a 
subsisting civil marriage,293 by granting such widow a dependency claim for loss of 
support, paints a totally deceptive picture. This is because it encourages the view that 
the legislature has created a new cause of action that did not exist in customary law. 
From the earliest times, long before the Europeans invaded the Cape, the dependency 
claim has always been available in terms of customary law.294  
 
2.4.4.5 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) 
The RCMA recognises customary marriages, which were hitherto partially recognised 
under South African general law.295 The Act also promotes equality between 
spouses296 and thus fundamentally changes the personal and proprietary 
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consequences of customary marriages. It further states that a customary marriage 
entered into after its commencement will be in community of property,297 and provides 
for the conversion of customary marriages contracted before its operation into civil 
marriages.298 Some legal scholars have also hailed this Act as a step in the right 
direction, while it has been criticised by others. On the one hand, Dlamini299 argues 
that the recognition of customary marriages, for all purposes, puts an end to their 
hitherto dubious status. Mqeke,300 on the other hand, laments the supplanting of 
customary law by Roman Dutch law, an equally patriarchal system. He concludes that 
there is not much customary law left in the Act. Mamashela and Xaba301 argue that 
what the framers of the 1998 Act considered a customary marriage was a version of it 
that had been warped by various processes, such as urbanisation and modernisation, 
among others. The effect of the enactment of the RCMA was to protect partners in a 
customary marriage and to put an end to the continuation of unfair treatment of 
partners in customary marriages whose breadwinner had been killed unlawfully and 
negligently. The Act confirmed a statutory cause of action for the benefit of partners in 
a customary marriage of a deceased person, where the death of the deceased was 
caused by the wrongful act of another person. Where there is more than one spouse 
eligible to receive compensation, the compensation should be divided between the 
spouses at the discretion of the court or authority responsible for paying the 
compensation.302  
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298  s 7(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
299  Dlamini OBITER 1999 14-15. 
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301  Mamashela & Xaba The practical implications and effects of the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (Law School University of Natal – Pietermaritzburg, School of 
Development Studies, Research Report No. 59/2003).  
302  The arguments outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.4.3 dealing with customary law apply here 
as well. 
 63 
2.4.4.6 Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
From Biblical times,303 sexual orientation inequality has been endemic in all 
jurisdictions, including South Africa. However, in recent years, the constitutional 
requirement for equality304 has been instrumental in extending the ambit of the judicial 
interpretation of the concept of “marriage” to homosexuals. Pursuant to the 
constitutional requirement that the government provide protection against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the South African parliament promulgated 
and adopted the Civil Union Act on 1 December 2006. South Africa became one of 
very few countries to confer legal protection and marriage benefits on partners in same-
sex relationships. The Civil Union Act is the main piece of legislation recognising 
marriage between lesbians and gays. The legislation was adopted as a direct response 
to the landmark decision of the Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie.305 The Court declared the lack of legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
unconstitutional, and gave Parliament a period of one year in which to develop a 
remedy that would allow same-sex partners to formalise their relationships.306 The 
objectives of the Civil Union Act are to regulate the solemnisation and registration of 
civil unions by way of either a marriage or a civil partnership; and to provide for the 
legal consequences of the solemnisation and registration of civil unions.307 Due to the 
passing of this Act, homosexuals who have registered their partnerships in accordance 
                                            
303  1 Corinthians 7:2 – “Nevertheless, [to avoid] fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let 
every woman have her own husband”; Leviticus 20:13 – “If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth 
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305  2006 1 SA 542 (CC). 
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with the provisions of this Act now have the right to lodge a claim for loss of support 
under the dependency action, where their partner was unlawfully killed. 
 
2.4.4.7 Section 1 of the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 
This Act amends the law regarding the assessment of damages for loss of support as 
a result of a breadwinner’s death. The calculation for loss of support claims is directed 
at the support that would have been provided had there been no death.308 The broad 
objective of the Act is to ameliorate the position of dependants whose claims for loss 
of support against the wrongdoer would otherwise have been reduced due to the 
application of the rules on compensating advantages.309 Section 1(1) of this Act 
prohibits insurance money, pensions or benefits from being considered in calculating 
loss of support. Before this section came into operation, such benefits were taken into 
account, but the legislature felt this to be unfair.310 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
The above discussion provided the background to the South African legal position on 
the action of dependants for loss of support. The following discussion focuses on the 
status of the dependency action for loss of support in Botswana and Lesotho. Similar 
to South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho have dual legal systems, which recognise the 
coexistence of both common law and customary law, and have a great variety of ethnic 
groups, of which the indigenous people of both countries are in the majority.311 The 
genesis of the action of dependants and the way in which these two systems operate 
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together in respect of the action of dependants in Botswana and Lesotho are 
investigated in the next section, in order to establish if the South African and Australian 
legislature can learn from these countries in terms of how they apply dependency 
claims in practice. 
 
2.5 Botswana and Lesotho 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Throughout the African continent, it is most difficult to discover the written history of 
the action of dependants for loss of support prior to the arrival of Europeans in Africa. 
The reason for this is that, with the exception of a few countries such as Egypt, there 
was no formal written history of laws in most African countries. African customs and 
laws were passed down from generation to generation through the oral tradition. From 
the middle of the seventeenth century, with the arrival of Dutch explorers in the Cape 
of Good Hope, the Roman-Dutch-based legal system spread rapidly, and quickly 
became the recognised legal system of not only South Africa, but the majority of 
Southern African countries.312 South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho thus share a 
common legal heritage.313 For political and strategic reasons, the British colonial power 
imposed the law of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the erstwhile protectorates 
of Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Basotholand (Lesotho).314 Similar to South Africa, 
the Roman-Dutch law formed the contingency that Botswana and Lesotho looked 
towards to ensure clarity in their law.315 
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2.5.2 Roman-Dutch law 
Botswana and Lesotho share with South Africa a mixed general legal system, which 
resulted from the interaction between Roman-Dutch civilian law and English common 
law.316 The reception formula for Botswana or extension of the Roman-Dutch law to 
Botswana was originally contained in section 19 of the General Administration 
Proclamation of 1891,317 and later in section 4 of Proclamation No. 36 of 1909.318 The 
latter related to common law and was identical to the Lesotho formula, which was 
imported by means of the language of section 4 of Proclamation 2B of 1884.319 
Although it is called Roman-Dutch law, all the Proclamations were a mix of the original 
Roman-Dutch law that was brought by the Dutch, the English law that was 
progressively introduced by the British, and the principles developed by the South 
African courts.320 In other words, what Botswana and Lesotho received during the 
colonial period under the Proclamations was neither pure Roman-Dutch law nor pure 
English law, but a mixture of both laws, as developed further in South African courts.321  
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The various High Commissioners who were appointed administered the territories from 
their seat in Cape Town and later Pretoria, and often legislated for the territories simply 
by extending Proclamations designed for what is now South Africa to Botswana and 
Lesotho.322 Therefore, calling it Roman-Dutch law may be both inaccurate and possibly 
perverse. Roman-Dutch law is a neutral term that, provided it is properly understood, 
serves to underline the uniqueness of this law, and establishes important views for its 
creative expansion to solve legal problems.323 Therefore, Roman-Dutch law, as 
influenced by English law, is the common law of both Botswana and Lesotho, and 
operates alongside legislation and judicial decisions as a source of law.324  
 
Although it is technically correct to say that the common law of Botswana and Lesotho 
is Roman-Dutch law, this is only true to the extent that it is understood as being the 
Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English law, and its interpretation in South African 
courts.325 References not only to South African judicial decisions, but also to academic 
works on the law of South Africa abound in the Botswana and Lesotho Law Reports.326 
The development of the legal systems of both Botswana and Lesotho was shaped by 
South African legal practice through the High Commissioner in the Cape, who retained 
legislative power over the territories.327 This is still the situation today in Botswana and 
Lesotho. Judgments emanating from the High Court or Appeal Court of both countries 
frequently and extensively express themselves on the authority of South African law. 
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Botswana and Lesotho rely on and follow judgments decided in the Republic of South 
Africa in the areas of the law where they are applicable, where Roman-Dutch law also 
constitutes the common law.328 
 
Botswana and Lesotho law provide for compensation to be paid by a person who 
wrongfully and unlawfully kills a breadwinner.329 It is apparent from the above that the 
action of dependants for loss of support of Botswana and Lesotho is of the same breath 
as the South African common law dependency action,330 although it does not reflect 
completely, nor has it been adapted to, all the modern developments of the South 
African dependency action. For instance, in Botswana and Lesotho, the abhorrence of 
homosexuals is such that there is no recognition of them. Therefore, where a partner 
to a permanent homosexual relationship claims support due to the unlawful death of 
his/her partner, the claim will not be approved because such a partner is not deemed 
to be a spouse or legally obliged to support his/her surviving partner.331 Their 
agreement to support each other will not afford the surviving partner a dependant 
action, unlike partners under customary law. 
 
2.5.3 Customary law 
Similar to South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho operate two systems of law  an 
imported system based on the Roman-Dutch common law, and an indigenous system 
based on the traditional customs and practices of Batswana (people of Botswana or 
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Setswana culture)332 and Basotho (people of Lesotho and Sesotho culture)333 from 
time immemorial.334 The right of indigenous people to have customary law 
accommodated within their communities is an integral part of the Botswana and 
Lesotho legal systems.335 In contrast to South Africa, the colonists interfered as little 
as possible with customary law and the internal administration of Botswana and 
Lesotho.336 The colonists saw it as the best way of administration to officially recognise 
and use, as much as possible, the existing indigenous systems of rule and law in both 
countries.337 The colonists were able to incorporate the indigenous system fairly easily 
into the new court structure introduced to deal with disputes involving Africans.338 
 
In Botswana, under Article 4 of the General Administration Order in Council of 9 May 
1891, the High Commissioner, in issuing Proclamations, was required to “…respect 
any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes or 
populations…”.339 Although the Proclamation of 10 June 1891 limited the jurisdiction 
of African courts, the Native Tribunals Proclamation of 1934 formally recognised 
customary courts, and for the first time incorporated them into the court system of the 
Protectorate.340 The next significant enactment in Botswana was the Native Courts 
Proclamation of 1943, which for the first time contained provisions dealing with the 
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recognition, constitution, powers and jurisdiction of customary courts. No other 
authority has more influence than customary courts, as custodians of culture and 
tradition, in terms of mobilising communities. The traditional courts continue to enjoy 
legitimacy among the people and have played a vital role in the delivery of justice, 
mainly because it is part of Setswana culture.341  
 
Indigenous law continued to receive due recognition, even after independence in 1966, 
under the Customary Courts Act of 1969.342 Customary law in Botswana is recognised, 
first and foremost, in the Constitution of Botswana.343 Section 10(12)(b) and (e),344 
section 15(4)(d)345 and section 88(2)346 allude to customary law in the exception to the 
discrimination provision. The most comprehensive law that regulates customary law in 
Botswana is the Customary Law Act.347 The Act defines customary law in the following 
terms: “in relation to any particular tribe or tribal community, the customary law of that 
tribe or community so far as it is not incompatible with the provisions of any written law 
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or contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice”.348 The Act was enacted in order to 
“provide for the application of customary law in certain actions before the courts of 
Botswana, to facilitate the ascertainment of customary law and to provide for matters 
ancillary thereto”.349 By virtue of the Act, all courts in Botswana are empowered, subject 
to their jurisdiction, to apply customary law in cases where it is necessary to do so.350 
 
In Lesotho, the General Law Proclamation351 provides for the general application of 
customary law in Basotho courts where all the parties to the proceedings are 
Africans.352 The codification of customary law came about after a council was 
appointed in 1903 to advise the British Resident Commissioner on what was best for 
the "Basotho” in terms of laws that would govern them. Until this time, the Basotho 
customs and laws were transferred from generation to generation by means of oral 
tradition. The council was then given the task of codifying and writing the laws, and 
came up with the Laws of Lerotholi which are applied by customary courts today (local 
courts).353 
 
Similar to South Africa, customary law currently stands on an equal footing with the 
common law and legislation as the general law of Botswana and Lesotho,354 and is 
protected further by their Constitutions.355 The customary law in Botswana and Lesotho 
recognises a dependant’s right and action to claim damages from the person 
                                            
348  s 2 of the Laws of Botswana. 
349  Laws of Botswana, cap. 16:01. 
350  s 3 of the Laws of Botswana. 
351  Act No 2B of 1884. 
352  Palmer & Potter Legal system (1972) 99. 
353  These Laws were named after Chief Lerotholi, the then Paramount Chief of Basutoland (now 
Lesotho), to distinguish them from the laws promulgated by his grandfather, Moshoeshoe. See also 
Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 5 6; Dube https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Lesotho.html 
(accessed on 8 August 2016). 
354  Palmer & Potter Legal system (1972) 99 169. 
355  Constitution of Botswana, 1966 and the Constitution of Lesotho, 1993. 
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responsible for his/her breadwinner’s death.356 In Lesotho and Botswana, if a 
polygamist is killed, each of his wives and minor children could bring a successful 
action for loss of support, since the laws of Botswana and Lesotho recognise them as 
legal dependants of the deceased.357 This is in contrast to the South African law, which 
previously denied such wives compensation on the ground that customary law 
marriages were not recognised by common law and the husband was therefore not 
legally bound to support his wives.358 The High Court of Lesotho has recognised such 
a union as a proper basis for compensation.359 Consequently, in Botswana and 
Lesotho, disputed matters are brought before the courts to be settled either through 
the application of customary law or common law, with their Constitutions as the 
supreme law. 
 
2.5.4 Constitutional provisions 
The current situation in Botswana and Lesotho is that the fundamental source of law 
in both countries is their Constitutions, which were formed by virtue of the Constitution 
of Botswana (1966) and the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). Any law or action that 
breaches the provisions of these Constitutions is illegal. Although there are striking 
similarities between the legal systems of South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho in terms 
of their common and customary laws, given the tendency of the Botswana and Lesotho 
courts to engage with South African case law and academic writings,360 there are still 
                                            
356  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) par 46. 
357  s 42 of the Marriage Act 10 of 1974. 
358  Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (AD). 
359  R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130; Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70; Palmer Law of delict (1970) 
112-113; s 42 of the Marriage Act 10 of 1970. 
360  In Silverstone (Pty) Ltd v Lobatse Clay Works (Pty) Ltd [1996] BLR 190 (CA) 194-195, Tebbutt JA 
declared that “the courts of Botswana have never been reluctant, in their own adaptation of the 
common law to the requirements of modern times, to have regard to the approach of the South 
African courts and the writings of authoritative South African academics.” 
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important differences, especially regarding the recognition, application and 
ascertainment of customary law.361 
 
In the case of South Africa, customary law is explicitly recognised by the South African 
Constitution,362 and the courts are compelled to apply customary law where it is 
applicable.363 The supremacy of the South African Constitution has certain 
consequences for customary law, most notably the fact that it is subject to the 
Constitution. Similar to common law, customary law is thus open to constitutional 
scrutiny.364 On the other hand, the Botswana Constitution365 does not implicitly 
recognise customary law, but recognises it indirectly by referring to it in connection 
with the right to a fair trial,366 the right to equality,367 and the promulgation of statutes.368 
The application and ascertainment of customary law are regulated in terms of the 
Botswana Customary Law Act.369 Of interest here is section 3, which prescribes the 
application of customary law in “proper cases” and, if improper, states that the common 
law must be applied.370 The Lesotho Constitution371 is analogous to the Botswana 
Constitution, in that it also does not implicitly recognise customary law, but recognises 
it indirectly by referring to it in connection with the right to a fair trial,372 the right to 
                                            
361  Rautenbach 2016 AHRLJ 145-147. 
362  ss 9(3) 30 31 39(2) & (3) 211 212 & Schedule 4 (Part A) of the Constitution. 
363  Bekker & Rautenbach “Application and ascertainment of customary law” in Bekker et al (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa (2015) 41-44; Nsereko Constitutional law in Botswana 
(2002) xv-xviii. 
364  See, eg, Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC); Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC); Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC); Pilane v Pilane 
2013 4 BCLR 431 (CC); Sigcau v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 9 BCLR 1091 
(CC); MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
365  LN 83 of 1966, as amended. 
366  s 10(12)(b) & (e) Botswana Constitution. 
367  s 15(4)(d) Botswana Constitution. 
368  s 88(2) Botswana Constitution. 
369  Act 51 of 1969. 
370  Rautenbach 2016 AHRLJ 146; Fombad Botswana legal system (2013) 55-92. 
371  LN 83 of 1993, as amended. 
372  s 12 of Lesotho Constitution. 
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equality373 and the promulgation of statutes.374 The application and ascertainment of 
customary law are regulated in terms of the Laws of Lerotholi.375 
 
2.5.5 Legislative framework  
Similar to South Africa, there is no unified, dedicated approach to legislation regulating 
the dependency action in Botswana and Lesotho. In this regard, neither country has 
any dedicated dependency action legislation. Like South Africa, the road thus far is 
characterised by piecemeal legislative recognition,376 which contains various sections 
conferring upon the dependants the rights and action for recovery of compensation for 
loss suffered due to the wrongful and negligent killing of their breadwinner. Several 
statutes provide for the recovery of loss of support where the breadwinner was 
wrongfully and unlawfully killed. These statutes will be discussed below. 
 
2.5.5.1 Workers' Compensation Scheme 
Similar to South Africa and Australia, a statutory workers’ compensation scheme exists 
in both Botswana and Lesotho. The Lesotho workers' compensation scheme was 
established in 1977 under the Workmen's Compensation Act,377 while the Botswana 
workers' compensation scheme was established in 1998 under the Workers' 
Compensation Act.378 In most respects, both Acts are materially identical to the South 
African Workmen’s Compensation Act.379 Both Acts provide for the compensation of 
                                            
373  s 19 of Lesotho Constitution. 
374  s 70 of Lesotho Constitution. 
375  These Laws were named after Chief Lerotholi, the then Paramount Chief of Basutoland (now 
Lesotho), to distinguish them from the laws promulgated by his grandfather, Moshoeshoe. See also 
Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 5 6. 
376  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956; Black Law Amendment Act 76 of 1963; Assessment of 
Damages Act 9 of 1969; Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993; 
Nuclear Energy Act 131 of 1993; Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996; Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998; Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005; the proposed Road 
Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017; Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
377  Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977. 
378  Workers’ Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
379  Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
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workers for injuries suffered or occupational diseases contracted in the course of their 
employment, or for death resulting from such injuries or diseases, and for matters 
incidental and connected to the foregoing. Should a worker be injured or die as a result 
of a work injury or disease, any person dependant upon the worker at the time of his 
or her death may be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The Acts state that an 
employer should insure his workers and himself in respect of all liabilities that he may 
incur under the provisions of the Act.380 Both Acts further state that an employer who 
fails to do this will be found guilty of an offence and liable for a fine.381  
 
In terms of regulation 2(1) of the Lesotho Workmen's Compensation Regulations of 
2014, the amount payable as compensation to a dependant of an employee who died 
because of an injury occurring at work, leaving the dependant wholly dependant on the 
worker's earnings, shall not exceed two hundred and forty thousand, five hundred 
Maloti (M240500).382 Regulation 2(2) provides that the amount payable by the 
employer for burial expenses of the deceased shall not exceed sixteen thousand, 
seven hundred Maloti (M16700).383  
 
In terms of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998, where death 
results from an injury or occupational disease under circumstances in which 
compensation is payable, the compensation to be paid shall be equal to such number 
of monthly earnings as may be prescribed by the Minister in terms of subsection (2). 
In terms of section 13(2), the Minister may prescribe the compensation payable in 
                                            
380  See s 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; s 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act 23 of 1998. 
381  See s 2(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; s 2(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act 23 of 1998. 
382  Currency Converter Results: M240500 = R241,165.14 @ 15:50 on the 9th August 2017 
https://www.exchange-rates.org/converter/LSL/ZAR/240500.00 (accessed on 9 August 2017). 
383  Workmen's Compensation Regulations, 2014, submitted on Thu, 04/16/2015. 
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terms of subsection (1) in the case (a) where a worker leaves dependants that are 
wholly dependant upon his earnings; (b) where a worker leaves dependants only 
partially dependant upon his earnings; and (c) of reasonable expenses for the burial of 
the deceased worker.384 According to the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 
of 1998,385 a "dependant" of a worker means 
(a) a widow or widower who at the time of the accident was married, in 
accordance with either the customary or statute law, to the worker; (b) where 
there is no widow or widower in terms of paragraph (a), a woman or man with 
whom the worker was at the time of the accident living as wife or husband; (c) 
a child of the worker or of his spouse and includes a posthumous child, a step 
child, an adopted child and a child born out of wedlock; (d) a parent of the 
worker or any person who was acting in the place of a parent; and (e) a brother 
or sister, grandparent or grandchild; who was at the time of the accident wholly 
or partly financially dependant upon the worker. 
 
Unlike Botswana, the Lesotho Workmen’s Compensation Act does not expressly 
categorise the dependants. It only states that the dependants eligible to claim are those 
who are wholly or partially dependant on the deceased worker’s earnings.386 
 
2.5.5.2 Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Scheme (MVA) 
Botswana and Lesotho are part of the five countries387 in Southern Africa that 
administer a fuel levy-funded motor vehicle accident compensation system. These 
accident compensation systems are administered by statutory bodies established 
through the respective Acts of Parliament, with the exception of Lesotho, which is 
outsourced to a private insurance agency for administration purposes. The motor 
vehicle accident compensation legislations for both Botswana and Lesotho388 are 
clearly a repetition of the South African RAF Act 51 of 1996. South African judgments, 
                                            
384  See s 13 of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
385  See s 2 of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
386  See s 2 of the Lesotho Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977. 
387  The five countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and the kingdom of eSwatini (the 
old Swaziland – see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa/43905628 (accessed on 28 December 
2018)). 
388  Order 26 of 1989. 
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which command a persuasive status in the two countries, have also been relied on 
where necessary.389 Neither country has yet amended their MVA legislation in 
accordance with the South African new RAFAA, or the proposed RABS Bill. It is 
uncertain whether these countries will follow suit or not. Therefore, the claim by the 
dependants of the deceased is not limited, since both countries apply the law in 
accordance with the old RAF Act 51 of 1996. 
 
2.5.5.3 Apportionment of Damages Act 32 of 1969 
The Botswana Apportionment of Damages Act 32 of 1969 was published on 22 August 
1969. The objective of the Act is to amend the law relating to contributory negligence 
and the law relating to the liability of persons jointly or severally liable in delict for the 
same damage, and to provide for matters incidental thereto.390 This Act is materially 
similar to the 1956 South African Apportionment of Damages Act391 in most respects. 
The Apportionment of Damages Act did not deal with situation where the dependants 
sought to recover for loss of support where the deceased breadwinner had been 
contributorily negligent. However, the Act was amended in 1998 to deal with this 
matter.392 Section 2(1) of the Act provides that if it is alleged that the plaintiff has 
suffered damage as a result of the death of any person, and that such injury or death 
was caused partly through the fault of such injured or deceased person and partly 
through the fault of any other person, such injured person or the estate of such 
deceased person, as the case may be, and such other person, shall, for the purposes 
of this section, be regarded as joint wrongdoers. A claim in this respect shall not be 
defeated by reason of the fault of the deceased, but damages recoverable in respect 
                                            
389  Ailola 1991 CILSA 365-366. 
390  Preamble of the Apportionment of Damages Act 32 of 1969. 
391  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
392  Apportionment of Damages Act 6 of 1998, Botswana. 
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thereof shall be reduced by the court to such an extent as the court may deem just and 
equitable, having regard to the degree in which the claimant was at fault in relation to 
the damage. In terms of this Act, a dependant's claim for loss of support, being the 
dependant's own action and not one derived from the deceased's estate, cannot be 
reduced on account of the deceased breadwinner's contributory negligence.393 
 
2.5.5.4 Recognition of customary law marriages 
Customary law marriages in Botswana are valid and recognised by the law, with full 
effect given to their consequences. They are potentially polygamous and in community 
of property between a husband and wife. The property is the joint property of the 
spouses. However, the property remains subject to the husband’s control as head of 
the family.394 Identical to Botswana, the position of Sesotho customary law marriages 
in the legal system of Lesotho has received full judicial recognition.395 Lesotho’s legal 
history shows that the Sesotho customary law marriage has always been treated 
equally to civil rites marriages by the legislature.396 Sesotho customary law marriage 
is also recognised in terms of their Marriage Act.397 This differs from the Marriage Act 
in South Africa and Australia. The South African and Australian Marriage Acts do not 
recognise customary marriages, as only civil marriages are acknowledged under the 
Marriages Acts of South Africa and Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
393  See s 2 of Act 32 of 1969, Botswana. 
394  Quansah Family law (2006) 36; Moisakamo v Moisakamo 1981 2 BLR 126 (CA). 
395  See Laws of Lerotholi, which was intended to constitute an authoritative source of Sesotho 
customary law. The aim of the Laws of Lerotholi was to restate customary legal rules and principles. 
It attempted to address every conceivable sphere of Basotho customary law and practices. 
396  Letsika 2005 BLJ 25-29. 
397  See s 42 of the Marriage Act 10 of 1974; Makata v Makata CIV/T/41/1981 (unreported). 
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2.5.5.5 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) persons  
Despite the constitutional guarantee of equality,398 blatant discrimination against 
homosexuals remains rife throughout Botswana. Same-sex couples have no legal 
recognition, as the law does not address sexual orientation. Homosexuality is a taboo 
subject in Botswana. It is commonly regarded as a Western disease and un-African.399 
In February 2011, the Deputy Speaker of the Botswana National Assembly, Pono 
Moatlhodi, responded as follows to a proposal to provide condoms to prison inmates 
engaging in same-sex sexual acts: if he had the power, he would have those who 
practice homosexuality killed.400 Homosexuality has been referred to by some chiefs 
in Botswana as a “mental illness”401 and an “alien behaviour that comes with 
foreigners”.402 There are reports of gay and lesbian children who have been chased 
away from their families, but are too scared to approach the kgotla403 and ask the chief 
or headman to deliberate on the issue.404 This is because they would then have to 
disclose the reasons why they were chased away from their home, thereby making 
their sexual orientation known. Since homosexuality is viewed as illegal, many gay and 
                                            
398  s 15(1) of the Constitution provides that no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory, 
either in itself or in its effect. The expression “discriminatory” is defined in s 15(3) as: “… affording 
different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly to their respective description 
by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such 
description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description 
are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons 
of another such description”. 
399  Mookodi "Botswana" 2004 CCIES 92. 
400  Kenosi 2011 Botswana Gazette 9. See Penal Code of 1964, II Laws of Botswana, Cap. 08:01 (rev. 
ed. 2012). 
401  Lute 2006 Botswana Gazette 3. 
402  Ibid. 
403  A kgotla is “a public meeting, community council or traditional law court of a Botswana/Lesotho 
village. It is usually headed by the village chief or headman, and community decisions are always 
arrived at by consensus” – see Educalingo Dictionary online – https://educalingo.com/en/dic-
en/lekgotla. 
404  See Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA) and the Lesbians, Gays and 
Bisexuals of Botswana (LeGaBiBo), ‘The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Persons in Botswana: A Shadow Report’, March 2008; Personal correspondence with 
Pilot Mathambo the Coordinator of the Pilot Mathambo Cente for Men’s Health. 
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lesbian people are scared to disclose their sexuality, due to the stigmatisation and 
discrimination faced by LGBT people.405  
 
The country has a law explicitly criminalising consensual same-sex sexual activities.406 
According to the Botswana Penal Code “[a]ny person who … has carnal knowledge of 
any person against the order of nature ... or permits any other person to have carnal 
knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty of an offence and is liable 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years”.407 An attempt to commit this 
crime is also an offense and punishable on conviction with up to five years in prison.408 
However, in order for carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) to be against the “order 
of nature”, there must be anal penetration by a sex organ.409 Although same-sex sexual 
acts remain illegal, their prosecution is rare, according to a 2004 publication.410 In the 
context of this illegality of sodomy, Botswana has retained its statutory prohibitions on 
homosexual marriages, despite much criticism from groups411 and individuals412 who 
believe that the law on sodomy413 is old-fashioned and should be repealed. As a result, 
                                            
405  Olivier The reality of being gay in Botswana (2000) 135.  
406  Botswana Penal Code of 1964, II Laws of Botswana, Cap. 08:01 (revised 2012). 
407  s 164 of the Penal Code of 1964, II Laws of Botswana, Cap. 08:01 (revised 2012). 
408  s 165 Penal Code of 1964 – Attempts to commit unnatural offences: Any person who attempts to 
commit any of the offences specified in section 164 is guilty of an offence and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. 
409  Gaolete v State [1991] BLR 325; Nsereko Criminal law (2011) 237–238. 
410  Mookodi 2004 CCIES 89-92. 
411  Botswana's primary Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgender rights organization is called 
Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana (LeGaBiBo). 
412  See "Sticky sodomy case has Botswana gays flustered", Sapa-AFP, reprinted on the Internet by 
TimesLive, 16 March 2011: In 2010 and 2011, former Botswana President Festus Mogae spoke 
out against sexual discrimination, saying that prejudice was hindering efforts to fight HIV in a 
country where one in four adults had the disease. “We do not want to discriminate. Our HIV 
message applies to everybody. If we are fighting stigma associated with sex, let's apply it to sexual 
discrimination in general.” He told the British Broadcasting Company that during his 10 years in 
office, he had instructed police not to arrest or harass gays. “I could not change the law because 
that would be unnecessarily stirring up a hornet's nest. I was not willing to lose an election on behalf 
of the gays. The majority of our people are still opposed [to homosexuality] so I must convince them 
first before changing the law unilaterally.” 
413  s 164 of the Penal Code of 1964, II Laws of Botswana, Cap. 08:01 (revised 2012); Mookodi 2004 
CCIES 92. 
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same-sex relationships, regardless of their duration, are not legally recognised. 
Therefore, homosexual partners are denied many of the legal and economic privileges 
automatically bestowed by marital status. These include employment benefits, 
surrogacy for gay male couples, joint adoption by same-sex couples, step-child 
adoption by same-sex couples, intestate inheritance, and perhaps most relevant to this 
thesis, the rights arising, on the death of a same-sex partner, to claim for loss of support 
where the deceased partner was wrongfully and unlawfully killed. These benefits are 
available to heterosexual de facto partners, but continue to be unavailable to 
homosexual partners. Homosexuals in Botswana continue to deal with stigma, 
discrimination, violence and exclusion due to their real or perceived sexual orientation 
or gender identity. 
 
Lesotho seems very similar to Botswana. Homosexual conduct is taboo and not openly 
discussed in Lesotho society.414 Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) persons was known to occur because of homophobia and 
transphobia in the country,415 but often went unreported for fear of being ridiculed. 
Public officials, the media and religious leaders continuously express their homophobic 
prejudice, adding to the country’s already hostile climate for LGBT persons.416 In 
September 2011, representatives from Matrix417 and the Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights participated in a radio programme seeking the views of the public on LGBT 
issues.418 There is no specific protection or anti-discrimination provision to protect 
                                            
414  BTI 2014, Lesotho Country Report  
http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Lesotho.pdf (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
415  Baseline document on Lesotho, COC Netherlands, 2013 7. 
416  Ibid. 
417  Matrix - a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender support group in Lesotho. 
418  Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lesotho, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor, U.S. Department of State 2011 15.  
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individuals from being discriminated against based on their sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity.419 Sexual activity associated with homosexuals is forbidden in Lesotho 
under common law.420 The country’s Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act classifies 
sodomy as one of the offences for which a person may be arrested without a 
warrant.421 In addition, same-sex marriage is illegal in Lesotho. Under the common 
law, Marriage Act and customary law of Lesotho, the definition of marriage is “a union 
of one man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others.”422 
Consequently, the attainment of equality and non-discrimination is exasperating for 
homosexuals in Lesotho. In terms of the Child Welfare and Protection Act of 2011, 
which governs adoptions, only married couples may adopt a child jointly. Single men 
and same-sex couples are not permitted to adopt children.423  
 
Sexual behaviour in Botswana and Lesotho societies is generally still predicated on 
heterosexuality, and as a result, any exhibition of homosexual tendencies is regarded 
as deviant behaviour and an affront to morals and decency.424 However, in recent 
years, there has been a wave of agitation for reform in many countries with regard to 
the decriminalisation of homosexual activity, with some measure of success425 in a 
                                            
419  See LGBT Situation in Lesotho, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (June 29, 2011) 
https://chriafrica.blogspot.com/2011/06/lgbt-situation-in-lesotho.html (accessed on 8 August 2016); 
Motebo Ntabe 
https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/LS/MSG_UPR_LSO_S08_2010_Matrix
SupportGroup.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2016); see also LGBT Situation in Lesotho, 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (June 29, 2011) 
https://chriafrica.blogspot.com/2011/06/lgbt-situation-in-lesotho.html (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
420  See https://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/african-nations-
laws.php#edn42; Motebo Ntabe, 
https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/LS/MSG_UPR_LSO_S08_2010_Matrix
SupportGroup.pdf; see also LGBT Situation in Lesotho, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 
https://chriafrica.blogspot.com/2011/06/lgbt-situation-in-lesotho.html (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
421  Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act No. 67 of 1939, First schedule, pt. II (1 January 1939). 
422  s 1 of the Marriage Act 10 of 1974, Lesotho. 
423  Child Welfare and Protection Act of 2011. 
424  Tafa Right to sexual orientation: The line of the Botswana government (2000) 127; Quansah  
https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/quansah-e-k (accessed on 19 July 2017). 
425  Steyn 2003 JSAL 341; Quansah https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/quansah-e-k (accessed on 19 July 
2017). 
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number of similar decisions in neighbouring countries such as South Africa.426 The 
agitation has taken the form of attack on the criminalisation of homosexual activity as 
a denial of the civil rights of those who exhibit this tendency. In Botswana and Lesotho, 
there has not been any noticeable agitation for such reform. 
 
However, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Utjiwa Kanane v The State427 has 
brought same-sex relationships into the public domain, which had hitherto been 
discussed, if at all, by whispers and innuendos in private.428 In this case, two men were 
charged with engaging in unnatural acts and indecent practices between males in 
terms of sections 164 and 167 of the Botswana Penal Code. The appellant, Mr Utjiwa 
Kanane, was caught in bed with another man, Graham Norrie, and was accused of 
engaging in illegal homosexual intercourse. He was arrested and brought before the 
court on charges of unnatural carnal knowledge and indecency. In relation to the first 
offence, it was alleged that on 26 December 1994, at Maun Village, the appellant 
permitted Graham Norrie, being male, to have carnal knowledge of him (Utjiwa 
Kanane), against the order of nature. The particulars of the second offence were that 
the appellant, a male person, on 26 December 1994 at Maun Village, committed an 
act of gross indecency with Graham Norrie, a male person. The appellant pleaded not 
guilty to both charges and averred that the sections of the Penal Code under which he 
was charged were ultra vires section 3 of the Botswana Constitution.429 The 
constitutionality of the laws defining these two crimes was questioned. Tebbutt JP gave 
the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal, with which the other four Justices of Appeal 
                                            
426  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & another v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 4 SA 266 (CC); J & B v Director General, 
Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 BCLR 463 (CC); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 362. 
427  Criminal Appeal No 9 of 2003 (30 July 2003) unreported. 
428  Quansah https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/quansah-e-k (accessed on 19 July 2017). 
429  Ibid. 
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concurred. On the question whether sections 164 and 167 violated the Constitution, 
Tebbutt JP opined that the Court should adopt a broad and generous approach to the 
construction of the Constitution, and held that discriminatory legislation on the basis of 
gender, though not expressly mentioned in section 15(3) of the Constitution of 
Botswana, would not violate section 3 of the Constitution of Botswana. The Appeal 
Court of Botswana had an opportunity to critically examine and authoritatively lay down 
and settle the question of the right to equality for homosexuals in Botswana in Utjiwa 
Kanane v The State. This study argues that the Court wrongly ignored this question. 
Consequently, the Court’s misdirection and ignorance in failing to draw on foreign 
jurisprudence like South Africa in developing the rights of homosexuals resulted in the 
loss of a great opportunity for the courts of Botswana to make an authoritative ruling 
on the rights of homosexuals in Botswana.430 Currently, the dependency claim is 
unavailable for same-sex partners in Botswana and Lesotho. 
 
2.5.5.6 Assessment of damages legislation 
Botswana and Lesotho lack specific legislation for the assessment of damages. No 
information on legislation regarding assessment of damages was located in any of the 
two jurisdictions, but it was observed that they both make use of the South African 
Assessment of Damages Act. 431 The Constitutions of both jurisdictions have opened 
the doors for the courts, in appropriate circumstances, to apply international 
instruments relating to assessment of damages, which have not been promulgated yet 
in order to determine damages. The trend of relying on international or foreign 
legislations and case law is evident from an analysis of the cases reported in both 
                                            
430  Bojosi 2004 SAJHR 466-468. 
431  Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
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countries.432 The South African Assessment of Damages Act was thus extended to 
both jurisdictions. 
 
2.5.6 Conclusion 
The above discussion provided the background to the Botswana and Lesotho legal 
position on the action of dependants for loss of support. The following discussion 
focuses on the status of the dependency action for loss of support in Australia. 
 
2.6 Australian law 
2.6.1 Brief background to the historical development of the Australian dependency 
action 
Prior to 1846, the dependants of a deceased person, who had died as a result of 
another person’s wrongful and negligent act, were unable to bring an action for 
damages for the loss that they suffered as a result of this wrongful death.433 The most 
frequently quoted statement upon this subject is that of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v 
Bolton:434 “In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as 
an injury; and in this case of damages, as to the plaintiff’s wife, must stop with the 
period of her existence.” This common law rule, which was formulated in the early 
nineteenth century,435 was probably based on a delusion of preceding English 
authority.436 Even so, the rule became firmly established in Australia,437 with the effect 
that it was impossible for a plaintiff to sue a defendant for a wrong committed by the 
wrongdoer against the breadwinner or his dependants, when that wrong consisted in 
                                            
432  Archibald v Attorney-General 1989 BLR 421 (HC); R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130. 
433  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for wrongful death (report number 57 
November 2003). 
434  Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 170 ER 1033; Admiralty Commissioners v SS America [1917] 
AC 38. 
435  Exall Damages for personal injuries and death (2011) 12. 
436  Holdsworth A history of English law (1972) 333-336, 676-677. 
437  Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603 615 & 622. 
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damage causing the death of a breadwinner, in the continuance of whose life the 
dependants had an interest.438 The dependants were left with the entire economic 
burden following the breadwinner’s death.439 Moral considerations and shifting public 
perception necessitated the rectification of what had become an unacceptable position 
in common law.440 
 
This intolerable injustice inherent in the absence of a right of action for wrongful death 
was remedied by England in 1846, with the enactment of the Fatal Accidents Act, 
commonly referred to as Lord Campbell’s Act, titled “An Act for Compensating the 
Families of Persons Killed by Accidents.”441 Section 1 of the Act (now the Fatal 
Accidents Act 1976 (Eng)) provides that where a person’s death is caused by any 
wrongful act, neglect or default, which is such as would (if death had not ensued) have 
entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect 
thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable 
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured. The effect of section 
1(1) was concisely explained by Lord Denning MR in Gray v Barr:442 “If [the deceased] 
had lived, i.e., only been injured and not died, and living would have been entitled to 
maintain an action and recover damages  then his widow and children can do so. 
They stand in his shoes.” This Act created a statutory cause of action for the benefit of 
                                            
438  Holdsworth A history of English law (1972) 333-334. 
439  International Committee of the Red Cross and the Australian Red Cross workshop “Widowhood 
and armed conflict: challenges faced and strategies forward” Workshop on Widowhood organized 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Australian Red Cross at the 27th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, November 1999 https://www.icrc.org 
(accessed on 8 August 2016). 
440  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on Fatal Accidents, Project No 66 (1978) 3; 
Law Commission of Canada, Compensation for Relational Harm (2002) 
https://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/vanpraagh/chap04.asp (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
441  Bryant Death and dying (2003) 952. 
442  [1971] 2 QB 554 (CA) 569D. 
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certain members of a deceased person’s family, where the death of the deceased was 
caused by the wrongful act of another person. 
 
In Australia, there was also an attempt to remedy this situation through the enactment 
of legislation. In Queensland, the relevant provisions were originally located in section 
12 of the Common Law Practice Act of 1867 (Qld). The existing Queensland (Australia) 
provisions are found in section 17 of the Supreme Court Act of 1995 (Qld). The section 
provides as follows: “Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful, 
neglect or default act and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not 
ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in 
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable if 
death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the 
death of the person injured and although the death shall have been caused under such 
circumstances as amount in law to crime.” 
 
Today, legislation founded upon Lord Campbell’s Act and imitating section 1 of an Act 
for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents exists in all Australian 
jurisdictions, in order to provide a cause of action against wrongdoers for the benefit 
of the statutorily defined family of a deceased. Wrongful death statutes vary from state 
to state, but in general, they define who may sue for wrongful death, and what, if any, 
limits may be applied to an award of damages.443 The rights enforced by dependant-
                                            
443  Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); Compensation to Relatives 
Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (Northern Territories); Fatal 
Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); s 83 of the Discrimination Law 
Amendment Act 2002 (Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 
(Western Australia); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto Relationships Act 
2003 (Northern Territory); s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); s 1 of the 
Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); s 2.3 of the Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales); s 23 and 28(2) of the Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory). 
 88 
claimants constitute a new cause of action arising by statute, and are not an extension 
of rights vested in the deceased.444 Per se, the legislation aims not to rectify the 
deceased’s damage, but to compensate those who have been deprived of the 
breadwinner, upon whom they were financially dependant, for the loss of support 
suffered as a result of his death.445 
 
2.6.2 Overview of the history and present status of Aboriginal customary law 
The Aboriginal people of Australia maintain one of the oldest continuous living 
cultures.446 Customary law in Australia relates to the systems and practices amongst 
Aboriginal Australians,447 which have developed over time from accepted moral norms 
in Aboriginal societies, and which regulate human behaviour, mandate specific 
sanctions for non-compliance, and connect people with the land and with each other 
through a system of relationships.448 Customary laws are transferred by word of mouth 
and are not codified (nor can they be easily codified). In addition, they are not singular 
throughout Australia — different language groups and clans have different concepts of 
customary law, and what applies within one group or region cannot be assumed to be 
universal.449 Historically, customary law has not been recognised as part of the canon 
of Australian law.450 The current legal status of the Aboriginal customary law seems to 
                                            
444  Pym v The Great Northern Railway Company (1863) 122 ER 508. 
445  Parker v The Commonwealth [1965] HCA 12; (1965) 112 CLR 295; De Sales v Ingrilli (‘De Sales’) 
[2003] HCA 16; (2002) 212 CLR 338. 
446  AG STAFF WITH AAP - Australian Geographic “DNA confirms Aboriginal culture one of Earth's 
oldest – Australian cultures” https://www.australiangeographic.com.au/.../dna-confirms-aboriginal-
culture-one-of-earths-oldest September 23, 2011 (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
447  The Australian Law Reform Commission discussed the definition of an ‘Aborigine’ in its 1986 report, 
The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 31 
(1986), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra [88]–[95]: Aboriginal Australians are 
legally defined as people who are members "of the Aboriginal race of Australia." 
448  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia (February 2006) - Aboriginal Customary Laws 
(Project 94) - Discussion Paper Overview, Quality Press 7 ISBN 1-74035-056-1. 
449  Australian Law Reform Commission (12 June 1986) "The proof of Aboriginal customary laws" - 
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws ALRC Report 31 (Retrieved 30 May 2011). 
450  The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 31 
(1986), Australian Government Publishing Service. 
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be very similar to the South African position prior democracy. South Africa initially 
rejected the recognition of customary law, but has now moved on, with customary law 
being admitted and recognised in all its aspects.451 The non-recognition of customary 
law in Australia is unsurprising, because in both jurisdictions, namely South Africa and 
Australia, the law was greatly influenced by Europeans. In the words of the following 
authors: 
 
Ginibi:452 
“Aboriginal laws, traditional and customary laws, have never been 
acknowledged by the colonial invaders of Aboriginal people. They came with 
their godly marriages and paternalistic ways, and we were forced to 
assimilate, and give up our languages, and deny our culture and heritage 
because our traditional practices were classified as ’heathen’ and ’vennin’ to 
be cleared off the face of the earth. Three hundred Aboriginal nations were 
wiped out by the colonising of our lands, and we were forced by governments 
to become like white people. We were always the ones who had to conform 
to white ways and white ideas, because we were never allowed to be our 
selves. We were forced to conform to the laws and standards of the invaders 
of our country because we were never allowed to be our damn selves, as we 
are an oppressed people. We had our own laws, and a very democratic 
society before the Whiteman stuck his nose into our affairs~ and literally 
stuffed our culture up!” 
 
Clark:453  
“The experience of Aboriginal Australians since European settlement is 
replete with suppression of their cultural practices and knowledge by the 
dominant cultural group/s in Australia.” 
 
and Chisholm and Nettheim:454 
 
“In the first century of settlement, these included land dispossession by force, 
theft of women, slavery and war, introduced diseases, and the missionary zeal 
for Aboriginal people to embrace Western religion and reject their own spiritual 
beliefs such as the dreaming. Moreover, settlement brought with it the 
assertion of British sovereignty and law, which effectively displaced 
indigenous customary law.” 
                                            
451  See ss 33 & 35 of the interim Constitution; ss 30 31 39 & 211 of the Constitution. 
452  Ginibi http://www.ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=ltc (accessed on 8 
August 2016). 
453  Clark [2002] ALRCRefJl 5. 
454  Chisholm & Nettheim Understanding law: an introduction to Australia's legal system (2012) 85. 
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The history of indigenous people as a result of European colonisation is one in which 
they were subject to oppressive suppression of their culture.455 Nowhere has there 
ever been any colonial legislation acknowledging the existence and continuation of any 
part of Aboriginal customary law. The courts and parliaments have defined Aboriginal 
legal rights within the framework of colonial law as common law native title and 
discriminatory. 
 
There have been no colonial statutes anywhere that attribute any legal legitimacy to 
Aboriginal sovereignty, culture, languages, heritage and relationship to land and 
customary law.456 There have been some attempts to recognise Aboriginal customary 
law in the Australian legal system. Since the late twentieth century, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (1986) and the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia 
(2005) have written extensive reports investigating the desirability of recognising the 
role of customary law in legal situations involving Aboriginal Australians. 
 
The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws report was released by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in June 1986, after an intensive nine-year inquiry. It 
reinforces the power of the Australian legal system to set the terms on which the 
“customary system” is acknowledged.457 The 2015 report tackled the difficulties 
associated with showing evidence of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
traditional law and custom, and recommended that native title rights for commercial 
purposes be recognised.458 It suggested reforms to strengthen the internal governance 
                                            
455  Halloran Cultural maintenance and trauma in indigenous Australia (2004) 2-4. 
456  The Federal Government’s “Act of Recognition” and Aboriginal customary law. 
https://unlearningtheproblem.wordpress.com/.../the-federal-governments-act-of-recognition-and-
aboriginal-customary-law/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
457  Clark [2002] ALRCRefJl 5. 
458  Godden https://theconversation.com/from-little-things-the-role-of-the-aboriginal-customary-law-
report-in-mabo-60193 (accessed on 9 August 2017). 
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capacity of native title groups, while allowing for traditional authority to be exercised.459 
In the Northern Territory, some statutes and courts make explicit reference to 
customary law, where this is useful in identifying relationships or social expectations.460 
These changes have not been without controversy,461 especially in cases where 
customary law is either imprecise or infringes upon human rights.462 The Australian 
Law Reform Commission has also produced a paper exploring the relationship 
between traditional Aboriginal law and Anglo-Australian law.463 
 
Currently, it may be said that in an unsystematic, indirect, piecemeal way, Australian 
law does now allow for the recognition of Aboriginal customary laws and traditions. 
Such recognition tends to be limited and to represent a specific response to particular 
situations or needs.464 There seems to be no reason in principle why Aboriginal 
customary law should not be given a wider recognition in Australia. The Native Title 
Act 1993 is a defining piece of legislation in terms of customary law. It is a statute that 
evolved through common law. It is the ultimate recognition of the fact that indigenous 
Australian societies possessed, and continue to possess, well-developed systems of 
law. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
459  Ibid. 
460  See s 69 of the Community Welfare Act 1983 (NT); s 4 of the Sentencing Amendment (Aboriginal 
Customary Law) Act 2004 (NT). 
461  Walker v New South Wales [1994] HCA 64; Coe v Commonwealth [1993] HCA 42. 
462  Yaxley https://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1643178.htm/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
463  Harris 1994 Sunday Telegraph 4. 
464  Calma https://www.humanrights.gov.au/.../speeches/integration-customary-law-australian-legal-
system-tom-calma (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
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2.6.3 Legislative framework 
2.6.3.1 General 
In Australian law, compensation for injury or death arises in a number of different areas 
of the law, including worker’s compensation,465 motor vehicle accidents legislation,466 
and apportionment of damages legislation.467 The basis of a claim for loss of support 
is to be found in statutory law.468 Legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions to 
provide a cause of action against wrongdoers for the benefit of the statutorily defined 
family of a deceased. The legislation aims to compensate those who have been 
deprived of one upon whom they were financially dependant, for the loss of pecuniary 
support suffered because of the death.469 Compensation benefits are generally 
payable to the surviving spouse and children. In recent years, this basic principle has 
been extended in some states and territories to include a surviving de facto spouse 
and other persons who were dependant on the injured or deceased person.470 A 
traditional marriage is only specifically recognised in the Northern Territory for the 
purposes of determining entitlement to compensation. It is necessary to deal 
separately with each area of the law allowing for compensation for injury or death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
465  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.3.2 hereunder. 
466  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.3.3 hereunder. 
467  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.3.4 hereunder. 
468  See Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); Compensation to 
Relatives Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (Northern 
Territories); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); Steynberg 
https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2015). 
469  Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 2; Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed 
on 18 March 2015). 
470  Australian Law Reform Commission: Compensation for Injury or Death https://www.alrc.gov.au/ 
(accessed on 8 August 2016). 
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2.6.3.2 Workers’ compensation legislation 
Statutory workers’ compensation schemes have existed in Australia since the turn of 
the 20th century.471 They were established by legislation and exist in all the states and 
territories.472 For instance, in New South Wales, there are two important legislations: 
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) (1987 Act) and Workplace Injury 
Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (1998 Act). The most 
recent amendments to the workers’ compensation scheme occurred in 2012 in terms 
of the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW). If a worker is 
injured or dies as a result of a work injury, any person dependant upon the worker at 
the time of his or her death may be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.473 In 
the Northern Territory, the Workmen’s Compensation Act (NT) provides for 
compensation to be paid to relations “by blood, traditional marriage or custom, and 
there is specific provision for additional dependant traditional wives aged 16 or older. 
Dependant traditional wives aged below 16 are only eligible as dependant children.474 
In all other Australian jurisdictions, a traditionally married spouse would only be able 
to rely on the rights given to de facto spouses (e.g. widows) pursuant to workers’ 
compensation legislation, generally using a broad definition of “dependant.”475 For 
example, section 6(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), defines 
“dependant” as: 
such of the worker’s family as were wholly or in part dependant for support 
upon the worker at the time of his death ... and includes ... a person so 
dependant who although not legally married to the worker lived with the worker 
as the worker’s husband or wife on a permanent or bona fide domestic basis. 
                                            
471  Ibid. 
472  Ibid. 
473  The entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits is set out in s 9 of the 1987 Workers 
Compensation Act. S 9 provides that a worker who has received an injury (and in the case of the 
death of a worker, his or her dependants) shall receive compensation from the worker’s employer. 
474  ss 6 & 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (NT), Second Schedule, especially par (1A)(b)(i), D, 
E. There has been no Northern Territory experience of claims by traditional wives under the Act: 
President, Workmen’s Compensation Tribunal Submission 326 (29 April 1982). 
475  Eg s 6(1) of the Workers Compensation Act, 1926 (NSW). 
 94 
In some jurisdictions, a de facto relationship will only be recognised if the parties have 
lived together for a specified period of time476 or if there are children born of the 
relationship. These provisions are no doubt capable of benefitting traditionally married 
spouses, who would otherwise not qualify under the statutory criteria of dependency, 
although it is not clear whether they would allow compensation to be paid to more than 
one wife.477 It is very hard to justify excluding traditionally married dependants from 
entitlements to workers’ compensation benefits. These benefits are an important form 
of protection for employees and their dependants.478 
 
To deny compensation to Aboriginal dependants because they practice different family 
traditions would be to deny Aboriginal employees an important aspect of their 
employment rights, and to shift the burden of dependency from the employer to the 
State (through the social security system). It would be even less justified, in that the 
Australian Worker’s Compensation Acts pay little regard to the forms or categories, as 
distinct from the fact, of dependency.479 A traditional marriage should be recognised 
as a “marriage” for all workers’ compensation purposes. Specific provision for 
traditional spouses, as in the Northern Territory, is a better way of ensuring that this 
right of traditional married couples is implemented in practice.480 Existing provisions 
entitling putative or de facto spouses to workers’ compensation vary significantly 
between the states.481 Unnecessary time limits are imposed and the position of plural 
(polygamous) wives (between whom compensation rights on death should be shared) 
                                            
476  s 4AA of the Family Law Act, 1975 Australia available at https://www.diyfamilylawaustralia.com 
(accessed on 9 August 2017). 
477  cf In re Fagan (1980) 23 SASR 464-465 (Jacobs J). 
478  Australian Law Reform Commission: Aboriginal traditional marriage: areas of recognition – 
Compensation for Injury or Death https://www.alrc.gov.au/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
479  Ibid. 
480  Ibid. 
481  Ibid. 
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is not clearly dealt with.482 In most jurisdictions, the legislation relating to dependants 
appears to be wide enough to include situations of polygyny (even though it may not 
have been envisaged by the drafters of the legislation), but specific provision for this 
situation should be made.483 In South Africa, although we do not have specific 
provisions dealing with the sharing of the compensation money, it is common practice 
that the money will be divided equally amongst the polygamous wives. 
 
2.6.3.3 Motor vehicle accident compensation legislation 
The most common claims for loss of support are due to accidents on the road.484 Each 
state and territory in Australia has different laws on compensation of claims, with each 
state having its own third-party compensation policies. A compulsory third party (CTP) 
insurance policy provides cover for legal liability for personal injuries or death arising 
from the use of a motor vehicle. The insurance covers the relevant motor vehicle for 
accidents causing personal injury and/or death anywhere in Australia. The relevant 
authorities in terms of road accidents in Australia are New South Wales - Motor 
Accidents Authority; Northern Territory - Territory Insurance Office; Queensland - 
Motor Accident Insurance Commission; South Australia - Motor Accident Commission; 
Tasmania - Motor Accidents Insurance Board; and Western Australia - Insurance 
Commission of Western Australia. 
 
In the New South Wales state, claims for personal injury and death arising out of motor 
accidents that occurred on or after 5 October 1999 are dealt with under the provisions 
of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).485 The relevant Queensland 
                                            
482  Ibid. 
483  Ibid. 
484  Comparison of Workers' Compensation Arrangements in Australia – 
https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/.../ComparisonWorkersCompensationArrangementsAusNZ
2011.doc (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
485  s 4 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW). 
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legislation is the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (MAI Act). This Act does not 
provide for the payment of statutory or no-fault benefits. The legislation governs an 
entirely fault-based scheme. No compensation is paid to injured road users, unless 
they can prove the injury was caused by the negligence of another person.486 
 
In South Australia, a government institution that provides third party injury insurance 
solutions for South Australians is the Motor Accident Commission. The institution offers 
coverage and compensation for people injured in road crashes, where the owner or 
driver of a registered motor vehicle, or a passenger, is at fault. The Motor Accident 
Commission (the Commission) was established pursuant to the Motor Accident 
Commission Act 1992 (the MAC Act). The main function of the Commission is to 
provide compulsory third party (CTP) insurance for motor vehicle users in South 
Australia.487 The Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) is a Tasmanian government 
business enterprise that operates a compulsory third party personal injury insurance 
scheme.488 The Insurance Commission of Western Australia (Insurance Commission) 
is a statutory corporation or government trading enterprise owned by the State 
Government of Western Australia. The Insurance Commission has, since 1943, ran 
the Motor Injury Insurance Scheme in Western Australia.489 
 
The Motor Accidents Compensation (MAC) Scheme provides personal injury cover for 
individuals and their families, which is included in their NT motor vehicle registration. 
The Motor Accidents (Compensation) (“MAC”) Act (NT) establishes a compensation 
                                            
486  See Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (MAI Act). 
487  s 18 of the Motor Accident Commission Act 1992 (the MAC Act) (SA); Motor Accident Commission 
https://www.audit.sa.gov.au/Publications/Annual-reports/2015-Reports/Annual-Report-by-
agency/Motor-Accident-Commission (accessed on 16 September 2016). 
488  Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) (Tas) https://www.legalaid.tas.gov.au/referral-
list/listing/motor-accidents-insurance-board (accessed on 16 September 2016). 
489  Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA) sets out the scheme details; see Motor Injury 
Insurance https://www.icwa.wa.gov.au/motor-injury-insurance (accessed on 16 September 2016). 
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scheme in respect of people who are injured or killed in motor vehicle accidents in the 
Northern Territory. MAC can provide benefits such as loss of support, medical, 
rehabilitation and financial support, in order to help people recover from serious and 
sometimes permanent injuries caused by a road accident.490 It is a no-fault scheme, 
which means that one is covered regardless of who caused the accident. However, 
some exclusions and reductions in benefits may apply if the driver was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, was unlicensed to drive, or was involved in criminal or 
reckless conduct. A reduction may apply to some benefits if the injured person failed 
to wear a seatbelt or safety helmet where required by law.491 MAC is a government-
owned scheme managed by the Motor Accidents Compensation Commission (MACC) 
and administered on its behalf by the Territory Insurance Office (TIO).492 The Motor 
Accidents (Compensation) Act (Northern Territory - NT) 493 specifically provides for 
benefits to be payable both to a de facto spouse and an Aboriginal traditional spouse. 
A “spouse” is defined in section 4 to include: 
(d) a person who was not legally married to the person but who, for a 
continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the 
relevant time, had ordinarily lived with the person as the person’s husband or 
wife, as the case may be, on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis, and 
who, in the opinion of the Board, was wholly or substantially dependant upon 
the person at the time: and 
(e) where that person is an aboriginal native of Australia — a person referred 
to in (a), (b), (c) or (d) or who is, according to the customs of the group or tribe 
of aboriginal natives of Australia to which he belongs, married to him. 
                                            
490  Motor Accidents Compensation Scheme (NT) https://www.tiofi.com.au/car-insurance/macc/ 
(accessed on 16 September 2016). 
491  See Motor Accidents (Compensation) (“MAC”) Act (NT) - 
https://www.ntmacc.com.au/GeneralInformation.pdf (accessed on 16 September 2016). 
492  Northern Territory Motor Accidents Annual Report 2015-2016 
https://parliament.nt.gov.au/__.../152.-Annual-Report-2015-2016 (accessed on 16 September 
2016). 
493  s 4(d) & (e) of the Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act (NT). 
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A traditionally married person under paragraph (e) above is in a better position than if 
he or she was forced to rely on the de facto relationship qualifications in paragraph 
(d).494  
 
The Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT)495 applies to claims for loss of support 
arriving from incidents other than motor vehicle accidents, and has similar recognition 
provisions for de facto relationships and traditional marriages. Section 4(3)(e)(ii) 
provides that a person who, being an Aboriginal, has entered into a relationship with 
another Aboriginal that is recognised as a traditional marriage by the community or 
group to which either Aboriginal belongs, shall be treated as the wife or husband, as 
the case may be, of the deceased person. A similar approach is adopted in the 
Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth),496 which 
provides for compensation to dependants on the death of a Commonwealth employee. 
“Dependant” is defined to include a lawful spouse, and a woman who, throughout the 
period of three years immediately before the date of the death of the employee, 
although not legally married to him, lived with him as his wife on a permanent and bona 
fide domestic basis. In addition, an Aboriginal traditional spouse is specifically provided 
for a “spouse” in relation to an aboriginal native, or a deceased aboriginal native of 
Australia or of an external Territory. It includes a person who is or was recognized as 
the husband or wife of that aboriginal native by the custom prevailing in the tribe or 
group of aboriginal natives of Australia or of such a Territory to which that aboriginal 
native belongs or belonged.497 The point of this provision was explained by the 
                                            
494  According to the Northern Territory Insurance Office, in the first three years of the operation of the 
Act there had been no claims involving Aboriginal traditional wives Submission 330 (13 May 1982). 
495  s 4(3)(e)(ii) of Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT). 
496  This Act applies to an employee who sustained injuries or contracted a disease during the course 
of his or her employment. 
497  s 5 of Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth). 
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Commonwealth Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation as “a special provision 
required to cover such cases because, unless a tribal wife or wife by native custom 
could fulfil the requirements that a de facto wife had to meet, eg, cohabitation 
throughout a period of three years, then an incapacitated employee with a tribal wife 
or wife by native custom would, probably, be ineligible for the additional weekly 
compensation in respect of such a wife. Moreover, in the case of a compensable death 
of an Aboriginal employee, the wife or husband would, probably, not have been eligible 
for compensation although she or he was, in fact, a dependant spouse.”498 
 
In other Australian jurisdictions, traditionally married spouses would only be entitled to 
accident compensation benefits if they fell within the provisions covering de facto 
relationships or a qualification based on dependency.499 For example, in South 
Australia, the Wrongs Act 1936 enables a “putative spouse” to bring an action in 
respect of the death of a deceased spouse if caused by the “act, neglect or default” of 
another person.500 This legislation is unique in that it also specifically provides for an 
apportionment of benefits (in such manner as the court thinks fit) if both a lawful spouse 
and a de facto spouse survive the deceased.501 There is a five-year qualification 
requirement for a “putative spouse” under the South Australian Act. 
 
In Victoria, the Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic) established a system of no-fault 
compensation for persons injured in road accidents. A “dependant spouse” is defined 
                                            
498  Dwyer “Commissioner for Employees Compensation” Submission 327 dated 3 May 1982. 
499  Not all States recognize de facto spouses. Western Australia does not, despite a recommendation 
of the WALRC to include de facto spouses: WALRC, Report on Fatal Accidents, Perth, 1978, par 
3.32. 
500  s 3a of Wrongs Act 1936 (South Australia): definitions of “spouse” and “putative spouse.” 
501  Wrongs Act 1936 (SA): s 20(4) & (7) (action for wrongful death), s 23b (action by spouse for 
solatium). The apportionment provisions are ss 20(3) 23b(2) & (3). Under the Compensation 
(Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth) apportionment would be the 
responsibility of the Commissioner under s 45(3) & (4). 
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in section 3(1) to include a woman living with a man immediately prior to his death on 
a permanent and bona fide domestic basis, and wholly or mainly dependant on him for 
economic support.502 No time qualification is specified for a de facto spouse. The 
parties to a traditional marriage should be able to claim compensation for death or 
injury, independantly of whether they fall within the definition of a de facto relationship. 
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, in its report 
on The Effects of Asbestos Mining on the Baryulgil Community (1984), recommended 
that priority be given to legislation under the Commonwealth marriage power, providing 
recognition to Aboriginal marriages, at least for the purposes of actions for damages 
for loss of support by surviving dependants in cases of death caused by personal 
injury.503 Where there is more than one spouse (whether a traditional spouse or a 
Marriage Act spouse) eligible to receive compensation, the compensation should be 
apportioned between them at the discretion of the court or authority responsible for 
paying the compensation.504 
 
2.6.3.4 Apportionment of damages legislation 
The apportionment legislation is applicable and virtually uniform in all Australian 
jurisdictions.505 This legislation allows the court to reduce the damages recovered 
where a person suffers damage partly through his own fault, and partly through the 
fault of another, to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable, having regard 
to the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for the damage.506 Proportionate liability 
                                            
502  s 3(1) of the Motor Accidents Act 1973 (Vic). 
503  House of Representatives, Standing Committees on Aboriginal Affairs, Report: The Effects of 
Asbestos Mining on the Baryulgil Community, AGPS, Canberra, 1984, 120. 
504  The arguments outlined in para 2.6.3.1 dealing with workers’ compensation apply here as well. 
505  Swanton 1981 ALJ 278-279; House of Representatives, Standing Committees on Aboriginal 
Affairs, Report: The Effects of Asbestos Mining on the Baryulgil Community, AGPS, Canberra, 
1984, 120 par 1.32. 
506  Arthur https://www.coursehero.com/.../Damages-and-Equitable-Compensation-John-Arthur 
(accessed on 8 August 2016). 
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legislation is applicable in every state and territory in Australia.507 Unfortunately, the 
legislation is almost uniform in every jurisdiction, which means that there are slight 
differences. Proportionate liability was introduced in response to the 2001-2002 
insurance crises, in order to reduce rising liability insurance costs.508 Proportionate 
liability enabled liability to be apportioned between wrongdoers according to their 
assessed proportion of responsibility for the damage suffered. Instead of being liable 
for the whole amount of a judgment, a defendant would only be liable, to the extent of 
his or her responsibility, for the loss. It was envisaged that this approach would 
overcome unfairness to defendants arising from joint and several liabilities, particularly 
in cases of economic loss or property damage.  
 
With regard to the claim for loss of support, similar to South Africa, a dependant's claim 
for loss of support, being the dependant's own action and not one derived from the 
deceased's estate, cannot, in terms of the Act, be reduced on account of the deceased 
breadwinner's contributory negligence. In other words, the dependency claim will not 
be defeated due to the fault of the deceased breadwinner. The dependant is thus 
entitled to his or her full compensation. 
 
2.6.3.5 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) legislation 
Although Australia recognises same-sex relationships, couples were prevented from 
marrying by the 2004 amendments to the federal Marriage Act of 1961 by the Howard 
                                            
507  Queensland – Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); New South Wales – Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); 
Victoria - Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Western Australia - Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); Australian Capital 
Territory - Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Northern Territory – Proportionate Liability Act 2005 
(NT); South Australia – Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 
2001 (SA); Tasmania – Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Commonwealth - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and Australian Securities & Investments Commission (Cth). 
508  Commercial notes - Australian Government Solicitor 
https://www.ags.gov.au/publications/commercial-notes/CN38.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
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Government.509 Section 88EA of the Act stipulated that any foreign marriages of same-
sex couples “must not be recognized as a marriage in Australia.” However, same-sex 
couples could enter into civil unions and civil partnerships. Both unions allow couples 
to have state-sanctioned ceremonies and provide conclusive proof of the existence of 
the relationship, thereby gaining the same rights afforded to de facto couples under 
state and federal law, without having to prove any further factual evidence of the 
relationship. In this way, a registered relationship is similar to a registered partnership 
or civil union in other parts of the world.510 Recently, a law legalising same-sex 
marriage was passed by Parliament on 7 December 2017 and received royal assent 
the following day (8 December 2017).511 
 
Same-sex couples can jointly adopt in New South Wales, the Australian Capital 
Territory, Western Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, whilst Queensland, the Northern 
Territory and South Australia ban same-sex couples from adopting jointly.512 Altruistic 
surrogacy is legal in all Australian states and territories, except Western Australia and 
South Australia. On 4 May 2012, the New South Wales Supreme Court found, for the 
first time in Australian history, a same-sex couple to be the parents of a baby who was 
born through a surrogate, as it was in the child’s “best interests”.513 It is clear that same-
sex partners are allowed the benefits of a marriage. Therefore, a same-sex partner 
can institute a claim for loss of support, should his/her partner be unlawfully killed, and 
                                            
509  s 5(1) of Marriage Amendment Act, 2004 https://www.comlaw.gov.au (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
510  Bull, Pinto & Wilson https://www.aic.gov.au/media library/publications/tandi.../tandi029.pdf 
(accessed on 8 August 2016). 
511  Yaxley http://www.abc.nt.au/news/2017-12-08/same-sex-marriage-legislation (accessed on the 12 
December 2017) – see further discussion in chapter 3 of this thesis par 3.5.4. 
512  DIY Family Law Australia “Same sex couples: Fostering or adopting children” 
https://www.diyfamilylawaustralia.com/pages/same-sex-relationships/same-sex-couples-
fostering-or-adopting-children/ (accessed on 7 August 2017). 
513  MM v KF re FM [2012] NSWSC 445. 
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the same would apply to children legally adopted by same-sex couples, if one of their 
parents is unlawfully killed.514 
 
2.6.4 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that while Australia is a multicultural society like 
South Africa, and the role of customary law is of great value; Australia still recognizes 
customary law only in certain circumstances. This corresponds with the law in 
Botswana and Lesotho where recognition of customary law is also limited in respect of 
other personal aspects, for example LGBT’s rights. The experience in Australia, 
Botswana and Lesotho confirms the need to broaden the recognition of customary law 
in all their aspects, such as in South Africa. 
 
2.7 Chapter conclusion 
From the above expositions, it is clear that the Roman-Dutch law and English law roots 
of the action of dependants are strong and palpable in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho 
and Australia. The shared civilian ancestry means that many features of the four 
systems are similar, although South Africa has seen notable modern developments 
that cannot be traced back to Roman-Dutch or English law.515 Unlike in South Africa, 
Botswana and Lesotho, the recognition of customary law is a comparatively slow-
                                            
514  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2015); 
Winter South Australian MPs' conscience vote backs allowing same-sex couples to adopt 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-15/sa-house-of-assembly-mps-vote-for-same-sex-couples-
adoption/8026938 (accessed on 12 August 2017); Burke https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-
03/queensland-adoption-laws-same-sex-couple-able-to-adopt/7991340?section=qld (accessed on 
7 August 2017); Adoption Amendment (Same Sex Couples) Act, 2010 New South Wales; Tasmanian 
Upper House passes gay adoption bill – updated on the 28 Jun 2013, 1:38am 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-06-27/gay-adoption-passes/4786102 (accessed on 7 August 
2017); Riley Same-Sex Adoption Reform on the Agenda in Victoria 19 May, 2014 Victoria 
News; Adoption Amendment (Adoption by Same-Sex Couples) Act 2015 (VIC); Acts Amendment 
(Gay and Lesbian Law Reform) Act 2002 (WA). 
515  E.g., Recognition of customary law; full marriage rights granted to the South African LGBT 
community. Despite the fact much has been achieved under the new constitutional order in South 
Africa to give customary law and its underlying values a rightful place in South African law, there is 
still much work ahead, especially in the customary law domain. 
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moving area of law in Australia. It is questionable whether full recognition of customary 
law will occur in the near future. Although Australia,516 contrary to South Africa, 
Botswana and Lesotho, seems to have a law dedicated to dependency action, the 
absence of traditional legal values in its law on the action is clear. It will be of the utmost 
value for our sister jurisdiction, Australia, to learn from South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho, and to keep abreast of developments on this side of the world. 
 
Customary law in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho recognises a dependant’s right 
and action to claim damages from the person responsible for his or her breadwinner’s 
death. From the earliest times, long before the Europeans invaded the Cape,517 the 
dependency claim has always been available in terms of customary law.518 In line with 
customary law, it is a civil wrong to bring about, intentionally or negligently, the death 
of another.519 This customary law action of dependants is called go tsoša hlogo or go 
tsosa hlogo in Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho cultures. It is a well-established and 
recognised practise in customary law and has always been part of the legal system of 
African people of Southern Africa.520 Many features of this customary law action of 
                                            
516  For instance, Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Fatal Accidents Act 1950 (Western 
Australia); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 1936 (Southern Australia); 
Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (New South Wales); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 
(Northern Territories); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); s 83 of 
the Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 (Queensland); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality 
of Status) Act 2003 (Western Australia); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto 
Relationships Act 2003 (Northern Territory); s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); 
sch 1 of the Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); sch 2.3 of the 
Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales); ss 23 & 28(2) of 
the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory). 
517  Archive 1 “The Arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck in the Cape - 6 April 1652” 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/.../arrival-jan-van-riebeeck-cape-6-april-1652 (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
518  Kerr 1956 SALJ 402; Clark 1999 SALJ 20 24; Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Mayeki v Shield 
Insurance Co Ltd 1975 4 SA 370 (C). 
519  Sekese Mekhoa le maele a Basotho (2009) 60; Duncan Sotho laws and custom (2006) 105; Palmer 
Law of delict (1970) 114. 
520  Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 379; Clark 1999 SALJ 20; Dlamini 1984 SALJ 346; Pasela 
v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 (1) SA 339 (W); Joel v Zibokwana 4 NAC 
130 1919; Nohele 6 NAC 1928 19; Silimo v Vuniwayo 5 NAC 1953 135; Sipongomana v Nkulu 
1901 NHC 26. 
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dependants, are similar to the Roman-Dutch law and English law roots of the 
dependency action.521 The legal recognition of the rights of LGBT522 societies in 
Botswana and Lesotho seems unlikely to happen. Australia recognises same-sex 
relationships, and now even allows the couples to marry. The recognition of LGBT 
societies is not limited. It will be valuable for Botswana and Lesotho to learn in this 
respect from South Africa and Australia, and to keep abreast of the shifting public 
perceptions necessitating the rectification of what has become an unacceptable 
position in common law. 
 
This chapter dealt with the origin and history of the action of dependants in the four 
researched jurisdictions. It has set the foundation for the action of dependants for loss 
of support in terms of customary law and common law in the four researched countries. 
It is clear that the reality of the action for dependants for loss of support is complex, 
both in theory and in practice. Therefore, the effective understanding of the nature of 
the action of dependants for loss of support is imperative. In chapter 3, attention is 
given to the principles applicable to the action and some of the problems relating to it. 
Chapter 3 also looks closely at the circle of eligible dependants under the dependency 
action. 
  
                                            
521  See the discussion on the nature and principles of the action in ch 3. 
522  LGBT stands for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATURE OF THE DEPENDANTS’ ACTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an analysis of the claim for loss of support under the dependants’ action 
is placed in context, by emphasising the “loss of support” concept,523 the nature of the 
dependency action,524 in particular the objectives525 and requirements526 of this 
delictual remedy, and the development of delictual and statutory claims for loss of 
support for different categories of dependants.527 An issue presenting difficulty relates 
to the different classes of persons (dependants) who qualify to claim under the action 
for loss of support. The comparative countries528 vary in terms of who is authorised to 
be a plaintiff in the dependants’ action.529 The South African judiciary has recently 
broadened the class of dependants entitled to bring the action for loss of support.530 
The question to be answered is whether the expansion of the eligible class of 
dependants has reached its final stages, or whether, within an African customary law 
                                            
523  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.3 hereunder. 
524  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4 hereunder. 
525  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.2 hereunder. 
526  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.3 hereunder. 
527  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5 hereunder. 
528  South Africa, Australia, Botswana and Lesotho. 
529  Pannel v Fischer [1959] SASR 77 (FC); Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Assessment 
of Damages in Personal Injury & Wrongful Death Litigation: Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, Section 15C 
Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Report No 45, October 1983) 68–69; Jodaiken v Jodaiken 1978 
1 SA 784 (W); Fourie v Santam Insurance Ltd 1996 1 SA 63 (T); Senior v National Employers 
General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 
468 (D); Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (ZH); Union Government v Warneke 
1911 AD 657; Pike v Minister of Defence 1996 3 SA 127 (Ck); Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-
Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); 
De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34; Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Van Gool 1992 4 SA 61 
(A). 
530  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53; Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 
1911 AD 657; Satchwell v President of the RSA 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v DG, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 
BCLR 463 (CC); Robinson v Volks 2004 2 All SA 61 (C); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident 
Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (A); Mlisane v South African Eagle Insurance 1996 3 SA 36 (C); Zimnat Insurance v 
Chawanda 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS); Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006; Paixăo and another v RAF 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA). 
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context, the true circle of family spreads so wide that it will be an open-ended class of 
persons, and could ultimately lead to a widespread abuse of the action? Can the 
African perspective of an unlimited class of dependants be authenticated in light of our 
constitutional outlook? In other words, can the variety of dependants in terms of the 
claim for loss of support under the dependency action be expanded further, or has the 
action reached its logical conclusion?  
 
As previously stated, the reality of the claim for loss of support under the action for 
dependants is much more complex, both in theory and in practice. The language of the 
action was not well chosen, and its ultimate meaning was left largely in the hands of 
judicial interpretation. As a result, the action is enshrouded in uncertainties and 
practical implementation problems regarding the vested rights531 given by the 
dependency action. The issue of vested rights given by the action has not been 
authoritatively decided.532 The question is whether a claim for damages for loss of 
support and other related expenses arising out of the unlawful death of the breadwinner 
is necessarily a dependant’s action, or whether, in some circumstances, such a claim 
must take the form of a breadwinner’s action instead?533 This is a highly debatable 
issue within the action of dependants for loss of support and related expenses, and 
has led to differences of opinion amongst legal writers, court decisions, and other legal 
systems. This raises the following questions: Why are the views and legal systems 
                                            
531  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.1 hereunder. 
532  Mnguni v RAF 2015 ZAGPPHC 1074 par [14]. 
533  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575; Union Government (Minister of 
Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202; Senior NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 
SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 468 (D); Santam v Fondo 
1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis 
v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 
(SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Brooks v Minister of Safety & 
Security 2009 2 SA 278 (SCA); Boberg 1971 SALJ 437; Pont 1940 THRHR 165; Price 1952 
THRHR 60; Claasen 1984 THRHR 443; Neethling 2003 TSAR 786; Carpenter 2003 SAPL 257 
259. 
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deviating on this question? Can an all-inclusive approach be adopted in this regard? 
Which possible claimants or dependants will be excluded if the approach followed is a 
breadwinner or dependants’ action?  
 
Another issue that has not been finally settled is whether the dependants of a 
breadwinner who is injured (not killed) in a wrongful and culpable manner should, as 
in the case of death, be able to claim for loss of support with the Aquilian action?534 
There is a strong division of judicial pronouncements on this issue, as well as under 
the dependency action. The question is whether this inconsistency in the treatment of 
dependants of the injured breadwinner is justified under the action of dependency, and 
whether it should be tolerated in the post-constitutional dispensation. Precisely how 
should this issue be dealt with, and would it not be in the public interest to pursue a 
more comprehensive approach to such dependants? This chapter will examine these 
problems and issues in detail. 
 
3.2 Brief background 
Australia, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa have legal systems that evolved from 
the English common law tradition, which failed to recognise a cause of action for the 
estate or the dependants of the wrongfully and negligently killed breadwinner.535 In 
common law, in accordance with the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona,536 
the death of the breadwinner terminated any cause of action. A death, according to 
common law, no matter how wrongfully and negligently caused, could not be 
                                            
534  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299-300; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 22. 
535  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 9-10 292-3; 
Quansah https://www.pulapulapula.co.uk/ (accessed on 17 September 2016); Dube 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/lesotho.htm also available at 
https://www.jcl.sagepub.com/content (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
536  This rule literally means that a delictual claim died with the person in whom it vested: no cause of 
action survived the death of the victim or wrongdoer; Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482 487. 
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characterised as an injury to another, and was therefore unable to give rise to an action 
by a third party,537 for example the representative of the deceased’s estate and/or 
dependants. In other words, delictual rights and liabilities were extinguished on the 
death of the breadwinner.538 This doctrine produced substantial partialities, which left 
the deceased’s estate and dependants without any compensation at all.539 In 
response, to remedy the severity of the common law system, consideration was given 
to statutory solutions to reverse this unjust rule. The common law rule was effectively 
reversed through legislation in England in 1846, with Lord Campbell’s Act,540 and 
subsequently in all Australian jurisdictions, as well as other common law 
jurisdictions.541 This legislation created a statutory cause of action for wrongful death. 
Though Lord Campbell was writing about English law, the position is generally similar 
under Botswana,542 Lesotho543 and South African544 civil law. While the exact origins 
of the action of dependants are unknown in South Africa, the action is commonly 
regarded as an extension of the actio legis Aquiliae.545 According to positive law, in 
                                            
537  Baker v Bolton (1801)1 CAMP 493; 170 ER 1033; Admiralty Commissioner v SS Amerika [1917] 
AC 38; Woolworths v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603 622; Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 
9 NSWLR 172; Holdsworth English law (1972) 333-334. 
538  Stewart & Stuhmcke Tort law (2017) 405. 
539  Stewart & Stuhmcke Tort law (2017) 407; Holdsworth English law (1972) 333-334. 
540  Handford “Lord Campbell and the Fatal Accidents Act” (2013) 129 LQR 420; the relevant provisions 
are now found in the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK). The Act allows claims as stipulated in s 1(1): 
“If death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as would (if death had not 
ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect 
thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action 
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.” 
541  Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 15(1)(a); Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 
(NSW), s 2(1);  Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 5(1); Succession Act 
1981 (Qld), s 66(1); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 2(1)(a); Administration and 
Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(1)(b); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(1); Law 
Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(1); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1968 
(ACT); Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act (NT); 
Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas); Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic); Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA); De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] HCA 52, (2002) 212 CLR 
338 [12]. 
542  Archibald v Attorney 1989 BLR 421 (HC). 
543  Dube https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/lesotho.htm (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
544  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292. 
545  Davel https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 17 September 2016); 
Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 9-10. 
 110 
Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa, the dependants of the deceased breadwinner 
who was wrongfully and negligently killed may claim damages for loss of support from 
the wrongdoer with the actio legis Aquiliae.546 
 
Unlike Australia,547 the other official, applicable law in Botswana, Lesotho and South 
Africa is customary law, which draws no clear distinction between delicts on the one 
hand, and crimes on the other.548
 
The unlawful causation of the death of another 
person traditionally gave rise to delictual liability in customary law.549 Originally, 
manslaughter and homicide were deemed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal 
chief.550 Normally, a part of the customary fine imposed by the chief would be allocated 
to the deceased’s relatives.551 However, the dependants did not institute claims for 
damages themselves,552  but this did not mean that they did not have the right to claim 
for loss of support where their breadwinner was wrongfully and negligently killed. The 
customary law loss of support action was recorded in 1901 with the Sipongomana v 
                                            
546  Burchell Delict (1993) 233; Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) par 9; Sekale v Minister of health 
2006 1 BLR 438 (HC); Archibald v Attorney 1989 BLR 421 (HC). 
547  See Chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.2; also see the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 31 (1986), Australian Government Publishing Service; 
Ginibi https://www.ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=ltc (accessed on 8 
August 2016); Clark Geoff [2002] ALRCRefJl 5; Chisholm & Nettheim Understanding law (2011) 
85; Halloran Cultural maintenance and trauma in Indigenous Australia (Paper presented at the 23rd 
Annual Australia and New Zealand Law and History Society Conference, Murdoch University, 
Western Australia 2-4th July, 2004) (unpublished contribution at a conference); The Federal 
Government’s “Act of Recognition” and Aboriginal customary law 
https://www.unlearningtheproblem.wordpress.com/.../the-federal-governments-act-of-recognition-
and-aboriginal-customary-law/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
548  Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (accessed on 17 September 
2015); Olivier 2004 LAWSA: Indigenous Law paras 212-217; Palmer & Potter Legal system (1972) 
53; Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70; Palmer Law of delict (1970) 7 16 19 112 113 212; Quansah 
https://www.pulapulapula.co.uk/ (accessed on 8 August 2016); Dube 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/lesotho.htm (accessed on 8 August 2016); also see 
https://www.jcl.sagepub.com/content (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
548  Maithufi & Bekker 2009 OBITER 164; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 379; Pasela v 
Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W). 
549  Palmer & Potter Legal system (1972) 53. 
550  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 7 16 19 112 113. 
551  Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70. 
552  Maithufi & Bekker 2009 OBITER 164 167; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 379; Pasela v 
Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W). 
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Nkuku553 case, which was
 
decided in KwaZulu-Natal.
 
Here the court found that if a valid 
customary marriage was concluded, a personal claim for loss of support of the wife 
and children could be instituted under customary law.554 
 
Today, both the estate and dependants of a wrongfully and negligently killed 
breadwinner have claims, in both civil and customary law, against the wrongdoer 
where a delict has caused the death.555 This type of action is commonly known as go 
tsoša/tsosa hlogo under customary law in Sepedi/Sotho/Setswana language, or 
wrongful death in the English language, and may arise out of a number of 
circumstances, such as medical malpractice,556 which results in the breadwinner’s 
death, an automobile or airplane accident, occupational exposure to hazardous 
conditions or substances, criminal behaviour, etcetera.557  
 
Wrongful death gives rise automatically to two different claims in law – a claim under 
the personal injury (survivorship) action, and a claim under the dependency action.558 
The survivorship action is brought by the executor of the estate of the deceased 
breadwinner, and is based on the deceased’s claim for damages for personal 
injuries559 arising from a delict committed by the defendant wrongdoer, which resulted 
in the deceased’s death, and which the deceased would have been able to sustain had 
he lived. The executor of the estate therefore steps into the deceased’s shoes560 to 
                                            
553  1901 NHC 26. 
554  Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302 306-308 314. 
555  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184. 
556  Maimela 2013 THRHR 589; Sekale v Minister of Health 2006 1 BLR 438 (HC). 
557  Maimela v Makhado Municipality [2011] ZASCA 69 (unreported). 
558  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184. 
559  Possible losses could be: pre-death loss of income, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; 
ambulance costs; medical and hospital costs; necessary travel costs; funeral expenses, etc. 
560  Any claims which existed immediately before the death remain in existence, and must be resolved 
as part of the process of administering the deceased’s estate. In other words, all the rights and 
liabilities accumulated up to the date of death are transferred to the deceased’s estate, to be sorted 
out by the executors or administrators. The said executor or administrator will lodge a claim for all 
personal injury losses on behalf of the deceased’s estate. However, the litis contestatio stage must 
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preserve this action.561 On the other hand, the dependency action is brought by the 
dependants of the deceased breadwinner against the defendant wrongdoer. The 
dependants of the deceased are entitled to sustain an action against the wrongdoer 
for the loss of support that the deceased would have provided to them (dependants) if 
he/she had lived for the period during which they (dependants) would have been reliant 
on him/her. 
 
The claims by the estate and dependants are coexistent and not alternatives.562 They 
are two separate and distinct causes of action. Different losses are involved under 
each cause of action, and there will not be a duplication of claims. The survivorship 
cause of action belongs to the estate for the deceased's losses suffered prior to 
death.563 The wrongful death cause of action belongs to the dependants of the 
deceased, who have suffered pecuniary loss because of death. In most situations, the 
greatest pecuniary loss suffered by the dependants is loss of support, but it is not 
restricted to this. It also includes funeral expenses and loss of services provided by the 
deceased.564 For purposes of this chapter, only the dependency action (wrongful 
death) is discussed. 
 
Before embarking on a discussion on the nature of the dependants’ action, it is 
important to gain an understanding of the concept “loss of support”. This concept is 
                                            
have been reached prior to death, particularly in the claim for pain and suffering, and loss of the 
amenities of life. 
561  Work Cover Queensland v Amaca Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 34, (2010) 241 CLR 420 [38]. 
562  Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 18(1); Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 
(NSW), s 2(5); Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 9(1); Succession Act 
1981 (Qld), s 66(4); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 6(1)(a); Administration and 
Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(9); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(5); Law Reforms 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(5). 
563  In the modern law, the survivorship cause of action for personal injury falls under these five 
headings: Pain and suffering, loss of the amenities of life, loss of future earnings/earning capacity, 
past medical expenses and future medical expenses. 
564  Ketsekele v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 308; 2015 4 SA 178 (GP). 
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utilised in different legal disciplines, particularly in family law and the law of delict. 
Therefore, great care has to be exercised in examining and applying the concept. 
Although these two areas superficially exhibit some common elements with regard to 
loss of support or maintenance, as it is called in family law, each concept is used to 
achieve varying objectives in the two areas. The family law concept of loss of 
maintenance cannot automatically be applied to cases involving delictual claims for 
loss of support, and vice versa.565 The family law concept of loss of maintenance 
warrants further investigation and research for future development and extension of its 
application in delictual cases. An overlap of the family law concept of “loss of 
maintenance” and the law of delict concept of “loss of support” does not mean that any 
culpable conduct under family law will automatically qualify as a delict. The concept 
“loss of support” will be explained in more detail in the next paragraph. 
 
3.3. Concept of “loss of support” in South Africa 
3.3.1 Family law concept 
The family law perception of loss of support is known as the duty of support or the duty 
to maintain. It relates to the legal duty to maintain the well-being of a family member.566 
The duty to maintain a family member is not limited to maintaining a child.567 Any family 
member,568 irrespective of his or her age, can ask another family member to maintain 
him or her.569 Generally, the duty to maintain is reciprocal,570 meaning that such a duty 
                                            
565  Klopper 2007 THRHR 440 445. 
566  E.g. parents, spouses and children – see Maintenance Amendment Act 9 of 2015. 
567  The duty to support a child rests commonly on both parents and must be shared between them 
according to their means. S15(3)(iii) of the Maintenance Act 9 of 2015 provides that the duty to 
support children exists irrespective of whether a child is born in or out of wedlock, or is born of a 
first or subsequent marriage. 
568  The relationship must have been created by birth (blood relation), adoption, or marriage. 
569  See Maintenance Amendment Act 9 of 2015 
https://www.justice.gov.za/vg/mnt.html#sthash.p375ITJs.dpuf (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
570  Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 642 643F. 
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may arise in either party. For example, although the parent is usually obliged to 
maintain his or her child, in certain circumstances, the obligation will fall on the child to 
maintain a parent,571 subject to certain requirements. In the case of family law, it is 
imperative to establish whether a duty to maintain exists, and even determine the 
extent of the duty of maintenance. In other words, the actual content of the duty to 
maintain is of paramount importance. The test is whether the following requirements 
are met: 
 The person claiming support must be unable to maintain himself or herself; 
 The person from whom support is claimed must be able to maintain the 
claimant; 
 A familial relationship must exist between the parties, for example the 
relationship must have been created by birth (blood relation), adoption, or 
marriage.572 
 
In Oosthuizen v Stanley,573 which dealt with the legal duty of children to support their 
parents, the court characterised support as including food, clothing, accommodation, 
medical care, education, and even payment of legal fees, bail and all other reasonable 
needs.574 The extent of this duty to maintain under family law is determined and 
balanced with reference to the social position, financial means and lifestyle of the 
parties,575 and is not necessarily limited to the bare necessities of life in the strict sense 
                                            
571  A remarkable exception is a child born out of wedlock, who is entitled to claim maintenance from 
his father, although he does not owe his father the corresponding duty. 
572  The main requirement of the test is whether the person who is liable to pay maintenance has the 
means to pay maintenance, and the maintenance is reasonable. 
573  1938 AD 322. 
574  Caldwell v Erasmus 1952 4 SA 43 (T) 45; Hahlo & Kahn South African law of husband and wife 
(1975) 135. 
575  Gammon v McCure 1925 CPD 137. 
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of the word,576 but applies only between family members (familial relationships).577 This 
interpretation of the duty to maintain is clearly limited in its scope of application. 
 
In Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd,578 the family law concept of loss of 
support was applied under the nasciturus fiction and extended to the law of delict in an 
action for loss of support by the dependants. Chisholm was the first case in which the 
nasciturus fiction was extended to the law of delict: The plaintiff’s husband had died in 
a mine accident and it was found that the accident had been negligently caused by an 
employee of the defendant. At the time of death of the breadwinner, the plaintiff was 
pregnant with their first child. She claimed damages due to the infringement of her and 
her child’s right to maintenance. The court ruled that the unborn child in a claim for 
damages is in the same position as children already born.579 The court extended the 
application of the nasciturus fiction to include instances where a delict had been 
committed against the unborn child. The court held that the unborn child has a right of 
action against the wrongdoer who caused the death of the breadwinner for loss of 
support. However, this action has a qualification, namely that the child must be born 
alive. 
 
In the law of delict, another meaningful development took place in Pinchin v Santam 
Insurance Co Ltd,580 wherein the nasciturus fiction was expanded to cover not only 
patrimonial loss, but also cases of reparation (recoverability of non-patrimonial 
                                            
576  Young v Coleman 1956 4 SA 213 (D); Modise v Modise 2007 1 BLR 622 (HC). 
577  Klopper 2007 THRHR 440 443 445. 
578  1909 TH 297 301. 
579  Boezaart (Davel) & Jordaan Persons (2016) par 2.3.1.3.2. 
580  1963 2 SA 254 (W). Pinchin’s case has been quoted with approval in judgments in Australia - see 
Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353 (FC), a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, at 360. It has also 
been discussed in leading textbooks published in Australia - see Fleming The law of torts (1998) 
182. 
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damages).581 Here an expectant mother was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and 
her child was subsequently born with cerebral palsy. As a result of the brain damage, 
the child would never be able to take care of herself. The accident was caused by the 
sole negligence of the driver of the other motor vehicle. The claim was unsuccessful, 
since it was not proven that the cerebral palsy of the foetus had been caused by the 
injury sustained by the mother. If it had been proven that the child's cerebral palsy was 
the result of the injuries sustained by the applicant during the accident, the nasciturus 
fiction would have been applicable to this case. 
 
Although the principles of our family law are flexible enough to extend the nasciturus 
fiction to the field of delict, and an unborn child does in fact have a claim for pre-natal 
injuries,582 both the Chisholm and Pinchin cases have been criticised by legal authors. 
This criticism is, mainly because our law of delict does not require that the wrongful act 
and damage caused should occur simultaneously. Therefore, it is unnecessary to 
invoke the nasciturus fiction in delict. For example, Joubert583 is of the opinion that the 
use of the nasciturus fiction is unnecessary when dealing with delictual claims. In his 
view, the actio legis Aquiliae is flexible enough to embrace the challenges presented 
to it by pre-natal injuries and infringement of the subjective rights of unborn children. 
Boberg584 has a contrasting view on the relevance of the nasciturus fiction. He states 
that the nasciturus fiction could be implemented with success if its scope could be 
extended to include actions based on pre-natal injuries, because the child does not 
only suffer injuries from the time of birth but begins suffering from the time of the 
commission of the delict. 
                                            
581  Boezaart (Davel) & Jordaan Persons (2016) par 2.3.1.3.2.  
582  Mankga 2007 Codicillus 50-51. 
583  Joubert 1963 THRHR 295 297. 
584  Boberg Persons (1999) 33. 
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The Chisholm and Pinchin cases have now been overruled in respect of the extension 
and application of the nasciturus fiction to the law of delict by the decision in the RAF 
v Mtati case.585 Here the mother was involved in a collision and the foetus was injured 
in utero and born brain damaged. The court held that the ordinary principles of delict 
apply, and it is not necessary to extend the nasciturus fiction to the law of delict. It is 
clear from the above discussion that the extension and use of the nasciturus fiction to 
include delictual claims would not provide a solution to a matter with overlapping 
delictual and family law principles. Furthermore, in the nasciturus fiction matter, there 
was no need to rely on family law in order to expand delictual claims. 
 
3.3.2 Delictual concept 
After the exploration of the concept of “support or maintenance” within family law, it is 
obvious that the acceptance of the limited understanding of this concept as applied in 
family law into the law of delict may lead to possible partiality. The objective of allowing 
a maintenance claim in family law also differs from the objective of allowing a claim for 
delictual damages based on loss of support. An analysis of the approach in the law of 
delict to the loss of support concept is required to determine whether the family law 
concept is valid and applicable when dealing with a delictual claim based on the 
unlawful and negligent killing of a breadwinner.586 Should the family law concept be 
acknowledged as a true reflection of the content of “loss of support” for purposes of a 
delictual claim for loss of support, it could have the potential of limiting recoverable 
damages. This is the case because the law of delict, although it utilises the duty to 
support as its principle for a claim for damages based on loss of support,587 it seeks to 
                                            
585  [2005] ZASCA 65; 2005 (3) All SA 340 (SCA). 
586  Klopper 2007 THRHR 444. 
587  Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 
(SCA). 
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effect restitution to a position prior to the commission of the delict.588 This fundamental 
principle of the law of delict seems to establish a somewhat wider and more liberal 
approach to the concept of “support” as applied in family law. The objective in awarding 
delictual damages for loss of support differs somewhat from the objective in awarding 
a claim for maintenance in family law. In order to be able to fulfil the restitutory function 
of damages within the law of delict, one may be compelled to include “losses”589 other 
than the necessities indicated by the content of support, as found in family law.590 
 
As far as the law of delict is concerned, “loss of support” includes considerations that 
do not strictly fall within the understanding of the same concept as in family law, and 
rather generically denotes all the negative consequences (losses) suffered by a 
dependant due to the death of his or her breadwinner. From case law,591 it appears 
that the concept of “loss of support” in the law of delict is ostensibly wider than that 
found in family law.592 The latter concept in essence only relates to familial 
relationships with reciprocal duties. In Jameson’s Minors v CSAR,593 the court said the 
following in relation to damages for loss of support: 
“There only remains the question of damages, and it is one of the most difficult 
points in this case. The general principles which should guide us are plain. I 
need only refer to Voet, who lays down the rule very clearly. He says (9,2,11): 
‘According to the modern practice the scope of the action’ . . . that is, an action 
by the widow or children of a man who has been killed through the default of 
another . . . ‘has been extended, in as far as it is now allowed to the wife and 
children of any husband or father killed through another’s default, for such 
damages as the equity of the judge will determine, account being taken of the 
maintenance which the deceased would have been able to supply, and had 
usually supplied, out of his labour, to the wife and children, or to other near 
relatives.’ I do not think that Voet intended to restrict, or that we should restrict 
the word ‘maintenance’ victus to the supply of mere necessities of life. It must 
                                            
588  Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 118ff. 
589  E.g. pre-death pain and suffering, funeral expenses, loss of services, etc. 
590  Anders 1909 SALJ 214. 
591  Radebe v RAF [2013] ZAGPJHC 135; Keforilwe v RAF [2015] ZANWHC 74; M v RAF [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 708; Santam v Fourie 1997 1 SA 611 (A); Singh v Ibrahim [2010] ZASCA 145; RAF v 
Monani 2009 4 SA 327 (SCA); Makhuvela v RAF 2010 1 SA 29 (GSJ); RAF v Maphiri 2004 2 SA 
258 (SCA). 
592  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.3.1 above. 
593  1908 TS 575 602. 
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include all the material advantages, conveniences, comfort, support, which 
the father would have afforded the claimants, but for his death. The language 
used shows that the Court must pay regard to what the deceased had been 
used to supply in the past – that is, to the station in life of the parties, and the 
comforts, conveniences and advantages which they had been 
accustomed.”594 
 
This interpretation was seemingly not accepted in Van Vuuren v Sam.595 In this case, 
the mother of a seventeen-year old boy claimed damages for loss of support after her 
son died because of the unlawful and negligent act of the defendant (respondent). In 
order to succeed, the plaintiff (appellant) was called upon to prove that the defendant 
unlawfully and negligently killed her son, and that the deceased son contributed to her 
support because he was legally obliged to do so. The deceased was employed and 
received a salary of R250 per month. The plaintiff’s husband was clearly in financial 
difficulties, to the extent that he was hard-pressed to maintain his family, of which the 
plaintiff was a member. The deceased, during his lifetime, gave some of his salary to 
his mother. According to the evidence, it was not proven what the exact amount was. 
The plaintiff’s entire case was based on the fact that her deceased son had a duty to 
support her. According to the principles of family law, parents are owed a duty of 
support by their children only if they can show that they are indigent and incapable of 
providing for themselves.596 In order to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact 
indigent and consequently owed a duty of support, the court was compelled to 
determine in what respect the plaintiff should be indigent. The question therefore was 
not what the plaintiff had lost in the form of support, but what she should lack in order 
to be found indigent, so that the duty of her deceased son to support her could be 
established. To establish whether the plaintiff was lacking in terms of basic needs, the 
court was compelled to investigate the measure that has to be applied in order for the 
                                            
594  Klopper 2007 THRHR 444. 
595  1972 2 SA 633 (A) 642. 
596  Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474. 
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support duty of a child to exist. In arriving at the decision that such duty did not exist, 
the court held that a parent is not entitled to support on the basis that he or she lacks 
that which he or she was accustomed to, but only when he or she is lacking the 
necessities of life.597 The court in this case had thus incorrectly applied the restricted 
family law concept of support to a delictual claim for damages. 
 
The distinctions between the family law concept of “loss of maintenance” and the 
delictual law concept of “loss of support” have been clearly explained. The concept of 
“loss of support” under law of delict is broader, more varied, applies beyond family 
members, and does not contain the reciprocal duty of maintenance or support. For the 
reasons highlighted above, it is clear that the family law concept of maintenance is 
limited in its scope and application to the family law sphere. Therefore, extending the 
family law concept of the duty to support to the law of delict will not provide any benefits 
or solutions to the questions posed regarding the application of the dependency action 
within the sphere of the law of delict.598 Keeping this theoretical background of the loss 
of support concept and its applicable principles of family law and law of delict in mind, 
the next paragraph looks at the nature of the dependency action. 
 
3.4 Nature of the action of dependants 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The action of dependants is a brilliant example of law in motion, of law not being 
stagnant but being able to amend and adjust to changing times.599 This flexible nature 
appears to be the same throughout the four countries being studied in this research. 
                                            
597  Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 641-643E. 
598  The term “loss of support” should not be used interchangeably. For family law, the term “loss of 
maintenance” should be utilised, while the term “loss of support” should be used for law of delict. 
599  Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (accessed on 17 September 
2015). 
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As early as 1911, the South African Appeal Court600
 
found that the dependants’ claim 
for loss support was a flexible remedy that needed to be adapted to modern conditions. 
The dependency action is a statutory601 delictual remedy, which can be instituted to 
claim and recover the loss of support that has been suffered by the dependants 
(plaintiffs) of the deceased (breadwinner), who was wrongfully and negligently killed 
by the wrongdoer (defendant).602 This remedy has been described as an anomaly, 
peculiar or sui generis in nature, in that it is based on a delict that is committed against 
the breadwinner, rather than against the dependant(s).603 The dependants' action 
constitutes a departure from the normal delictual principles, and this is why the courts 
regard the action as an anomaly  and describe it as sui generis.604 
 
A crucial and uncommon feature of the remedy for loss of support is that although the 
defendant incurs liability because he or she has acted wrongfully and negligently (or 
with intention  dolus) towards the deceased breadwinner, by causing his or her death, 
the claimants (dependants) derive their right of action not through the deceased 
breadwinner, or from his or her estate, but because they have suffered a loss through 
the death of the deceased breadwinner, for which the defendant is legally 
responsible.605 As stated above, the reason for this anomaly or peculiarity is because 
                                            
600  Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657 at 665 668: The 
Court recognised that no dependant’s action at the instance of the husband was mentioned in the 
old authorities, but this was because it never occurred to the jurists of the seventeenth century to 
extend this remedy to a husband. It was held that there was no reason why our courts should not 
adapt the Lex Aquilia to the conditions of modern life, in this respect as far as that can be done 
without doing violence to its principles. 
601  A claim for loss of support as the result of the wrongful and negligent act of another may be created 
by legislation or may function in terms of legislative provisions. For different statutes, see Chapter 
2 of this thesis, par 2.4.4 (South Africa), par 2.5.5 (Botswana & Lesotho) & par 2.6.3 (Australia). 
602  Van der Walt & Midgley Delict (2016) paras 54 & 96; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 
814 (A). 
603  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292. 
604  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par [15]. 
605  Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security [2008] ZASCA 141; 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) par 7; Paixăo v 
RAF [2012] ZASCA 130 par 12; Neethling 2009 THRHR 297-299; Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 
1074 paras [7] & [8]. 
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the action is not based on the law of delict as we know it. In a loss of support claim, 
the delict is not committed against the dependant himself or herself, but against the 
deceased breadwinner.606 This delictual claim is based on a delict committed against 
someone else (the deceased) other than the claimant (the dependant). However, the 
traditional notion that the dependency action is sui generis has provoked strong 
criticism607 over the years, which has led to differences of opinion amongst legal 
writers,608 court outcomes609 and other legal systems.610 The language of the action 
was not well chosen, and its ultimate meaning was left largely in the hands of judicial 
interpretation. As a result, the action is enshrouded in several uncertainties regarding 
the vested rights given by the dependency action. 
 
3.4.1.1 Vested rights 
In South Africa, the question of vested rights given by the action has not been 
authoritatively decided.611 The dilemma concerns the question as to whether a claim 
for damages for loss of support arising out of the unlawful and negligent death of the 
breadwinner is necessarily a dependant’s action, or whether, in some circumstances, 
such a claim must take the form of a breadwinner’s action instead.612 This is a highly 
                                            
606  Mnguni v RAF 2015 ZAGPPHC 1074 par [15]; Neethling 2009 THRHR 297. 
607  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par [9]. 
608  Dendy 1990 SALJ 155 157; Burchell 1999 SALJ 729 731. 
609  Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A); Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Victor NO 
1986 1 SA 601 (A); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); 
Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Brooks v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA). 
610  Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 17; Fombad https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 17 
September 2016). 
611  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 paras [12] & [14]. 
612  Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575; Union Government (Minister of 
Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202; Senior NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 
SA 136 (W); Ismael v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 468 (D); Santam v Fondo 
1960 2 SA 467 (A); Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA); Du Plessis 
v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 
(SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2008 2 SA 397 (C); Boberg 1971 SALJ  429; Pont 
1940 THRHR 167; Conradie 1943 THRHR 148; Price 1952 THRHR 60; Claasen 1984 THRHR 
443; Neethling 2003 TSAR 789; Carpenter 2003 SAPL 260. 
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debated question within the action of dependants. Some authors and cases are an 
authority for the view that a claim for loss of support is based on the wrongful and 
culpable causing of damage to the dependant himself.613 Other authors and cases hold 
that the claim for the action of dependants is based on a delict committed against the 
breadwinner.614 
 
Those who criticise the traditional view support what is referred to as the “theoretically 
correct approach”, on the basis that the traditional view cannot be dogmatically 
justified. The root of the criticism is that it is completely unsound to base an action for 
damages on a delict committed against, and therefore damage caused to, another 
person  almost in the form of a delict per consequentias. The dogmatically correct 
view is that the dependant's claim should be based on the wrongful, culpable causing 
of damage (loss of support) to the dependant himself or herself.615 The notion that the 
dependency action is sui generis has subsequently been rejected by Neethling, who 
argues that it is completely unacceptable to base a delictual claim [indirectly] on a delict 
committed against someone else.616 According to Neethling, the correct approach is 
endorsed by the Apportionment of Damages Act,617 by recognising that the negligent 
                                            
613  Neethling 2009 THRHR 297 297-299; Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 348; 
Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 19; Gibson 
Wille’s principles (1977) 514; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 837-838; Brooks 
v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 4 ALL SA 1389 (C) 1394-1400; Santam v Henery 1999 3 
SA 421 (SCA) 430; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1326; Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 222; 
Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956, s 2(1B). 
614  Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 50-51; Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 345; 
Boberg Delict: Aquilian liability (1984) 728; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 293; Brooks 
v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97-98; Plotkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd 
1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394; Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409; Harde v 
Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1974 2 SA 109 (E) 114D. 
615  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par [9]; Neethling 2009 THRHR 297. 
616  Neethling 2009 THRHR 296 304. 
617  s 2(1B) of Act 34 of 1956 as amended by Act 58 of 1971. 
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wrongdoer and the contributorily negligent breadwinner can be regarded as joint 
wrongdoers vis-à-vis the dependants. 
 
The Apportionment of Damages Act provides that if the negligent conduct of the 
deceased breadwinner and the third party contributed to the breadwinner's death, and 
consequently to the dependants' loss of support, they are regarded as joint 
wrongdoers, and are therefore jointly and severally liable in delict vis-a-vis the 
deceased breadwinner's dependants for the same damage.618 These provisions 
acknowledge that the delict is committed directly against the dependants, whose claim 
is based on a delict committed against them.619 The “theoretically correct approach” is 
also said to be endorsed, by implication, by the Supreme Court of Appeal in cases 
such as Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund620  and Du Plessis v RAF.621 
In these cases, the court’s decision that the dependants right to support was worthy of 
protection against the negligent conduct of a third party (wrongdoer) is a clear 
indication that the action of dependants is based on a delict against the dependants 
themselves. However, Boberg622 contends that the 1971 amendment of the 
Apportionment of Damages Act, which introduced the provisions of section 2(1B), does 
not confer rights of action upon dependants, but merely creates a new class of joint 
wrongdoers, namely the injured person (breadwinner) or the deceased's estate. In 
addition, Boberg states that the rights of the plaintiff must be sought within the four 
corners of section 2 of the Apportionment of Damages Act. According to Boberg, the 
section deals only with joint wrongdoers  it does not cover cases where the plaintiff’s 
loss has been caused by a single wrongdoer. As such, Boberg is of the opinion that 
                                            
618  See s 2(1) of the Apportionment of Damages Act. 
619  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 293. 
620  1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1326. 
621  2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 370-378. 
622  Boberg 1971 SALJ 452. 
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the inevitable conclusion is that no right of action is conferred upon a dependant whose 
breadwinner has killed or injured himself or herself through his or her fault alone. He 
goes on to state the following: 
"Once again the legislature has removed one anomaly only to create another. 
It appears that the dependant can sue the breadwinner or his estate together 
with another joint wrongdoer or alone where there is another joint wrongdoer 
(although the latter is not sued), but that no action lies against the breadwinner 
or his estate in cases where the breadwinner's fault was the sole cause of his 
injury or death."623 
 
The acceptance of the “theoretically correct approach” in judgments in cases like 
Madyibi v Minister of Safety and Security624 and Brooks v Minister of Safety and 
Security625 could indicate that the time has perhaps come for the position of the 
dependants' claim for loss of support to be normalised, in order to fit in with the 
foundations of our law of delict,626 as the High Court in these two judgments has been 
courageous enough to accept the “theoretically correct approach.” The legislature627 
has also, whether intentionally or not, accepted this approach by regarding the 
deceased breadwinner and a third party as joint wrongdoers. In such circumstances, 
it would thus be possible for dependants to hold the estate of a deceased breadwinner 
liable where he or she has contributed to the negligent conduct which caused the 
breadwinner's death and dependants’ loss of support. In addition, Boberg,628 though 
not in support of the “theoretically correct approach”, acknowledges the anomaly 
created by the Apportionment of Damages Act, in allowing the dependants to sue the 
breadwinner or his or her estate, together with another joint wrongdoer, or alone where 
there is another joint wrongdoer (although the latter is not sued), whereas no action is 
brought against the breadwinner or his or her estate in cases where the breadwinner's 
                                            
623    Ibid. 
624  [2008] ZAECHC 30 par 7. 
625  2008 2 SA 397 (C). 
626  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par [16]. 
627  Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 as amended by Act 58 of 1971. 
628  Boberg 1971 SALJ 452. 
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fault was the sole cause of his or her injury or death. Neethling,629 when dealing with 
claims for loss of support in relation to a breadwinner who committed a criminal act, 
which resulted in his or her incarceration, and a breadwinner who committed suicide, 
opines as follows: 
"Although the Supreme Court of Appeal (in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund above) is still hesitant to declare outright that the dependants' 
action is based directly on a delict committed against them, there are clear 
signs that that court has, at least by implication, accepted this position: the 
wrongfulness of the third party's conduct (that is, causing loss of support via 
the death of the breadwinner) vis-a-vis the dependant is determined by 
enquiring whether, according to the boni mores criterion for wrongfulness, the 
dependant's right of support is worthy of protection against such conduct. This 
approach has also been accepted by the legislature, since the deceased 
breadwinner and the third party are regarded, where appropriate, as joint 
wrongdoers against the dependant. Furthermore, the approach is supported 
by most academic commentators as being dogmatically correct because it 
accords with the foundations of our law of delict, and to this end the opposite, 
traditional approach is therefore rejected, mainly for the reason that it is 
completely unacceptable to base a delictual claim (indirectly) on a delict 
committed against someone else. Recently, especially in Brooks, the High 
Court also strongly favoured the latter approach. For these reasons the 
Supreme Court of Appeal should accept the direct nature of the dependants' 
action in South African law, thereby adapting the remedy to modern conditions 
and legal thought. Finally, unless there are positive legal and policy 
considerations to the contrary, the proposition that the action of dependants 
vis-a-vis third parties should not be extended to encompass the situation 
where the breadwinner by his deliberate act renders himself unable to fulfil his 
duty of support towards his dependants - irrespective of whether this is 
accomplished by a criminal act or suicide - is sound and should be 
supported."630 
 
It is submitted that the anomaly or sui generis nature of the remedy in dependants' 
claims of loss of support ought to be normalised and cured by the acceptance of the 
“theoretically correct approach”. This will result in the dependants deriving their rights, 
not through the deceased or his/her estate, but from the fact that the dependants have 
suffered a loss due to the death of their breadwinner, and that the defendant 
(wrongdoer) is legally responsible for such death.631 
 
                                            
629  Neethling 2009 THRHR 299-304. 
630    Neethling 2009 THRHR 301. 
631  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par [14]; Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security [2008] 
ZASCA 141; 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) par 8; Hlomza v Minister of Safety and Security and another 
[2012] ZAECMHC 14; 2013 1 SACR 591 (ECM); Krawa v RAF [2010] ZAECGHC 57; 2010 6 SA 
550 (ECG). 
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Wrongfulness in a claim for loss of support will lie directly in the infringement of the 
dependants' personal right to support from the person who caused the delict.632 The 
killing of the deceased breadwinner must be actionable as a wrongful act against the 
dependants concerned.633 Since, as the law stands, the loss of support of dependants 
is said to constitute pure economic loss, the questions that would therefore arise would 
be whether the deceased breadwinner had a legal duty to support the dependants, and 
whether such duty was worthy of protection.634 The protection would be determined by 
the criterion of the boni mores (legal convictions of the community), which is considered 
a general yardstick for wrongfulness in our law.635 In considering the boni mores, the 
constitutional norms and values should be taken into account.636 As a result, the 
existing South African law in respect of claims of dependants for loss of support is that 
such claims are available to dependants against a person who unlawfully killed a 
breadwinner, who was legally liable to support such dependants.637  
 
There has been recent developments with regard to the test for wrongfulness, 
especially in respect of pure economic loss.638 The “new test for wrongfulness” was 
formulated in the case of Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising 
Standards Authority SA,639 and is explained as the reasonableness of holding the 
defendant liable.640 In terms of this new test the “conduct” is wrongful if public policy 
considerations demand that in the circumstances the plaintiff has to be compensated 
                                            
632  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par 18. 
633  Ibid. 
634  Ibid. 
635  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 
1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par 17. 
636  Du Plessis v RAF 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) par 18. 
637  Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security [2008] ZASCA 141; 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) par 6; Mnguni v 
RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 1074 par 31. 
638  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 80. 
639  2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468. 
640  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 80.  
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for the loss caused by the negligent act or omission of the defendant.641 However, 
academics have raised their concern over the unacceptability of the new test of 
wrongfulness in our law. Potgieter642 is of the view that the new test of wrongfulness 
and the court’s approach towards it undermines the substance of the wrongfulness 
inquiry, denatures the wrongfulness element and violates the sound structure and 
principles of the law of delict. It is in any event not clear whether the new test for 
wrongfulness was ever intended to requestion wrongfulness after the parties had 
already agreed that a legal duty existed and had not been adhered to. Nevertheless, 
the almost bizarre manner in which the new test for wrongfulness was embraced in the 
cases referred to, albeit without success, is an example of how this test, in the words 
of Scott,643 “is running out of control” and is also an indication of the damage and 
confusion that this unnecessary approach to wrongfulness can cause to the law of 
delict. For these reasons the author agrees with Neethling and Potgieter644 that the 
new test for wrongfulness do not contribute to a better evaluation of delictual 
wrongfulness, and that the established tests of wrongfulness deal satisfactorily with 
the determination of wrongful conduct in the case of the dependency action. 
 
On the question of vested rights in general, Botswana and Lesotho laws provide no 
direct assistance. This study has found no specific provision or reference to a law that 
deals with the issue of vested rights. However, the existing case decisions in respect 
of dependants for loss of support is that Botswana and Lesotho mirror or follow the 
                                            
641  Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 
461 (SCA) 468; Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd v Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122; 
Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 315. 
642  Potgieter 2017 Litnet Akademies 823 https://www.litnet.co.za/new-wrongfulness-test-trojan-horse-
endangering-delictual-principles/ (accessed on 5 January 2019). 
643  Scott “Delictual liability for adultery – a healthy remedy’s road to perdition” in Potgieter et al (reds) 
Huldigingsbundel vir Johann Neethling (2015) 433. 
644  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 87. 
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South African law, and therefore their legal position is the same as in South African 
law.645  
 
In contrast, in Australian law, the question of vested rights given by the action is clear-
cut. The approach is that the dependants derive their rights not through the deceased 
or his/her estate, but from the fact that the dependants have suffered due to the death 
of their breadwinner, and that the defendant (wrongdoer) is in law responsible for such 
death.646 The basis of a wrongful death claim is “… for injuriously affecting the family 
of the deceased. It is not a claim which the deceased could have pursued in his own 
lifetime, because it is for damages647 suffered not by himself, but by his family after his 
death …”648 and the dependants have an action, even in cases of suicide.649  
 
Wrongful infringement of the dependant’s right to support is a wrongful act committed 
against the dependant and not the breadwinner  it is an infringement of the rights of 
the dependant. In other words, the legal duty lies in favour of the dependant and not 
the breadwinner.650 The effect of the independant nature of the action is that any 
defence, which is personal to the deceased, does not operate against the 
dependant.651 Consequently, from the above discussion, it is clear that the dependency 
action for loss of support belongs to the dependants, not to the deceased person, 
although it is administered through the deceased’s estate.652  
 
                                            
645  Eg, see Archibald v Attorney-General 1989 BLR 421 (HC); Manyeula v Botswana Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Fund 1999 2 BLR 391 (HC); Sekale v Minister of Health 2006 1 BLR 438 (HC); Swartz 
& Itumeleng http://www.iosrjournals.org (accessed on 21 September 2018). 
646  Hedley Death and tort (2007) 252; Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action 
for wrongful death (Issues Paper WP No 56 June 2002). 
647  This is the incorrect use of terminology – one cannot suffer damages, but suffers damage. 
648  Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601 per Lord Wright at 611. 
649  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 187; Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 350-351 358. 
650  Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security [2007] ZAWCHC 51; [2007] 4 All SA 1389 (C); 2008 2 SA 
397 (C) par [28]. 
651  See Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575. 
652  Hedley Death and tort (2007) 242 252. 
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Another very important and interesting uncertainty is regarding the question as to 
whether the dependants of a breadwinner injured (not killed) in a wrongful and culpable 
manner should be able to claim for loss of support with the Aquilian action, as in the 
case of death.653 
 
3.4.1.2 Injured breadwinner 
In general, the dependants’ action caters for loss of support caused by the wrongful 
and unlawful killing of a breadwinner in all four jurisdictions being researched in this 
study. However, at times, an injury to a breadwinner that was caused in a wrongful and 
culpable manner may also result in an actionable claim for loss of support under the 
dependants’ action.654 According to Neethling and Potgieter,655 the dependants of a 
person injured in this way should be able to claim loss of support with the Lex Aquilia 
action, as in the case of death. However, uncertainty exists in this regard in South 
African positive law. There is a strong division of judicial pronouncements:656 On the 
one hand, there are decisions that grant the Aquilian action to the dependants of an 
injured breadwinner who has a duty to support them. In Abbott v Bergman,657 a man 
married in community of property was allowed to claim damages inter alia for the loss 
of his wife’s services in the running of the boarding house. De Villiers JA said: 
“If he is allowed to recover the loss sustained by him through the death of his 
wife, he must also be allowed to recover when the injuries are not fatal. For in 
principle, no distinction can be drawn between the two cases.”658 
                                            
653  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299; Van Zyl Law of maintenance (2005) 22; De Vaal v 
Messing 1938 TPD 34. 
654  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299; see also Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par 8. 
655  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299. 
656  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56; Plotkin v Wester Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-
395; Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C); Mnguni v RAF (1090/2014) [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 1074; De Vries NO v RAF [2011] ZAWCHC 215; Verheem v RAF [2010] ZAGPPHC 
282; 2012 2 SA 409 (GNP); RAF v Sweatman [2015] ZASCA 22; [2015] 2 All SA 679 (SCA); 2015 
6 SA 186 (SCA); Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security [2008] ZASCA 141; 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA), 
[2009] 2 All SA 17 (SCA). 
657  1922 AD 53 56. 
658  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56. 
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Similarly, in Plotkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd,659 the court granted the husband 
damages in circumstances where his injured wife was legally liable to contribute to the 
common household, where the parties were married out of community of property. In 
Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd,660 the court granted the husband an action for 
loss of support due to his wife’s injuries, in accordance with modern social ideas. 
However, the decision in De Vaal v Messing661 provides support for the opposite view. 
The policy reason why the extension of liability is sometimes refused where the 
breadwinner is injured, but not killed, is that it would impose an additional burden on 
the defendant, which would be unwarranted.662 In this case, the court refused a claim 
for loss of support by the wife and children because of injury to the husband 
(breadwinner). The court reasoned that the dependants could not claim where the 
breadwinner was injured, because the injured breadwinner himself could institute an 
action for loss of future income, which could then be utilised to support the dependants. 
Neethling and Potgieter are of the view that the court’s argument cannot survive in all 
cases. They provide the following practical example: the breadwinner was 80% 
negligent with regard to his own injuries, which means that he will be able to claim only 
20% of his loss of future income, and in all probability, this amount will be inadequate 
if he wishes to support his dependants as in the past. Therefore, the dependants 
definitely suffer loss of support.663 The Apportionment of Damages Act recognises 
Neethling and Potgieter’s view.664 According to the Act, the dependants are granted 
an action for loss of support if the injured breadwinner and a third party acted 
                                            
659  1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-395. 
660  1985 3 SA 402 (C) 406 408-409. 
661  1938 TPD 34. 
662  RAF v Shabangu 2005 1 SA 265 (SCA) par 18. 
663  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 285. 
664  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 300. 
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negligently and are regarded as joint wrongdoers against the dependants.665 The Act 
speaks of “injury to or death of any breadwinner”. For these reasons, and also due to 
the fact that the wording of the Apportionment of Damages Act now covers this issue, 
the dependants should have a claim, irrespective of whether the breadwinner has died 
or is injured.666 The decision in De Vaal NO v Messing should not be seen as an 
obstacle in extending an action of dependants where the breadwinner is injured.667  
 
As stated above, Botswana and Lesotho are very reliant on South African law in all 
their legal areas. Though the provisions of the Apportionment of Damages Act were 
written for South African law, the position is generally similar under Botswana,668 
Lesotho669 and Australian670 law. It is clear that the inconsistency in the treatment of 
dependants of the injured breadwinner is unjustifiable under the action of dependency 
and should not be tolerated in the post-constitutional dispensation, as it would be in 
the public interest to pursue a more comprehensive approach to such dependants. 
 
3.4.1.3 Customary law 
In the four countries being studied, the dependants’ action for loss of support has 
traditionally only been acknowledged to have its foundation in legislation.671 In the true 
sense, the remedy has its foundation beyond statutory law, including customary and 
delictual law. The dependants must prove that the death of their deceased breadwinner 
was negligently and wrongfully caused.672 In this sense, the remedy has a purely 
                                            
665  Ibid. 
666  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 285. 
667  Burchell Delict (1993) 236. 
668  See Apportionment of Damages Act 32 of 1969 – Botswana. 
669  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.5.3 - the arguments outlined there dealing with Apportionment 
of Damages legislation apply here as well. 
670  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.5.3.4 - the arguments outlined there dealing with Apportionment 
of Damages legislation apply here as well. 
671  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for Wrongful Death (Issues Paper 
WP no 56 June 2002); Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 285. 
672  Ibid 
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delictual point of departure.673 Although customary law generally draws no clear 
distinctions between the law of delict on the one hand and crimes on the other,674
 
the 
duty to support is a well-established principle under customary law.675 The dependency 
action is recognised by customary law676 and is known as go tsoša/tsosa hlogo in the 
Sepedi/Sotho/Setswana languages. The question is whether, although there is such 
an action under customary law, it is legally enforceable? The death of a breadwinner 
who had a duty to support the dependants undoubtedly causes loss to such 
dependants, irrespective of whether it is under customary law or civil law. In all fairness, 
the dependants, under customary law, should be able to recover such loss from a party 
who has unlawfully and negligently caused the death of their breadwinner by any act 
of negligence or other wrongful conduct. This is the rationale for the dependants’ 
action, even under customary law. There are no reasons why such an action, which 
accords with customs, would not be enforceable. The dependants’ action to claim for 
loss of support against the person responsible for their breadwinner’s death is not 
contrary to public policy or opposed to the principles of natural justice. The dependency 
action under customary law does not even differ significantly677 from the dependency 
action under civil law. Accordingly, it is legally competent to equate it to the present 
remedy applicable under civil law. When one observes the aim of the customary law 
dependant claim for loss of support due to the unlawful and negligent killing of the 
breadwinner, it is also to place the dependants under customary law in the same 
                                            
673  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equity Intervening) 
1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par [6]. 
674  Olivier 2004 LAWSA paras 212-217. 
675  Bennett Customary law (2004) ch 8; Mqeke & Church “Law of Persons & Family” in LAWSA: 
Indigenous law (2003) 106-107; Dlamini “Family Law” in Bekker et al (eds) Introduction to legal 
pluralism in South Africa: Customary law (2002) ch 3; Palmer Law of delict (1970) 7 16 19 112 113 
212 213. 
676  Ibid. 
677  The principles of the customary law dependant action are the same as those under civil law. The 
customary law principles or requirements do not cause any damage to the principles of the civil law 
dependency action. 
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financial position they would have been if their breadwinner had not been killed.678
 
In 
this sense, the customary law remedy of go tsoša hlogo/go tsosa hlogo has a purely 
delictual point of departure, namely damages in the case of wrongful conduct.679 
 
The aborigines of Australia seem to have the same claim where their breadwinner was 
wrongfully and unlawfully killed. The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws report 
was released by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in June 1986, after 
an intensive, nine-year inquiry.680 The report examined the interaction between two 
legal systems – one based in British law “received” through colonisation, and the other 
in the customary laws of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia.681 The common law, 
largely through the judgments of the High Court, has furthered the recognition of 
customary law in Australia. The High Court in Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) and 
Yanner v Eaton (1999) further developed the principles of native title in relation to the 
common law and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). At the Federal Centenary Convention, 
held in April 1997, participants resolved, by clear majority, that the Australian 
Constitution should recognise the particular rights of indigenous peoples and give 
appropriate recognition to their customary law.682 It was resolved that indigenous 
customary law should be recognised and considered within the rule of law. At the 
Australian Reconciliation Convention in May 1997, there was strong support among 
participants for the recognition and application of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
customary law and traditions within Australia's written statutes and common law, as 
                                            
678  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 112-113. 
679  Ibid. 
680  Godden https://theconversation.com/from-little-things-the-role-of-the-aboriginal-customary-law-
report-in-mabo-60193 (accessed on 13 July 2017). 
681  Ibid. 
682  See Australian Law Reform Commission: Aboriginal Customary Laws  
https://alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-laws (accessed on 25 September 2017). 
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well as in court procedures.683 Although the comprehensive recognition of indigenous 
law remains controversial,684 the ALRC report made recommendations to the 
recognition of traditional Aboriginal marriages for accident compensation, including 
workers’ compensation, compensation on death, criminal injuries compensation, and 
repatriation benefits.685  
 
3.4.2 Objectives of the delictual claim for loss of support 
The objective of the dependency action is the same in South Africa,686 Botswana,687 
Lesotho688 and Australia.689 This is unsurprising, because in all four jurisdictions, the 
law on dependency action is greatly influenced by English law. In South African law, 
the aim of the claim for loss of support is to place the dependants of the deceased 
breadwinner who was wrongfully and negligently killed in as good a position with regard 
to support as they would have been if the deceased or injured breadwinner had not 
been killed or injured, whatever the case may be.690 Where the death was not caused 
negligently and wrongfully,691 the dependants of the deceased breadwinner have no 
claim against the person who caused the death.692  
 
                                            
683  Ibid. 
684  Aboriginal Customary Law ALRC report 31 Published on 12 June 1986. Last modified on 23 March 
2017 https://alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-laws (accessed on 13 July 2017). 
685  Ibid. 
686  Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 20-22; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for 
Gender Equity Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par [6]. 
687  Archibald v Attorney-General 1989 BLR 421 (HC). 
688  Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; also see chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.5.2  the 
arguments outlined there, apply here as well. 
689  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 187. 
690  Mnguni v RAF [2015] ZAPPHC 1074 par [7]; Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 20 23; Kewana v Santam 
Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (TkA) 776; Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 
(T). 
691  E.g. self-defence, lawful medical procedure, etc. 
692  Maimela v Makhado Municipality [2011] ZASCA 69 (unreported); Barnett& Harder Remedies 
(2014) 185. 
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The action is clearly for economic loss in so far as it relates to dependency in all four 
jurisdictions. The goal of the dependant action is to provide the dependants of the 
deceased with a sum of money, which will be sufficient to supply them with material 
benefits of the same standard and duration as they would have received out of the 
earnings of the deceased, had he not been killed by the wrongful and culpable act of 
the wrongdoer.693 In order to successfully employ the dependency action remedy, the 
essential delictual requirements discussed hereunder must be met. 
 
3.4.3 Requirements for the delictual claim for loss of support under the 
dependency action 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly dealt with the 
requirements for a claim for loss of support under the action of dependants.694 A claim 
for loss of support under the action of dependants was only possible if instituted in 
accordance with the common law principles.695 The dependants must prove all the 
basic requirements for delictual liability at common law, namely conduct, wrongfulness 
or unlawfulness, fault, causality and damage.696 These common law elements are a 
prerequisite for a claim for loss of support by a dependant. 
                                            
693  Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97; Victor v Constantia Ins Co Ltd 1985 
1 SA 118 (C) 119; Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 202 220-222; Santam Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 
SA 467 (A) 471-472; Santam Ins Ltd v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 267; Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (SCA) 425-426; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for 
Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1324-1325; Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 2003 3 
SA 1098 (W) 1113-1114; Mankebe v AA Mutual Ins Association Ltd 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 198-199; 
Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 
1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 246; Milns v  Protea Ass Co Ltd 
1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1010; Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versmpy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O) 
463; Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (Z) 131; De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 
16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 
234 244; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
694  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 293-4 296; Davel 
https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
695  Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Mankebe v AA Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 198-199; Sanlam Insurance Ltd v Meedith 1990 4 SA 265 (TK) 
267. 
696  RAF v Krawa [2011] ZAECGHC 61; 2012 2 SA 346 (ECG) par 21. 
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In Australia, the provisions of Lord Campbell’s Act lay down only two prerequisites for 
a wrongful death action to succeed: firstly, it must be shown that the death of the 
deceased was caused (causation)697 by the defendant’s wrongful act,698 and secondly, 
it must be shown that the deceased, if he or she had not died, would have been able 
to bring an action against the defendant.699 Botswana and Lesotho are mirroring the 
South African law. In addition to the common law delictual elements, the dependants 
must comply with the following most important requirements for the loss of support 
under the dependants’ action: 
 
3.4.3.1 Duty to support700 
A claim for loss of support is based upon the maintenance obligation of the deceased 
breadwinner in lieu of a relationship of dependency.701 Typical examples of such 
relationships of dependency would include parent and child, husband and wife, 
grandparents and grandchildren, and brothers and sisters.702 The breadwinner must 
have been under an obligation to support the dependants. This duty must have been 
legally enforceable inter partes, which means a reciprocal duty of support.703 This first 
requirement is qualified by the condition that the dependant must need support, and 
the breadwinner should have been capable of providing such support.704 
                                            
697  Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268 per Dixon CJ, Fullagar and Kitto JJ 277; March v E & M H 
Stramare (Pty Ltd) (1991) 171 CLR 506 per Mason CJ (with whom Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed) 
515; March v E & M H Stramare (Pty Ltd) (1991) 171 CLR 506 per Deane J 522. 
698  Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 17; Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603 per Latham CJ 
603, 619, 620; Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 17; Queensland Law Reform Commission: 
Damages in an action for Wrongful Death (Issues Paper WP no 56 June 2002) 4; Barnett & Harder 
Remedies (2014) 187. 
699  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 187. 
700  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.3.1 supra. 
701  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2015); 
Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 299; Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 53; Potgieter, Steynberg 
& Floyd Law of damages (2012) 278 280. 
702  Ibid. 
703  Groenewald v Swanepoel 2002 6 SA 724 (E); Pike v Minister of Defence 1963 3 SA 127 (Ck). 
704  Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 612-613; Senior v National 
Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 SA 136 (W); RAF v Kwara 2012 2 SA 346 (ECG) 367-
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3.4.3.2 Right to support 
The second requirement is that the dependant must have had a right to such support, 
which is worthy of legal protection against third parties.705 The existence of the right to 
support is determined in light of the boni mores, the delictual criterion of 
wrongfulness,706 by enquiring whether, according to the boni mores, the dependants 
had a right to support worthy of protection against third parties.707 In its original form, 
during the pre-constitutional era, the dependency action gave a claim to only the 
surviving spouse, parents and children of the deceased.708 The requirements for the 
action of dependants to claim for loss of support were generally linked to a valid civil 
marriage, in accordance with the boni mores at that point in time.709 However, over the 
years, the principles underpinning the dependant’s action have been adapted and 
widened to afford relief to classes of persons not mentioned in the traditional Act710 
and authorities.711 Currently, the scope for the recognition of a duty of support, 
premised on factors other than the traditional grounds, for example parenthood or 
marriage, has received considerable judicial attention, and requires further 
discussion.712 
 
 
                                            
8; Fosi v RAF 2008 3 SA 560 (C); Jacobs v RAF 2010 3 SA 263 (SE) 265; Seleka v RAF 2016 4 
SA 445 (GP). 
705  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 294. 
706  For general information and criticism on the new test of wrongfulness, see Neethling & Potgieter 
Law of delict (2015) 81-87; also see chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.1. 
707  Santam Bpk v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 430; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1326; Du Plessis v RAF 2004 
1 SA 359 (SCA) 370. 
708  Baker v Bolton (1801)1 CAMP 493; 170 ER 1033; Work Cover Queensland v Amaca Pty Ltd [2010] 
HCA 34, (2010) 241 CLR 420 [38]. 
709  Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (acessed on 17 September 
2015). 
710  Lord Campbell’s Act.  
711  Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 202 222; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par 9. 
712  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); Paixăo v 
RAF [2012] ZASCA 130; Taljaard v RAF [2014] ZAGPJHC 229; 2015 1 SA 609 (GJ). 
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3.5 Development of the delictual claim for loss of support for specific 
dependants 
The dependency action for loss of support can only be claimed by an eligible person 
who, because of the death of the breadwinner, is deprived of the financial support that 
the deceased had actually been personally providing or required by a court order to 
provide at the time of his death. 
 
A number of developments, especially in South Africa, were witnessed with the 
extension of the action for loss of support to unusual dependants. Presently, it is not 
only the surviving spouses in terms of the Marriage Act, or the deceased’s biological 
children or surviving parents who can be considered for a dependency claim for loss 
of support, but any other individual who is eligible, provided that he or she can prove 
that the deceased gave him or her financial support during his/her lifetime. In the next 
section, different categories of eligible dependants who can institute an action for loss 
of support will be discussed. 
 
3.5.1 Civil marriages 
Under the common law713
 
in South Africa, the duty to support was traditionally only 
acknowledged if it arose in a valid marriage or resulted from a blood relationship714
 
or 
in terms of adoption.715 Only surviving spouses from civil marriages were able to 
successfully claim for loss of support under the action of dependants. From early case 
law,716 a so-called common law duty of support, which was rooted in a legal marriage 
                                            
713  Du Plessis Introduction to law (1999) 18-21. 
714  Burchell Delict (1993) 235-237; Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90; Kewana v Santam Insurance Co 
Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (TK). 
715  Children’s Act 38 of 2005, chapter 15; Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (TK); 
Metiso v Padongelukkefonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T). 
716  Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657; Waterson v Mayberry 1934 TPD 210; Mokoena v 
Laub 1943 WLD 63. 
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according to common law, was required. The courts refused to allow a dependant 
action in cases where such a marriage was absent.717  
 
Valid marriages only included civil marriages entered into in terms of the Marriage 
Act,718
 
which allows for the solemnisation of a civil or religious marriage between a man 
and a woman. Black South Africans could also enter into common law marriages 
governed by the Marriage Act.719
 
In the case of the wrongful and negligent death of a 
spouse, in the instance where Blacks were married in terms of the Marriage Act, the 
surviving spouse and the dependants of the deceased had no problems instituting 
claims based on a recognised duty to support, irrespective of their racial and cultural 
background. 
 
The situation in Botswana, Lesotho and Australia is similar to South Africa, in that 
heterosexual couples could also enter into common law marriages governed by the 
Marriage Act.720 African Blacks in Botswana721 and Lesotho722 and Aboriginal people 
in Australia723 could also enter into common law marriages governed by the Marriage 
Act. In the case of the wrongful and negligent death of a spouse, in the instance where 
Blacks were married in terms of the Marriage Act, the surviving spouse and the 
dependants of the deceased had no problems instituting claims based on a recognised 
duty to support, irrespective of their racial and cultural background. In Lesotho, 
marriage is a complex issue, as the African marriage has had to co-exist with civil or 
                                            
717  Zulu v Minister of Justice 1956 2 SA 128 (W); Santam Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Nkabinde 
v SA Motor & General Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 302 (N). 
718  Act 25 of 1961, South Africa. 
719  Ibid. 
720  Marriage Act 18 of 2001, Botswana; Marriage Act 10 of 1974, Lesotho; Marriage Act, 1961 
Australia. 
721  Quansah https://www.pulapulapula.co.uk/ (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
722  Dube https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/lesotho.htm; https://www.jcl.sagepub.com/content 
(accessed on 17 September 2016) 
723  Ginibi https://www.ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=ltc (accessed on 8 
August 2016). 
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Christian marriage imported to Southern Africa by settlers.724 Botswana is of the same 
breath as Lesotho.725 In Botswana and Lesotho, there is no legislation that specifically 
gives rise to a duty of support to a spouse in a customary marriage. Such spouses 
were granted the right to claim for loss of support through case law,726 with reference 
to South African judicial decisions. South African case law and academic authorities 
still feature prominently in reported loss of support claims related to motor vehicle 
accidents in Botswana and Lesotho.727  
 
Customary law marriages in Botswana are valid and recognised by the law, with full 
effect given to their consequences. They are potentially polygamous and in community 
of property between a husband and wife. The property is the joint property of the 
spouses. However, the property remains subject to the husband’s control as head of 
the family.728 Like Botswana, the position of Sesotho customary law marriages in the 
legal system of Lesotho has received full judicial recognition.729 Lesotho’s legal history 
shows that the Sesotho customary law marriage has always been treated in the same 
way by the legislature as civil rites marriages.730 Sesotho customary law marriage is 
also recognised in terms of their Marriage Act.731 This differs from the Marriage Act in 
South Africa and Australia. The South African and Australian Marriage Acts do not 
recognise customary marriages  only a civil marriage is acknowledged under the 
                                            
724  Maqutu 1983 CILSA 374-382. 
725  Quansah Family law (2006) 36; Moisakamo v Moisakamo 1981 2 BLR 126 (CA). 
726  Moletlanyi v Botswana Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund 1997 4 BLR 1298; Sekale v Minister of Health 
2006 1 BLR 438 (HC). 
727  See Manyeula v Botswana Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund 1999 2 BLR 391 (HC); Setumo v Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Fund 2002 1 BLR 405 (HC); Rebeetsweng v Botswana Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Fund 1999 1 BLR 105; Sebate v RAF 2011 ZANWHC 77. 
728  Quansah Family law (2006) 36; Moisakamo v Moisakamo 1981 2 BLR 126 (CA). 
729  See Laws of Lerotholi, which was intended to constitute an authoritative source of Sesotho 
customary law. The aim of the Laws of Lerotholi was to restate customary legal rules and principles. 
It attempted to address every conceivable sphere of Basotho customary law and practices. 
730  Letsika 2005 BLJ 25-29. 
731  See s 42 of the Marriage Act 10 of 1974; Makata v Makata CIV/T/41/1981 (unreported). 
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Marriages Acts of South Africa and Australia. Today, legal marriages are not restricted 
to only civil marriages entered into according to the Marriage Act, but include any 
solemn marriage in accordance with the principles of a recognised and accepted 
faith,732 and marriages entered into according to recognised customary law 
principles.733 
 
3.5.2 Customary marriages 
Customary marriages are those marriages concluded in accordance with customary 
law, which is, for purposes of South African customary law, defined in the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act734 as “the customs and usages traditionally observed 
among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the 
culture of those peoples”.735 Prior to the year 2000, customary marriages enjoyed only 
limited recognition in South Africa, as polygamy and payment of lobola, which are the 
essential elements of customary marriages, were regarded as contra bonos mores.736 
Since 2000, customary marriages have enjoyed full recognition under the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act. This is in line with the provision in the Constitution737 for 
“marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family 
law”. Consequently, customary marriages are now valid and, in all respects, equal in 
status to civil marriages.738 Therefore, the status of a customary marriage in terms of 
                                            
732  O’Sullivan 2004 ESR Review 10-13; Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 20 24; Freedman 1998 THRHR 532-
533. 
733  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
734  Act 120 of 1998. 
735  s 1 of Act 120 of 1998. 
736  Bennet Customary law (2004) 239-240; Nkabula v Linda 1951 1 SA 377 (A); Maithufi 2015 THRHR 
307. 
737  s 9(3) of the Constitution. 
738  Marriage in terms of Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
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the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act is equal to that of a civil marriage in terms 
of the Marriage Act.739  
 
Although the comprehensive recognition of customary marriages only came into 
operation on 15 November 2000, and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
does not expressly refer to the duty of support, this duty has already been recognised 
and enforced.740 The surviving customary spouses were already being accommodated 
by way of legislative intervention as early as 1963741 in relation to wrongful and 
negligent death actions. The main objective of the enactment was to grant the widow 
of a customary marriage the right to claim damages for loss of support from any person 
who unlawfully causes the death of her husband or is legally liable in respect thereof.742 
At the time of the enactment, a customary marriage was not regarded by South African 
law as bringing about a legal duty of maintenance or support inter partes.743 This was 
because South African law did not recognise it as a valid marriage, and the claim for 
loss of support by a widow was held to disclose no cause of action.744 Section 31 of 
the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 specifically provides for the institution of a 
claim for loss of support by a surviving customary spouse if all of the requirements in 
terms of the action of dependants were met. As late as 2003, in RAF v Mongalo,745
 
 it 
was confirmed that the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963, which originated from 
a period when legal measures were racially based, still provides a relevant tool to effect 
                                            
739  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; Maithufi & Moloi 2002 TSAR 599-561; 
Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (accessed on 17 September 
2015). 
740  Boezaart Child law (2017) par 9.4. 
741  s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. 
742  Maithufi & Bekker 2009 OBITER 164; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 379; also see 
Pasela v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W). 
743  Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63. 
744  See Zulu v Minister of Justice 1952 2 SA 128 (N); Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A). 
745  2003 1 All SA 72 (SCA). 
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claims by customary widows for customary marriages that were entered into prior to 
2000, even though the action arose after the year 2000. 
 
In Australia, customary law has not been recognised as part of the canon of Australian 
law. However, since the late twentieth century, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
in 1986 and the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia in 2005 have written 
extensive reports investigating the desirability of recognising the role of customary law 
in legal situations involving Aboriginal Australians. In the Northern Territory, some 
statutes and courts make explicit reference to customary law, where such is useful in 
identifying relationships or social expectations.746 Nonetheless, marriage and the duty 
to support was a central feature of traditional Aboriginal societies.747 Therefore, the 
Aboriginal dependants would have a claim for loss of support if their breadwinner was 
unlawfully and wrongfully killed.748 
 
3.5.3 Muslim marriage 
A Muslim marriage is a marriage concluded in terms of Islamic religious law or rites. 
Muslim marriages are not recognised as having the same legal status as civil 
marriages in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, mainly because they are 
polygamous unions, and on the grounds of public policy, such unions are contrary to 
the accepted norms that are morally binding on our society. These are the same 
reasons advanced for refusing to recognise customary marriages. The status of 
Muslim marriages in South Africa has, since 1990, been the subject of ongoing 
                                            
746  Community Welfare Act 1983 (NT), s 69; Walker v New South Wales [1994] HCA 64; Coe v 
Commonwealth [1993] HCA 42. 
747  Bell & Ditton The old and the new law (1980) 91-92. 
748  The arguments outlined in chapter 2 of this research study, par 2.6.2, dealing with the background 
to Aboriginal customary law, apply here as well. 
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investigation and discussion749 by the South African Law Reform Commission.750 The 
Muslim Marriages Bill was published in 2000,751 but is still subject to intense debate in 
the Muslim community, and has not yet been passed, which means that our law does 
not yet formally recognise Muslim marriages.752 As such, spouses in these types of 
unions do not fully enjoy the rights afforded to other spouses married in accordance 
with South African civil or customary law.753  
 
However, there has been some progress in this field, insofar as our government and 
the courts have been taking steps towards the recognition thereof. The government 
has enacted the Muslim Marriages Bill,754 even though it has not seen the light of day 
yet.755 The South African courts have also furthered the recognition of Muslim 
marriages in their decisions. In the 1983, Natal Division case of Moola and Others v 
Aulsebrook NO and Others,756 it was decided that Muslim marriages are putative 
marriages, namely marriages that are not automatically invalid, which meant that the 
children born from such marriages were no longer seen as being illegitimate. This has 
obviously changed with the advent of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, in terms whereof 
the concept of “illegitimate children” has been done away with.757  
 
                                            
749  Harrington-Johnson 2015 De Rebus 93. 
750  South African Law Reform Commission Project 59 Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report 
July 2003. 
751  Muslim Marriages Bill 2010 https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/ (accessed on 13 October 
2016). 
752  Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (accessed on 17 September 
2015). 
753  Harrington-Johnson 2015 De Rebus 95. 
754  The government has enacted the Muslim Marriages Bill Government Gazette No 33946 Notice 37 
of 2011 20 January 2011, even though to date it has not seen the light of day. 
755  Van der Merwe 2016 Daily Maverick 6. 
756  1983 1 SA 687 (N). 
757  Harrington-Johnson 2015 De Rebus 93. 
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In 1997, the Constitutional Court in Ryland v Edros758 decided that, as a Muslim 
marriage is a contract from which certain proprietary obligations flow, this was reason 
enough to impose some of the consequences of a civil marriage on a Muslim marriage, 
chiefly the obligation of maintenance. In 1999, in Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accident 
Fund,759
 
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the widow’s right had to be 
protected if there was a legal duty to support in terms of Muslim law, irrespective of 
whether the Muslim marriage was valid according to South African family law or not. 
By correctly applying the common law principles, the Supreme Court of Appeal simply 
extended the common law to include a claim for maintenance for Muslim widows who 
were partners in a de facto monogamous marriage. The consequence of this case is, 
however, limited, since it only provides for the recognition of the duty to support claims 
in relation to de facto monogamous Muslim marriages.760  
 
In 2004, the Constitutional Court went one step further in Daniels v Campbell NO and 
Others761 and decided that a Muslim spouse in a monogamous Muslim marriage had 
the right to inherit and to claim maintenance from their deceased spouse in terms of 
the Intestate Succession Act,762 as well as the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act.763 This naturally led to the 2005 decision in Khan v Kahn,764 where the Transvaal 
Division held that partners in Muslim marriages also owe each other a duty of support, 
just as in civil marriages, and therefore have the right to claim maintenance from one 
another in terms of the Maintenance Act.765 Finally, in 2009, the Constitutional Court, 
                                            
758  1997 2 SA 690 (CC).  
759  1999 4 SA 119 (SCA). 
760  Harrington-Johnson 2015 De Rebus 93. 
761  [2004] ZACC 14; 2004 5 SA 331 (CC). 
762  Act 81 of 1987. 
763  Act 27 of 1990. 
764  2005 2 SA 272 (T). 
765  Act 99 of 1998. 
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in the case of Hassam v Jacobs NO and Others,766 held that the right to claim 
maintenance from a deceased spouse, as decided in the Daniels case, was also to be 
extended to polygamous Muslim marriages. 
 
The religious polygamous Muslim marriage was upheld in the succession-inheritance 
case of Hassim v Jacobs767 in South Africa. In this case, the applicant was married to 
the deceased in accordance with Muslim rites. The deceased married a second wife, 
Mrs Mariam Hassam, also according to Muslim rites, without the applicant’s knowledge 
or consent. The deceased died intestate in August 2001. His death certificate shows 
that he was “never married”. The first respondent refused to regard the applicant as a 
spouse and wife to the deceased, or to recognise her claim against the estate of the 
deceased, because the applicant’s marriage was polygamous, and she could therefore 
not be treated as a survivor or a spouse. The applicant would be entitled to the relief if 
her marriage had been a monogamous one. The court stated that denying the applicant 
a claim would amount to unfair discrimination, and effectively ruled that all the wives 
of the deceased should be treated equally, and their rights be recognised for purposes 
of inheritance where the husband has not left a will. This judgment extends the right to 
inherit from a deceased husband’s estate to women in Muslim marriages, where there 
is more than one wife. In 2010, the court in Verheem v RAF768 recognised a claim for 
loss of support arising out of a marriage in terms of Islamic law, where the claimant 
was legally dependant on the deceased for maintenance. 
 
                                            
766  [2009] ZACC 19; 2009 11 BCLR 1148 (CC); 2009 5 SA 572 (CC). 
767  Ibid. 
768  2012 2 SA 409 (GNP). 
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Notwithstanding these legal developments, the comprehensive recognition of a Muslim 
marriage has not been legally acknowledged in South Africa yet.769 Muslim marriages 
experienced a lengthy piece-meal development in case law, in which certain aspects 
of these relationships were recognised over a period of time.770 The traditional 
polygynous nature of Muslim marriages is the main reason why such marriages are 
still not recognised. The reality is that, in principle, there is no difference between a 
polygynous marriage according to customary law and a polygynous Muslim marriage. 
Since polygynous customary marriages are recognised in South African law, the 
dependants in de facto polygynous Muslim marriages could argue that they should 
also receive protection, in order to succeed in their claims for loss of support.771 The 
correct approach is not to ask whether the Muslim marriage was polygynous and 
unlawful according to common law, but rather whether or not the deceased was under 
a legal duty, according to Muslim law, to support the dependants during the 
subsistence of the polygynous Muslim marriage. If so, it needs to be determined 
whether the right of the widows was one that deserved protection for purposes of the 
dependant’s claim. The duty to support in de facto polygynous Muslim marriages also 
deserves recognition and protection by law, as is the case with the duty to support in 
polygynous customary law marriages. This protection could be afforded either by the 
judiciary extending the application of the common law principles even further to include 
polygynous Muslim marriages, or by the legislature providing the required protection 
through a statute, as was done in the case of customary law. 
 
                                            
769  Pienaar https://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers (accessed on 17 September 
2015). 
770  Maithufi 2000 De Jure 383-284; Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 748 752; Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 
(CC). 
771  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 294. 
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The preferred way to protect dependants in Muslim marriages is for the legislature to 
take the lead through the transformation of the Muslim Marriages Bill into an Act.772 In 
this way, Muslim dependants would automatically have a right to claim for loss of 
support, without first having to exercise the recourse of lengthy and expensive High 
Court litigations, which are not always successful. In the absence of full legal 
recognition of Muslim marriages and legislation that clearly spells out the legal 
consequences, Muslim dependants will remain vulnerable.773 The Act is an essential 
ingredient for the confirmation and endorsement of the protection of Muslim 
dependants. However, legal expertise should be sought in order to rectify the unfair 
elements of the Shariah law prior to it being passed as an official law, especially with 
regard to its effects on women.774 The non-recognition of de facto polygynous Muslim 
marriages categorically ignores the constitutional provisions on equality, human dignity 
and the right to religious freedom.775 
 
The legal position of de facto polygynous Muslim marriages in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia is similar to that in South Africa. Religious polygamous marriages do not 
seem to be legally recognised in Botswana. While the Constitution of Botswana 
provides a degree of protection in terms of religion,776 Justice Moses Chinhengo is 
reported to have instructed the Attorney General to bring an end to religious 
                                            
772  De Waal, Paleker & Bradfield Law of succession & trust (2014) 189. 
773  Morata https://www.insurancegateway.co.za/17.8.131.Irn=2109#.WWiEmWdDGUk (accessed on 
14 July 2017). 
774  E.g., “a man can beat his wife for insubordination or unilaterally divorce his wife; but a wife needs 
her husband's consent to divorce” - see Quran 4:34; “a female heir inherits half of what a male heir 
inherits” - see Mathematics in Quran. 
775  ss 9 & 15(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
776  s 3 of the Constitution declares that every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, to enjoy these rights and freedoms regardless of his 
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others, and for the public interest to the rights and freedoms set out under the 
Constitution; Quansah 2008 AHRLJ 486-504. 
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polygamous practices in Botswana.777 In a case that involved religious polygamous 
marriages, Mabuaaeme v Mokgweetsi,778 the appellant contracted a civil marriage with 
Joseph Mabuaaeme. While they were still so married, Joseph married the respondent, 
as was permitted by the church to which he and the appellant belonged. He did so 
without the appellant’s knowledge or consent. He subsequently left the appellant and 
began cohabiting with the respondent. The appellant claimed damages from the 
respondent for wrecking her marriage. The court granted the applicant damages and 
annulled the second marriage of a member of the church, because religious 
polygamous marriages are not legal in Botswana. 
 
Another case was reported in The Voice, a newspaper report,779 wherein the plans of 
an ex-mayor, Christopher Ramolemane, to marry a second wife were stopped by the 
Lobatse High Court of Justice, following an urgent application by his wife, Bontle 
Ramolemane. It is reported that the ex-mayor had paid lobola for his church mate, 
Mary Tebogo Kojane, and was in the process of solemnising the polygamous religious 
marriage when the court intervened. The High Court ruled against the intended union 
and contended that it would have been an illegal matrimony, as the laws of Botswana 
prohibit polygamous religious marriages. The court interdicted the two lovebirds and 
stopped them from proceeding with the intended marriage. The research yielded no 
reported case regarding de facto polygamous religious marriages in Lesotho. 
 
Although it is claimed that the mono-cultural nature of Australian law might be 
presenting religious difficulties for Muslims in Australia regarding the recognition of 
their personal law in matters including wills, inheritance and divorce, Jamila Hussain 
                                            
777  Kgalemang https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=261&dir (accessed on 14 July 2017). 
778  2011 1 BLR 365 HC. 
779  Baaitse https://thevoicebw.com/no-marriage/ (accessed on 14 July 2017). 
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rightly notes that there are very few areas where Muslim personal law conflicts directly 
with the Australian secular legal system.780 In Australia, Muslims apply Shariah781 
principles in their personal relationships as part of their religious observance.782 For 
example, in Wold v Kleppir783 and Oltman v Harper,784 the issue of the validity of the 
marriage of Muslim couples according to Shariah law was raised. In both cases, the 
court found the marriages to be valid under Australian law.785 Indeed, Islamic law 
formalities in marriage were accepted for the purpose of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), 
insofar as they were consistent with Australian family law. The realisation that the 
Australian legal system can accommodate certain Shariah practices by Muslims could 
mean that Muslim dependants will have a claim for loss of support under the 
dependency action.786 
 
3.5.4 Civil unions 
In the pre-democratic era in South Africa, not only were individual gays and lesbians 
denied any protection, but their relationships were neither acknowledged nor 
respected.787 South Africa became the first country ever to include sexual orientation 
                                            
780  Jamila Hussain Islam: Its law and society (2011) 256. 
781  Also spelled Shari'a or Shariah: As a legal system, Sharia law is exceptionally broad. Its other legal 
codes regulate public behaviour, Sharia law regulates public behaviour, private behaviour, and 
even private beliefs. Of all legal systems in the world today, Sharia law is the most intrusive and 
restrictive, especially against women https://www.billionbibles.org/sharia/sharia-law.html 
(accessed on 14 July 2017). Due to its discriminatory nature against women and old primitive 
approach to legal and private issues (e.g. Theft is punishable by amputation of the hands (Quran 
5:38),criticizing or denying any part of the Quran is punishable by death; a woman or girl who has 
been raped cannot testify in court against her rapist(s); testimonies of 4 male witnesses are required 
to prove rape of a female (Quran 24:13), it is, in many ways, inconsistent with human rights, which 
are the cornerstone of the Constitutions of all four countries being studied, and cannot be altered. 
The present theoretical contents of Shariah principles are oppressive and contrary to the laws of 
these four countries and therefore affect the potential legality of the marriage. If passed as a law, 
at its present status, it would perpetuate the oppression of Muslim females. 
782  Esmaeili 2015 FLinLawJI 75; Omari and Omari v Omari [2012] ACTSC 33. 
783  [2009] Famm CA 178. 
784  [2009] Famm CA 1360. 
785  See generally Richards & Esmaeili (2012) 26 AJFL 142. 
786  This is only an observation, as the research could not find any Australian authority on this issue. 
787  Jivan 2007 Law, democracy & development 19 44. 
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in its anti-discriminatory constitutional provisions.788 These provisions have led to the 
legal rights of lesbians and gay men becoming the subject of considerable judicial and 
legislative activity. Same-sex partners were not considered as “dependants” for the 
purposes of compensatory rewards. The Medical Schemes Act defined a “dependant” 
as a “spouse”789 while the Military Pensions Act referred to “wife” (or “child”),790 and 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act included as a dependant 
a “widow/widower married to an employee by civil law, indigenous law or customary 
law, as well as any person with whom the employee was, in the opinion of the 
commissioner, at the time of the accident, living as husband and wife but not including 
gays and lesbians”.791 
 
Several judicial decisions dealing with legal challenges against allegedly discriminatory 
laws have clarified the legal position of lesbians and gay men.792 In Farr v Mutual and 
Federal Insurance Company Ltd,793 the court held that two gay men living together in 
a domestic relationship constituted a family. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,794 
the Constitutional Court recognised that the family is a social institution of vital 
importance, and that families come in many shapes and sizes. The court ruled in this 
case that the right to dignity encompasses and protects the rights of individuals to enter 
into and sustain permanent intimate relationships. In other words, the right to family 
life is protected by the right to dignity. 
 
                                            
788  s 9(3) of the Constitution. 
789  Act 72 of 1967, s 1(a). 
790  Act 84 of 1976, s 1(1). 
791  Act 130 of 1993, s 1(c). 
792  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); Harksen v 
Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC); Prinsloo v Van der Linde & another 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC); President of 
the Republic of South Africa & another v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC); Langemaat v Minister of Safety 
and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T). 
793  2000 3 SA 684 (C). 
794  2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
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In Du Plessis v RAF,795 the Supreme Court of Appeal extended the common law 
dependant’s action to the surviving partner in a same-sex permanent life partnership, 
similar to a marriage, in circumstances where the deceased had contractually 
undertaken a duty of support towards the survivor. In this case, the appellant and the 
deceased had lived together continuously for approximately eleven years, until the 
deceased was killed in a motor vehicle accident. Their relationship was in all respects 
similar to a marriage. Some five years into the relationship, the appellant was medically 
boarded. From this time on, the deceased contributed towards the appellant’s financial 
support and undertook to continue doing so for as long as the appellant needed it. After 
the deceased’s death, which was largely attributable to the negligence of the driver of 
a vehicle insured by the Road Accident Fund, the appellant instituted a dependant’s 
claim for loss of support against the Fund. He also sought to recover the deceased’s 
burial expenses. By consent, the matter proceeded to trial only on the issue of whether 
the appellant’s right to such compensation was recognised by law. The court a quo796 
dismissed the appellant’s claim for support on the grounds that a stable, long-standing 
relationship of cohabitation between same-sex partners does not give rise to the legally 
enforceable duty of support necessary to find such a claim. To hold otherwise, the 
court held797 that it would create legal uncertainty and open the floodgates of litigation. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, took a different view. In a unanimous 
judgment delivered by Cloete JA, the court found that the appellant was entitled to 
compensation for the loss of the deceased’s financial support. In coming to this 
conclusion, the court held that to extend the action in this case “would be an 
incremental step to ensure that the common law accords with the dynamic and evolving 
                                            
795  2003 11 BCLR 1220 (SCA), 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA). 
796  Du Plessis v Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds 2002 4 SA 596 (T). 
797  Idem 598. 
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fabric of our society as reflected in the Constitution, recent legislation and judicial 
pronouncements”.798 
 
This pronouncement denotes a significant step in the direction of recognising and 
defending persons involved in same-sex partnerships, in that it advanced the common 
law dependant’s action to accord with the realities of modern family life and social 
conditions. The outcomes of the above decisions have addressed some of the 
concerns that lie at the heart of the equality debate surrounding the rights of same-sex 
partners. However, the form of full equality was only achieved through the passing of 
the Civil Union Act.799 As of 30 November 2006, same-sex partnerships enjoy statutory 
recognition in South Africa under the Civil Union Act.800 The Civil Union Act, allows for 
the solemnisation of a civil or religious marriage, or a civil partnership between two 
people, regardless of gender. The legal consequences of a marriage under the Civil 
Union Act are the same as those of a marriage under the Marriage Act. This Act has 
conferred a new distinct status upon gays and lesbians in cohabiting relationships. 
Today, surviving partners in civil unions concluded in terms of the Civil Union Act 17 
of 2006 are entitled to claim maintenance from their deceased civil union partner’s 
estate, just as common law spouses can claim from one another’s estates. 
 
In Botswana and Lesotho,801 sexual behaviour in society is generally predicated on 
heterosexuality, unlike in South Africa and Australia. As a result, any exhibition of 
homosexual tendencies is regarded as deviant behaviour and an affront to morals and 
                                            
798  See Du Plessis v RAF 2003 1 BCLR 1220 (SCA), 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) paras [34]-[41]. 
799  Act 17 of 2006. 
800  Ibid. 
801  The arguments outlined in chapter 2 of this research study, par 2.5.5.5, dealing with the legal 
position of Lesbian, bisexual, gay and transgender (LBGT) persons, apply here as well. 
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decency.802 The law performs the function of prohibition through the criminalisation of 
homosexual activity, and attempts to organise relationships in the public and private 
sphere.803 This implies that a surviving homosexual partner cannot institute a claim for 
loss of support in the circumstances where his/her partner was wrongfully and 
negligently killed, as these relationships do not legally “exist” in Botswana.804 The 
Botswana Constitution does not refer to a right or protection from discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation.805 
 
Until recently, in Australia, as in South Africa, civil unions and domestic partnerships 
were available to same-sex couples in most states and territories, but not the institution 
of marriage. As mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis,806 same-sex couples were 
prevented from marrying by the 2004 amendments to the federal Marriage Act of 
1961.807 In 1961, though the concept of modern marriage was a heterosexual union 
where the parties pledged monogamy and permanency in their relationship,808 the 
Marriage Act as originally enacted that year did not contain a definition of marriage.809 
                                            
802  Tafa “Right to sexual orientation: The line of the Botswana government” in Ditshwanelo Conference 
on Human Rights and Democracy, 17-19 November 1998, Gaborone, Ditshwanelo, 2000 127 
(published contribution at a conference); Quansah 2004 4 AHRLJ 201; Baseline document on 
Lesotho, COC Netherlands, 2013, p. 7; BTI 2014, Lesotho Country Report  
https://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Lesotho.pdf (accessed on 8 
August 2016). 
803  Penal Code Act 1998 ss 21 & 33; Utjiwa Kanane v the State Criminal Appeal No 9 of 2003 
(unreported) Botswana; Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act No. 67 of 1939, First schedule, pt. II 
(1 January 1939), Lesotho. 
804 Olivier “The reality of being gay in Botswana” in Ditshwanelo 135; Motebo Ntabe 
https://www.lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/LS/MSG_UPR_LSO_S08_2010_
MatrixSupportGroup.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2016); see also LGBT Situation in Lesotho, 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (June 29, 2011) 
https://www.chriafrica.blogspot.com/2011/06/lgbt-situation-in-lesotho.html (accessed on 8 August 
2016). 
805  Quansah 2004 AHRLJ 201 209; Sander 1984 CILJSA 350; Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
67 of 1939, First schedule, pt. II (1 January 1939), Lesotho. 
806    See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.3.5 above. 
807  Marriage Amendment Act, 2004. 
808  Rundle 2011 AJFL 126. 
809  Neilsen https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary...Library/.../SameSexMarriage 
(accessed on 14 July 2017). 
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The 2004 amendments to the Marriage Act of 1961 inserted the definition of a 
marriage. Presently, marriage is defined as follows: 
“Marriage, according to law in Australia, is the union of a man and woman to 
the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”810  
 
These words expressly exclude any union where the parties are not a male and a 
female, for example same-sex unions. Same-sex marriage-related bills have been 
introduced in the Parliament of Australia, none of which have passed and become law. 
In December 2013, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) passed legislation which 
briefly legalised same-sex unions within the territory,811 prompting the Federal 
Government to launch a constitutional challenge in the High Court. The High Court 
struck down the Australian Capital Territory legislation on the basis that the law was 
inconsistent with federal legislation, which defines marriage as between a man and a 
woman.812 A law legalising same-sex marriage was passed by Parliament on 7 
December 2017 and received royal assent the following day (8 December 2017).813 In 
this sense, Australia has progressed from its history of express prohibition of same-
sex marriage by the Howard Government in 2004. The current position is that same-
sex couples in Australia can enter into a marriage union. 
 
3.5.5 Unmarried heterosexual partners 
Common law does not recognise and never has recognised the rights of an unmarried 
heterosexual woman who merely lives with a man.814 As it was briefly put by Lord 
Devlin: “A man and woman who live together outside marriage are not prosecuted 
                                            
810  See s 46(5)(1) of the Marriage Act, 1961. 
811  Marriage Equality (Same sex) Act, 2013. 
812  The Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55; Alastair [2005] MelbULawRw 17. 
813  Yaxley http://www.abc.nt.au/news/2017-12-08/same-sex-marriage-legislation (accessed on the 12 
December 2017). 
814  Otlhogile 1994 BJAS 2. 
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under the law, but they are not protected by it.”815 They live outside the law. This union 
is not recognised, hence no legal obligation is implicit in it, and an express obligation 
will not be enforced by law.816 Though Lord Devlin was writing about English law, the 
position is generally the same under Australian,817 Botswana,818 Lesotho and South 
African819 common law. Hahlo stated the following: 
“…a man and woman who, for good reason or bad elect to live in concubine 
rather than marry, make a deliberate choice and cannot complain if the 
consequences of marriage do not attach to their union…”820 
 
The social judgements of today on matters of unmarried heterosexual partners living 
together as husband and wife are different from those of common law.821 In Australia, 
Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa, many couples live in this type of arrangement, 
and openly so. Cohabitation has become commonplace, accepted, or at least tolerated 
by society, and to some extent even recognised by our courts, by extending the law 
applicable to married couples to unmarried heterosexual partners.822 The introduction 
and enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act823 has certainly granted surviving 
unmarried heterosexual partners a right to claim for loss of support from their deceased 
partner’s estate. It conferred certain rights on the unmarried heterosexual partner. In 
its definition of a dependant for the purposes of claiming compensation for the death 
of a workman, the unmarried heterosexual partner is explicitly included. In the English 
case of Dyson Holdings v Fox,824 protection was given to a woman who had lived with 
                                            
815  Lord Devlin Enforcement of morals (1965) 77. 
816  Ibid. 
817  Andrews v Parker 1973 Qd R93 104. 
818  Otlhogile 1994 BJAS 3. 
819  Van der Vyver “Human rights aspects of the dual system applying to Blacks in South Africa” in 
Takirambudde (ed) The individual under African law (1982) 130. 
820  Hahlo 1972 SALJ 321. 
821  Otlhogile 1994 BJAS 1 3; Andrew v Parker (1973) Qd R93 104. 
822  Otlhogile 1994 BJAS 2; Dyson Holdings v Fox 1975 3 All E R 1030; Andrews v Parker 1973 Qd 
R93 104; Thompson v Model Steam Laundry 1926 TPD 674; Paixăo v RAF [2012] ZASCA 130. 
823  s 1 of the COID Act 130 of 1993. See s 1(xv)(c): “…a person with whom the employee was at the 
time of the employee’s death living as husband and wife”. 
824  1975 3 All ER 1030. 
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a man for 40 years, without being formally married. It would therefore seem that in 
England, the action is available where the relationship was long and durable. 
 
In a 1926 South African case, Thompson v Model Steam Laundry,825 Mr and Mrs 
Thompson were married with two children. On their divorce, Mrs Thompson was 
awarded custody of the daughter, and custody of the son was awarded to Mr 
Thompson. Mr Thompson kept the son in the house occupied by the mother and fed 
him there. He also had meals there and occupied the house during the daytime but 
took no part in the management of the house. Mrs Thompson performed all the 
functions of a manageress. For all outward appearances, (Mr Thompson) comported 
himself in the same manner as an ordinary married man who lived with his wife and 
children in this house. Mrs Thompson took laundry to the respondents and pledged the 
defendant's credit. In an action to claim payment for the laundry services, Mr 
Thompson pleaded that Mrs Thompson had no authority  actual or implied  to bind 
his credit. Mr Schreiner for the respondent argued that where a man employed his or 
any woman with whom he cohabitated to manage the joint household, there is a 
rebuttable presumption of implied agency. Though the court rejected this argument, it 
nonetheless held Mr Thompson liable for the payment of laundry services. It was held 
that since he kept his son in the house and Mrs Thompson maintained the house, as 
well as the children to whom he owed a duty of support, he was liable for all expenses 
(household necessaries) incurred in this regard. 
 
Recently, the court in South Africa adjudicated on a matter concerning the dependant 
action instituted by an unmarried heterosexual partner and her daughter. In Paixiăo v 
                                            
825  1926 TPD 674. 
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RAF,826 the plaintiff, Ms Paixiăo, and her daughter sued the Road Accident Fund for 
loss of maintenance and support as a result of the wrongful and negligent death of Mr 
Gomes. They contended that Mr Gomes had contractually undertaken to maintain and 
support them, was legally obliged to do so, and would have done so for the remainder 
of Ms Paixião’s life and until her daughter became self-supporting, if not for his 
ultimately death. Ms Paixiăo and Mr Gomes had been living together and had planned 
to marry. Mr Gomes supported Ms Paixiăo and her children financially, had formed a 
strong bond with the children, and they had a joint will wherein they referred to “our 
daughters. For her part, Ms Paixiăo nursed and supported Mr Gomes when he was 
unable to work. Their relatives, community and friends accepted them as a family unit. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal recognised that a dependant must have a right which is 
worthy of the law’s protection in order to claim support. Whether this is the case is 
determined by the legal convictions of the community, which is in turn determined by, 
among other things, society’s history, its ideas of morals and justice, its perception of 
where the loss should fall, and the convenience of administering the rule.827 The court 
found that as the legal convictions of the community is the decisive factor in the 
determination; the dependants’ action always has the flexibility to adapt to social 
changes and modern conditions.828 It held that there is no reason to restrict the action 
to traditional family and blood relationships when social change does not require it.829 
The Supreme Court of Appeal recognised that the nuclear family has, for a long time, 
not been the norm in South Africa and millions of South Africans live together without 
                                            
826  [2012] ZASCA 130. 
827  See Paixăo v RAF [2012] ZASCA 130 paras [23]-[24]. 
828  See Paixăo v RAF [2012] ZASCA 130 par [30]. 
829  See Paixăo v RAF [2012] ZASCA 130 par [14]; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par [7]. 
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entering into formal marriages. This is because of religious, legal, social, cultural and 
financial reasons.830  
 
Although the cases discussed here are on South African law, illustrating that the 
institution of marriage has long been on a slippery slope, the position is generally the 
same in Australia,831 Botswana,832 and Lesotho.833 What was once a holy estate 
enduring for the joint lives of the spouses, is steadily assuming the characteristics of a 
contract for a tenancy at will834 and concubines or relationships outside marriage are 
a reality that we can no longer afford to ignore. 
 
3.5.6 Blood relations: grandparents, parents and children (step-siblings) 
Blood relation was also a source of the common law duty of support.835 Nonetheless, 
in M v Minister of Police,836 the court held that the duty of a parent to support his/her 
child arises out of and is now governed by statute,837 and no longer by common law, 
and that constitutional damages may be claimed. A duty of support between family 
members is one of those areas in which the law gives expression to the moral views 
of society.838 A child (even unborn839 and an adult child) has the right to claim for 
support from both his parents.840 Likewise, a parent has a right to support from his own 
child (also a minor).841 Grandparents also have a right to institute a claim for support 
                                            
830  See Paixăo v RAF [2012] ZASCA 130 par [32]. 
831  Andrews v Parker 1973 Qd R93 104. 
832  See Otlhogile 1994 BJAS 3. 
833  In Lesotho, there was no case that dealt specifically with heterosexual partners. 
834  Fender v John-Mildway 1938 A.C 34-5. 
835  Mohapi 2016 De Rebus 28; Burchell Delict (1993) 236-237. 
836  2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) 635. 
837  s 28 of the Constitution; Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
838  Taljaard v RAF [2014] ZAGPJHC 229; 2015 1 SA 609 (GJ). 
839  Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd 1909 TH 297 301. 
840  Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90; Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (Tk.); Metiso v 
Padongelukkefonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T); Kramer v Port Elizabert Municipality 1986 1 SA 441. 
841  Anthony v Cape Town Municipality 1967 4 SA 443; Manuel v African Guarantee Ltd 1967 2 SA 
417; Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A); Moletlanye v BMVAF 1997 
BLR 1298; Fosi v RAF 2008 3 SA 560 (C); Seleka v RAF 2016 4 SA 445 (GP). 
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from grandchildren,842 but only where their own children are dead or unable to provide 
support.843 In addition, a brother (or sister) may claim support from brothers and sisters 
if his or her parents are unable to support him or her.844 The duty of support with regard 
to collateral consanguinity does not, however, extend beyond brothers and sisters.845 
Since they are not related by blood, a stepparent and stepchild or persons related by 
affinity (such as brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law) have no mutual right to support vis-
à-vis one another.846  
 
Despite this clear common law rule, the issue to be decided by the court in Heystek v 
Heystek847 was whether there is any obligation on a stepfather to maintain his 
stepchildren. In this case, the applicant was a widow with three minor children. She 
married the respondent in community of property in 1997. There were no children born 
of the marriage. The respondent initiated divorce action against the applicant, which 
the applicant defended. The applicant claimed for maintenance pendent lite. Although 
the applicant claimed maintenance for herself, it was clear that some of the items 
included in her claim related to her minor children, for example school fees. The court 
held that the inevitable concomitant of a marriage in community of property is the 
shared responsibility for the maintenance duty in respect of his or her spouse’s children 
from a previous marriage.848 The court also held that the right to parental care in 
section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution extends to stepparents,849 meaning that the 
stepparent would be held liable for the maintenance of his stepchildren. In addition, 
                                            
842  Ford v Allen 1925 TPD 57; Motan v Joosub 1930 AD 61 70. 
843  Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 502 (E) 510. 
844  Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331. 
845  Vaughan v SA National Trust and Assurance Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 667 (C). 
846  Ibid. 
847  2002 2 SA 754 (T). 
848    Idem 754A-C; also see Boezaart Child law (2017) par 2.4.3.4. 
849    Boezaart Child law (2017) par 2.4.3.4. 
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that parental care includes the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care and 
social services, and the right to basic education.850  
 
According to Boezaart,851 the nature of the universal community of property is that all 
debts and assets of both spouses fall into the joint estate, from which the obligations 
of one of the natural parents in respect of the support of his/her children from the 
previous marriage fall into and have to be paid from. Contrast to a marriage out of 
community of property where the maintenance is paid out of the natural parent’s estate. 
Boezaart further states that this does not mean that different rules apply to a stepparent 
who is married in community of property. The common law rule remains the same852 
although, parenthetically and inescapably, stepparents provide a share of what would 
otherwise have been part of their community property to the maintenance of their 
stepchildren. The marriage in community of property does not in and of itself impose 
any obligation of support between the stepparent and stepchild. The base for the 
existence of this indirect stepparent support in cases of a stepparent who is married in 
community of property, is the source from which the maintenance has to be paid  the 
joint estate, which is the assets of both the natural parent and stepparent.853 It is 
submitted that the Heystek case did not change the common law rule, although a 
stepparent who is married in community of property may attract a legal duty to maintain 
his/her stepchild.  
                                            
850    s 29(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
851    Child law (2017) par 2.4.3.4. 
852    The rule is that there is no obligation on a stepparent to provide maintenance for his or her stepchild 
even in cases where the stepparent is married in community of property to the natural parent. See 
Boezaart Child law (2017) par 2.4.3.4. 
853    See Boezaart Child law (2017) par 2.4.3.4. 
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The common law rule that there is no obligation on a step-parent to provide 
maintenance for his or her step-child854 stands in contrast to customary law, within an 
African context, where the true circle of family spreads so wide that it could include 
step-children855 and a brother-in-law under certain circumstances. For instance, in a 
case of levirate marriage or ukungenwa in Zulu, the brother of a deceased man is 
obliged to marry his brother's widow, and the widow is obliged to marry her deceased 
husband's brother.856 This institution of marriage obliges the oldest surviving brother 
of a man who dies childless to marry the widow of his childless deceased brother, with 
the firstborn child being treated as that of the deceased brother.857 Although the child 
will be treated as the deceased’s child, the surviving brother will be responsible for the 
child’s maintenance, and the child will therefore qualify as a dependant in an action for 
loss of support against the wrongdoer who is responsible for the wrongful and unlawful 
death of the surviving brother. Levirate marriage was also practiced by the Australian 
Aborigines.858 This marriage practice has declined to a level of non-existence in all four 
jurisdictions, but it is clear from the above discussion that the parties mentioned will 
have a lawful action against the wrongdoer who unlawfully and negligently caused the 
death of their breadwinner. 
 
  
                                            
854    S v MacDonald 1963 2 SA 431 (C) 432F; Mentz v Simpson 1990 4 SA 455 (A) 460B. 
855  A stepchild may have a claim under customary law – see Nkala “Stepchildren and the duty of 
support on the death of the breadwinner in customary law and common law” 2004 De Rebus 23. 
856  A levirate marriage is mandated in/by Deuteronomy 25:5-6. 
857  See Genesis 38:8. 
858  See Levirate Marriage  New World Encyclopedia 
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Levirate_Marriage (accessed on 25 September 
2017); Marriage - IPFS https://www.ipfs.io/ipfs/.../wiki/Marriage.htm (accessed on 25 September 
2017). 
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3.5.7 Adoption 
Adoption is regulated either by statute859 or by customary law.860 Over a century, South 
African courts have had to adjudicate on and listen to cultural evidence dealing with 
adoptions under customary law in a number of cases.861 Customary law recognises 
many different arrangements, forms or methods of adoption of children.862 The natural 
father of a child born out of wedlock can adopt the child and have the child affiliated to 
his family group. This is known as ukulobola ingani in Zulu/Xhosa; nwana ukhou leliwa 
nga khotsi awe in Venda; kolobola n’wana in Shangane; or go nyala ngwana in 
Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho. It literally means “to marry a child”.863 Other adoption 
practices are based on the principle that a father may allot one of his daughters to a 
younger son;864 or the father’s brother can adopt the child after the death of the 
father;865 or a sister may adopt her deceased sister’s child;866 or a childless couple can 
adopt a child whose parents have passed on.867 Adoption also takes place where a 
groom marries the bride and adopts her children from her previous relationship(s).868 
                                            
859  Chapter 15 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
860  Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (Tk). 
861  See e.g. Mpeti v Nkumanda 2 NAC 43 1910; Mbulawa v Manziwa 1936 NAC (C&O) 76); Dlula 
Zibongile 1938 NAC (C & O) 64; Sonqishe v Sonqishe 1943 NAC (C&O) 6); Nongqayi v Mdose 
1942 NAC NAC (C & O) 34; Tokwe v Mkencele 3 NAC 118; Siqcau v Siqcau 1944 AD 67; Salmani 
v Salmani 14 1948 1 NAC (5) 33; Mkazelwa v Rona 1950 NAC (S) 219; Xolilwe v Dabula 4 NAC 
148; Mokoatle v Plaki 1951 NAC (S) 283; Mbese v Lumanyo 1957 NAC (S) 25; Myaki v Qutu 1961 
NAC 10 (S); Gujulwa v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); Kewana v Santam Insurance 1993 4 SA 771 
(TkA); Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T); Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 
SA 147 (T); Maneli v Maneli 2010 7 BCLR 703 (GSJ); MRL v KMG [2013] ZAGPJHC 87. 
862  Mqeke Customary law (2003) 79; Du Bois Wille’s principles (2007) 198; Bekker Seymour’s 
customary law (1989) 236; Bennet Customary law (2004) 375; Maithufi 2001 De Jure 390. 
863  Mofokeng Legal pluralism in South Africa: Aspects of African customary, Muslim and Hindu family 
law (2009) 106; Mqeke Customary law (2003) 82; Poulter Family law and litigation (1976) 237-239; 
Bennett Customary law (2004) 359; Mpeti v Nkumanda 2 NAC 43 1910; Mkazelwa v Rona 1950 
NAC (S) 219; Xolilwe v Dabula 4 NAC 148; Mbulawa v Manziwa 1936 NAC (C&O) 76); Myaki v 
Qutu 1961 NAC 10 (S); Gujulwa v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); s 21(1)(b)(i) of Children’s Act 38 of 
2005. 
864  Mqeke Customary law (2003) 80; Mokoatle v Plaki 1951 NAC (S) 283; Sonqishe v Sonqishe 1943 
NAC (C&O) 6. 
865  Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T). 
866  Kewana v Santam Insurance 1993 4 SA 771 (TkA). 
867  Maneli v Maneli 2010 7 BCLR 703 (GSJ). 
868  Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (T). 
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This form of customary law adoption practice is known as ukuthatha inkomo ne 
konyana in Zulu/Xhosa; u tshi kokodza luranga na mafhuri a a tevhela in Venda; ku 
koka rhanga na vana va rona in Tsonga; or oe gapa le namane in 
Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho.869  
 
Section 242 of the Children’s Act addresses the effects of an adoption order. It provides 
that:   
“(1) Except when provided otherwise in the order or in a post-adoption  
agreement confirmed by the court an adoption order terminates- 
(a) all parental responsibilities and rights any person, including a parent, step-
parent or partner in a domestic life partnership, had in respect of the child 
immediately before the adoption; 
(b) all claims to contact with the child by any family member of a person 
referred to in paragraph (a); 
(c) all rights and responsibilities the child had in respect of a person referred 
to in paragraph (a) or (b) immediately before the adoption; and 
(d) any previous order made in respect of the placement of the child.”870 
 
 
Adoption, both in terms of the Children’s Act or under customary law, confers full 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the adopted child upon the adoptive 
parent; and confers the surname of the adoptive parent on the adopted child, except 
when otherwise provided in the order. An adopted child must essentially be regarded 
as the child of the adoptive parent, and an adoptive parent must likewise be regarded 
as the parent of the adopted child.871 The right to support does not arise because it is 
a “spousal benefit”, but rather because the obligation to support was assumed in a 
relationship similar to a family relationship. Bertelsmann J in Metiso v 
Padongelukkefonds872 addressed a claim against the RAF arising from the death of an 
uncle of certain children whom he had supported: After their father had died, their 
mother had deserted them. A formal adoption according to the custom of the 
community had not occurred because the consent of the absent mother was a 
                                            
869  Mokotong 2015 THRHR 344-345. 
870  s 242(1)(a)-(d) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
871  Metiso v Padongelukkefonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T); s 242(3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
872  2001 3 SA 1142 (T). 
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prerequisite, and she was unreachable. It was contended on behalf of the children that 
the uncle had agreed to maintain them. The court resolved the problem by two findings. 
Firstly, that a de facto adoption should be acknowledged and that the formal defects 
be overlooked, and secondly, that a binding offer to support the children was sufficient 
to ground a duty of support, because to do so was consistent with the morality of 
society.873 In MB v NB, 874 Brassey AJ dealt with whether or not an ex-husband had a 
duty of support towards the children of his former wife, who had been widowed. During 
the marriage, the ex-husband had related to the children as a father. The issue was 
whether he was obliged to continue to contribute to the payment of the school fees of 
the children. Brassey AJ took the view that it was unnecessary to construe a quasi-
adoption because it was sufficient that by making the promise to pay, which was 
regarded as a contractual undertaking,875 the husband was bound. 
 
Adoption in Botswana is governed by the Adoption of Children Act of 1952.876 Section 
4 of the Botswana Adoption Act provides that the adoption of a child shall be effected 
by the order of the court of the district in which the adopted child resides, granted on 
the application of the adoptive parent or parents.877 A court to which application for an 
order of adoption is made shall not grant the application unless it is satisfied that the 
applicant is or that both applicants are qualified to adopt the child; are of good repute, 
fit and proper to be entrusted with the custody of the child; and possessed of adequate 
means to maintain and educate the child.878 The proposed adoption should serve the 
interests and conduce to the welfare of the child.879 The consent to the adoption must 
                                            
873  Metiso v Padongelukkefonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T) 1150G-H. 
874  2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ). 
875  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5.9 hereunder. 
876  See s 4(1) & (2) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
877  See s 4(1) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
878  See s 4(2) (a) & (b) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
879  See s 4(2) (c) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
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have been given by both parents of the child or, if the child is born to an unmarried 
parent, by the mother of the child, whether or not such mother is a minor or married 
woman, and whether or not she is assisted by her parent, guardian or husband, as the 
case may be. If both parents are dead, or in the case of a child born to unmarried 
parents and the mother is dead, by the guardian of the child; if one parent is dead, by 
the surviving parent and by any guardian of the child who may have been appointed 
by the deceased parent; if one parent has deserted the child, by the other parent; or 
by a guardian specially appointed under section 5.880 If the child is over the age of 10 
years, the child must consent to the adoption.881 
 
In Lesotho, the Child Welfare and Protection Act of 2011 governs adoptions. In terms 
of the Act, only married couples may adopt a child jointly. Single men and same-sex 
couples are not permitted to adopt children. Similar to Botswana, there is no anti-
discrimination provision to protect individuals from being discriminated against based 
on their sexual orientation and/or gender identity.882 Since homosexuality in Botswana 
and Lesotho is viewed as illegal, adoption by partners in a same-sex union is not 
allowed and is therefore null and void. This implies that adopted dependants or children 
of same-sex couples will be excluded from claiming damages for loss of support, even 
where their adopted breadwinner was wrongfully and unlawfully killed. The exclusion 
of these types of classes of dependants limits the recovery of these classes of 
dependants.883 
 
                                            
880  See s 4(2) (d) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
881  See s 4(2) (e) of the Adoption of Children Act 1952, [Cap 28:01] Law of Botswana. 
882  Botswana Panel code of 1964, s164, II Laws of Botswana, Cap. 08:01 (rev. ed. 2012); Quansah  
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/african-nations-laws.php#_edn7 
(accessed on 17 September 2016). 
883  The arguments outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.5.5.5 dealing with the legal position of 
LGBT persons apply here as well. 
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In Australia, similar to South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, adoption is governed by 
legislation. Each state and territory has its own legislation.884 The current State and 
Territory Adoption Acts are: Australian Capital Territory: Adoption Act of 1993; New 
South Wales: Adoption Act of 2000; Northern Territory: Adoption of Children Act of 
1994; Queensland: Adoption Act of 2009 & Adoption Regulation of 2009; South 
Australia: Adoption Act of 1988 & Adoption Regulations of 2004; Tasmania: Adoption 
Act of 1988; Victoria: Adoption Act of 1984; and Western Australia: Adoption Act of 
1994. Adoption was restricted to married couples.885 The Family Law Act of 1975 
(amended 1995) allowed the adoption of a child only in a heterosexual relationship. 
Since February 2017, adoption by same-sex couples is legally available in all 
jurisdictions of Australia, except for the Northern Territory.886 Only Northern Territory 
same-sex couples cannot legally adopt a child, but can become foster parents.887 With 
the recent law legalizing same-sex marriage, married gay and lesbian couples will 
jointly be allowed to adopt children even in Northern Territory State. Therefore, children 
legally adopted by same-sex couples in a civil union or civil partnership can institute a 
claim for loss of support should one or both of the adopted parent(s) be unlawfully and 
negligently killed.888  
                                            
884  Swain & Rice In the shadow of the law (2009) 208. 
885  Idem 213. 
886  Family Law Australia “Same sex couples: Fostering or adopting children” 
https://www.diyfamilylawaustralia.com/pages/same-sex-relationships/same-sex-couples-
fostering-or-adopting-children/ (accessed on 7 August 2017). 
887  Ibid. 
888  Steynberg http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2015); 
Winter South Australian MPs' conscience vote backs allowing same-sex couples to adopt 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-15/sa-house-of-assembly-mps-vote-for-same-sex-couples-
adoption/8026938 (accessed on 12 August 2017); Burke (3 November 2016) "Adoption laws in 
Queensland changed to allow same-sex couples to become parents" ABC News 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-03/queensland-adoption-laws-same-sex-couple-able-to-
adopt/7991340?section=qld (accessed on 12 August 2017); Adoption Amendment (Same Sex 
Couples) Act, 2010 (New South Wales); Tasmanian Upper House passes gay adoption bill – updated on 
the 28 Jun 2013, 1:38am https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-06-27/gay-adoption-passes/4786102 
(accessed on 12 August 2017); Riley Same-Sex Adoption Reform on the Agenda in 
Victoria 19 May, 2014 Victoria News; Adoption Amendment (Adoption by Same-Sex Couples) 
Act 2015 (VIC); Acts Amendment (Gay and Lesbian Law Reform) Act 2002 (WA). 
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In all four jurisdictions, the introduction of legislation on adoption did not replace 
adoptions under customary law  instead, they have continuously operated alongside 
each other within a dual legal system.889  
 
3.5.8 Court order 
A divorced woman who is entitled to support from her former husband in terms of a 
court order may institute a dependant’s action upon his negligent and wrongful 
death.890 In the South African case of Santam v Henery891 the court held that in 
accordance with a court order, a divorced woman was entitled to a certain amount for 
support from her previous husband in terms of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act.892 Her 
previous husband had been negligently killed and the question was whether she was 
entitled to damages for loss of support. The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged 
her claim by extending the sui generis action of the dependant for support to include 
the claim of a divorced woman. The court held that the interests of the community 
determine that the divorced woman’s rights need protection. The fear of multiplicity of 
actions is not relevant here.893 The court also held that her claim for loss of support is 
not restricted to the amount in terms of the court order, and that whatever amount she 
would in fact have received from the deceased if he were still alive is a factual question.  
 
This study has found no reported cases of authority relating to claims for loss of support 
by a divorced wife in Botswana and Lesotho. Nonetheless, based on the tendency of 
the two jurisdictions to follow the South African law, an inference might be drawn to the 
effect that a duty of support will arise where there is a court order. With regard to 
                                            
889  Roberts Tswana family law (1972) 13; Marman v Marman and others [2003] 1 BLR 97; Montshiwa 
v Montshiwa 1999 2 BLR 216 (HC); Molokomme Children of the fence (1991) 27. 
890  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 296. 
891  1999 3 SA 421 (SCA). 
892  Act 70 of 1979. 
893  Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) par [44]. 
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Botswana and Lesotho, it is accepted that their legal positions would be similar to the 
South African position, since both jurisdictions mirror South African legal judicial 
decisions, and no contrary legislation or case law could be found.894  
 
The Australian law relating to a divorced wife claiming for loss of support under the 
dependency action seems very similar to the South African law.895 Consequently, in all 
these jurisdictions, a divorced woman who is entitled to support from her former 
husband in terms of a court order may institute a dependant’s action upon his negligent 
and wrongful death. 
 
3.5.9 Contract  
In common law, a person who has a mere contractual claim to support has no claim 
for loss of support resulting from the death of the person bearing the contractual duty 
of support.896 Such a right to support is in principle deemed not to be enforceable 
against third parties, but only enforceable inter partes. The nature of the contractual 
relationship founding the duty or right to support fulfils an important role in determining 
the responsibility.897 However, certain types of relationships out of which contractual 
duties of support may arise should be approached with caution. 
 
In Paixăo v RAF,898 the court developed the common law to deal with the duty of 
support between unmarried heterosexual couples and held that a dependant’s action 
                                            
894  This study has failed to find any Botswana and Lesotho case effectively dealing with a divorced 
wife or husband who is entitled to support from his or her former spouse in terms of a court order. 
895  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report De Facto Relationships: Claims by surviving de facto 
partners under the Common Law Practice Act 1867 for damages for wrongful death (Report 48, 
1994); Common Law and Workers’ Compensation Amendment Act 1994 (Qld) s 5, which inserted 
the amended definition into s 13 of the Common Law Practice Act 1867 (Qld). 
896  Smith & Heaton 2012 THRHR 472-473. 
897  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 294; Neethling & Potgieter 2001 THRHR 488. 
898  2012 6 SA 377 (SCA). 
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existed where a contractual duty of support had been established. The effect of the 
decision in Paixăo v RAF is that the unmarried dependant in a permanent heterosexual 
life partnership will now be able to claim damages for his or her loss of support from 
the wrongdoer who caused the death of the dependant's breadwinner.899 It seems that 
courts will find in favour of a partner who was in a domestic partnership if the 
agreement between such partners amounted to more than a mere undertaking to 
support each other. There must be a binding contract, with the intention by both parties 
to be legally bound by such contract. This seems to be the only exception to the rule, 
which is welcomed because it recognises that some people do not wish to marry, or 
there are circumstances that prevent marriage.900 This case once again shows the 
ever-evolving nature of South Africa's common law. It follows a line of previous 
judgments, where the highest courts in South Africa have moved away from only 
allowing a dependant's action for persons married in accordance with the Marriage Act 
25 of 1961.901 
 
In MB v NB,902 the facts of the case were essentially that after a ten-year period of 
marriage, the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that 
the wife instituted divorce proceedings against her husband. The main issue of care of 
the minor child born of the marriage was not in dispute, but what was in dispute was 
the issue of the defendant’s alleged obligation to provide maintenance for the private 
school education of a step-child whom the husband had intended to adopt, though the 
                                            
899 Ismail & Marias 
https://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/200552/Insurance/Loss+Of+Support+Extended+To+Perm
anent+Heterosexual+Life+Partnership (accessed on 5 September 2017); Didishe 2012 De Rebus 
27.  
900  Didishe 2012 De Rebus 26. 
901  Smith 2016 De Rebus 37; Ismail & Marias 
https://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/200552/Insurance/Loss+Of+Support+Extended+To+Perm
anent+Heterosexual+Life+Partnership (accessed on 5 September 2017). 
902  [2009] ZAGPJHC 76; 2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ). 
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process of adoption was not pursued. Even though the husband never formally 
adopted his wife’s son, by promising to pay the boy’s expensive private school fees, 
and agreeing to give the boy his surname, the defendant implicitly represented to the 
boy, to his wife, and to the world at large, that he proposed to stand in relation to the 
boy as a father to a son. Confirmation of this was found in the documents pertaining to 
the boy’s schooling, including but not confined to the school’s application form, to which 
the husband appended his signature as “father” without reservation or qualification. 
The court held that by making the promise, the husband assumed a duty to support 
and maintain the boy. The court thus created a duty of support between a person and 
an unrelated benefactor.903 
 
In Seleka v RAF,904 there was a verbal contract between the plaintiff and her deceased 
daughter that the daughter would support the plaintiff by contributing an amount of 
R1300 per month towards household expenses, until such time as the mother would 
turn 60 years of age and thus be eligible to receive a government old-age pension. The 
daughter was killed due to the unlawful and negligent driving of a motor vehicle. At the 
time of her death the deceased lived with her mother and stepfather according to 
(Tswana) African customary law. She was working and contributing to the family 
income. The plaintiff brought a claim for loss of support against the RAF. The issue 
before the court was whether in terms of customary law (Tswana) a child has an 
obligation to support an indigent parent. The court held that customary law place a duty 
on a child who is financially able to provide maintenance for his/her needy parents. As 
far as Tswana law and customs were concerned, the principle has developed from not 
only a duty on a son to maintain his parents, but also to such duty on a daughter. 
                                            
903  Smith & Heaton 2012 THRHR 472. 
904    2016 4 SA 445 (GP).  
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With regard to Botswana and Lesotho, it is accepted that their legal positions will be 
similar to the South African position, since both jurisdictions mirror the South African 
legal judicial decisions, and no contrary legislation or case law could be found. The 
writer, having extensively researched this issue under Australian law, found no 
judgment, legislation, or case wherein contractual rights pertaining to the duty to 
maintain or support were discussed. 
 
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the review of the development of the categories of dependants 
who are suitable to be recognised as having a claim for loss of support against the 
wrongdoer responsible for the wrongful and negligent death or injury of their 
breadwinner, as well as some of the problems905 relating to the action of dependants 
for loss of support. It emerged that the scope for the recognition of a duty of support is 
premised on factors other than inflexible common law principles. The discussion has 
demonstrated that the common law has been developed to recognise that a duty of 
support can arise, in a given case, from the fact-specific circumstances of a proven 
relationship, which shows that a binding duty of support is assumed by one person in 
favour of another. Moreover, a culturally embedded notion of “family”, defined as being 
a network of relationships of reciprocal nurture and support, informs the common law’s 
appetite to embrace, as worthy of protection, the assumption of duties of support and 
the reciprocal right to claim support by persons who are in relationships akin to that of 
a family.906 This norm is not narrow-minded, but is instead likely to be universal. It 
certainly is consonant both with the norms derived from the Roman-Dutch tradition, as 
                                            
905  E.g., vested rights; injured breadwinner and classes of dependants: see chapter 3 of this thesis, 
paras 3.3.1.1 3.4.1.2 & 3.5 above. 
906  Taljaard v RAF [2014] ZAGPJHC 229; 2015 1 SA 609 (GJ). 
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alluded to by Cachalia JA in Paixăo v RAF,907 and the norms derived from African 
tradition, as exemplified by the spirit of Ubuntu mentioned by Dlodlo J in Fosi v RAF.908  
 
These important developments do not, however, indicate that the action of dependency 
in South Africa has developed into a general remedy for the wrongful and negligent 
killing of the breadwinner. It has not advanced to this level yet.909 The discussion will 
help the reader to understand that this list of categories of dependants may expand 
further in the future, owing to South Africa’s constitutional democracy, which promotes 
a culture of respect for basic human rights910 and the norm of public accountability.911  
 
A brief investigation of the literature and case law of South Africa, Australia, Botswana 
and Lesotho was explored in this chapter. This chapter has set the foundation for the 
different categories of legally recognised dependants and problematic aspects relating 
to the dependency action. In the next chapter, this study will address the assessment 
of compensation (damages) in respect of the action of dependants for loss of support, 
along with a review of the literature that has discussed related problems.912 
                                            
907  [2012] ZASCA 130. 
908  2008 3 SA 560 (C). 
909  Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA). 
910  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 
1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par [11]. 
911  Davel https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 17 September 2016). 
912  See Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on 18 March 2016); 
Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 477-490. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ASSESSMENT AND QUANTIFICATION OF COMPENSATION (DAMAGES) IN 
TERMS OF THE ACTION OF DEPENDANTS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the general principles relating to the assessment 
and quantification of compensation (damages) for loss of support due to the death of 
a breadwinner under the dependency action. Assessment of damages is a very 
“technical” and “complex” area of the law,913 both in theory and in practice. It is a 
process to determine the severity and magnitude of the damage or loss caused to the 
dependants as a result of the unlawful and negligent death of their breadwinner. 
According to Neethling and Potgieter,914 it is a process whereby damage, which the 
law has found to exist and for which compensation may be awarded, is expressed in 
monetary terms, in order to reach a specific amount of damages. Consequently, it 
involves fact-finding in line with legal principles915 and forms an integral part of the 
dependency action for loss of support.  
 
The assessment and quantification of damages is often the principal issue in litigation, 
because the primary objective of the dependant-plaintiff is usually to collect as much 
damages as possible, while that of the defendant-wrongdoer is to pay as little damages 
as possible.916 Accordingly, litigants frequently devote substantial time and effort to 
attempting to establish the level of harm.917 In fact, assessment and quantification of 
                                            
913  Appau https://jtighana.org/new/links/papers/ASSESSMENT%20OF%20DAMAGES%20-
Justice%20Yaw%20 Appau.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2017); Gillies Business law (2004) 346; 
Mogale v Seima [2005] ZASCA 101; 2008 5 SA 637 (SCA) par [8]. 
914  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 246; Van der Merwe v RAF (Women’s Legal Centre 
Trust as amicus curiae) 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) 252. 
915  Gillies Business law (2004) 346; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 22. 
916  Ketsekele v RAF [2015] ZAGPPHC 308; 2015 4 SA 178 (GP). 
917  Kaplow & Shavell 1996 JLE 191. 
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damages is an area of the law in which many attorneys or advocates in South Africa 
specialise.918 A large percentage of the cases currently before our High Courts are 
negligence cases involving assessment and quantification of damages, either in a 
claim for personal injury or for loss of support.919  
 
This chapter critically examines the principles and methods according to which the loss 
of support is assessed and compensated.920 The major controversy in loss of support 
claims today is not so much in terms of the establishment of liability, but more in 
determining claimable damages under the dependency action.921 This chapter 
unsympathetically explores the narrow list of heads of damage (losses) under the 
dependency action,922 as well as the blanket denial of non-financial damages under 
the dependency action923 in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. 
 
The courts in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Australia place a lot of emphasis 
on actuarial expert evidence.924 It is rare for a claim for compensation for death to be 
settled in or out of court, without the benefit of an actuarial report.925 Furthermore, this 
chapter considers the role of the guiding principles, evidential framework and 
                                            
918  See in general Mkhwanazi 2015 South African Health News Service Health E-news 9: according 
to Stellenbosch University Professor Ethelwynn Stellenberg, multi-million-rand negligence claims 
against the Department of Health have increased nine-fold since 2013. 
919  See Dereymaeker https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sacq.v54il3 (accessed on 30 March 2017): In recent 
years, reports have increasingly pointed to the mounting quantum of claims for civil damages faced 
by the South African Police Service (SAPS). A close analysis of the publicly available data shows 
that a large number of claims are increasingly being filed against the SAPS. The South African 
Police Service (SAPS) has, in recent years, reported a substantial annual increase in civil claims 
filed for damages as a result of actions or omissions by its officials, and an even larger increase in 
pending claims. The 2014/15 SAPS annual report showed that pending claims stood at over R26 
billion, which is equivalent to over a third of the SAPS budget. 
920  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.7 hereunder. 
921  Jaffe https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol18/iss2/5 (accessed on 30 October 2017). 
922  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4.1 hereunder. 
923  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4.2 hereunder. 
924  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
925  Koch 2011 SAAJ 125. 
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discrepancies in assessments of dependants’ claims by actuarial experts,926 and the 
proof or lack thereof for the assessment and quantification of awards for loss of 
support. Moreover, a mathematical model to calculate the present value of loss of 
financial support due to wrongful and negligent death is noticeably absent from the 
statutes (legislative guidelines), which may result in inconsistency in terms of how it is 
calculated, thereby resulting in over- or under-compensation.927  
 
In addition, there are remarkably broad similarities between all four countries, with a 
lively replication of legal concepts in the area of assessment of damages. However, 
there are also noteworthy differences in this regard. This chapter highlights the 
similarities and differences in the context in which assessment of damages under the 
dependency action functions, with the aim of ensuring that comparative law is 
appropriately understood. Lastly, this chapter identifies solutions to some of the 
problems in the assessment of compensation for loss of support in respect of the 
action of dependants. The next section provides an explanation of the concepts of 
“damage”, “damages” and “compensation”. 
 
4.2. Concepts of “damage”, “damages” and “compensation” 
“Damage”, “damages” and “compensation” are words that we hear very often in 
connection with personal injury and death cases in courts of law in South Africa, 
Australia, Botswana and Lesotho. For purposes of clarity and perspective, it is 
important to reflect briefly on the legal meaning of the concepts of “damage”, 
“damages” and “compensation” within the dependency action. The definition of and 
                                            
926  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.7.2 hereunder. 
927  Burchell Delict (1993) 238; Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A); Waring & Gillow 
Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234; De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W); 
Victor NO v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C) 120C; McKerron Delict (1971) 151-
153; Howroyd & Howroyd 1958 SALJ 65 68; Boberg 1964 SALJ 147 153. 
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distinction between the concepts of “damages” and “compensation” is nothing new in 
the legal arena. In the case of South African Airways v Van Vuuren,928 the distinction 
between “damages” and “compensation” was deliberated on in the judgment of the 
Labour Appeal Court. According to the Labour Appeal Court, the two words were often 
used interchangeably because of their ambiguous meaning, and as a result, this would 
naturally affect the discretion of the court in awarding claims for damages and 
compensation in labour matters. The terms “damages” and “compensation” have also 
been used interchangeably, for the most part, in death matters. From this, the question 
arises as to whether the terms mean the same, or whether there is any difference 
between the two. Furthermore, the question is whether their meaning could also be 
regarded as rather ambiguous under the dependency action for loss of support. 
 
“Damage” and “damages” as legal terms had their origins and development in the 
context of delictual and contractual liability929 within the broader concepts of liability 
and compensation. According to Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd,930 the term “damage” 
or damnum is an ancient concept that became part of the legal terminology with the 
lex Aquilia in 287 B.C. The term “harm” also denotes “damage”.931 In South African 
law, the word “damage” plays a role in many branches of law, such as the law of delict, 
contract, insurance, enrichment, expropriation, hire purchase, estoppel, criminal law, 
and the law of procedure.932 Nonetheless, there is no commonly accepted definition of 
the term “damage”. 
 
                                            
928  [2012] ZALCCT 52; (2013) 34 ILJ 1749 (LC); [2013] 10 BLLR 1004 (LC). 
929  Le Roux Difficulties in claiming prospective losses (2013) 8; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of 
damages (2012) par 1.5.1. 
930  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 2.2; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict 
(2015) 222. 
931  Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict (2017) par 4.1; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26-27. 
932  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 2.2. 
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One of the leading cases on damage, Oslo Land Co Ltd v Union Government,933 was 
not very helpful in offering a proper definition of the concept “damage”. The Appellate 
Division simply remarked that the word “damage” does not mean injury to property, but 
rather the “damnum”, which is the “loss” suffered by the plaintiff.934 This definition is 
not specific or clear enough, as it does not explain the meaning of the word “loss”,935 
or at best, provide examples of “loss”. The term “damage” is an uncountable singular 
noun and has no plural form.936 The word “damages” has a completely different 
meaning and is not the plural of “damage”. Most sources define “damage” as simply 
connoting the harm, loss, injury or detriment suffered or presumed to have been 
suffered by a person, property or right, thereby impairing the usefulness of the person, 
property or right, as the result of a wrongful act, omission, or negligence of another. 
For example, Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd described the word “damage” as the 
diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, of the utility or quality of a 
patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the legally recognised needs of the 
person involved.937 The authors stated that the term “damage” is a broad concept, 
which includes patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial loss as its two mutually exclusive 
components.938 
 
The difference between general and special damages has been described by 
Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd939 as follows: (a) “general damage” (also referred to as 
intrinsic damage) often refers to damage which is legally presumed to flow from an 
                                            
933  1938 AD 584. 
934  1938 AD 584 590. 
935  Erasmus & Guantlett Damages (updated by Visser PJ) (1995) 9. 
936  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2011). 
937  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 1.7.2. 
938  Idem par 2.3.2. 
939  Idem par 3.4.4. 
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unlawful act, and which only needs to be generally pleaded,940 while (b) “special 
damage” (also referred to as extrinsic damage) usually means damage which is not 
presumed to be the consequence of a damage-causing event, and must be specially 
pleaded and proved.941 In other words, special damage is legally considered to be all 
present pecuniary expenses and losses up to the time of trial,942 and may be 
calculated precisely, while general damages includes all non-patrimonial loss943 as 
well as prospective loss of support, and requires the court’s assessment. 
 
Boberg refers to the term “damage” as “loss suffered by the plaintiff”.944 Van der Merwe 
and Olivier state that the term “damage” is only a diminution of patrimony (estate) which 
flow from the infringement of a right.945 Cooper,946 Van der Walt947 and Reinecke948 
also define “damage” in terms of the reduction of someone’s patrimony. Neethling and 
Potgieter denote an acceptable definition of the term “damage” as the detrimental 
impact upon any patrimonial or personality interest deemed worthy of protection by the 
law.949 It is a reduction in the utility of interests, which has been brought about by an 
uncertain event.950 Authors such as McKerron,951 Pauw952 and Pont953 also regard 
damage as a broad concept, which comprises both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
losses. The dictionary meaning of the term “damage” is harm impairing the value, 
                                            
940  Reid v Royal Insurance 1951 1 SA 713 (T) 718. 
941  See Dhlomo v Natal Newspaper 1989 1 SA 945 (A) 952-3; Caxton Ltd v Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 
1990 3 SA 547 (A) 574-5; Du Bois Wille’s principles (2007) 883. 
942  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 3.4.4. 
943  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 3.4.4 & 5.5. 
944  Boberg Delict: Aquilian liability (1984) 75. 
945  See Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 179-80. 
946  Cooper Liability for patrimonial loss (1982) 387. 
947  Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 3. 
948  Reinecke 1976 TSAR 56. 
949  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 222. 
950  Idem 223. 
951  McKerron Delict (1971) 51 53. 
952  Pauw 1977 TSAR 248. 
953  Pont 1942 THRHR 12. 
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usefulness, or normal function of something with unwelcome and detrimental 
effects.954  
 
Similar to civil law, the word “damage”955 under customary law also refers to the harm, 
loss, injury or detriment suffered or presumed to have been suffered by a person, 
property or right, thereby impairing the usefulness of the person, property or right, as 
the result of a wrongful act, omission or negligence of another.956 The word “damage” 
in customary law can also refer to compensation or a fine paid for the delict or wrong 
committed against another person or family.957 It is important to note that customary 
law lacks the conceptual structure of modern law of damages concepts, since they are 
foreign to customary law. In addition, the judicial process in the customary courts has 
its own shortcomings. For instance, the courts do not distinguish clearly between civil 
and criminal cases. Thus, in a case from the Umzimkhulu district, the offence charged 
was that the accused's dogs injured the complainant’s child. The accused entered a 
plea of guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of R150, which he promptly paid. The 
complainant and the community were satisfied that justice had been served, yet the 
                                            
954  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2011). 
955  The term “damage” is also used under customary law. 
956  R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130; Olivier et al Indigenous law (1995) paras 10 & 119; Bekker Law 
of delict in Joubert, Faris & Church (eds) LAWSA vol 32 (2009) paras 180-181; Bekker Seymour’s 
customary law (1989) 98 121 242; Bennett Customary law (2004) 310 312 314; Boezaart 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/32934/Boezaart_Building_2013.pdf (accessed 
on 25 March 2017). 
957  Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 342. Different types of damages are recognised under 
customary law, e.g.: Ukuthwala gives rise to delictual liability only in some communities and inkomo 
yokuthwala or a thwala or bopha beast, being the beast paid as damages; the inkomo yokhona is 
payable for defloration and the inkomo yesisu for impregnating a girl; damages of a vimba (or 
nquthu) beast as an admission of paternity; go tsoša hlogo damages are payable, according to the 
Sesotho custom and tradition, by the accused to raise the head of the breadwinner if he is 
responsible for his/her death. The deceased's dependants have a right to sue such an accused to 
raise his head (loss of support); section 321(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act No 9 
of 1981 (Lesotho): When any person is convicted of an offence, which has caused personal injury 
to some other person, or damage to or loss to property belonging to some other person, the court 
trying the case may after recording the conviction and upon application made by or on behalf of the 
injured party, award him compensation for the injury, damage or loss provided that the 
compensation claimed does not exceed the civil jurisdiction of the court. 
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finer points of the actio de pauperie and the circumstances under which it applies, as 
well as the decided cases by which the court should be guided in arriving at a decision, 
were not investigated, as would have happened in a South African civil court. The case 
was concluded within 18 days of the occurrence, and there were no pleadings.958  
 
Another example is the case of R v Monnanyane,959 wherein the accused was charged 
with the murder of his uncle.960 The proprietary of the assessment of loss of support 
was considered, without any evidence to submit to the court regarding the economic 
and financial standing of the deceased, and therefore the amount of the loss to be 
awarded to the widow.961 The principles of assessment of damages for loss of support 
were not tested, as would have happened in a Western court.  
 
Therefore, in determining delictual liability and compensation in customary law, it must 
be borne in mind that in contrast to Western law, the general elements and principles 
for delictual liability and assessment of damages in terms of customary law are not as 
clear as in South African common law.962 This can be attributed to the fact that 
traditional customary dispute resolution emphasises the goals of reconciliation and 
reintegration. Remedies tend to look forward, with the goal of re-establishing harmony 
within the community.963 Thus, customary law does not draw a clear distinction 
between the law of delict and criminal law, as it is in its nature to generalise, as opposed 
to the nature of common law, which is to contain specialised rules and (often) subtle 
distinctions between the two systems.964 Nonetheless, the customary law of delict 
                                            
958  Koyana 1997 Consultus 128. 
959  2005 LSHC 50. 
960  R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130 par [1]. 
961  Idem par [9]. 
962  Knoetze 2012 Speculum Juris 43-44. 
963  Boege “Traditional approaches to conflict transformation” in Fischer, Giebmann & Schmelzle (eds) 
Berghof handbook for conflict transformation (2006) 7. 
964  Ibid. 
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gives redress for the violation of any right representing material value, which is capable 
of being acquired by a family head.965 This implies redress for damage (harm) to the 
property, as well as for the injury to a woman or dependants of the deceased, who was 
unlawfully and negligently killed.966 A chief or queen mother is not merely a 
representative of the government tasked with applying the rules of law, but the 
instantiation of the community, tasked with upholding community norms and standards. 
The norms are rooted in a range of values, from community and sanctity to 
autonomy.967  
 
Traditionally, murder or homicide constituted a delict, as well as a crime committed 
against the family and the chief.968 It is thus considered actionable in customary law.969 
The customary law principle on the loss of support action was recorded in 1901, with 
the Sipongomana v Nkuku case970
 
decided in KwaZulu-Natal.
 
The court found that if a 
valid customary marriage was concluded, a personal claim for loss of support of the 
wife and children could be instituted under customary law.971 Later, in 1963, the South 
African statutory law documented the delict of the negligent causation of the death of 
a breadwinner, through the promulgation of section 31 of the Black Laws Amendment 
Act.972 Today, both the estate and dependants of a wrongfully and negligently killed 
breadwinner have claims against the wrongdoer, where a delict has caused the death, 
                                            
965  R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130 par [4]; Palmer Law of delict (1970) 112. 
966  See R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130; Bekker “Law of delict” in Joubert LAWSA (2009) par 141; 
Bekker, Rautenbach & Goolam (eds) Legal pluralism in South Africa (2015) 88-89. 
967  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 46. 
968  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 112-113; R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130. 
969  Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70; Maithufi 2009 Obiter 164; Bekker Seymour’s customary law 
(1989) 379; Pasela v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W). 
970  1901 NHC 26. 
971  Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302 306-308 314. 
972  Act 76 of 1963; see Maithufi & Bekker 2009 Obiter 164 for a contemporary viewpoint on the 
applicability of s 31 after the promulgation of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 
1998. 
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in both civil and customary law.973 Botswana and Lesotho inherited their law from South 
Africa, and still follow the South African law and cases; hence, the definition of the term 
“damage” in Botswana and Lesotho is the same as in South Africa.974  
 
Similar to South Africa, the term “damage” generally refers to loss, harm or injury in 
Australia.975 In this regard, the Australian legal author, Luntz,976 states that the term 
“damage” generally refers to loss, harm or injury.977 The civil liability statutes 
throughout Australia define “harm” as harm of any kind, including personal injury or 
death, damage to property, or loss.978 
 
On the other hand, the term “damages” is not the plural of the term “damage”, but is 
rather an uncountable plural noun with no singular form.979 It refers to a sum of money 
claimed as compensation, or awarded by a court to the dependant-claimant as 
compensation for harm, loss, injury or detriment suffered by the dependant-claimant 
because of a delictual act committed by the defendant or his agent.980 In the South 
African textbook Visser & Potgieter Law of Damages,981 the word “damages” is defined 
as the monetary equivalent of damage awarded to a person, with the object of 
eliminating, as fully as possible, the person’s past and future damage.982 It is further 
                                            
973  See s 31 of Black Law Amendment Act 76 of 1963; s 2(1) & (2) of Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998; Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
974  See Archibald v Attorney General 1991 BLR 169 (CA); Sekale v Minister of Health 2006 1 BLR 438 
(HC); R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130; Formbad 1999 AJIC 245 249; Palmer Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 507. 
975  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) 1; Tettenborn Damages (2010) 11. 
976  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) 1. 
977  Harriton v Stephens (2004) 59 NSWLR 694 (CA) [6]; Kenny v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 
413 [79]. 
978  Civil Liability Act 22 of 2002 (NSW), s 5; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); 
s 4; Civil Liability Act 22 of 2002 (Qld), s 5; Civil Liability Act 22 of 2002 (WA), s 3. 
979  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2011). 
980  Van der Merwe & Olivier Die onregmatige daad (1989) 179; South British Insurance Co Ltd v Smit 
1962 3 SA 826 (SCA). 
981  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 1.7.2. 
982  Van der Merwe v RAF 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) 253. 
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stated that “damages” also refers to the process whereby an impaired interest may be 
restored through money.983 Erasmus explains the term “damages” as follows: “the sum 
of money of the judgment is probably to be explained as the price of redemption from 
liability, that is, the monetary composition offered to the victim in order to save the 
wrongdoer from the harshness of personal execution”.984 The dictionary meaning of 
the term “damages” is “a sum of money claimed or awarded in compensation for loss 
or injury”.985  
 
According to Luntz, the word “damages” is used to describe a sum of money that a 
court may award to a successful plaintiff in an action in tort, or for breach of contract, 
or under the jurisdiction conferred by the successors to Lord Cairns’ Act, in aid of 
equitable remedies.986 In the legal book McGregor on Damages, the word “damages” 
is defined as “the pecuniary compensation obtainable by success in an action, for a 
wrong, which is either a tort or a breach of contract, the compensation being in the 
form of a lump sum, which is awarded unconditionally”.987 
 
The notion of “damages” is best understood by its purpose. Damages are the monetary 
equivalent of loss awarded to a person, with the object of eliminating, as fully as 
possible, the claimant’s loss for past as well as future damage.988 Therefore, the 
primary purpose of awarding damages is to place the dependant in the same position, 
as far as possible, that she or he would have been in, but for the wrongful conduct. To 
achieve this purpose, the law, in all four countries being studied, generally recognises 
                                            
983  Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146; Van der Merwe v RAF (Women’s 
Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) 253; Van der Merwe v RAF 2006 4 SA 
230 (CC) 253; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 1.7.2. 
984  Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 106. 
985  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2011). 
986  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.1. 
987  McGregor McGregor on damages (2016) 3. 
988  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 1.7.2. 
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two heads of damages, namely non-patrimonial damages or non-pecuniary damages, 
and patrimonial damages or pecuniary damages.989 Corresponding terms, such as 
economic or non-economic damages990 and tangible or intangible damages991 are 
sometimes used. The damages seek to restore the diminution in the value and efficacy 
of a legally protected interest. 
 
Patrimonial damages aim to compensate, to the extent that money can, the actual or 
probable reduction of a person’s patrimony as a result of the delict.992 Patrimonial 
damages are a “true equivalent”993 of the patrimonial loss suffered, and are calculable 
in monetary terms. Well-settled examples of patrimonial loss in terms of dependency 
claims are past medical expenses until the date of death, funeral or cremation 
expenses, and loss of support, of which the two last-mentioned are relevant to this 
study. 
 
On the other hand, non-patrimonial damages are utilised to redress the deterioration 
of highly personal legal interests that attach to the body and personality of the claimant, 
and is also called non-patrimonial loss. Non-patrimonial damages do not have a readily 
determinable or direct monetary value,994 and do not serve a compensatory function, 
because such loss does not have an economic or pecuniary value, unlike patrimonial 
loss. The emphasis is on providing satisfaction and solace, and aims to appease the 
wounded feelings of the claimants, in so far as it is possible for an award of money to 
                                            
989  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.1; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) paras 1.7.2 & 3.4.4. 
990  Howarth 2014 SAJBL 2; Tilbury https://www.australii.edu.au (accessed on 15 April 2017). 
991  Fourie v Santam Insurance Ltd 1996 1 SA 63 (T). 
992  See Hutchison 2004 SALJ 51 53; Erasmus & Gauntlett “Damages” LAWSA (updated by Vissser) 
(1995) par 25. 
993  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 3.1. 
994  See Rudman v RAF 2003 2 SA 234 (SCA); Versfeld v South African Citrus Farms Ltd 1930 AD 
452; Coetzee v SA Railways & Harbours 1934 CPD 221. 
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do so.995 Therefore, non-patrimonial losses are illiquid and are not instantly sounding 
in money.996 The court exercises its own judgment in the matter and strives to 
determine awards that will be fair to the plaintiff997 and the defendant, as well as to the 
public at large, since such awards also serve to guide future awards.998 Well-
established variants of non-patrimonial losses include pain and suffering, 
disfigurement, and loss of amenities of life. Besides bodily integrity, our law recognises 
and protects other personality interests, such as dignity,999 mental integrity,1000 bodily 
freedom,1001 reputation,1002 privacy,1003 feeling,1004 and identity,1005 of which none are 
relevant to this study. Nevertheless, the study will focus on the existing problematic 
aspect in our legal system regarding the blanket denial of non-patrimonial damages 
under the dependency action.1006 However, in general, a wrongful reduction in the 
quality of these personality interests or rights entitles the victim to non-patrimonial 
damages.1007 The primary object of non-patrimonial damages is also to make good the 
                                            
995  Delange v Costa 1989 2 SA 857 (A); Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 
9.5.4.1. 
996  See Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (AD) 838; Solomon and another, NNO v De 
Waal 1972 1 SA 575 (AD); Eggeling v Law Union & Rock Insurance Co. Ltd 1958 3 SA 592 (D); 
Administrator-General, South West Africa v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A); Gillbanks v Sigournay 1959 2 
SA 11 (N); Botha v Minister of Transport 1956 4 SA 375 (W) at 380. 
997  De Jongh v Du Pisanie 2005 5 SA 457 (SCA); Van der Merwe v RAF [2006] ZACC 4; 2006 4 SA 
230 (CC); 2006 6 BCLR 682 (CC) par [40]. 
998  Ŵanda 2005 CILSA 113 117. 
999  See Brenner v Botha 1956 3 SA 257 (T). 
1000  See generally Christian Lawyers’ Association v National Minister of Health 2004 1) BCLR 1086 (T); 
2004 4 All SA 31 (T); Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC); 1996 1 
SA 984 (CC); Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 3 BCLR 80 (SE); 1994 4 
SA 899 (SE); Coetzee v Government of the RSA 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC); 1995 4 SA 631 (CC). 
1001  See In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet t/a Metrorail 2005 4 BCLR 301 (CC); 2005 2 SA 
359 (CC). 
1002  National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1999 1 BCLR 1 (SCA); 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1216G-H; O v O 1995 
4 SA 482 (W) 490H-J; Gardener v Whitaker 1994 5 BCLR 19 (E); 1995 2 SA 672 (E) 690G-691A; 
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 6 BCLR 836 (W); 1996 2 SA 588 (W) 606F; Potgieter v 
Kilian 1995 11 BCLR 1498 (N), 1996 2 SA 276 (N). 
1003  See Jansen van Vuuren NNO v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A). 
1004  See S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
1005  See Kidson and others v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 3 SA 461 (W). 
1006  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4.1 hereunder. 
1007  General damages will be awarded if, at the time of death, the proceedings would have reached a 
stage of litis contenstatio – see chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.5.1 hereunder. 
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loss  to amend the injury.1008 Furthermore, its aim is to place the plaintiff in the same 
position that she or he would have been in, but for the wrongdoing.1009  
 
The term “compensation” in the narrow sense denotes “damages”, and in a general 
sense means the process of reparation of any patrimonial or non-patrimonial loss.1010 
In the case of Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Thomas,1011 it was stated 
that “compensation” comes in two forms. The first is for prescribed benefits in 
legislation payable for injuries sustained as a result of an accident, and the second is 
for damages assessed by a court of law.1012 Therefore, the difference between these 
two forms of compensation lies in the way in which the award is determined  one is 
prescribed by legislation and the other is assessed by a court of law, based on 
evidence presented. When one goes through the contents of the Road Accident Fund 
Act1013 and Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act,1014 one finds 
the word “compensation”, but not the term “damages”. Accordingly, any financial claim 
presented and awarded to the victim in a court of law is considered compensation. 
Consequently, compensation is a concept that attempts to redress, in monetary terms, 
any wrongdoing against an individual or any losses (patrimonial and non-patrimonial) 
suffered because of the delict committed by any other person. It is an attempt to make 
amends or to express sorrow to the victim. 
                                            
1008  Ibid. 
1009  Van der Merwe v RAF [2006] ZACC 4; 2006 4 SA 230 (CC); 2006 6 BCLR 682 (CC) par [41]. 
1010  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 1.7.2. 
1011  [2015] ZACC 26. 
1012  [2015] ZACC 26 par [2]: Compensation under the Act may come in two guises. The first is for 
prescribed benefits payable under the Act for occupational injuries sustained as a result of a work 
accident (occupational injury benefits). It is payable irrespective of any negligence on the part of 
the employer. The second is for damages, beyond those benefits, that were caused by a third party 
at the workplace (workplace damages). This is an ordinary delictual claim, dependant on proof of 
wrongful and negligent conduct by the third party. In contrast, the common law delictual claim 
against an employer for workplace damages is precluded. 
1013  Act 56 of 1996; RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005. 
1014  Act 130 of 1993. 
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In light of the above discussion, the concept “compensation” may also include the fine 
or damages payable in terms of customary law, where a breadwinner has been 
unlawfully and negligently killed. From the above discussion, what emerges from the 
language of the definitions of the concepts “damages” and “compensation” is that the 
scope of the word “compensation”, as it is used under the dependency action, rightly 
appears to be interpreted to be wider and more comprehensive in its context than the 
term “damages.” Nonetheless, what is significant is the fact that both concepts are the 
principal remedy that provides monetary compensation, by law, to an individual who 
has suffered loss, including personal injury or loss due to the death of a breadwinner. 
Both seek to redress injustice or wrongdoing by providing the victim with monetary 
assistance for the loss suffered. It is clear that both concepts attempt to measure, in 
financial terms, the extent of the harm suffered because of the wrongdoer's actions. 
 
Damages or compensation is distinguishable from “costs”, which are the expenses 
incurred as a result of bringing a lawsuit, and which the court may order the losing 
party to pay.1015 These concepts also differ from the “verdict”, which is “the final 
decision issued by a court of law”.1016 The terms “damages” and “compensation” seem 
to have the same connotation for purposes of the dependency action, although the 
latter is more comprehensive. Therefore, the two concepts will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. The difference between damages and 
compensation, at least in the context of the dependency action, seems to be a 
distinction without a difference. 
 
                                            
1015 Mlambo 2012 Advocate 22 26 32. 
1016 See legal definition of damage - https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/damages. 
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Having reflected on these terminologies, the objectives of assessing compensation 
(damages) will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3 Basic principles of assessing damages for loss of support in terms 
of the dependency action 
There is no dispute amongst the four jurisdictions regarding the fundamental principle 
which underlies an award of damages to the dependants-claimants under the 
dependency action. The overriding compensatory principle applied to the assessment 
of an award of damages for loss of support is that the dependants-claimants should 
be fully compensated for their loss.1017 This principle is also known as the principle of 
restitutio in integrum.1018 It has been held to be applicable to death claims, so that the 
dependants should be awarded a sum of money that will restore them to the positions 
they would have been in, had there been no wrongdoing committed against their 
breadwinner. The following statement by the Australian Judge, Windeyer, has been 
widely quoted: “The one principle which is absolutely firm, and which must control all 
else, is that damages for the consequences of mere negligence are 
compensatory.”1019 An accurate expression of the award of damages comes from the 
case of Walker v Floyd,1020 wherein it was held that the plaintiff’s remedy remains 
damages designed to restore him, as far as money is able, to his pre-accident 
condition, and to satisfy, again insofar as money can, the needs arising from his 
                                            
1017  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) paras 1.5 & 1.6; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 21; 
Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 292; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) par 1.7.2; Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 5 
October 2017); Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (HL) 39; McCrohon v Harith 
[2010] NSWCA 67 [52] [60]. 
1018  Meaning restoration to the original position; see Liesbosch, Dredger v Edison SS [1933] AC 449 
(HL) 463. 
1019  See Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94 128; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 412 427 
442 463; Harriton v Stephens (2004) 59 NSWLR 694 (CA) 216-230; Luntz Assessment of damages 
(2006) par 1.6. 
1020  [1995] 2 Qd. R 447 452. 
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injuries or the death of the breadwinner. Therefore, the general objective of an award 
of damages in Australia, and indeed in most common law countries, such as South 
Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, is to place the claimant in the financial position he/she 
would have been in “but for” the delict, to the extent that money can,1021 without the 
claimants landing a windfall. This is simultaneously the function of any award of 
damages.1022  
 
From this, it follows that if an assessment is done on a basis, which negates this 
fundamental principle, such assessment is potentially flawed, inequitable and 
unjustifiable.1023 It is therefore important to first determine the damage or loss flowing 
from the untimely demise of a breadwinner. The classic formulation of the 
compensatory principle is the recoverable damages in monetary terms, not more, nor 
less, than the plaintiff’s actual loss.1024 Consequently, the dependants-claimants are 
entitled to be restored to the position they would have been in, had the delict not 
occurred, in so far as this can be done through the payment of money.1025 The aim is 
to make the dependants “whole” through the award of money, in order to compensate 
them for all the losses suffered. 
 
In the assessment of damages, the real question to ask should always be the 
following: What damage or loss has the dependant really suffered from the death of 
his or her breadwinner? Therefore, the calculation of the quantum of damages 
focuses on the full support which would have been provided if there had been no 
                                            
1021  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.4. 
1022  Klopper 2007 THRHR 442. 
1023  Collins v Administrator, Cape 1995 4 SA 83 (C); Geldenhuys v SAR & H 1964 2 SA 230 (C); Parity 
v Hill C and B I 680; Marine & Trade v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 983; Southern Insurance v Bailey 
1984 1 SA 98 (A) 118. 
1024  Monyamane The nature, assessment and quantification of medical expenses (2013) 87. 
1025  De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 
386, 393; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
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death.1026 The ideal measure of damages1027 is that which leads to the most 
comprehensive compensation possible.1028 This means that when assessing 
damages, regard should be had to all losses flowing from the death, including both 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial damage,1029 even though non-patrimonial losses as 
a head of damages under the dependency action are not recognised in South Africa. 
As a result, the aim of the assessment of damages for loss of support is to provide 
the dependants of the deceased with damages or compensation in the form of a sum 
of money, which will be sufficient to supply them with all the benefits of the same 
standard and duration as would have been provided for them by the deceased 
breadwinner, had he not been killed through the wrongful and culpable act of the 
wrongdoer.1030 It is an attempt by our legal system, via a compensation payment, to 
place the dependants in the same financial position as they would have been, but for 
the wrongdoer’s unlawful and negligent act.1031  
                                            
1026  Koch 2011 SAAJ 111 125; De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; 
Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance Co 
Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
1027  A formula for determining monetary damages or a way to compute damages that are to be awarded 
to claimants – see Webster's New World Law Dictionary (2010)  
https://www.yourdictionary.com/measure-of-damages#iQ75KQqTWqZvQxLS.99 (accessed on 23 
July 2017). Quantum of damages appears to be the preferred term in legal circles for the amount 
of damages, and measure of damages will be interpreted by this study to refer to the method used 
to quantify the amount of damages. 
1028  Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer en die “once-and-for-all” reël (1977) 8 46 93 108 125-6 227 242 
250 279 301 304. 
1029  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 6.2; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) par 2.3.2. 
1030  Brooks v Minister of Safety & Security 2009 2 SA 94 (SCA) 97; Victor v Constantia Ins Co Ltd 1985 
1 SA 118 (C) 119; Union Government v Lee 1927 AD 202 220-222; Santam Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 
SA 467 (A) 471-472; Santam Ins Ltd v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 267; Santam v Henery 1999 
3 SA 421 (SCA) 425-426; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for 
Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 1324-1325; Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 2003 3 
SA 1098 (W) 1113-1114; Mankebe v AA Mutual Ins Association Ltd 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 198-199; 
Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 
1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 246; Milns v  Protea Ass Co Ltd 
1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1010; Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 
1982 4 SA 458 (O) 463; Witham v Minister of Home Affairs 1989 1 SA 116 (Z) 131; De Sales v 
Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393; 
Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244. 
1031  De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 
386 393; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614. 
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Common law damages are thus designed to compensate the plaintiff, and not to 
punish the wrongdoer. This stands in contrast to the moralistic view of customary law 
damages, which are more focused on how the wrongdoer should be appropriately 
punished,1032 as stated above,1033 while simultaneously emphasising the traditional 
goals of reconciliation and reintegration in dispute resolution, rather than on what the 
dependants may need in order to be restored to their pre-loss position. Therefore, 
customary law damages are more geared towards the payment of fines, in 
accordance with a criminal law framework, and are therefore regarded as punitive in 
nature. The award of damages under customary law, as previously stated, does not 
adhere to the fundamental principles of assessment of damages for loss of support, 
as would have been applied in a Western court. Therefore, it can be said that 
customary law damages are considered an inadequate and even unjust remedy for 
the loss of support, because it could lead to under-compensation of the dependants.  
 
Customary law damages can also be regarded as being in contrast to common law 
punitive damages,1034 which are awarded to a plaintiff in addition to compensatory 
damages.1035 The award for damages under customary law is limited to punitive 
                                            
1032  Palmer Law of delict (1970) 112; Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70. 
1033  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.2 above. 
1034  Punitive damages are also known as “exemplary damages, and may be awarded in addition to 
actual damage suffered. The purpose is to punish the wrongdoer in a civil lawsuit and to deter 
others from similar misconduct in the future. Punitive damages are based on the theory that the 
interests of society and the victim can be met by imposing additional damages on the wrongdoer. 
They are regarded as non-compensatory, as they have some of the characteristics of a criminal 
fine, and have been characterised as ‘quasi-criminal’ because they stand halfway between criminal 
and civil law” – see Legal dictionary (online): https://www.legaldictionary.net/punitive-damages/. 
1035  Joubert & Prinsloo Law of South Africa (2009) 76. 
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damages.1036 As previously stated,1037 customary law lacks the conceptual structure 
of the modern law of assessment of damages.1038 Concepts such as compensatory 
damages are foreign to customary law. For this reason, customary law falls short of 
the fundamental principle discussed here, namely that the law entitles the dependants 
to be awarded damages for the full measure of their losses, as best as it can be 
calculated in monetary terms. Common law, to some extent, also fails to satisfy the 
requirement of full compensation for the damage flowing from the death of a 
breadwinner, as will be discussed below.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
1036  It should be noted that the continued existence or availability of punitive damages is questionable 
in the South African law of delict.  The accompanying risk of receiving no compensation in respect 
of damage suffered, may justify the consideration of an alternative type of damages in the event 
that punitive damages are no longer awarded. The particular alternative type of damages 
suggested is aggravated compensatory damages. Aggravated compensatory damages are the 
special and highly exceptional damages awarded on a wrongdoer/defendant by a court, when 
his/her conduct amounts to tortious conduct subjecting the dependant/plaintiff to humiliating and 
malicious circumstances, where a dependant/plaintiff is subjected to distress, embarrassment, or 
humiliation. Aggravated damages are basically compensatory in nature and are determined on the 
basis of the intangible injury inflicted on a plaintiff. Intangible injury includes the pain, anguish, grief, 
humiliation, wounded pride, damaged self-confidence or self-esteem, loss of faith in friends or 
colleagues, and similar matters that are caused by the conduct of a defendant. When compared to 
punitive damages, aggravated damages require proof of injury. Aggravated damages can be 
attained as additional compensation if the injured dependant establishes that the unlawful and 
negligent killing of his/her breadwinner caused mental distress, grief, pain (non-patrimonial 
damage).  It is obvious that the dependants of the deceased who was unlawfully and negligently 
killed may suffer extensive non-patrimonial damage. For instance, it is conceivable that a 
dependant who has witnessed the brutal assault of his/her breadwinner may suffer pain, mental 
and emotional distress, shock, grief, shortened life expectancy caused by the conduct of the 
wrongdoer. He/she may incur extensive medical costs and continue to incur related financial costs 
as medical treatment is likely to continue well after the date of death of his/her breadwinner. If the 
victim fails to obtain compensation for such damage, the dependant will bear the burden by 
him/herself, thereby adding further depression to the already unfortunate state of affairs brought 
about by the unlawful and negligent death of his/her breadwinner. However, if the victim is 
compensated, it will alleviate the financial consequences and provide satisfaction in respect of the 
non-patrimonial damage. In this regard, aggravated damages will respond to the precise gap that 
will be left open by the anticipated future absence of punitive damages.  The concept of aggravated 
compensatory damages will thus fulfil to a certain extent the function of punitive damages.  See 
Neethling and Potgieter Law of delict 7 fn 30. 
1037  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.2 above. 
1038  Knoetze 2012 Speculum Juris 47-48. 
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4.4 Irrecoverable damages for loss of support and other related losses in 
terms of the dependency action 
Notwithstanding the fact that a claim for loss of support should include all the financial 
contributions that the breadwinner would have made to his or her dependants over 
the lifetime of the breadwinner or the dependants, whichever is shorter, not all 
financial losses suffered due to the unlawful and negligent death of the breadwinner 
are recoverable under the dependency action for loss of support. A claim for loss of 
support in the law of South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho only comprises itemised 
tangible losses,1039 unlike in Australia, where the relevant legislative provision does 
not explicitly limit the damages recoverable for loss of support to itemised tangible 
losses.1040 Damages recoverable are limited to the loss of that dependant which arose 
from the loss of the expectation of the deceased’s financial support.1041 The general 
principle applied by the South African courts is that a dependant-plaintiff, when 
entitled to damages for loss of support, should be awarded damages only for the 
"material loss” caused by the death of the breadwinner.1042 Claims by dependants are 
thus available solely for pecuniary or patrimonial loss.1043 Practically, no 
                                            
1039  Although for purposes of this study, only loss of support and funeral or cremation expenses will be 
discussed, claimable heads of damages that have been acknowledged as losses under a 
dependency action in the South African practice are loss of financial support, funeral expenses, 
medical and hospital expenses that occurred prior to death, and pain and suffering caused to the 
deceased if proceedings had already been instituted prior to the death. 
1040  Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) s 3(1): An action to be maintainable against any person 
causing death through neglect, despite the death of the person injured 
(1) Whensoever, the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and 
the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party 
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every 
such case the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable 
to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the 
death has been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a serious indictable 
offence. 
1041  De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338 [91]. 
1042  Jameson’s Minor v CSAR 1908 TS 575 602; Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 662 665 
667; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 at 243; Indrani v African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd 1968 4 
SA 606 (D) 607F-G. 
1043  Boberg 1972 SALJ 147-148; Nochomovitz v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1972 1 SA 718 (T). 
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compensation is available for non-pecuniary losses,1044 as well as pecuniary loss of 
future savings or inheritance.1045 In the next section, the loss of consortium (non-
pecuniary loss) and the loss of future savings or inheritance (pecuniary loss) as losses 
suffered by dependants due to the death of the breadwinner will be discussed. 
 
4.4.1  Loss of consortium (non-pecuniary loss) 
4.4.1.1 General  
Consortium consists of several elements, encompassing not only tangible services 
provided by a family member, but also intangible benefits that each family member 
receives from the continued existence of other family members. Such benefits include 
attention, guidance, care, protection, training, companionship, cooperation, affection, 
love, and in the case of a spouse, sexual relations, comfort and society.1046 Damages 
for the loss of consortium are not limited to the loss of a spouse. The loss of consortium 
may be claimed by close family members other than a spouse, including children and 
parents. In this study, special attention will be given to the loss of spousal consortium, 
as well as a child’s loss of parental consortium. However, before discussing them, it is 
important to first briefly reflect on the history of the loss of consortium. 
 
4.4.1.2 Loss of spousal consortium 
The original common law action for loss of consortium was only available to the 
husband for loss of consortium of the wife.1047 The right was initially centred on the 
                                            
1044  Boberg et al Law of persons and family law (1999) 298. 
1045  Joubert & Prinsloo Law of South Africa (2009) 76; Boberg Delict: Aquilian liability (1984) 298. 
1046  Hitaffer v Argonne (DC Circ. 1950). 183 F. 2d 81 1; Best, Barnes & Kahn-Fogel Basic tort law: 
Cases, statutes & problems (2014) chapter 12: Union Government v Warneke 1911 A.D. 657; 
Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53; Peter v Minister of Law & Order 1990 4 SA 6 (E) 9; Carpenter, 
Zuckerman & Rowley https://www.czrlaw.com/damages-arising-out-of-loss-of-consortium 
(accessed on 9 October 2017); Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 5.10. 
1047  See Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 183; Brett 1959 ALJ 321 389 428; Riseley 1981 Adelaide 
Law Report 421 432 453; Thornton https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/1984/2.pdf 
(accessed on October 2017); The Law relating to Loss of Consortium and Loss of Services of a 
Child https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/wpLossOfConsortium.htm 
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husband's position as master1048 of the household, although the element of consortium 
was gradually stressed more than that of servitium.1049 In South Africa, a husband 
whose wife has been wrongfully injured may recover damages from the wrongdoer for 
the hospital and medical expenses that he has incurred, but he may not recover for 
non-pecuniary damage to the consortium of his wife. The right to recover pecuniary 
damage is based on an extension of the actio legis Aquiliae. In 1911, a South African 
court first recognised the right of a husband to claim damages in respect of pecuniary 
loss sustained by him due to the death of his wife,1050 and in 1921,1051 a similar right on 
the part of the husband was recognised in relation to injuries sustained by his wife. Mr 
Justice Villiers stated the following in the 1921 case: 
“As in the case of the death of a wife, our law is, however, silent whether a 
husband can recover from a person who has through culpa injured his wife, 
though not fatally. But no reason can be suggested why the husband should 
not be allowed to recover when the injuries are not fatal. For, in principle, no 
distinction can be drawn between the two cases.”1052 
 
The extent of entitlement to recover for loss of consortium in South Africa is quite 
limited. Non-pecuniary injury to consortium is in general not recoverable.1053 In Union 
Government v Warneke,1054 the plaintiff’s claim for the loss of comfort and society of 
his wife, for whose death in a railway accident the defendant was responsible, was 
disallowed. Lord De Villiers CJ said:1055 “the plaintiff’s claim for loss of comfort and 
society of his wife does not appear to me to be a pecuniary loss at all”. Therefore, a 
                                            
(accessed on 5 October 2017); Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618; Harris v Grigg [1988] 1 Qd R 
514 522; Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 251; Foulds v Smith 1950 1 SA 1 (A). 
1048  The action for loss of consortium was entitled by actio per quod servitium amisit. 
1049  The term servitium refers to the duty of obedience and performance which a tenant was bound to 
render to his lord, by reason of his fee https://www.thelaw.com/lawdictionary& black's law dictionary 
(accessed on 19 July 2017). 
1050  Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657. 
1051  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53. 
1052  Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56. 
1053  Hardford 1982 UNSWLJ 291 297; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 
14.7.5.3(b). 
1054  1911 AD 657. 
1055  Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 662. 
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dependant could not claim for loss of social comfort and society resulting from the 
death of a spouse.1056 Furthermore, the pecuniary damages are limited to the domestic 
context. Injury suffered by the husband in the form of diminished happiness or lessened 
spiritual enjoyment of his home life or his wife's society is not recoverable. Thus, it 
would appear that only the part of the wife's earnings that is used to defray household 
expenses may be taken into account by the court in determining the husband's loss of 
consortium of his wife.1057 The contributory negligence of the wife will not reduce the 
amount of damages awarded to the husband, but the defendant will have a right to 
claim for a contribution from her estate.1058 While there is no precedent in favour of 
recognising this right of action to the wife for the loss of consortium of her husband, 
there appears to be, in principle, no objection in South African law to the recognition of 
such a right. The law relating to loss of consortium in Botswana and Lesotho appears 
to be substantially the same as that in South Africa. 
 
The leading decision on the loss of consortium in Australia is Toohey v Hollier.1059 The 
facts, briefly, were that “the plaintiff's wife was seriously injured in a traffic accident 
caused by the defendant's negligence. She was unable to carry out her domestic duties 
and the plaintiff was obliged to employ a housekeeper. The plaintiff was awarded a 
sum of money by the trial judge in respect of his financial loss, together with the sum 
of £1,000 as “general damages”. The defendant appealed against this latter award. 
The High Court of Australia dismissed the appeal. In Birch v Taubmans Ltd,1060 the 
court permitted the recovery of pecuniary damages for impairment of consortium, as 
                                            
1056  Also see Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53; Plotkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 388 (W); 
Nochomovitz v Santam 1972 1 SA 718 (T); Church 1979 THRHR 376 384; Boberg 1972 SALJ 147 
149. 
1057  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.5.3(a). 
1058  ss 2(1A) & (6) (a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956; McKerron 1963 SALJ 15 17. 
1059  (1955) 92 C.L.R. 618 (High Ct of Australia), analysed by Parsons (1955) MLR 514. 
1060  (1956) 57 S.R. (N.S.W.) 93. 
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well as for its total destruction. In this case, the plaintiff's wife had been injured in a 
traffic accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. Her injuries were of such a 
nature as to make her unable to have sexual relations. The plaintiff was held to be 
entitled to recover in respect of financial impairment of consortium. The court stated: 
“We are unable to agree that nothing more than the actual pecuniary loss 
suffered is recoverable, and we think that in any event the decision in Toohey 
v Hollier would require us so to hold... [o]nce it is accepted that consortium is 
not one and indiscerptible, and that damages may be recovered for any 
impairment thereof, the essential matter for consideration appears to us to 
be the extent to which the right to recover is limited. The terms of the limitation 
placed upon the husband's right to recover by the decision in Toohey v Hollier 
is that the damage must be confined to the 'material or temporal loss capable 
of estimation in money'.... We think that the meaning of this limitation is plain. 
Injury suffered by the husband in the nature of diminished happiness or 
lessened spiritual enjoyment of his home life or his wife's society is not 
recoverable. Indeed, elements of this kind, including also such matters as 
mental distress suffered by the husband, are not in a true sense impairments 
of consortium at all. But if a consequence is that, in his domestic 
establishment, there are rendered to the husband fewer or inferior comforts, 
conveniences or assistance, of a temporal as distinct from a spiritual kind, 
then he may recover in respect thereof without it being necessary for him to 
incur expenditure in replacing or improving what is done for him.”1061 
 
 
Similar to the position in South Africa, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's wife 
will not affect the defendant's liability to the plaintiff. It was so held by the final court of 
appeal in Australia in Curran v Young.1062 From the above discussion, it is clear that 
the law in Australia currently recognises loss of consortium claims1063 brought by either 
the husband or wife,1064 and both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages can be 
claimed under the loss of consortium.1065 The question presented here is whether 
South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho should now recognise non-pecuniary damages 
                                            
1061  Birch v Taubmans Ltd (1956) 57 S.R. (NSW) 93 99. 
1062  (1965) 112 C.L.R. 99. 
1063  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184; Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 729 744-46 751-2; 
Thornton 1984 SLR 259 269. 
1064  Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723; Johnson v Kelemic [1979] F.L.C. 78, 487; Bugius v Smith 
[1979] F.L.C. 78.497; Wrongs Act, 1936 (Tas), s 33. 
1065  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184; regulation 6 of the Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld); 
regulation 128 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Regulation 2014 (Qld). 
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of a spouse emanating from loss of consortium as well. In the next section, attention 
will be given to the child’s loss of parental consortium.1066 
 
4.4.1.3 Legal position regarding a child’s loss of parental consortium 
Parental consortium is usually defined as the child's right to the parent-child 
relationship.1067 In order for damages to be granted in a claim for loss of parental 
consortium, a child-claimant must prove the loss of parental support, protection, 
affection, society, discipline, guidance and training.1068 The action for loss of parental 
consortium recognises that children suffer a similar loss of emotional support, 
companionship, love and other emotional benefits when a parent dies to married adult 
couples whose spouse is killed, because when children are in their maturing years, the 
parents’ guidance is critical and comforting.1069 The recognition of the action for loss of 
parental consortium in Australian law is a recent development, having its genesis in 
the tort of loss of consortium. It is a logical evolution of the common law consortium 
claim, because of changes in modern society regarding childrens’ rights.1070  
 
In South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, there is no compensation for unlawful 
deprivation of parental consortium.1071 Such a cause of action does not exist. The 
South African law, and by implication, that of Botswana and Lesotho, adhere strictly to 
the principle that only itemised pecuniary losses are claimable upon death. It therefore 
precludes claims for bereavement, grief or loss of comfort and society on the part of 
                                            
1066  See Marx v Attorney-General (1974) 1 NZLR 164; Berger v Weber (1978) 267 NW 2d 124. 
1067  Vannatta 1993 MLR 154. 
1068  Ibid. 
1069  Jaffe http://www.bpslawyers.com/Articles/Loss-of-Parental-Consortium.shtml (accessed on 5 
October 2017). 
1070  Marx v Attorney-General (1974) 1 NZLR 164; Berger v Weber (1978) 267 NW 2d 124. 
1071 Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 172; Parker & Zaal 2016 THRHR 146; M v Minister of 
Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP), 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA); Robinson & Prinsloo 
http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S1727-37812015000500015&script=sci (accessed on the 
27 August 2017). 
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the deceased’s relatives, including that of a child.1072 In South Africa, a short-lived 
development has recently occurred in respect of a child‘s claim for loss of parental 
consortium in the decision of M v Minister of Police,1073 which was reversed by the 
Appeal Court in Minister of Police v Mboweni.1074  
 
In M v Minister of Police, the issue before the court was whether a child whose parent 
has died as a result of the wrongful and unlawful conduct of the South African Police 
Services may sue for damages arising from the child's constitutional right to parental 
care in terms of section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.1075 The question that the High 
Court had to answer was whether a claim for damages may be instituted on the 
grounds that children are, as a result of the wrongful death of their father, deprived of 
their constitutionally entrenched right to parental care.1076 The Gauteng North High 
Court substantially expanded the claim for damages for loss of parental care. It found 
that a child's claim following the wrongful death of his or her parent is not restricted to 
the common law claim for loss of support, but certainly encompasses claims for 
constitutional damages, since the notion of the right to parental care is entrenched in 
section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.1077  
 
This extension of the claim of children was unequivocally overruled by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Minister of Police v Mboweni.1078 The basis of this decision was that 
the procedure adopted by the High Court was incorrect. The parties had failed to place 
                                            
1072  Joubert & Prinsloo Law of South Africa (2009) 68. 
1073  M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
1074  2014 6 SA 256 (SCA). 
1075  s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution provides as follows: (1) Every child has the right - (a) ... (b) to family 
care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment… 
1076  Robinson & Prinsloo http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S1727-
37812015000500015&script=sci (accessed on the 27 August 2017). 
1077  M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP) par 43. 
1078  Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 256 (SCA). 
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the relevant facts concerning the nature of the relationship between the deceased and 
his daughters before the judge, and it was accordingly impossible to say whether and 
to what extent there had been a loss of parental care, in the sense given to this by the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeal also pointed out that the proper 
interpretation of the constitutional right in section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution is a matter 
of some difficulty, as the right embodied in the section is expressed as being a right to 
family or parental care, or appropriate alternative care outside the family environment. 
The court also lamented that the existence of such a remedy could have a substantial 
impact on public funds, such as those of the Road Accident Fund, which were not 
represented before the High Court. Therefore, an opportunity ought to have been given 
for such bodies to participate in the proceedings. The judgment of the High Court was 
accordingly set aside and the matter referred back for trial, where the issues could be 
fully and properly canvassed. 
 
In light of this decision in South Africa, the position at present is that there is no 
compensation for a child’s loss of parental consortium. Although such a right does not 
exist in the Republic of South Africa, there seems to be little reason why dependant-
children who suffer emotional shock due to the death of a breadwinner should not 
successfully claim compensation for personal injury on that basis.1079 In Bester v 
Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Ltd1080 a child, Deon Bester, had 
suffered nervous shock as a result of witnessing the death of his younger brother, who 
had been run over by a car while the two boys were crossing the road together. The 
shock sustained by Deon manifested itself in a personality change. From a child who 
was happy and carefree, and who did well at school, Deon changed into a child with 
                                            
1079  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) 22. 
1080  1972 3 SA 68 (D). 
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an anxiety neurosis. He had nightmares and screamed in his sleep; he became 
withdrawn and his schoolwork suffered. It eventually became necessary for him to 
consult a psychiatrist, who gave him psychotherapy under drug analysis. The court a 
quo refused to allow a claim for damages for mental illness arising from the nervous 
shock sustained as a result of an accident, on the ground that mental illness was not 
an injury to a physical organism, and was therefore not actionable. The Appellate 
Division reversed this decision.1081 The decision of the Appellate Division was most 
welcome and encouraging, and showed that our law, while keeping to its Roman-Dutch 
foundations, is flexible and therefore capable of keeping abreast with modern 
developments, by bringing our law into line with modern medicine, which has for many 
years recognised the existence of psychological illness. However, it has also brought 
it into line with the law of other jurisdictions, such as England and Australia.1082 
 
Even though the case law cited hereunder in support of the argument in favour of 
compensation for a child’s loss of parental consortium does not directly relate to the 
emotional shock suffered by children due to the death of their breadwinner, these 
decisions could provide the basis for the extension of such damages under those 
circumstances. In the Boswell v Minister of Police case,1083 damages were awarded 
for the emotional consequences of the shock caused by a false statement to the victim 
that her nephew, whom she had brought up, had been shot dead. In Sebatjane v 
Federated Employers' Insurance,1084 compensation was awarded for the psychological 
shock of a miscarriage. In Masiba v Constantia Assurance,1085 the victim had suffered 
severe shock from the sight of his stationary car being crashed into by another vehicle. 
                                            
1081  1973 1 SA 769 (AD). 
1082  Tager 1973 SALJ 123. 
1083  1978 3 SA 268 (E). 
1084  1989 4 C&B H2-1 (T). 
1085  1982 4 SA 333 (C) 343. 
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He died as a result of the shock. A right of action for damages for loss of support was 
granted to his dependants, on the basis that had he merely been injured, he would 
have had a personal right of action for damages for the injury suffered. It is argued that 
the disadvantage resulting from the unlawful and negligent death of a breadwinner 
encompasses more than the termination of sources of financial support.1086 The 
unlawful and negligent death of a breadwinner also leads to a child suffering a loss of 
emotional support, companionship, love and other emotional benefits (non-financial 
damages). 
 
A breadwinner-parent has several duties that he or she must perform, where money is 
not a factor. Above and beyond the dependant-children’s right to the needs that money 
can meet, the dependant-children also have the right to parental care, love, affection, 
comfort, protection and guidance (parental consortium). It is submitted that the loss of 
a parent's love and affection is devastating to any child. Children should also be able 
to bring a loss of parental consortium claim against the wrongdoer, whose negligent 
act has resulted in the loss of a parent. Such a cause of action does not currently exist 
in the three Southern African countries investigated in this study. The courts in South 
Africa, Botswana and Lesotho have the power and duty to modify and conform to the 
changing conditions of our society. Development of the common law is a judicial 
function, and when the common law does not keep up with the times, our courts have 
a responsibility to change this law.1087 The blanket denial by the South African courts 
of any non-financial damages under the dependency action is a major shortcoming 
relating to the assessment of damages under the action of dependency. It is contended 
                                            
1086  Parker & Zaal 2016 THRHR 146 147 152; M v Minister of Police 2013 5 SA 622 (GNP). 
1087  ss 8(3) 39(2) 173 of the Constitution. 
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that it should no longer be supported, as it leads to unjust consequences for the 
dependants, including the dependant children. 
 
4.4.2 Loss of future savings or inheritance (pecuniary loss) 
According to the current law in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, a dependant has 
no claim for loss of inheritance.1088 When a person’s life expectancy is shortened, his 
or her claim for compensation is limited to the period during which it is expected that 
he would continue to live, and he has no claim for loss of savings beyond that date. In 
the same manner, the deceased is not, theoretically, kept alive until the date when, but 
for the accident, he would probably have died. If this is so, no claim for loss of savings 
after death can pass to the executors of the deceased’s estate.  
 
In the case of Lockhat’s Estate v North British and Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd,1089 the 
appellants, the executors of the estate of the deceased, alleged that the deceased had 
died as the result of injuries he sustained when he was knocked down by a motor car 
negligently driven by one N. The appellants sued the insurer of N, the respondent, for 
an amount representing the value of the amount that the deceased would have saved 
between the date of his premature death and the date up to which he would have lived, 
in accordance with his normal life expectancy, if he had not been killed. The respondent 
had successfully objected to the declaration as being bad in law, or alternatively as 
being insufficient in law to sustain the action in whole or in part. In an appeal, the court 
held that the deceased was not an asset in his estate, which had suffered destruction, 
and the executor had no claim, on behalf of the estate, to recover his value as the 
earner of money. Therefore, the heirs and legatees had no right to claim against N or 
                                            
1088  Lockhat’s Estate v North British and Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 304. 
1089  Ibid. 
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the respondent, and an executor could not claim future earnings or savings from the 
wrongdoer that had been lost through the death of the deceased. 
 
Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd are of the view that in a proper case, a court may 
increase an amount of annuity1090 if it appears that a breadwinner would have amassed 
further assets, and that his or her dependants would probably have benefited from this 
by receiving a larger inheritance.1091 They further state that a claim for loss of support 
is not confined to that which a dependant could legally claim, but extends to all the 
material advantages, comfort and support which, as a matter of reasonable probability, 
the dependant would have enjoyed but for the death of his or her breadwinner.1092 
According to the current law, a person has no claim on account of the frustration of his 
or her expectation to an inheritance.1093 There is only a limited protection where the 
heir is also a dependant.1094 The expectation of an inheritance is an uncertain future 
event, which cannot be proven, but which is a possibility and would have resulted in a 
benefit to the dependant if realised. Therefore, where a dependant’s inheritance has 
been compromised, it constitutes a loss if it deteriorates the inheritance. The 
breadwinner’s capacity to earn money forms part of the breadwinner’s estate, which 
could later be inherited by his or her dependants. The unlawful killing of the 
breadwinner leads to the impairement of the breadwinner’s capacity and constitutes a 
loss on the part of both the breadwinner and his or her dependants. The expectation 
of receiving an inheritance should be recognised and protected by awarding damages. 
                                            
1090  By increasing the amount of an annuity, the dependant will be paid a large fixed sum of money 
each year, typically for the rest of their life, as opposed to receiving a lump sum payment upon the 
death of the breadwinner. 
1091  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.5.3(c). 
1092  Ibid. 
1093  Lockhat’s Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 304. 
1094  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 3.2.4.2(b). 
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This could perhaps be included as a positive contingency1095 for increasing the award 
for loss of support. 
 
It is suggested that denial of the loss of future potential savings or inheritance is unfair 
to the dependant, as the value of the dependency does not include only that part of the 
deceased’s earnings which the deceased would have expended annually in 
maintaining his or her dependants, but also that part of the deceased’s earnings which 
he or she would have saved, and which would have come, partially or wholly, to the 
dependants through inheritance upon his or her natural death. It is further suggested 
that a sum in respect of loss attributable to the cessation of contributions which the 
deceased had made to a retirement or other fund, of which the dependants were the 
nominated beneficiaries, should also be included1096 as a positive contingency.  
 
Unlike in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, where the loss of future savings or 
inheritance is not awarded in a dependency claim, in Australia, a sum reflecting what 
the dependants could have expected to inherit or benefited from the deceased’s 
savings, had the deceased lived his natural life, namely the loss of savings or 
inheritance, is awarded as part of the dependency claim.1097 A solatium is allowed for 
by including in the damages a figure representing a percentage amount, which the 
                                            
1095  Contigencies may be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, 
indepenedent of the defendant’s conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a 
person’s health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support 
in future, or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in 
a fair and realistic manner, by increasing or decreasing the plaintff’s damages during the 
quantification process – see Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 1.7.2 
4.6.3.5 & 4.6.3.6; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) paras 2.10 4.3 & 9.7. 
1096  Hwang & Fong https://www.sal.org.sg/ (accessed on 14 April 2017). 
1097  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 5.2; also see Civil Liability Act 1936, s 55: Lump sum 
compensation for future losses: If—(a) an injured person is to be compensated by way of lump sum 
for loss of future earnings or other future losses; and (b) an actuarial multiplier is used for the 
purpose of calculating the present value of the future losses, then, in determining the actuarial 
multiplier, a prescribed discount rate is to be applied; also see Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 
125 CLR 383; Eaton International encyclopaedia of comparative law (1983) 18. 
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dependant would have inherited had his or her breadwinner not been unlawfully and 
negligently killed. Examples of Australian cases which took into account the loss of 
savings or inheritance in dependency claims are the following: In Clements Estate v 
Central Valley Taxi,1098 the deceased husband had, just before his death, changed his 
career to sales training and set up his own company. The court allowed the wife of the 
deceased a recovery or entitlement to compensation for the value of the loss of 
potential savings. Another case is Roads and Traffic Authority v Cremona,1099 where a 
larger component of the deceased’s income would have been applied to savings or 
investments, and the plaintiff and her children were entitled to claim what the deceased 
would have saved and ultimately left to them.1100  
 
The non-awarding of loss of future savings or inheritance in South Africa, Botswana 
and Lesotho means that if a deceased, who was killed in an accident in South Africa, 
earned, for example, R10,000 a month and spent only R1,000 on his dependant, but 
saved R4,000 per month of his income for rainy days, or for bequeathing this sum to 
his family, the dependant’s loss of support would be based on only R1,000 per month, 
even though the dependant might reasonably have expected to receive part of the 
R4,000 per month saved in the future, had the deceased-breadwinner not been 
unlawfully and negligently killed. The present position in South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho is unsatisfactory, as it creates a gap which benefits wrongdoers and their 
insurers, at the expense of dependants. There is a need to bring the laws of these 
three countries in line with the more persuasive and forward-thinking position taken by 
                                            
1098  (1992) ACWSJ Lexis 36193; SCBC New Westminster Registry No A910185, 26 November 1992. 
1099  [2001] NSWCA 338. 
1100  Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Limited [1942] AC 601; Nance v British Railway 
[1951] AC 601. 
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Australia’s judiciary, which has legal decisions expressly allowing loss of future savings 
or inheritance to be taken into account in a dependency claim.  
 
The present political situation in South Africa,1101 and our inadequate system of social 
welfare,1102 as well as an aging population, has resulted in South Africans saving more 
to provide for various contingencies. When an actively saving breadwinner is 
prematurely killed, the failure to recognise the loss of future savings or inheritance as 
a head of claimable pecuniary damages means that the dependants are not fully 
compensated for the complete extent of their financial losses as a result of the untimely 
death of their breadwinner. The driving principle behind the law of dependency claims 
is to compensate dependants for the loss of all reasonable expectation of pecuniary 
benefits. Australia has held that such reasonable expectation should include the 
dependant’s expectation of benefiting from the future savings of the deceased 
breadwinner. There is no reason why South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho should fail 
to award the loss of future savings or inheritance to the dependants. This pecuniary 
loss should be awarded in the same way as other patrimonial losses1103 under the 
dependency action, minus of course the necessary discounts for acceleration due to 
early receipt of a capital sum, tax and other contingencies.1104 
 
                                            
1101  For example, over the last few years, our media has been saturated with reports of corruption and 
misuse of government monies by top government officials. Recently, there has been a report on 
News24 by Dr Eugene Brink that “a report by trade union Solidarity details nine corruption scandals 
that, over the past few years, have cost the taxpayer much more than the R246m spent on 
President Jacob Zuma's home in Nkandla”. 
1102  Du Toit “The real risks behind SA’s social grant payment crisis” Business Day Newspaper report 
dated 2 1  F e b r u a r y  2 0 1 7 :  Recently, there have been disputes arising over SA’s social grant 
system, and millions of vulnerable beneficiaries have been threatened with non-payment, which 
creates risks that go far beyond interrupting poor people’s access to desperately needed grants. 
The failure of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), which is responsible for the 
payment and administration of social grants, to act timeously has created a crisis that threatens to 
deliver grant recipients, on a silver platter, into the hands of unscrupulous financial services 
companies. 
1103  Eg, loss of support. 
1104  McGregor McGregor on damages (2016) ch 17. 
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Australia takes future loss of savings into account as part of the value of the 
dependency, by either including the savings when calculating the annual value of the 
dependency, or by way of an additional sum.1105 Similarly, South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho should not deprive dependants of the amount of lost future savings or 
inheritance, which they would have been given by or inherited from the deceased if he 
had not died prematurely. The fact that Australia has been explicitly awarding sums as 
accumulation of wealth or loss of inheritance for at least the past decade demonstrates 
clearly that such awards reflect a calculable and estimable pecuniary loss, which 
dependants can demonstrate would have accrued to them, and which they have 
therefore lost as a result of their breadwinner having been prematurely killed. 
 
Cleaners and construction workers, to name two groups from the workforce in South 
Africa, are capable of establishing a savings pattern from which a loss of future savings 
or inheritance can be actuarially calculated. It is therefore submitted that the loss of 
future savings or inheritance is indeed a calculable and estimable pecuniary loss. The 
denial of the loss of future savings or inheritance as a head of damages suggests an 
unfair treatment of dependency claims. There is a need for such a loss to be 
recognised and fully compensated through the medium of the law in South Africa, 
Botswana and Lesotho, as has been done in Australia. 
 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, the comparative analysis reveals that non-pecuniary 
damages for loss of spousal consortium and a child’s parental consortium, as well as 
pecuniary damages for loss of future savings or inheritance, are treated differently by 
South African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian courts. Australian law has been 
                                            
1105  Civil Liability Act 1936, s 55. 
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accepting of the notion of compensation for patrimonial loss of future savings or 
inheritance, and non-patrimonial loss accruing to the relatives and children of a 
deceased person,1106
 
unlike the law in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. Death 
represents the deprivation of a number of possible and even probable future 
enjoyments, yet the wrongful death action in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho does 
not attempt to redress all these losses. No good explanations have been provided as 
to why non-patrimonial losses and patrimonial losses of future savings or inheritance 
are not compensated. Indeed, the fact that the dependants have been deprived of 
these types of losses seems to have escaped the notice of our legislature. The current 
denial of compensation for non-patrimonial loss and patrimonial damages for loss of 
future savings or inheritance is unacceptable and prejudicial to the larger group of 
dependants.1107  
 
It is recommended that an award should be made in South African law to acknowledge 
the non-patrimonial loss and patrimonial loss of future savings or inheritance suffered 
by the claimant in respect of the death of the deceased. An award of damages for the 
non-patrimonial loss suffered, even if it is small, can provide some consolation where 
a child loses a parent or a parent loses an infant child, or a partner loses his or her 
spouse. The amount of compensation could be fixed at a conventional sum, and the 
right to such compensation can also, for example, be limited to a child whose parent(s) 
was killed in an accident (unnatural death). Some might oppose the suggested fixed 
conventional award as inadequate, as it could be perceived to be an insult to a grieving 
                                            
1106  Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; Eaton International encyclopaedia of 
comparative Law (1983) 18. 
1107  Queensland Law Reform Commission: Damages in an action for wrongful death (Issues Paper WP 
No 56 June 2002); De Sales v Ingrilli 2002 [2003] HCA 16; 212 CLR 338 383 388-9; Dominish v 
Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386 393; Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict (2015) 284; Potgieter, 
Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 14.7.5.3(b) & 14.7.5.3(c); Lockhat’s Estate v 
North British and Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 304. 
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child, and be treated scornfully by a child suffering the greatest grief. On the other 
hand, a large award could be seen as a gratuitous payment to a child who did not in 
fact suffer much grief, or it could be seen as an unfair distribution of limited resources 
for social welfare. The award may be sought as a way to penalise the wrongdoer, rather 
than as any real consolation for the grief suffered. If a fixed sum is set, unfairness could 
arise, as the same award would be payable to a child whose much-loved parent was 
killed as to one who had no close relationship with his or her parent. However, if the 
sum awarded was at the discretion of the court, the court would be required to 
investigate every family relationship, in an attempt to place a value on the complex 
personal relationship between parents and their children, which could turn out to be 
even more difficult to do in a fair and consistent manner. The present position is 
unsatisfactory, as it creates a gap that benefits the wrongdoers (defendants) or their 
insurers, at the expense of the dependants. Consequently, there is a need to bring the 
South African law in line with the more persuasive position taken by Australia, which 
has similar legislation and expressly allows for loss of savings or inheritance to be 
taken into account in a dependency claim.  
 
An award for bereavement is appropriate in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. It is 
submitted that a monetary award would be accepted by the children in these three 
countries as a partial mitigation of their grief, and that the consolation afforded to the 
majority of the population would outweigh the problem of the occasional over-
compensation to non-grieving, vindictive or greedy family members. The support and 
guidance provided by family members to each other is of great value, and confirms 
that when a family member is killed, there is a real personal loss suffered by the other 
family members, apart from material and economic loss.  
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A claim for a child’s bereavement should be allowed in all three jurisdictions, with the 
aim of providing compensation to a child for grief, loss of society, comfort, love and 
guidance upon the loss of his or her parent. There is no sufficient reason for the law to 
protect the blanket denial of a claim for the loss of consortium by the child. It is old-
fashioned and inconsistent to believe that only a husband1108 should be entitled to 
claim for loss of consortium. Based on the above discussion, there is a strong case to 
be made for extending the remedy to other persons who had a close relationship with 
the deceased, such as a child. Damages for loss of the companionship, society and 
comfort of a parent or child should not be overlooked. In the next section, the 
recoverable damages in terms of the dependency action are explored. 
 
4.5 Recoverable damages for loss of support and other related losses in 
terms of the dependency action 
4.5.1 Non-patrimonial damages  
Non-patrimonial or non-pecuniary damages cater for all losses which are intangible 
and non-financial in nature, or that seek to compensate the claimant for losses, which 
are immeasurable. South African common law does not entitle a dependant of a 
deceased person, or an estate (through the executor) of a deceased person to pursue 
a claim for non-patrimonial damages on behalf of the deceased.1109 There is, however, 
an exception to the rule, namely where the deceased had already commenced action, 
                                            
1108  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 183; The Law relating to Loss of Consortium and Loss of 
Services of a Child 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/wpLossOfConsortium.htm (accessed 
on 5 October 2017); Brett 1959 ALJ 29 321 389 428; Riseley 1981 ALR 421; Thornton 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/1984/2.pdf (accessed on 5 October 2017); 
Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618; Harris v Grigg [1988] 1 Qd R 514 522; Nguyen v Nguyen 
(1990) 169 CLR 245 251; Foulds v Smith 1950 1 SA 1 (A); Seroot v Pieterse [2005] ZAGPHC 67. 
1109  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
187; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 116; Hamlin v Great Northern Railway Co (1856) 1 H & N 
408 411; Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344. 
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and the claim had reached the stage of litis contestatio before his or her death,1110 
which means that the claim for non-pecuniary damages does not abate and may be 
continued by the executor of his or her estate.1111 In such a case, the law allows the 
claim for general damages to be actively transferred to the estate of the deceased. In 
a court case, the stage of litis contestatio is usually reached when the court pleadings 
have closed, namely once the issues in dispute have been identified by the parties 
through the exchange of the required court documents.1112 The basis for the exception 
is exactly the same as that under the early Roman law, namely that the rights of the 
plaintiff were defined and frozen at the very moment that the stage of litis contestatio 
was reached. In such a case, according to logic, the executor of the estate has merely 
stepped into the shoes of the deceased. The executor has not acquired a claim in his 
or her own right.1113  
 
However, the issue regarding when the stage of litis contestatio is reached in modern-
day law is a complicated one. It is said to have been reached when pleadings are 
closed. However, this is no simple matter. Guidance as to when pleadings are closed 
is provided in Rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of Court.1114 It advises that pleadings are 
closed if all parties to the case have joined issue and there are no longer any new or 
further pleadings, or the time period for the filing of a replication has expired, or the 
parties have agreed in writing that the pleadings have closed and have filed their 
agreement with the Registrar of the Court, or the court, on application, has declared 
                                            
1110  See Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) 
paras [182]-[184], as an exception in the Gauteng local division to be discussed hereunder. 
1111  Potgieter v Rondalia Assurance 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 
(T). 
1112  Hoffa v SA Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1965 2 SA 944 (C) 950 955; Potgieter v 
Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T) 21-22; Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile 
Insurance 1959 3 SA 295; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 267. 
1113  Booysen v Booysen 2012 2 SA 38 (GSJ). 
1114  Act 115 of 1998. 
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that the pleadings are closed. At this point, the pleadings are treated as being closed 
and the proceedings are said to have reached the stage of litis contestatio. In everyday 
practice, they are normally closed as soon as the period for the filing of the replication 
has expired, since the issues have then been identified and parties are able to 
commence preparation for the ensuing battle. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that, as annoying as it can be, the law often places a caveat on its pronouncements. 
In this regard, it is the following: pleadings, though closed, will be re-opened if an 
amendment is effected, or if the parties agree to alter the pleadings. Amendments to 
pleadings can be brought by any party at any time before judgment is delivered.1115  
 
Thus, a claim for non-patrimonial loss can be transmitted to the estate of the deceased 
claimant if his or her death occurs after pleadings are closed. In such a case, the 
executor of the estate will take his or her place as the plaintiff. However, if any party 
re-opens the pleadings by amending its case, or if the parties agree to alter the 
pleadings, the claim for non-patrimonial loss cannot be transmitted, even if by that time, 
his or her place has already been taken by the estate, because the initial situation of 
litis contestatio falls away and is only restored once the issues have once more been 
defined in the pleadings or in some other less formal manner.1116 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality1117 stated 
that the procedural developments that have taken place in our modern law have 
ensured that our legal process is significantly distinct from that which prevailed during 
the Roman times. A significant difference is that in our law, pleadings can be re-opened 
                                            
1115  Rule 28 of the Uniform Rules of Court. Courts have, over the years, identified the principles 
underlying the granting of an application for an amendment to a pleading. These have been 
succinctly summarised in Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd v Waymark NO 1995 2 SA 73 (Tk) 
77F-I. See also Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [2005] ZACC 3; 2006 3 SA 247 
(CC) par [9]. 
1116  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) par [15]. 
1117  Idem par [17]-[21]. 
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at any stage before judgment. This means that it can never be said with absolute 
certainty in any case that the stage of litis contestatio has been reached at a specific 
time.1118 Unsurprisingly, under these circumstances, in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Ngubane,1119 Holmes JA was prompted to refer to it as the alchemy of 
litis contestatio. 
 
In a refreshing recent case, the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Local Division) in 
Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Others1120 considered 
various foreign legal positions in the UK, the USA and Australia, and held that the 
South African common law had failed to keep up with procedural developments in the 
law. In these jurisdictions, the legislatures intervened to put an end to the injustices 
caused by the common law, holding that general damages1121 can only be transmitted 
post litis contestatio.1122 It was stated in the legislature1123 of these jurisdictions that it 
was necessary to intervene in order to avert the injustice that prevailed, and that many 
had previously been forced to endure because of this rule precluding the 
transmissibility of general damages pre-litis contestatio.1124 It was highlighted that this 
failing was most acute in cases involving claims for pain and suffering endured by 
plaintiffs who had contracted dust-related diseases.1125 The failing of the common law 
                                            
1118  Ibid. 
1119  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A) 606B-C. 
1120  2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ). 
1121  Though the Nkala case was based on general damages, the principle of litis contestatio is 
applicable to both special and general damages. Therefore, the decision of this case will be binding 
on all future cases in the Gauteng Local Division, irrespective of whether they are based on special 
or general damages, unless the decision is overturned on appeal. 
1122  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
[205]. 
1123  See South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 4 October 2001, 2385. 
1124  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
[207]. 
1125  Ibid. 
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was eloquently captured in a speech delivered during a South Australia Parliamentary 
debate, where it was said: 
“The way the current legislation exists, if litigation has commenced but the 
applicant passes away before it has been completed, that individual is not 
able to have that case proceeded with on their behalf for the non-economic 
loss. That is an absurdity. There is clearly no justice, equity or fairness in a 
system such as this when we are talking about a totally unique disease of 
this nature. This puts enormous pressure on the sick and the dying plaintiffs 
to press ahead as quickly as possible with their litigation, the pressure of 
which may greatly increase the plaintiff’s distress. Sometimes they may 
succeed in doing that, and sometimes they may not. It is simply a lottery: 
sometimes it may happen, and sometimes it may not work.”1126 
 
The court further stated that all fifty states in the United States of America have enacted 
statutes to address the issue of wrongful death and the claim for non-patrimonial 
damages for injuries sustained by the deceased. The majority of them allow the estate 
of the deceased to receive the amount due to the deceased. There is no restriction in 
any of the statutes against the deceased having launched his or her case for the claim 
prior to his or her death, and the case having reached the stage of litis contestatio, in 
order for the claim to remain valid.1127 These legislative interventions demonstrate that 
the law which prohibits the transmissibility of general damages pre-litis contestatio fails 
to reflect the boni mores of a modern society organised according to the principle of 
the rule of law.1128  
 
In September 2016, six of the defendant companies were granted the right to appeal 
the decision of the High Court, which was handed down on the 13 May 2016, in which 
the High Court decided to develop and alter the South African common law as it applies 
to the transmissibility of claims for non-patrimonial (general) damages, in order for it to 
                                            
1126  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
[208]; South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 4 October 2001, 2385. 
1127  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
[208]. 
1128  Idem par [209]. 
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include the fact that a claim for non-patrimonial (general) damages is actively 
transmissible to a deceased person’s estate, provided that the deceased person had 
merely commenced with the legal action.1129  
 
In December 2017, both parties requested the Supreme Court of Appeal to postpone 
the hearing, while they were attempting to reach a settlement. On the 3 May 2018, the 
parties announced that they had reached an agreement. The settlement provided 
compensation to all workers who had been employed at the companies’ mines at any 
time since March 1965, and who were suffering from silicosis, as well to the families of 
deceased miners. The class action will continue against three smaller companies that 
did not participate in the settlement.1130  
 
The High Court removed the requirement that the court proceedings must have 
reached a stage of litis contestatio. The practical effect of this judgement is that the 
estate of a deceased person can now continue with a claim for non-patrimonial 
(general) damage suffered by the deceased, provided that the legal action was 
instituted before his or her death. If a claimant dies after instituting legal action, but 
before the issues in dispute have been fully identified by the parties through the 
exchange of the required court documents, otherwise known as the close of pleadings 
or litis contestatio, the claim is no longer closed and the claimant’s estate may proceed 
to recover both the patrimonial and non-patrimonial (general) damage that was 
suffered. It must, however, be noted that the parties to this case have stated their 
intention to appeal the High Court’s judgment, which means that this might not be the 
final position on the transmissibility of non-patrimonial claims.  
                                            
1129  Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2016 7 BCLR 881 (GJ); 2016 5 SA 240 (GJ) par 
[243]. 
1130  Davenport https://www.business-humanrights.org (accessed on the 16 June 2018). 
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The decision in this case will also apply only to the Gauteng Local Division, and not to 
all the jurisdictions in South Africa. From the above discussion, it is clear that modern 
South African case law rejects the stage of litis contestatio. The issue of whether or 
not non-patrimonial damages may be claimed depends on whether or not the 
deceased person had simply began with the legal action. Be that as it may, the 
requirement that the legal action must have commenced is a complicated and 
uncertain requirement, which deserves further judicial consideration of dismissal and 
removal as well. There is no reason in our law why somebody who, as the result of the 
unlawful and negligent act of another, has suffered shock,1131 disfigurement,1132 
pain,1133 loss of amenities of life,1134 and shortened life expectation,1135 should only be 
entitled to claim for non-patrimonial damages, provided the deceased person had 
commenced with the legal action prior to his or her death. 
 
The next section will deal with patrimonial damage following the death of a 
breadwinner, who was killed due to the wrongful and negligent act of another, resulting 
in the payment of patrimonial damages to the third-party dependants. 
                                            
1131  The quantification of shock usually takes place together with that of pain and suffering, and no 
separate principles exist. 
1132  Disfigurement refers to all forms of facial and bodily disfigurement, including scars, loss of limbs, a 
limp caused by a leg injury, and facial or bodily distortion. 
1133  Pain and suffering includes all pain, discomfort, physical and mental suffering on account of a 
physical impairment of the body, or the causing of emotional shock, which the deceased endured 
and for which he was conscious of during the period from injury to death.  Unconsciousness or a 
comatose condition precludes a claim under this head, as it is assumed that in these conditions, 
the claimant does not feel pain – see Hoffa v Mutual Fire & General Insurance 1965 2 SA 944 (C). 
In the assessment of a fair compensation for pain and suffering, the subjective experience of the 
deceased plaintiff is of paramount importance, while awards in previous cases should also be taken 
into account. The deceased-plaintiff’s actual experience is decisive. 
1134  Loss of amenities of life refers to the loss of the ability or will of someone to participate in general 
or specific activities of life and to enjoy life as he/she did previously. If a claimant is unconscious, 
damages are only recoverable (potentially) for loss of amenity” – see Botha v Minister of Transport 
1956 4 SA 375 (W) 380. 
1135  Shortened expectation of life is classified with loss of the amenities of life for purposes of 
compensation. The test to determine compensation is not the length of time of life of which a person 
has been deprived, but should be the prospect of a predominantly happy life. The test is an 
objective one. The economic and social position of the deceased has to be ignored in the 
assessment of this damage. 
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4.5.2 Patrimonial damages  
4.5.2.1 General 
The main claimable form of patrimonial damages that have been acknowledged as a 
loss under a dependency action in the South African, Botswana and Lesotho practice 
is the loss of support. However, should the dependants be responsible for expenses, 
such as medical and hospital expenses that the breadwinner incurred prior to his or 
her death, and funeral or cremation expenses, these losses will be included under the 
dependency action. This is in contrast to Australia, which, in addition to the mentioned 
patrimonial damages, acknowledges loss of prospective savings or inheritance.1136 
Although loss of support and funeral or cremation expenses are established heads of 
damage under a dependency action, they have not received any attention within the 
African context by distinguished authors1137
 
in the law of damages. In essence, there 
are only a limited number of post-graduate studies on the assessment and 
quantification of these heads of damage. With this in mind, the next section explores 
the nature and assessment of dependency claims for loss of support and funeral 
expenses, since these two are the most important heads of patrimonial damage 
relevant to this study.  
 
4.5.2.2 Loss of support 
A dependant of a deceased who was unlawfully and negligently killed can institute an 
action for loss of support. As noted above, the purpose of an award of damages for 
loss of support is to compensate the dependants, in as far as money can, for the 
financial loss occasioned by the death of their breadwinner. This is also an accurate 
                                            
1136  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4.2 above. 
1137  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages par 14.7.3; Luntz Assessment of damages par 
5.2. 
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version of the compensation principle for loss of support in terms of the dependency 
action under the laws of Botswana,1138 Lesotho1139 and Australia.1140 The dependant 
must prove that he or she had a right to support by the deceased1141 and that the death 
has caused damage to him or her.1142 The measure of damages for loss of support is 
usually the difference between the current position of the dependant as a result of the 
loss of support, and the position that he or she could reasonably have expected to 
have been in had the deceased not died.1143 This is also called the comparative method 
or the sum-formula approach.1144 Loss of support arises at the time of death, and 
continues until the time that the dependants would normally have become self-
supporting, or when the deceased would have stopped supporting the dependants due 
to lack of income or death, whichever would have happened first. 
 
In Hulley v Cox,1145 the court referred to the calculation of an annuity, as well as a fair 
and general estimation, as methods for calculating damages for the loss of support of 
a dependant. Although our courts are not bound by some fixed method of calculating 
damages, the loss of support is commonly assessed by means of an annuity 
                                            
1138  Fombad http://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
1139  R v Monnanyane 2005 LSHC 130. 
1140  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.5; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 184; Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002, s 18(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(5); Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(5); Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 9(1); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(4); Survival of Causes of Action 
Act 1940 (SA), s 6(1); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(9); Administration and 
Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(5); Tilbury 1982 WALR 469; Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 1-27. 
1141  See chapter 3 for classes of eligible dependants under the action of dependant for loss of support. 
1142  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.2. 
1143  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.3; Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 
[2002] ZASCA 714 par 12; RAF v Monani and another 2009 4 SA 327 (SCA); Legal Insurance 
Company Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614E; Wigham v British Traders Insurance Company Ltd 
1963 3 SA 151 (W) 154; Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 725; Hulley 
v Cox 1923 AD 234 243-244; Zaayman v RAF [2016] ZAGPPHC 124 par [19]; Matthew v Flood 
(1939) SASR 389 at 392-393; Watson v Dennis (1968) 88WN (PT1) (NSW) 491 at 495; Nguyen v 
Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 at 263. 
1144  Tilbury 1982 WALR 469; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 4.2; see also 
par 4.6 hereunder. 
1145  1923 AD 234 243-244. 
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method,1146 while a comparative method is necessary to determine damage.1147 This 
comparative test is concerned with subtracting the current patrimonial position of the 
dependant from the hypothetical patrimonial position the dependant would have 
occupied if his or her breadwinner had not been killed.1148 The loss of support relates 
to the monetary amount that the deceased would have contributed to the support of 
each dependant for the period that he would normally have supported each of them. It 
includes all actual sums that he had spent on them, all costs which he absorbed by 
virtue of providing services to them, which now have to be paid on their behalf, and 
any activity which he would have normally undertaken. The loss is always divided 
between the pre-trial and post-trial period, because the pre-trial loss represents 
monies, which the dependants have already been deprived of, and which may have 
had to be taken out of the dependants’ pockets. The pre-trial loss is called past loss of 
support, and the post-trial loss is called future loss of support.1149 The post-trial award 
will earn interest in the hands of the dependants, hence the amount is reduced. The 
pre-trial award is lost money for the dependant, hence interest lost by the dependant 
during the time he was out-of-pocket is added. The measure of damage is referred to 
as negative interesse, and as applied in South African law,1150
  
it is also applied in 
Australia, where it means that the dependant should be awarded such sums of money 
as would restore him or her to the position he or she would have been in if there had 
been no negligence.1151 
                                            
1146  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.6 hereunder. 
1147  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 231-232. 
1148  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.3; Neethling & Potgieter Law of 
delict (2015) 232. 
1149  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.7.3; Matthew v Flood (1939) 
SASR 389; Watson v Dennis (1968) 88WN (PT1) (NSW) 491; Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 
245. 
1150  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 4.3. 
1151  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) 5; Trindade & Cane Torts in Australia (2007) 511; Stewart 
& Stuhmcke Australian principles of tort law (2005) 587. 
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In South Africa, if a breadwinner is killed in a motor vehicle accident, the dependant of 
the breadwinner may claim his or her proven past and future loss of support from the 
Road Accident Fund (RAF). If the third party claim arose on or after 1 August 2008 (the 
loss of support claim arises on the date of death of the breadwinner), the RAF’s liability 
to compensate the loss is limited to a prescribed cap, adjusted quarterly for inflation 
since 2008, regardless of the actual loss incurred. The cap is adjusted quarterly to take 
inflation into account. If the third party’s claim arose prior to the aforementioned date, 
no cap applies to the claim for loss of support.1152 In South Africa, if a breadwinner dies 
as a result of a workplace-related accident, illness or disease, the dependant of the 
breadwinner may claim his or her proven past and future loss of support from the 
Compensation Commissioner.1153 
 
Customary law draws no distinctions in terms of the manner in which the breadwinner 
died. As discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, customary law recognises a dependant’s 
right and action to claim for loss of support from the person responsible for his/her 
breadwinner’s death.1154 The study has revealed that this customary law action is 
called go tsoša hlogo or go tsosa hlogo in Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho cultures. It is a 
well-established and recognised practise in customary law, and has always been part 
of the legal system of the African people in South Africa.1155 Furthermore, it closely 
resembles the Roman-Dutch law or common law dependency action. The difficulty 
                                            
1152  RAF matters will be fully dealt with in ch 5 of this thesis. 
1153  COIDA matters will be fully dealt with in ch 5 of this thesis. 
1154  Sekese Mekhoa le maele a Basotho (2009) 60; Duncan Sotho laws and custom (2006) 105; Palmer 
Law of delict (1970) 114; Sipongomana v Nkulu 1901 NHC 26; Suid Afrikaanse Nationale Trust en 
Assuransie Maatskappy Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Nkabinde v SA Motor & General 
Insurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 302 (D); Ismael v Ismael 1983 1 SA 1006 (A); Zulu v Minister of Justice 
1956 2 SA 128 (W). 
1155  Sipongomana v Nkulu 1901 NHC 26; Joel v Zibokwana 4 NAC 130 1919; Nohele 6 NAC 1928 19; 
Silimo v Vuniwayo 5 NAC 1953 135; Dlamini 1984 SALJ 346; Pasela v Rondalia 
Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1967 1 SA 339 (W); Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1989) 
379; Clark 1999 SALJ 20. 
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arises with the lack of methods of assessment and quantification of the claim, which 
appear to be more inclined towards criminal fines. Customary law generally draws no 
clear distinctions between the law of delict, on the one hand, and crimes on the 
other.1156 As stated above, South African customary law lacks the conceptual structure 
of concepts or principles of modern law assessment and quantification of damages for 
loss of support. These principles are foreign to customary law, which means that the 
judicial process in the customary courts has its own shortcomings in this regard. 
 
The aborigines of Australia seem to have the same claim where their breadwinner was 
wrongfully and unlawfully killed. This study has found no specific provision or reference 
to a law that deals with the claim for loss of support under the law of aborigines. 
However, the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws report that was released by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in June 1986, after an intensive nine-
year inquiry,1157 examined the interaction between two legal systems – one based on 
the British law “received” through colonisation, and the other on the customary laws of 
the Aboriginal peoples of Australia,1158 and acknowledged that the Australian 
Constitution should recognise the particular rights of indigenous peoples, and give 
appropriate recognition to their customary law.1159 Although the comprehensive 
recognition of indigenous law remains controversial,1160 the ALRC report made 
recommendations regarding the recognition of traditional Aboriginal marriages for 
                                            
1156  Olivier 2004 LAWSA paras 212-217; Knoetze 2012 Speculum Juris 43-44. 
1157  Godden https://theconversation.com/from-little-things-the-role-of-the-aboriginal-customary-law-
report-in-mabo-60193 (accessed on 13 July 2017). 
1158  Ibid. 
1159  See ALRC: Aboriginal Customary Laws https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-
laws (accessed on 25 September 2017). 
1160  Aboriginal Customary Law ALRC report 31 Published on 12 June 1986. Last modified on 23 March 
2017 https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-laws (accessed on 13 July 2017). 
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accident compensation, including workers’ compensation, compensation on death, 
criminal injuries compensation, and repatriation benefits.1161 
 
4.5.2.3 Funeral or cremation expenses 
Under the dependency action, the recovery of funeral or cremation expenses is 
confronted by the limitation of “reasonableness”. The expenses are limited to the 
reasonable actual costs of preparing the body for interment or cremation. Funeral 
expenses are the bare minimum, and only specified items are recoverable. The 
itemised expenses are the costs of a hearse, travelling costs to attend the 
funeral/cremation, telephone calls, reasonable costs of refreshments, and expenses 
for erecting a tombstone.1162 The same principle applies under social security 
legislations.1163 
 
The difficulty arises in terms of what can be regarded as funeral expenses or funeral 
costs, especially in South Africa, which has contrasting views, attitudes, cultures and 
traditional practices with regard to funeral expenses. A review of the existing research 
on African bereavement rituals highlights the assumption that African societies turn 
their funerals into extravagant ceremonies.1164 In African societies and cultures, 
meticulous care is taken to fulfil the funeral rites.1165 Unlike in western cultures, death 
                                            
1161  Aboriginal Customary Law ALRC report 31 Published on 12 June 1986 last modified on 23 March 
2017 https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-laws (accessed on 13 July 2017); 
ALRC: Aboriginal Customary Laws https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/aboriginal-customary-laws 
(accessed on 25 September 2017). 
1162  Finlay v Kutoane 1993 4 SA 675 (W); Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 
11.8 & 14.7.1; Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 68. 
1163  eg s 18(4) of the RAF Act 56 of 1996 limits the liability of the Fund in respect of funeral expenses 
to necessary actual costs to cremate or inter him/her in the grave; s 54 of the COIDA 130 of 1993 
determines the compensation award following the death of an employee in a work-related accident, 
or as a result of an occupational injury or disease, and payment is a fixed reasonable funeral 
benefit, as is annually gazetted by the Minister of Labour, which is currently a maximum of 
R16398.00. 
1164  Boateng & Anngela-Cole 2012 JDD 296 298; Arhin 1994 CILSA 318 321; Jindra et al Funerals in 
Africa (2013) 209. 
1165  Mbiti African religion (1990) 113. 
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and mourning in African cultures do not end with a funeral. According to Mbiti,1166 
Africans do not view death as an event which simply occurs, is handled, and then 
forgotten about. When a person dies, there is a series of events, which usually take 
place. These include a period of at least one week of mourning before the actual 
funeral, and the feasting and gatherings associated with the funeral. Evening prayers 
may also be held in some families, depending on their family traditions. Family 
members usually prepare food for friends and neighbours, and inform visiting mourners 
about the cause of death of the deceased. 
 
There are also specific rituals and ceremonies observed and performed by the 
deceased’s family members after the deceased has been buried.1167 Traditional 
bereavement rituals for indigenous Africans have been a constant phenomenon 
throughout history. Most of the rituals have their bases in the people’s traditional and 
religious belief systems. In most African cultures, these rituals include, among others, 
cleansing, funeral ceremony, removal of hair, slaughtering of a cow, wearing of 
mourning clothes, and restriction of the mourners’ participation in social activities for a 
stipulated time.1168 The current recoverable funeral expenses are set within, arguably, 
a western-dominated construct mind-set, which has adopted a cold and emotionless 
approach to African burial rites issues. Unfortunately, the colonial implication here is 
that African funeral expenses remain ignored, and are labelled as problematic. 
 
Western worldviews or assumptions divide the world and life into one of two categories: 
sacred or secular. Those African rites and practices that did not fit into a “sacred” 
western worldview were assigned to the “secular”, which was understood to be 
                                            
1166  Idem 115. 
1167  Setsiba Mourning rituals and practices in contemporary South African townships (2012) 42. 
1168  Ibid 2-3. 
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essentially non-Christian, even anti-Christian. In this paradigm, these practices had to 
be denied.1169 An ancillary problem, which arose out of a western mind-set, led to the 
categorisation of the rites and practices associated with the ancestors being referred 
to as worship and, therefore, idolatrous.1170 This classification of Africans’ relationship 
with their ancestors still persists1171 and is reflected now in the blanket denial or 
ignorance of expenses related to African funerary rites and cleansing ceremonies 
under the assessment of damages with regard to the dependency action, or under 
social security legislations. 
 
The observance of post-burial cleansing ceremonies forms an important part of African 
customs and has a special historical legitimacy. The adoption of a new western lifestyle 
by African societies did not lead or encourage Africans to abandon their traditional 
lifestyles. These traditional lifestyles include the performance of various rituals and 
customs, which have a special meaning for African people, in particular funerary rites 
and post-burial cleansing ceremonies. These funeral practices and post-burial 
cleansing ceremonies are deeply ingrained in culture, beliefs, and values, and are 
regarded as important costs related to the death of a beloved family member. Even 
though the funeral rites and post-burial cleansing ceremonies are costly, and could 
easily overwhelm and negatively impact on the dependants of the deceased, who was 
unlawfully and negligently killed, they have been observed to be maintained in both 
rural and urban environments.1172  
 
                                            
1169  Olupona African spirituality: Forms, meanings and expressions (2001) 49. 
1170  Becken Beware of the ancestor cult! (1993) 335. 
1171  Pobee 1976 Sociological analysis 1 6-7. 
1172  Rosenblatt et al 2007 Death Studies 31 67-85. 
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There are public rituals in which the community will participate such as the funeral and 
the services that are offered to the bereaved family during the process of the 
preparation for burial. There are also private rituals, which are mostly performed by the 
family and close relatives of the deceased.1173 This refers to the cleansing ceremonies 
that take place after the burial.1174 Whenever a member of the family dies, the 
remaining members, regardless of their financial status, have to perform the funeral 
rites and cleansing ceremonies. Consequently, expenses will be incurred before the 
funeral takes place, on the day of the funeral, and after the funeral. All these expenses 
are linked to customs and rituals that have to be performed during the mourning 
period.1175 All traditions follow a fairly uniform pattern, with variations according to 
region, caste and family tradition. In most African societies, the death of a person is 
symbolised by a tradition called ukuzila in Zulu1176 or go ila in Sepedi/Northern 
Sotho,1177 which is defined as showing respect to the deceased by avoidance of certain 
behaviour and places like clubs/shebeens/parties.1178 If the deceased is a man, the 
widow has to wear mourning clothes, called izila or ukuzila in Zulu, before and after 
the funeral, which are sewn at a price.1179 The attire is primarily formal blackclothing. 
 
In addition to the specified recoverable funeral expenses under the dependency action, 
African communities encounter the following expenses related to the burial and culture 
of the deceased: It is typical of African people to mourn collectively.1180 Social support 
                                            
1173  Romanoff et al 1998 Death studies 22 697-711. 
1174  Ngubane 2004 Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems 3(2) 171-177; 
Hutchings 2007 Alternation 14(2) 189-218; Mkhize “Psychology: An African perspective” in Ratele 
et al Self, community & psychology (2004) 24 37. 
1175  Chaza 2013 De Rebus 5. 
1176  Ngubane 2000 SAJFS 46-53. 
1177  Maloka https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392848 (accessed on 27 March 2017); Magudu 2004 
AGENDA 141; Manyedi et al 2004 HSAG 8(4) 69-87. 
1178  Ngubane 2000 SAJFS 49. 
1179  Chaza 2013 De Rebus 5. 
1180  Baloyi https://www.dx.doi.org/10.4102/ve.v35i1.1248 (accessed on 27 March 2017). 
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is very important in African cultures, especially when a death has occurred in the 
community. According to Shange,1181 not only the availability, but also the extent and 
quality of social support, are important determinants of the resolution of grief. Before 
the funeral takes place, family members, friends, community members and church 
members will visit the home of the deceased to comfort and help them with the 
preparations for the funeral. Therefore, meals have to be prepared for all of them. This  
period usually lasts a week or two. A sheep has to be slaughtered in preparation for 
the men who come to dig the grave1182 (these men are called banna ba diphiri in 
Sepedi), and for those who help with the preparations for the funeral. A day prior to the 
funeral or in the early morning of the day of the funeral, an ox has to be slaughtered, 
in order to accompany the deceased into his or her ancestral home.1183 After the burial, 
cleansing of the remaining family members has to take place. After 10 days from the 
date of the funeral (burial), a small feast is held, whereby a traditional beer bjala bja di 
garafo has to be brewed in order to cleanse the picks and spades that were used to 
dig the grave.1184 
 
When the period of one year has passed, the first death anniversary will signal the end 
of mourning and restoration back to normal life in society, and this is also celebrated 
by a feast.1185 The mourning clothes will be removed during a ritual called ukukhulula 
izila in Zulu or go tlhobola kobo e ntsho/sefifi in Sepedi. For the major purification 
ceremony after a year, the widow is expected to return to the home where she was 
born. This involves slaughtering a cow/sheep, brewing traditional beer, buying new 
                                            
1181  Shange Bereaved employees in organisations (2009) 29. 
1182  Chaza 2013 De Rebus 5. 
1183  Ibid. 
1184  Ibid. 
1185  Manyedi et al 2004 HSAG 69-87; Maloka https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392848 (accessed on 27 
March 2017). 
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clothes, including a blanket for the widow, and the ceremony is concluded by a group 
of women accompanying her back to her in-laws. This group of four to five women 
carry food such as half the cow, African beer, home-made bread, sugar, tea and many 
other items, which will be eaten on their arrival. The in-laws also prepare for this 
occasion.1186 These cleansing ceremonies are costly and can exacerbate the poverty 
of the mourners and their children,1187 especially if unplanned for, as in the case where 
the breadwinner was unexpectedly, unlawfully and negligently killed. 
 
It is argued that the blanket ignorance or denial of African funerary rites and cleansing 
ceremonies by the dependency action and social security legislations is discriminatory, 
symbolises the legislator’s failure to respect and recognise African burial rights and 
cleansing ceremonies, and forces African communities to follow the rules regarding 
funeral expenses that are laid down for them in terms of western views. This blanket 
denial or ignorance of funerary rite expenses needs to be revised, so that it recognises 
cultural practices, treats all cultures equally, and is in line with the current legal 
developments in a democratic South Africa. It is suggested that the dependants are 
entitled to receive a certain sum of money from the wrongdoer under the dependency 
action, in order to help them recover most, if not all, of the expenses related to cultural 
burial rites and cleansing rituals associated with the wrongful and unlawful death of 
their breadwinner. There is no way that a grieving African family can bypass these 
ritual burial expenses. Therefore, the expenses related to the cultural rites of mourning 
and cleansing ceremonies should be expressly included in the assessment and 
quantification of damages under the dependency action, as well as in related social 
security legislations.  Had it not been for the unlawful and negligent death of the 
                                            
1186  Magudu 2014 AGENDA 143. 
1187  Ibid. 
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breadwinner, the families of the deceased would not have incurred all these funeral 
expenses. 
 
It appears that there is a perception that the expenses associated with the cultural rites 
of mourning and cleansing ceremonies are not necessary funeral expenses under the 
dependency action. These kinds of perceptions could be seen as disrespectful of other 
people’s culture.1188 Are these perceptions a result of lack of information, as well as 
the spread of misinformation about African burial issues, or are the burial expenses 
ignored, simply because they differ from the western view of what burial expenses 
should include? The very limited compensation for funeral expenses in South African 
social security legislations remains a perplexing phenomenon, and shows that the 
legislature has failed to adequately compensate the dependants for this necessary 
expense. 
 
In addition, South Africa has a Constitution that is founded on human dignity, 
guarantees respect for all cultures, religions and linguistic communities, and rejects 
discrimination and oppression. Furthermore, the Constitution provides that everyone 
has inherent dignity and the right to have his or her dignity respected and protected. 
Despite all these provisions and assurances, to date, expenses related to funeral rites 
and cleansing ceremonies are still denied. The question therefore remains: Does the 
non-payment of cultural funeral expenses symbolise the legislator’s failure to respect 
and recognise African burial rights and cleansing ceremonies?1189 
 
Other expenses which are also not considered under this head of damage include the 
printing of a programme or obituary, post-burial costs related to the administration of 
                                            
1188  Chaza 2013 De Rebus 5. 
1189  Ibid. 
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the deceased’s estate at the Masters offices, transportation costs to attend the criminal 
proceedings of the wrongdoer, the attorney’s costs to attend to the administration of 
the deceased’s estate, or the conveyancer’s fees for the transfer and registration of 
the deceased’s properties into the names of his or her dependants. It is argued that all 
these expenses should also be expressly included in the assessment and 
quantification of damages under the dependency action and related social security 
acts. 
 
In Australia, the head of damage for funeral or cremation expenses also does not 
include Aboriginal burial rights and cleansing ceremonies. The costs include, for 
example, cemetery or crematorium fees, celebrant or clergy, musician or vocalist, 
venue hire, funeral expenses, death and funeral notices, catering, registered death 
certificate, cremation certificate, tombstone, etc.1190 The same comment as above can 
be made regarding the inclusion of Aboriginal burial rights and cleansing ceremonies 
into Australian law. 
 
The next section will deal with principles applicable to the assessment of damages for 
loss of support in terms of the dependency action  
 
4.6 Principles applicable to the assessment of damages for loss of support 
and related losses in terms of the dependency action 
4.6.1 General 
South African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian laws contain a number of rules on 
the acknowledgment of accountability for loss of support. This section discusses how 
the rules on balance of probabilities, causation, remoteness, once-and-for-all rule 
                                            
1190  Colin https://www.gatheredhere.com.au/understanding-funeral-costs-in-australia/ (accessed on 8 
March 2018). 
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(lump sum payments), prescription, contributory negligence, inflation, and mitigation 
of losses affect delictual liability in a claim for loss of support. It is reiterated that South 
African customary law lacks the conceptual structure of concepts or principles of 
modern law of damages. These principles are foreign to customary law, which means 
that the judicial process in the customary courts has its own shortcomings in this 
respect. In the next section, the relevance of these principles to the assessment of 
damages for loss of support under the dependency action is discussed. 
 
4.6.2 Balance of probabilities, causation and remoteness 
The dependant must establish that the death of his or her breadwinner occurred, on 
a balance (preponderance) of probabilities,1191 as a result of the cause of action which 
gave rise to the claim. The Australian law relating to the principle of balance of 
probabilities appears to be substantially the same as that in South Africa.1192 The 
wrongdoer’s conduct must be the cause of the harm or loss that the dependant has 
suffered. The causing of damage through conduct, or the causal nexus between 
conduct and damage, is required for a delict.1193 A delictual duty to pay damages can 
arise only if the wrongdoer’s conduct factually and legally caused the harm suffered 
by the claimant.1194 The dependant is burdened with the evidentiary duty to prove all 
the loss he or she has suffered, including the uncertain future loss, which might not 
                                            
1191  Steynberg http://www.sayas.org.za/PERJ/journal/view (accessed on 12 October 2017); Mlenzana 
v Goodrick and Franklin Inc [2011] ZAFSHC 111; 2012 2 SA 433 (FB); Goldie v City Council of 
Johannesburg 1948 2 SA 913 (W) 916; Naidoo v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 798 
(D); Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 9.3. 
1192  Ibid. 
1193  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 183; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) paras 9.3 & 
9.14; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5E; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 14; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA), s 5D; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 35; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 12; Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) s 52; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 45. 
1194  First National Bank of South Africa v Duvenhage 2006 5 SA 319 (SCA) 320; Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth) s 140(2). 
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yet have transpired at the time that the claim is lodged,1195 and the exact amount of 
damages that should be awarded to compensate for this loss.1196 A dependant may 
claim if death is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default, which is such as would 
(if death had not ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action. 
 
It is important to note, however, that recovery of damages is limited by the rules of 
limitation of liability or remoteness of damage.1197 Limitation of liability refers to the 
fact that the loss must not be too remote from, but must be proximate to, the delictual 
act.1198 In determining which consequences of the delictual conduct are proximate 
and recoverable, and which are too remote and therefore unrecoverable, two tests 
need to be applied. Firstly, it must be determined whether the damage does in fact 
arise from the wrongful act and was a causa sine qua non of the loss. This is also 
known as the "but-for" test. Secondly, it must be determined whether the wrongful act 
can be linked sufficiently closely or directly to the loss, in order for legal liability to 
ensue. In other words, is there legal liability, or is the loss "too remote"?1199 This is 
basically a juridical problem. However, the court has now expressed itself in favour of 
the flexible approach.1200 In terms of this approach, there is no single criterion that 
can be applied to all situations.1201 The basic question is whether there is a close 
enough relationship between the wrongdoer’s conduct and its consequence for such 
consequence to be imputed to the wrongdoer in view of policy considerations based 
                                            
1195  Steynberg http://www.sayas.org.za/PERJ/journal/view (accessed on 12 October 2017); Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2). 
1196  Ibid. 
1197  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.4; Livingstone v Rauyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 
25 (HL) 39. 
1198  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.5.1; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness 
(2000) 49 NSWLR 262 (CA). 
1199  See in general, Bennett https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLRev/1963/12.pdf (accessed on 
12 October 2017); Bennett 1963 SLR 293. 
1200  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.5.4. 
1201  Ibid. 
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on reasonableness, fairness and justice.1202 Should the answer to the two questions 
posed above be in the affirmative, then the damage caused is not too remote, and 
therefore recoverable. 
 
A final aspect of remoteness of damage is the eggshell or thin skull rule, which means 
that wrongdoers must take their victims as they find them.1203 For instance, if the victim 
has a pre-existing condition, resulting in him or her suffering greater injury than would 
be expected in an ordinary person, the wrongdoer remains responsible for the full 
extent of the loss.1204 The fact that the victim was more prone to injury can therefore 
not be used as a justification to limit or exclude liability. The principle of remoteness 
of damage in Australia is the same as in South Africa.1205 
 
4.6.3 Once-and-for-all rule (lump sum payments) 
There is no doubt that the once-and-for-all rule is a well-established principle, which 
applies in South African,1206 Botswana,1207 Lesotho,1208 and Australian laws.1209 
Damages, including those for death, are assessed "once and for all".1210 The once-
and-for-all rule is an old common law rule derived from English law.1211 The rule 
                                            
1202  S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A). 
1203  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.5.4.7; Neethling & Potgieter Law of 
delict (2015) 208. 
1204  Potgieter v Rondalia 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E); Masiba v 
Constatia Insurance Co Ltd 1982 4 SA 333 (C). 
1205  See in general, Bennett https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLRev/1963/12.pdf (accessed on 
12 October 2017); Bennett 1963 SLR 292; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of damages (2012) 
par 11.5.4.7. 
1206  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 7.1. 
1207  As stated earlier, Botswana applies the South African law. 
1208  Similar to Botswana, Lesotho also applies the South African law. 
1209  See Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.2; James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Newton (1997) 
42 NSWLR 729 (CA) 731. 
1210  Boberg Delict: Aquillian liability (1984) 475 481; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 215-
219; Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 128, 136-137; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) paras 2.1 & 
2.8. 
1211  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2006) par 7.1; Cape Town Council v Jacobs 1917 
AD 615; Evins v Shield Insurance Co 1980 2 SA 814 835; Coetzee v SAR & H 1933 CPD 565 574; 
Lim v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174 183. 
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requires that all claims generated from the same cause of action be instituted in one 
action.1212 In other words, the dependants’ claim for loss of support sustained as a 
result of the wrongful and unlawful death of their breadwinner at the hands of the 
wrongdoer has a single, indivisible cause of action, and they must sue for all damages 
in one claim.1213 In Coetzee v South African Railways & Harbours,1214 it was held that 
a person cannot sue solely for prospective damages. Gardiner JP, with whom 
Watermeyer J concurred, expressed himself as follows: 
“The cases, as far as I have ascertained, go only to this extent, that if a 
person sues for accrued damages, he must also claim prospective 
damages, or forfeit them. But I know of no case which goes so far as to 
say that a person, who has as yet sustained no damage, can sue for 
damages which may possibly be sustained in the future. Prospective 
damages may be awarded as ancillary to accrued damages, but they 
have no separate, independant force as ground of action.”1215  
 
The rule was introduced in consideration of public policy, which requires that there 
should be a term set for litigation, and in order to prevent multiplicity of actions for 
damage caused by the same unlawful, culpable act or omission, as well as to ensure 
that a single judgment on the issues is rendered. Furthermore, it carries the advantage 
of bringing both certainty and finality to disputes brought to court for resolution. 
Certainty and finality are two important principles upon which the edifice of the rule of 
law is constructed.1216 Lastly, it is important for the protection of the rights of 
                                            
1212  See Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.1, where the author refers to cases from as far 
back as 1701 (e.g. Fitter v Veal); Trindade & Cane Torts in Australia (2007) 509; Stewart & 
Stuhmcke Principles of tort law (2012) 588; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 
paras 7.1-7.5.11 for an exposition of the once-and-for-all rule; Schnellen v Rondalia Ass Corp of 
SA Ltd 1969 1 SA 517 521; Green v Coetzee 1958 2 SA 697 (W); Neethling & Potgieter Law of 
delict (2015) 225-227; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 154-184; Boberg 
Delict: Acquillian liability (1984) 476. 
1213  Steynberg http://www.sayas.org.za/PERJ/journal/view (accessed on 12 October 2017); Luntz 
Assessment of damages par 2.2; Mendelson New law of torts (2014) 40; Brandi v Mingot (1976) 
12 ALR 551 563. 
1214  1933 CPD 565. 
1215  Coetzee v South African Railways & Harbours 1933 CPD 565 576; Talbot v Berkshire Country 
Council [1994] QB 290 (CA). 
1216  Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1992 2 SA 417 (T) 420F; Doherty v Liverpool District 
Council (1991) 22 NSWLR 284 (CA) 295; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.4 2.19. 
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dependants to claim the benefits they could reasonably have expected to receive from 
the breadwinner, if the breadwinner’s life had not been shortened,1217 to avoid the 
running of prescription1218 and the congestion of cases coming to court on numerous 
reviews, and in order to be administratively efficient.1219 
 
The once and-for-all rule implies that damages are awarded in one collective sum, 
normally referred to as a lump sum representing all the heads of damages.1220 
Therefore, damages for death are awarded as a lump sum. The award, which covers 
past, present, and future loss must, under the law of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho 
and Australia, be paid as a lump sum and assessed at the conclusion of the legal 
process. The award is final  it is not susceptible to review as the future unfolds, 
substituting fact for estimate or speculation,1221 regardless of how uncertain the future 
loss is. 
 
Thus, the South African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian laws, by virtue of the once-
and-for-all rule, requires the dependants to bring the claim for loss of support 
simultaneously for all damage, past, present and future, caused by the same unlawful, 
culpable conduct or omission, in order for them to be raised in a single action.1222 This 
principle is criticised because it leads to grave difficulties and injustices, in that as soon 
as the lump sum has been paid, the claimant is precluded from recovering further 
losses, which were not envisaged at the time of the assessment. The knowledge of the 
future is denied to manhood. Accordingly, ample of the award, as is to be attributed to 
                                            
1217  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.26. 
1218  Kingdom Films v Harry Kaplan NO [2016] ZAGPJHC 37. 
1219  See Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer (1977) 315 448. 
1220  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.8; R v Monnanyana [2005] LSHC 130; Neethling & 
Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 245. 
1221  Todorovic and Another v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 at 412-413. 
1222  Kingdom Films v Harry Kaplan NO NO [2016] ZAGPJHC 37 par 24. 
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future loss, will almost confidently be incorrect.1223 There is a certainty that the future 
will prove the award to be either too high or too low. 
 
The once-and-for-all principle is unknown in customary law. Under customary law, 
there is a principle called molato ga o bole, which means that the once-and-for-all rule 
is unsustainable in terms of the African understanding of law. If the African principle is 
applied in the assessment of damages, it will mean that the dependants will be able to 
sue solely for prospective loss as it develops in the future.1224 With the molato ga o 
bole principle in mind, it is permissible under customary law to order the wrongdoer to 
pay the dependants a non-fixed allowance, determined in accordance with the needs 
of the dependants at a particular moment, until death, either of the dependants or 
wrongdoer, whichever comes first. This allowance does not correlate with the periodic 
payments in terms of the RAF Act.1225 As a result, the lump sum payment will not be 
applicable under customary law. This stands in contrast to the once-and-for-all rule, 
which prevents the payment of future loss of support expenses, as and when the losses 
accrue.1226 
 
The once-and-for-all principle has also been criticised by academic writers, but did 
receive the endorsement of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 
and others:1227 “It is, in any event, a rule of the common law and unless it can be shown 
that it is in conflict with a right in the Bill of Rights, and therefore requires to be 
developed in order to be consistent with or, to put it differently, in order that it promotes 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights,1228 it should be applied. In this case 
                                            
1223  Todorovic and Another v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 at 412-413. 
1224  Moroke Molato ga o bole (1979) 5. 
1225  See s 17(6) of the RAF Act 56 of 1996. 
1226  Botha v RAF [2013] ZAGPJHC 400; 2015 2 SA 108 (GP) par [33]. 
1227  2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) par [22]. 
1228  s 9(2) of the Constitution. 
 239 
there is no suggestion that this common law rule conflicts with any right in the Bill of 
Rights.”1229 Luntz,1230 Boberg1231 and Corbett1232 raised the same criticism and 
contended that there is no reason why a person cannot sue solely for prospective loss, 
provided that he can establish the future loss on a balance of probabilities, although it 
is not necessarily the quantum of his claim. The advantage of the approach adopted 
in the Coetzee1233 case is the certainty that it provides. If an action for prospective loss 
is completed only when the loss actually occurs, prescription will not commence to run 
until that date, and a plaintiff will generally be in a position to quantify his claim. To the 
extent that there may be additional prospective loss, the court will make a contingency 
allowance for it. 
 
On the other hand, if the completion of an action for prospective loss for which a person 
is entitled to sue, is to depend not upon the loss occurring, but upon whether or not 
what will happen in the future can be established on a balance of probabilities, it 
seems, according to the legal author Corbett, that the inevitable uncertainty associated 
with such an approach is likely to prove impractical, and result in hardship to a plaintiff, 
particularly in so far as the running of prescription is concerned.1234 Van der Walt1235 
states that any attempt to justify the rule with principles concerning res iudicata, ne bis 
in idem or continetia causa1236 fails, because a claim for loss already sustained, and a 
claim for prospective loss, are necessarily based on two causes of action. He adds that 
it is incorrect to describe the once-and-for-all rule as a principle of law, since it is merely 
                                            
1229  2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) par [22] - the sources of the criticism are listed in this paragraph. 
1230  See Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.9-2.17. 
1231  Boberg Delict: Acquillian liability (1984) 488. 
1232  Corbett & Honey Quantum of damages (2014) 9. 
1233  Coetzee v South African Railways & Harbours 1933 CPD 565. 
1234  Corbett & Honey Quantum of damages (2014) 9. 
1235  See Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer (1977) 425-485; also see Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of 
damages (2012) par 7.2. 
1236  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 7.2. 
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based on convenience and may be departed from whenever necessary.1237 He further 
mentions that it should no longer be tolerated that recovery of damages for further 
damage is frustrated by the once-and-for-all rule. According to Van der Walt, it should 
no longer be tolerated that recovery of damages for further damage can be frustrated 
by the once-and-for-all rule. Courts should be free to decide finally over all matters 
regarding completely developed damage, whilst indicating the circumstances under 
which, and the period during which, the defendant will also be liable for further damage 
developing from the challenged event.1238 This viewpoint is not generally accepted in 
South African jurisprudence. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the once-and-for-all rule has been a point of 
dispute, not only in South Africa, but in Australia as well, which led to legislative 
exceptions to the rule being formulated in the various jurisdictions. It was held in 
Hodsoll v Stallebrass1239 that damages had to be awarded once-and-for-all in respect 
of both past and future loss. The consequence of the rule is that where a claim for loss 
of support resulting from the death of the breadwinner has been successfully litigated 
or compromised, the dependants of the deceased breadwinner are prevented from 
bringing an action in respect of any manifestation of future losses. Although there is no 
doubt that the once-and-for-all rule applies in Australia, it has frequently been 
regretted.1240 There have been arguments in favour of dispensing with the rule.1241 
Many of the difficulties associated with the assessment of damages in cases of serious 
personal injury and death can be blamed on the once-and-for-all rule.1242 The rule, for 
                                            
1237   See Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer (1977) 523.                          
1238  Ibid; also see Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 7.2. 
1239  (1840) 11 Ad & E 301. 
1240  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.2. 
1241  Hutley 1954 ALJ 74 77. 
1242  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.9. 
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example, poses difficulties in the assessment of future contingencies. Speculations as 
to what would happen if not for the death of the breadwinner are inevitable. In general, 
no one knows what would have happened to the breadwinner if he had not died.1243 
Associated with the difficulty of future contingencies is the impossibility of forecasting 
the effect of inflation on a lump sum,1244 and the distasteful assessment of remarriage 
prospects.1245 Whether the dependants can invest a lump to provide a hedge against 
inflation, or to provide sufficient support, is controversial. A significant portion of the 
lump sum paid to dependants is spent on discharging debts that were accumulated 
between the accident or death and payment.1246 The fact that a dependant is young, 
attractive and has prospects of re-marrying should be ignored. This is a personal 
choice and a surviving spouse should not be coerced into remarriage. 
 
In South Africa, an exception to the once-and-for-all rule is found in section 17(4) of 
the RAF Act.1247 Normally, damage for future loss of support is paid in a lump sum. 
However, this section allows the RAF, at its discretion, to tender an undertaking to pay 
such damage in instalments in arrears, as agreed upon or ordered by the court.1248 
This section was enacted for the benefit of the RAF in order to ameliorate the 
detrimental consequences of the once-and-for-all rule.1249 
 
Western Australia enacted section 16 in terms of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party 
Insurance) Act of 19431250 to counter the speculation that is inherent in the lump sum 
                                            
1243  Idem par 2.10. 
1244  Idem par 2.16. 
1245  Idem par 2.17. 
1246  Idem par 2.15 
1247  Act 56 of 1996. 
1248  See s 17(4)(b) of the RAF Act, 1996 (as amended). 
1249  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 207. 
1250  The section provides as follows in subsection 4P: (4) On the hearing and determination of any 
action or proceedings a Court shall, without in any way limiting its usual powers in relation thereto, 
have the following further powers: (a) to award by way of general damages either a lump sum or 
periodical payments, or a lump sum and periodical payments, such periodical payments to be for 
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awarding of damages that are ordered at once. The section vests the court with the 
power to order periodical payments, either as an alternative to the lump sum 
damages, or cumulatively therewith, and further allows for a review of awards of 
damages if the situation warrants such, or on application by a party to the initial 
litigation. It is respectively submitted that the periodical payment of loss of support 
would not only be benefcial to the dependants, but also to the fund, by ameliorating 
the detrimental consequences of the once-and-for-all rule, and the dependants would 
be paid compensation for as long as they would reasonably have expected support. 
In South Australia, section 30B of the Supreme Court Act of 19351251 empowers the 
court with the authority to order interim payments as a departure from the accepted 
once-and-for-all rule of damages. The purpose of this section is to encourage early 
hearings on liability and to defer the assessment of damages, in order to do more 
precise justice to the litigants. The application of this section is a matter of the court’s 
unconstrained discretion.1252  
 
Closely related to the once-and-for-all rule is the principle of prescription. In the next 
section, the relevance of the principle of prescription to the assessment of damages 
for loss of support under the dependency action will be explored. 
                                            
such period and upon such terms as the Court determines; and (b) at any time either of its own 
motion or on the application of any party to the action or proceedings: (i) to review any periodical 
payment and either continue, vary, reduce, increase, suspend, or determine it, or on the review to 
order payment to the claimant of a further lump sum; or (ii) to order that any such periodical 
payments be redeemed by payment of a lump sum. 
1251  The relevant provision of the section provides as follows: (1) Where in any action the court 
determines that a party is entitled to recover damages from another party, it shall be lawful for the 
court to enter declaratory judgment finally determining the question of liability between the parties, 
in favour of the party who is entitled to recover damages as aforesaid, and to adjourn the final 
assessment thereof. (2) It shall be lawful for the court when entering declaratory judgment and for 
any judge of the court at any time or times thereafter— (a) to make orders that the party held liable 
make such payment or payments on account of the damages to be assessed as to the court seems 
just; and (b) in addition to any such order or in lieu thereof, to order that the party held liable make 
periodic payments to the other party on account of the damages to be assessed during a stated 
period or until further order. 
1252  Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336. 
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4.6.4 Prescription 
Prescription is another important rule applicable to the assessment of damages,1253 
and is found in virtually all legal systems,1254 particularly in all the comparative 
jurisdictions relevant to this study.1255 Prescription is the extinction of a debt through 
the passing of time.1256 It serves a valuable social purpose1257 because its underlying 
idea is to bring about legal certainty,1258 and it is governed by legislation.1259 The 
Prescription Act lays down periods of prescription, which apply to various categories 
of debts.1260 South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Australia follow much the same 
principle of prescription.1261 In terms of the Prescription Acts of all Southern African 
comparative jurisdictions,1262 a delictual debt prescribes after three years,1263 except 
where stipulated otherwise by another Act of Parliament, and commences to run as 
soon as a cause of action accrues, and the debt in regard to the payment of damages 
is claimable.1264 The combined application of the rule of prescription and the once-and-
                                            
1253  Steynberg http://www.sayas.org.za/PERJ/journal/view (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
1254  Van der Bank 2014 JFE 28 31. 
1255  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.11; Luntz Assessment of 
damages (2006) paras 2.3 & 2.4. 
1256  Vrancken & Brettenny Tourism and the law (2015) 56. 
1257  Jackson https://www.scl.org.uk/sites/default/files/Concurrent%20Liability0.pdf (accessed on 23 
October 2017). 
1258  Havenga et al Commercial law (2015) 9. 
1259  See Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (South Africa); Prescription Act (Proc)76 of 1959, 30 of 1962, L.N. 
84 of 1984 (Botswana); Prescription Act 6 of 1861 (Lesotho); Prescription Act 1832 (Australia); 
New South Wales, the Limitation Act, 1969 (NSW); Capital Territory, the Limitation Act. 1985 (CT); 
Northern Territory, the Limitation Act, 1981 (NT); Queensland, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Qld); South 
Australia, the Limitation Act, 1936 (SA); Tasmania, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Tas); Victoria, the 
Limitation Act, 1958 (Vic); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 20(1); Western Australia, the Limitation Act, 
1935 (WA). 
1260  Van der Bank 2014 JFE 28; Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (South Africa); Prescription Act (Proc) 76 
of 1959, 30 of 1962, L.N. 84 of 1984 (Botswana); Prescription Act 6 of 1861 (Lesotho); Prescription 
Act 1832 (Australia); Limitation of Action Act. 
1261  Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (South Africa); Prescription Act (Proc) 76 of 1959, 30 of 1962, L.N. 84 
of 1984 (Botswana); Prescription Act 6 of 1861 (Lesotho); Prescription Act 1832 (Australia). 
1262  Ibid. 
1263  s 3(2) Prescription Act, 1969 (South Africa); s 4(2)(b)(vi) of the Prescriptions Act, 1984 (Botswana); 
Matere v Attorney-General 2003 2 BLR 385 (HC); Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 235 
278. 
1264  Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 842; s 17 of the RAF Act 56 of 1996; Klopper 
Third party compensation (2012) 148; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 235 278; Luntz 
Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.3. 
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for-all rule burdens the dependant with the almost impossible task of proving uncertain 
future loss, which might not yet have transpired by the cut-off date of three years after 
the damage-causing event, when the claim has to be lodged.1265 
 
Apart from the Prescription Act, a variety of statutes deal with the claim for loss of 
support and stipulate their own specific prescriptive periods. The Prescription Act does 
not affect the provisions of any other Act stipulating its own specific prescriptive 
periods, but leaves prescription to be governed by whatever relevant law applied to the 
prescription of that particular debt.1266 The prescription of delictual debts incurred 
under the Road Accident Fund Act1267 is governed by the provisions of section 23 
thereof, and provides that where the death of the breadwinner was a result of the 
driving of a motor vehicle, and the identity of either the owner or driver of the vehicle 
concerned is known, the claim of the dependant will prescribe after 3 years from the 
date of the death of the breadwinner.1268 This implies that when the breadwinner is not 
killed on impact, but dies of his or her injuries at a later date, the cause of action arises 
on the date of death of the breadwinner, and not on the date of the accident.1269 It 
further indicates that the plaintiff-dependant must within three years1270 institute an 
action against the wrongdoer. However, if the dependant-claimant is a minor,1271 
prescription against such a minor-dependant is suspended until the minor dependant 
attains majority.1272 In practice, prescription will only commence on the attainment of 
                                            
1265  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017); 
Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.3. 
1266  Van der Bank 2014 JFE 32. 
1267  Act 56 of 1996, as amended. 
1268  ss 17(1)(a) & 23(1) of the RAF Act 56 of 1996, as amended. 
1269  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 253; Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 235 278. 
1270  For exceptions to this rule, see s 23 of the RAF Act 56 of 1996; Klopper Third party compensation 
(2012) 271-284. 
1271  A minor is any person under the age of 18 years – see s 17 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
1272  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 250; s 23(2) of the RAF Act 56 of 1996, as amended. 
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majority, and will be completed three years after majority has been achieved.1273 In the 
case of an unidentified motor vehicle,1274 prescription commences to run on the date 
of death of the breadwinner, irrespective of the minority status or any other form of 
disability of the dependant, and will be completed two years after the death.1275 
 
The prescription of delictual debts incurred under the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act,1276 is governed by the provisions of section 44 thereof, and 
provides that a right to benefits in terms of the COID Act will lapse if the accident or 
death1277 in question is not brought to the attention of the commissioner, employer or 
mutual association concerned, as the case may be, within 12 months after the date of 
such accident or death. In practice, prescription will only commence on the date of 
death of the breadwinner and will be completed 12 months after the breadwinner’s 
death. There are thus four different prescriptive periods for loss of support claims in 
terms of the three different South African statutes mentioned above: 3 years in terms 
of the Prescription Act; 3 years for identified claims and 2 years for unidentified claims 
in terms of the RAF Act; and 1 year in terms of the COID Act. 
 
Similar to South Africa, throughout Australia, there are legislations in force that provide 
for the various prescriptive periods of limitation of action for claims for delictual debts. 
Each state in Australia, except for the Capital Territory, has a prescriptive period of 6 
years for claims for damage debts emanating from tort (a delict), while the prescriptive 
                                            
1273  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 250. 
1274  For example, hit-and-run claims. 
1275  s 17(1)(b) of the RAF Act, as amended; regulations 2(1)(a) & 2(1)(b) of the RAF regulations 
published in Government Gazette 31249 of 21 July 2008; Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 
252. 
1276  Act 130 of 1993, as amended. 
1277  See definition of accident in s 1(i) of the COIDA 130 of 1993, as amended. 
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period of the Capital Territory is similar to South Africa, namely 3 years.1278 In Australia, 
there are thus four different prescriptive periods for loss of support claims, depending 
on which statute is applicable: either 6 years, 3 years, 2 years, or 12 months. For 
example, in the state of Victoria the prescriptive period for claims for compensation for 
the death of a worker is 2 years after the date of death of the relevant worker.1279 If the 
injured person is a minor at the time of the accident, the minor, or a person on his or 
her behalf, has 12 months from the minor attaining 18 years of age within which to 
make a claim.1280 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that there is no uniform prescription period in all 
the comparative jurisdictions for claims for delictual debts for loss of support in terms 
of the dependency action. The problem of having different prescription periods 
designed for the same type of claim (loss of support), as contained in various statutes, 
creates inequalities amongst dependants. The prescription rule may have a significant 
impact on the collectability of a debt, and in respect of any claim that a dependant may 
have against a wrongdoer. However, dependant-claimants should be wary of leaving 
claims on the back burner, where they run the real risk of such claims prescribing on 
the basis set out in the various statutes.1281 Many dependants who sustain loss of 
support and are entitled to financial compensation are either unaware of, or poorly 
                                            
1278  New South Wales, the Limitation Act, 1969 (NSW); Capital Territory, the Limitation Act, 1985 (CT); 
Northern Territory, the Limitation Act, 1981 (NT); Queensland, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Qld); South 
Australia, the Limitation Act, 1936 (SA); Tasmania, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Tas); Victoria, the 
Limitation Act, 1958 (Vic); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 20(1); Western Australia, the Limitation Act, 
1935 (WA). 
1279  Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic). 
1280  Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic). 
1281  E.g., see Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (South Africa); Prescription Act (Proc) 76 of 1959, 30 of 1962, 
L.N. 84 of 1984 (Botswana); Prescription Act 6 of 1861 (Lesotho); Prescription Act 1832 (Australia); 
RAF Act, 1996; Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic); COIDA, 1993; New South Wales, the 
Limitation Act, 1969 (NSW); Capital Territory, the Limitation Act. 1985 (CT); Northern Territory, the 
Limitation Act, 1981 (NT); Queensland, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Qld); South Australia, the 
Limitation Act, 1936 (SA); Tasmania, the Limitation Act, 1974 (Tas); Victoria, the Limitation Act, 
1958 (Vic); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 20(1); Western Australia, the Limitation Act, 1935 (WA). 
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informed about, the different prescriptive periods. Currently, in South Africa, there is 
no condonation in terms of the Prescription Act where there is late filing of a claim.1282 
Claimants with genuine claims may not have the opportunity to institute their cases, 
even where there is a just cause for failure to institute such claim.1283 
 
The harmonisation of the provisions of existing laws providing for different prescription 
periods regarding the delictual debts for loss of support should be abolished and 
replaced by one uniform prescription period. In addition to the uniform prescription 
period, the courts should be granted the power to condone, on good cause shown, the 
late institution of a claim, where the delictual debt has prescribed in terms of the 
proposed uniform prescription period.1284 
 
Customary law has no rules allowing acquisitive or extinctive prescription. Statutory 
provisions in this regard do not supersede customary law, because the Prescription 
Act expressly states that it does not apply “in so far as any right or obligation of any 
person against any other person is governed by Black Law”.1285 Under customary law, 
there is a principle called molato ga o bole, which means that prescription is 
unprotected in terms of the African understanding of law. This means that the 
wrongdoer will be liable to the dependants of the deceased until the death of the 
wrongdoer or the dependants, whichever comes first. This African principle benefits 
the dependants one-sidedly, and if applied in the assessment of damages, it could lead 
to grave difficulties and injustices to the wrongdoer, in that the certainty and finality of 
                                            
1282  Van der Bank 2014 JFE 34. 
1283  South African Law Reform Commission “Investigation on Prescription periods (Project 125)” 
https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/media/2011-prj125-prescription-periods.pdf (accessed on 27 
October 2017); Van der Bank 2014 JFE 35. 
1284  s 44 of the COIDA 130 of 1993; s 23 of the RAF Act 56 of 1996. 
1285  s 20 of Prescription Act 68 of 1969; Van der Bank 2014 JFE 30. 
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the matter will never be achieved.1286 It is suggested that this African principle should 
not be followed in order to avoid this danger. In contrast, the commonly accepted 
principle in all litigation matters is that immediate certainty and finality are to be 
preferred.1287  
 
Another important principle relevant to the assessment of damages is contributory 
negligence, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.6.5 Contributory negligence 
Contributory negligence refers to when a claimant suffers damage as a result, partly, 
of his or her own fault, and partly of the fault of another person(s).1288 Historically, 
contributory negligence was an absolute or complete defence under common law.1289 
The victim’s recovery of damages was barred if his or her negligence contributed, even 
minimally, to causing the injury or loss. However, this harsh rule has been departed 
from in most jurisdictions, and a more flexible approach has been adopted.1290 In South 
Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, under the Apportionment of Damages Act,1291 if a 
claimant suffers damage as a result, partly, of his own fault, and partly of the fault of 
another person(s), his or her claim is no longer defeated. Instead, his or her damages 
are reduced to reflect his or her share of the responsibility for the harm sustained. 
 
                                            
1286  Moroke Molato ga o bole (2009) 5. 
1287  Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1992 2 SA 417 (T) 420F4. 
1288  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.4.1; Barnett & Harder Remedies 
(2014) 80 154. 
1289  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 284; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 80 154. 
1290  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 78. 
1291  See s 2(1B) of Act 34 of 1956 (South Africa); Apportionment of Damages Act 32, 1969 (Botswana); 
Apportionment of Damages Order No 53 of 1970 (Lesotho). 
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Similarly, throughout Australia, there is legislation in force providing for the reduction 
of damages where the victim is guilty of contributory negligence.1292 Therefore, where 
any person dies, partly as the result of his or her own fault, and partly due to the fault 
of another person(s) or third party, the damages recoverable will be reduced under the 
Apportionment of Damages Act in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho,1293 and under 
several law reform legislations in Australia,1294 to a proportionate extent. The third party 
and deceased’s estate will be considered as joint wrongdoers with regard to the loss 
of support suffered by the dependants.1295 In principle, this means that the dependant 
may now claim the full amount of damages from either the third party or the deceased’s 
estate, and that there is a right of recourse between the two joint wrongdoers.1296 
 
The defence of contributory negligence is one of the most frequently pleaded defences; 
hence the impact which a finding of contributory negligence has on the damages award 
is significant. The rationale behind the doctrine is that by denying recovery, in whole or 
in part, to a victim who has contributed negligently to his or her loss, the law can deter 
                                            
1292  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) Pt 3; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld) Pt3 Div 
3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s7; Wrongs 
Act 1954 (Tas) ss 4 and 5; Wrongs Act 1954 (Vic) Pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and 
Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) ss 3A and 4; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Pt7.3; 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) Pt V. 
1293  See Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 (South Africa); Apportionment of Damages Act 32 
of 1969 (Botswana); Apportionment of Damages Act 6 of 1998 (Botswana). 
1294  See Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth); Repatriation (Far East Strategic Reserve) Act 1956 (Cth); 
Repatriation (Special Overseas Service) Act 1962 (Cth); Repatriation (Torres Strait Islanders) Act 
1972 (Cth); Swanton 1981 ALJ 278; House of Representatives, Standing Committees on Aboriginal 
Affairs, Report: The effects of asbestos mining on the Baryulgil community, AGPS, Canberra, 1984, 
120 Par 1.32; Arthur https://www.coursehero.com/.../Damages-and-Equitable-Compensation-
John-Arthur (accessed on 8 August 2016); Queensland – Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); New South 
Wales – Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Victoria - Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Western Australia - Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA); Australian Capital Territory - Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Northern 
Territory – Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT); South Australia – Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA); Tasmania – Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); 
Commonwealth - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and Australian 
Securities & Investments Commission (Cth); Commercial notes - Australian Government Solicitor 
https://www.ags.gov.au/publications/commercial-notes/CN38.pdf (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
1295  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 284. 
1296  Ibid. 
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people from engaging in conduct, which involves an unreasonable risk to their own 
lives. In assessing the relevance of the contributory negligence theory, it seems that 
the principle is fairest and accords best with the compensatory principle under the 
assessment of damages, since it treats both the victim and the defendant equally, and 
compensates the damaged party in proportion to the harm caused to the victim by the 
other party. It also harmonises with the concept of corrective justice. The essence of 
corrective justice is that the party who injures another must correct the wrong, in order 
to restore the moral balance between them.1297 
 
The anticipated move in South African third party motor vehicle accident compensation 
towards a no-fault based compensation system,1298 or at least a system in which the 
plaintiff’s fault plays a minimal role, will have the effect of cancelling the application of 
the contributory negligence principle in this area of the law. However, it is doubtful 
whether the costs of accidents will in fact be lessened under the comprehensive no-
fault compensation scheme. On paper, the scheme seems to prove to be too expensive 
to run and maintain. It appears that the scheme will place pressure on the government 
to substantially increase other income maintenance programmes. Moreover, the 
concept of corrective justice is foreign to such a scheme, and in practice, the 
deterrence function may not be served as well as was the case under the various fault-
based systems. 
 
 
                                            
1297  Devaney 2009 EJCL 7. 
1298  Road Accident Benefit Scheme is intended to replace the current fault-based system administered 
by the Road Accident Fund (RAF), which often results in extensive and costly litigation, prolonged 
claims finalisation, and high administrative costs. Under RABS, fault will not be considered on the 
part of the claimant or other persons involved in the road accident. The focus will essentially be on 
how the claimant can be immediately assisted. A no-fault scheme will create a new era of socio-
economic balance and will also remove the unintended negative consequences and financial 
burden on the families of the wrongdoer. 
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4.6.6 Mitigation of losses  
The concept of mitigation of loss under the dependency action applies to, or is 
concerned with the conduct of the dependant after the damage-causing event.1299 It is 
a compensation principle that the dependant should take reasonable steps, either to 
avoid the increase of the original loss, or to avert further loss, as the dependant would 
run the risk of his or her compensation being reduced.1300 The South African, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Australian law of damages follows much the same principle of 
mitigation of losses,1301 and applies to all common law wrongs.1302 Under the mitigation 
of loss doctrine, a person who has suffered an injury or loss should take reasonable 
action, where possible, to avoid additional loss.1303 The claimants should not 
unreasonably burden the defendant’s duty to pay damages.1304 This principle is equally 
applicable to patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss, and applies to damage already 
suffered up to the date of trial, as well as to future loss.1305 In all comparative countries, 
the onus of proving that the dependant did not properly fulfil his or her duty to mitigate 
loss rests with the defendant.1306 
 
                                            
1299  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.3; Tilbury 1980 WALR 282; Barnett & 
Harder Remedies (2014) 80. 
1300  Burchell Delict (1993) 126; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 1.9; Tilbury 1980 WALR 282 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/1980/4.pdf (accessed on 19 July 
2017). 
1301  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 10.8.5 & 11.3.1; Mogomotsi v 
Pudologong Rehabilitation and Development Trust for the Blind 2008 2 BLR 340 HC; Standard 
Lesotho Bank v Masechaba Anna Ntsihlele [2013] LSLC 58 par [23]; British Westinghouse Electric 
& Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673 (HL) 
688-689. 
1302  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 80. 
1303  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 244; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) par 11.3.1; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 10.5; Cattanah v Melchior (2003) 215 
CLR 1; Butler v Durban Corporation 1936 NPD 139. 
1304  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 233. 
1305  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.3.1. 
1306  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 245; Tilbury 1980 WALR 282; Luntz Assessment of 
damages (2006) par 10.1. 
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Stewart and Stuhmcke1307 state that the objective of mitigation is to ensure that the 
compensation awarded is reasonable for both claimant and defendant. The same view 
is endorsed in Australia in the Motor Accident Insurance Act,1308 which provides that if 
an insurer is not satisfied with the action taken by a claimant to mitigate damage, the 
insurer may give the claimant written notice, suggesting a specified action that the 
claimant should take to mitigate damage.1309 Furthermore, in assessing damages 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the court must consider whether the claimant 
has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damage, by not following the 
suggestions made under subsection 2 of this section. In addition, if it appears that the 
claimant has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the losses, by not following the 
suggestions, the court may reduce the dependant’s damages to an appropriate extent, 
in order to reflect the failure.1310 This section highlights the significance of mitigation of 
losses and the insurer’s role in assisting the court to assess the award of damages. 
 
Failure on the part of a dependant to take reasonable preventative steps after suffering 
loss of support could lead to a reduction in the amount of his or her recovery.1311 The 
dependant cannot recover for loss which could have been reasonably avoided.1312 In 
following the mitigation of losses doctrine, does it mean that there is a duty on a widow 
to marry a healthy, wealthy second man to reduce her loss of support,1313 or a duty on 
                                            
1307  Stewart & Stuhmcke Tort law (2017) 591. 
1308  s 54 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 9 of 1994. 
1309  s 54(1) & (2) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 9 of 1994. 
1310  s 54(3) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 9 of 1994. 
1311  Swart v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 630 (A); Shrog v Valentine 1949 3 SA 1228 (T); 
Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B). 
1312  McGregory McGregory on damages (2014) 599. 
1313  See in general, on the prospect of remarriage – Esterhuizen RAF case number 26180/2014 
(reportable) 2016 ZAGPPHC 1221 2017 4 SA 461 (GP); Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 
(C); Legal Insurance Company Limited v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (AD). Peri-Urban Areas Health 
board v Munarian 1955 3 SA 367 (A). These judgements do not suggest that the dependants should 
remarry in order to mitigate the loss of support, but that the possibility of remarriage must be taken 
into account in the calculation of loss of support. The writer hereof disagrees. The writer is of the 
view that the prospect of remarriage should not be taken into account at all. The second marriage 
 253 
dependant-children to drop out of their studies in order to decrease their dependency, 
and to prove that they have taken reasonable steps to mitigate their losses? Will it be 
reasonable to expect dependants to take such drastic steps in order to mitigate their 
losses? Surely, these are examples of unreasonable steps, as it is submitted that the 
duty on the dependants cannot be expected to be this heavy. 
 
Where a dependant and a deceased breadwinner were married under the Marriages 
Act,1314 or Recognition of Customary Law Marriages Act,1315 or in a civil partnership,1316 
the dependant acquires the competence to remarry or re-partner upon the death of the 
breadwinner.1317 In South Africa, such a remarriage or re-partnership creates a new 
right of support1318 and is taken into account in the assessment of loss of support.1319 
There is no obligation or duty on the surviving spouse or partner to re-enter into a 
permanent relationship, but if they do, any benefits received will be taken into account 
in calculating their damages for loss of support. In contrast, in three territories of 
Australia, re-partnership may not be taken into account in a claim for loss of support, 
and all benefits derived from re-partnering will be ignored in the assessment of 
damages.1320 
 
                                            
may not result in financial support and might not even last, and therefore the financial support would 
be lost. Taking the prospect of remarriage into account in the calculation of loss of support is 
offensive and should not be part of the law, given the modern attitude towards marriage. If 
remarriage has indeed taken place by the time the court has to assess damages, of course then it 
should be taken into account. 
1314  Act 25 of 1961. 
1315  Act 120 of 1998. 
1316  Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
1317  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017). 
1318  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 10.8.5. 
1319  See R v RAF [2004] ZAGPPHC 987. 
1320  Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1794, s 10(4)(h) (NT); Wrong Act 1958, s 19(2) (Vic); Supreme 
Court Act 1995, s 23A (2) (Qld); Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.17; Willis v The 
Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105; R v RAF [2014] ZAGPPHC 987. 
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Mitigation of losses is an unknown doctrine under customary law, and is therefore not 
considered in arriving at an appropriate fine for the killing of a breadwinner. Although 
customary law allows levirate marriages, it is not for the purpose of mitigating losses 
under the go tsoša/tsosa hlogo action (dependency action). Levirate marriage is an 
ancient African institution, in response to the dilemma posed by the death of a 
deceased breadwinner, who is childless or has no male heir, and the plight of his 
widow.1321 It is consistent with biblical ethos.1322 Ordinarily, a man could not marry his 
brother's wife (divorced or widowed), so there had to be conditions necessitating the 
marriage, which would only apply when the deceased brother had no son or children 
at all.1323 This practice is optional, and both parties (the dependant-widow and the 
brother to the deceased breadwinner) must agree to enter into this marriage. Should a 
dependant widow of a deceased breadwinner who was unlawfully and negligently killed 
enter into a levirate marriage, the benefits of such a marriage would probably be taken 
into account to mitigate her losses under the general law. 
 
4.6.7 Inflation 
Inflation is not only a matter of economic reality, but a legal factor as well.1324 Therefore, 
it must be considered by the court1325 in arriving at an award for damages, particularly 
awards paid in a lump sum, such as an award for loss of support.1326 Monetary awards 
are affected by economic changes over time, as well as by tax policies. Consequently, 
                                            
1321  Meek 1929 Tribal Studies 542-543; Weisberg https://www.bibleodyssey.org/en/people/related-
articles/levirate-marriage (accessed on 19 July 2017). 
1322  See Good News Biblical verses: Deuteronomy 25: 5-10; Ruth 1: 11-13. 
1323  See Robison https://www.blainerorison.com/hebroots/levirate.htm (accessed on 19 July 2017); 
Good News Biblical verse: Leviticus 18:16; Leviticus 20:21. 
1324  Monyamane Nature, assessment and quantification of medical expenses (2013) 84; Everson v 
Allianz Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 SA 173 (C). 
1325  Erasmus & Gauntlett “Damages” in LAWSA (1995) par 29; Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 
(A) 556. 
1326  Burchell Delict (1993) 126. 
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the courts make an effort to ensure that awards are protected from loss of value due 
to the passage of time.1327 Loss of support is one of the important awards of damages 
in wrongful death cases.1328 An award for loss of support should accurately 
compensate the dependant for what he would have received if his breadwinner had 
not died  it should not place him or her in a better monetary position. In calculating 
the loss of support, the amount of support which the dependant would have received 
during his or her dependency is based on speculation, and part of this speculation is 
to determine to what extent inflation will influence this award.1329 
 
There is a general uncertainty with regard to the correct manner in which to determine 
inflation, whether in the past or in the future.1330 Predicting future losses without 
considering the effect of inflation produces an unrealistically low estimate of the 
dependant’s total future loss of support.1331 Since inflation cannot be determined with 
accuracy, the court should follow a reasonably conservative approach.1332 Therefore, 
the courts have, in calculating such losses, recognised the investment potential of a 
sum of money awarded now for future damages.1333 The courts have required the 
reduction of lump-sum awards for loss of support to their present value by an 
appropriate discount factor.1334 The need to adjust damages to allow for future inflation 
is sharpened by the impact of the technique, termed reducing to "present value", which 
is often used by the courts to calculate future damages.1335 The present-value rule 
                                            
1327  De Vries NO and others v RAF [2011] ZAWCHC 215. 
1328  Stein Damages and recovery (1972) par 6. 
1329  Nanile v Minister of Posts and Telecommunications 1990 4 QOD A4-30 (E); Corbett & Honey 
Quantum of damages (2002) A4 -39. 
1330  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.7.5. 
1331  Burchell Delict (1993) 126; Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 11.7. 
1332  Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A); Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages 
(2012) par 11.7.5. 
1333  Ibid. 
1334  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 156-157. 
1335  Koch Damages for lost income (1984) 295. 
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states that all damages awards for lost future support must be discounted to reflect 
their investment potential. 
 
If the dependant is presently given the total amount of damages that the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) has determined he is entitled to, he has been overcompensated to 
the extent of the "earning power" of the sum he receives. A sum of money available at 
present is worth more than an identical sum of money received at any time in the future, 
because the recipient may invest the entire amount and gather interest.1336 Therefore, 
since the plaintiff is awarded his damages in a lump sum and not over a period of time, 
the aggregate of the periodic payments must be reduced.1337 The award is discounted 
to the present value, that is, it is reduced to the amount, which, if safely invested, would 
grow to an amount equal to the total lost support. In order to discount an amount to 
present value, the court has to consider and choose interest rates, depending on expert 
evidence, and often using actuarial tables.1338 The award also saves on paying income 
tax,1339 hence the court will deduct this saving from the amount of damages. In this 
sense, the inflation principle is consistent with the objective of the compensation 
principle, which is to fully compensate the dependant when measuring damages, and 
unless inflation is accounted for, the dependant of the deceased person is unlikely to 
be returned to the position he or she occupied before the death of the breadwinner. 
 
The Australian principle of inflation is substantially the same as the South African 
principle.1340 Similarly, in Australia, the application of the once-and-for-all rule was 
                                            
1336  Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 556. 
1337  Ibid. 
1338  Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict (2017) par 34.2.6.4. 
1339  Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict (2017) par 34.2.6.4; Minister of Defence v Jackson 1991 4 SA 23 
(ZS). 
1340  See in general Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 2.16. 
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noted in Todorovic and Another v Waller1341
 
as a remedy to provide compensation for 
losses that might arise in the future due to the prevalence of a claimant’s loss, 
particularly in the area of inflation. In this case, a majority in the High Court of Australia 
held that at common law, the advantage of receiving the investable lump sum must be 
taken into account, and that this is to be done by way of a discount rate (uniform across 
Australia) that also takes future inflation, increases in the price of goods, services and 
tax into account. The rate was set at 3% per annum.1342 
 
4.6.8 Contingencies 
Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd1343 state that contingencies may be described as 
uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independant of the 
defendant’s conduct, and if it should realise, would probably influence a person’s 
health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy, or dependency on 
support in future, or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be 
taken into account in a fair and realistic manner, by increasing or decreasing the 
plaintiff’s damages during the quantification process.1344 In other words, contingencies 
include any uncertain future possibilities of some degree of probability, which have an 
influence on the assessment of the dependant’s loss of support or the future benefits 
to which the dependant may be entitled or would have received from the deceased.1345  
 
Contingencies are an important control mechanism to adjust the damages to be 
awarded for the loss suffered to the circumstances of the individual case, in order to 
                                            
1341  Todorovic and another v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402 439. 
1342  Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 47. 
1343  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) 25. 
1344  Ibid; also see Steynberg 2007 THRHR 36. 
1345  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 6.7.3; Loubser & Midgley (eds) Delict 
(2017) par 34.2.6.6; Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 4.3. 
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achieve equity and fairness for the parties,1346 and fall squarely within the subjective 
discretion of the court.1347 Contingencies cover a wide range of considerations, which 
may vary from case to case. The list of contingencies can never be exhaustive.1348 
 
In a claim for damages for loss of support by dependants, there are different types of 
contingencies, which may be taken into account.1349 These contingencies can be 
divided into two main categories, namely general and specific contingencies.1350 
General contingencies can be relevant at any stage in people’s lives, to the extent that 
the court could take judicial notice thereof, without the need for proof  for example, 
early death of the breadwinner or dependant, illnesses or accidents that could have 
occurred to the breadwinner, retrenchment, which could have influenced the 
breadwinner’s income stream, etc.1351 Adjustments of general contingencies are on 
the low side, no more than 20 per cent,1352 and are taken into account if it is found that 
the actuary based the calculations on wrong assumptions, or if relevant contingencies 
were not taken into account.  
 
On the other hand, specific contingencies are primarily relevant at certain stages in 
specific individuals’ lives,1353 and should be substantiated by evidence, although not 
necessarily proven on a preponderance of probabilities1354  for example, expectation 
of an inheritance, the chances of early employment of the dependants or remarriage 
                                            
1346  Labuschagne v RAF [2016] ZAFSHC 109 par [19]. 
1347  Steynberg 2008 De Jure 115. 
1348  Gwaxula v RAF [2013] ZAGPJHC 240 par [25]. 
1349  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 6.7.3. 
1350  Steynberg 2011 THRHR 389. 
1351  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 6.7.3; Steynberg 2011 THRHR 389; 
Nienaber & Van der Nest 2005 THRHR 546-547. 
1352  See RAF v Guedes 2006 5 SA 583 (SCA). 
1353  E.g. re-partnering, divorce, promotion, etc. 
1354  See Steynberg 2007 PELJ 144-52, Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html 
(accessed on the 27 August 2017); Steynberg 2007 De Jure 36. 
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of the widow, etcetera. Remarriage contingency is an issue and topic of debate that 
has been the subject of news headlines in recent months.1355 The discussion on 
contingencies will be incomplete without a brief explanation on the recentl 
developments on the remarriage contingency. 
 
In South African law, when determining the amount to be paid to the wife/widow of the 
deceased breadwinner, the possible remarriage of the surviving wife/widow plays a 
persuasive role in the final calculation of the amount to be paid in a claim for loss of 
support.1356 In the past, apart from the number of children and attitude of the widow to 
the idea of remarriage, the courts would consider appearance and personality as 
essential factors when determining possibility of remarriage.1357 In Legal Insurance 
Company Ltd v Botes, the court a quo took the following into consideration: “… 
adjustments must be made according to the appearance, personality, nature and 
attitude to remarriage of the person concerned, and indeed other factors such as the 
number and ages of the widow’s children”.1358 This approach was repeated in the 
matter of Snyders v Groenewald, where the court found the following: “In determining 
the percentage deduction to be made, the Court has regard to such matters as the 
age, health, appearance and nature of the widow, as well as such other factors as the 
age and number and financial dependence of her children.”1359 
 
                                            
1355  See Rickard https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/financial-mail/20180222 (accessed on the 
5 January 2019); De Lange https://www.thecitizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1373509 (accessed on 
5 January 2019). 
1356 Wiers https://www.adamsadams.com/insights/being-beautiful-and-widowed/ (accessed on 4 
January 2019); Members of the Executive Council Responsible for the Department of Road and 
Public Works, North West Province v Oosthuizen (A671/07) [2009] ZAGPPHC 16 par [5]. 
1357  See Legal Insurance Company Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A); Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 
(E) 785. 
1358  1963 1 SA 608 (A) par [4]. 
1359  1966 3 SA 785 (E) par [6]. 
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This attitude was challenged in the case of Members of the Executive Council 
Responsible for the Department of Road and Public Works, North West Province v 
Oosthuizen.1360 The appellants appealled against the award of damages to the 
respondent in her personal capacity and in her capacity as mother and natural guardian 
of her child for loss of support arising out of the death of the respondent’s husband in 
a collision. It was argued that a remarriage contingency should be struck down as 
unconstitutional as reliance on appearance offends the equality provisions of the 
Constitution.1361 After considering the facts of that particular case, the Court ultimately 
pointed out that no reference had been made to the respondent’s appearance and 
found that remarriage contingencies are not unconstitutional. 
 
Recently, this ancient interpretation of determining re-marriage contingencies was 
addressed in the case of Esterhuizen v RAF.1362 In this matter, the husband died in a 
car accident. He was the sole breadwinner and his wife and two children depended on 
him for financial support, so the surviving widow claimed maintenance from the Road 
Accident Fund for herself as mother to look after the two children. The RAF was found 
to be 100% liable for all damage she could prove she had suffered due to her 
husband’s death and the loss of financial support. The court commented that the 
possibility of remarrying was usually taken into account when the claim for loss of 
support was considered in law. The courts calculate the percentage it deemed possible 
for remarriage, and then subtracted that amount from the total amount that the 
wrongdoer would pay. The process of remarriage contingency makes provision for the 
possibility of another breadwinner stepping into the shoes of the deceased. Previously, 
                                            
1360  [2009] ZAGPPHC 16. 
1361  Members of the Executive Council Responsible for the Department of Road and Public Works, 
North West Province v Oosthuizen [2009] ZAGPPHC 16 par [45]. 
1362  [2016] ZAGPPHC 1221; 2017 4 SA 461 (GP). 
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the younger and prettier the widow was, the higher the remarriage contingency 
deduction. So prettier widows received less. However, the more children the wife had, 
the prospect of her remarrying became less, as did the remarriage contingency 
deduction. The court found that reliance on a woman’s appearance and nature to be 
an outdated and offensive approach towards women. It remarked that to take 
appearance and nature in consideration is not in accordance with the constitutional 
values of dignity and equality enshrined in our constitution.1363 The court stated that an 
award of damages should be fair, and to allow for the possibility of remarriage is 
appropriate, but no reliance should be placed on factors such as appearance.1364 In 
this case, the applicant argued that a 20% contingency should apply. But the 
RAF/respondent asked for 39%. An actuary report stated that a 39% deduction was 
the average for a “35-year-old female with two children”. The judge ordered a 
contingency deduction of 27%. 
 
One of the most recent cases to address the issue of remarriage contingencies directly 
is the case of LD v RAF.1365 The plaintiff brought an action for damages for loss of 
support arising out of the death of her late husband as a result of injuries sustained by 
him in a motor vehicle collision. The action was brought against the RAF, the party 
responsible to pay such claims in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. In 
this case the remarriage contingency was re-visited. In conclusion, the court referred 
to Steynberg’s article titled “Re-partnering as a contingency deduction in claims for 
loss of support comparing South Africa and Australian law”: “Re-partnering is merely 
another of the many vicissitudes of life, namely that the claimant may enter an 
                                            
1363  Idem par [10]. 
1364  Idem par [12]. 
1365  LD v RAF unreported judgement of the North Gauteng Division, case no 14606/2016 on 5/2/2018 
https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2018/181.pdf (accessed on 5 January 2019). 
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economically beneficial or detrimental relationship after the trial.  It is therefore to be 
given no more weight than any of the other vicissitudes that go to make up the general 
discount. The ‘standard’ adjustment should not be increased to reintroduce the 
‘remarriage’ discount by the back door.”1366 The court agreed with Steynberg’s 
approach and held that unless special circumstances ensue, no higher than normal 
contingency ought to be deducted. It is clear that while the principle of a re-marriage 
contingency continues to have relevance and applicability, one must be cautious in 
how it is applied.  If there is evidence to justify its application, then the courts should 
apply it with due regard to the facts of each matter.  Where there is no evidence, simply 
to include such a contingency on the broad assertion that the possibility of re-partnering 
must always exist, would offend the principles of fairness and justice. In this case the 
parties agreed to the deduction of a 5 and 15 percent contingency for the general 
hazards of life in respect of the past and future loss respectively. This is the usual 
deduction applied in our courts for this type of contingency. On the established facts 
of the present case, the court was of the view that there are no circumstances that 
warrant the deduction of any further contingency and it was satisfied that the agreed 
deduction appropriately provides for the possibility of the remarriage of the plaintiff 
such as it may be.1367  
 
Specific contingency adjustments should preferably not be made in the actuarial 
calculations, but should be left to the discretion of the court,  and can vary from small 
to large, depending on the specific circumstances of the plaintiff.  The effect of an 
adjustment based on contingencies is that the court always reduces the calculated 
                                            
1366  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017). 
1367  LD v RAF unreported judgement of the North Gauteng Division, case no 14606/2016 par [38] 
https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2018/181.pdf (accessed on 5 January 2019). 
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compensation by a percentage, which may range from 5 to 80 per cent.  The 
adjustment percentage is determined on a case-by-case basis, and depends upon 
what is considered to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.  
 
In many matters in Australia, the courts have adopted a general contingency deduction 
of approximately 15%.1368 According to the Australian author, Luntz,1369 the following 
contingencies have in the past been taken into account in wrongful death actions, 
similar to South Africa: remarriage or re-partnering of a dependant,1370 level of support 
given by the new spouse,1371 failure of a second marriage,1372 and pension 
schemes.1373 Steynberg1374 deals authoritatively with the role played by contingencies, 
particularly the contingency of remarriage or re-partnering of a dependant under 
Australian law. Besides Northern Territory, Victoria and Queensland,1375 the legal 
position in Australian law on re-partnering as a possible contingency deduction is to be 
found in case law, as is the case in South Africa. Steynberg explains that in a case 
where a claim is submitted for loss of support by the spouse of the deceased 
breadwinner, the claim will be influenced by the probable remarriage of the surviving 
spouse.1376 The reason for this is that remarriage gives rise to a new maintenance 
relationship between the surviving spouse and his or her new marriage partner.1377  
                                            
1368  Lee Assessment of damages (2017) 7. 
1369  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 4.3. 
1370  Except for the Northern Territory, Victoria and Queensland; Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 
CLR 105. 
1371  AA Tegel Pty Ltd v Madden (1985) 2 NSWLR 591 (CA). 
1372  Hollebone v Greenwood (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 424 (CA). 
1373  Quinlivan v Robinson [1968] 2 NSWR 786 (CA). 
1374  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017). 
1375  Ibid. 
1376  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017); 
also see Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 978-980. 
1377  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017); 
also see Carver 2005 QUTLJJ 2-3; De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC); Peri-Urban Areas 
Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376D; Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy v Victor 
1986 1 SA 601 (A) 614C-D. 
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In Australian law, the courts usually refer to the “marriageability” of the surviving 
spouse when determining the chances of remarriage or re-partnering.1378 Comparable 
to South Africa, age and conventional good looks have traditionally been used as 
markers of the marriageability of women.1379 Steynberg states that a man who is 
economically dependant on his deceased wife could find himself in the same position, 
but such a case is much more uncommon, and a man’s physical attractiveness has 
never, according to the author’s knowledge, been considered in South African or 
Australian case law.1380 Steynberg observes that the financial benefit that the widow 
receives through re-partnering is taken into account in calculating damages according 
to the theory on compensating advantages.1381 The new relationship does not 
necessarily mean that the widow automatically loses her right to a claim for loss of 
support.1382 The income of the new partner and his life expectancy will be taken into 
account in the calculation of the extent of her claim.1383 If the new partner is not able 
to support the widow at the same level as the deceased, the loss to the widow is 
deemed to continue beyond the date of the new relationship, though it is reduced by 
whatever support is likely to be obtained from the second or subsequent partner.1384  
 
In Dominish v Astill,1385 Reynolds AJ declares that the remarriage did not automatically 
exclude the right to support.1386 Where remarriage had not yet occurred, a double 
                                            
1378  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017). 
1379  See De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 365. 
1380  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017); 
Atkinson 2003 QUTLJJ 7. 
1381  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017); 
also see Koch Reduced utility (1993) 325; AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 604-605. 
1382  Steynberg https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2007/14.html (accessed on the 27 August 2017); 
Glass v Santam Insurance 1992 1 SA 901 (W). 
1383  Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 126; Legal Insurance Company v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 618; De Sales 
v Ingrilli [2002] 21 2 CLR 338 (HC) 352. 
1384  Luntz & Hambly Torts (2013) 632; Hollebone v Greenwood (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 424 (CA). 
1385  [1979] 2 NSWLR 368 (CA) 378F-G. 
1386  Steynberg 2007 PER/PELJ 123. 
 265 
contingency had to be addressed: firstly, the probability that the claimant would 
remarry, and secondly, the probability that financial advantage would flow from this 
union. Chief Justice Gleeson was of the opinion that “the court’s subjective adjudication 
of both these contingencies would be speculative in nature, and that even statistics 
would not sufficiently assist the court”.1387 It is clear from this discussion that the 
Australian legal position concerning remarriage or re-partnering as a contingency is 
substantially the same as in South Africa, except in the Northern Territory, Victoria and 
Queensland. 
 
In Australia, the loss of future savings or inheritance is regarded as establishing an 
enforceable claim by the dependants.1388 It is a positive contingency which is taken 
into account in the calculation of loss of support. Our law is quite different, as the loss 
of the capacity to save during the lost years or inheritance is not regarded as 
establishing an enforceable claim by the victim of a wrongdoing.1389 Ramsbottom JA 
makes this clear when he says:1390  
“But I think that it is clear that the only right which the injured man had was to 
claim loss of earnings up to the date of this death, and nothing more could 
pass to his executors. A man who has been killed has no claim for 
compensation after his death; after that event he needs no support for himself 
and is under no duty to support his family. His dependants have their own 
action against the wrongdoer for the loss that they have sustained. If the 
wrongdoer is unable to pay, they may be able to claim support from the estate 
of the deceased, but that does not give the executor the right to claim from the 
wrongdoer earnings or savings that have been lost through the death of the 
deceased. If it did, the dependants would have no claim against the 
wrongdoer; their claim for maintenance would be against the estate of the 
deceased. That is not the law.”1391 
                                            
1387  See De Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 36. 
1388  Oliver v Ashman [1962] 2 QB 210. 
1389  Singh v Ebrahim [2010] ZASCA 145 par [10]. 
1390  Lockhat’s Estate v North British and Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 304 at 305H-
306B. 
1391  No one has, since Lockhat’s Estate, suggested that it is not good law. The cases which have dealt, 
if only in passing, with lost years’ claims, have accepted it as sound  Singh v Ebrahim [2010] 
ZASCA 145 par [11]. Academic opinion has been unwaveringly in support of its correctness - see 
Scholtens 1959 SALJ 373; Boberg 1960 SALJ 438; Boberg 1962 SALJ 43 ; Boberg Delict: Aquilian 
liability (1984) 542; Howroyd 1960 77 SALJ 448. 
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Botswana and Lesotho are both common law countries, and as such, follow the system 
of judicial precedents. Given their similar legal systems, decisions from South African 
courts are highly persuasive, and courts from both jurisdictions refer to and follow 
South African cases in formulating their decisions.1392 Therefore, the legal position in 
Botswana and Lesotho regarding contingencies is the same as in South Africa. 
 
In contrast to the general law, contingencies are unknown under customary law, and 
are therefore not considered in determining the appropriate fine where the breadwinner 
was unlawfully and negligently killed. 
 
4.6.9 Collateral benefits 
The basic principle of compensation in delictual actions is to place the plaintiff in the 
position he or she would have been if the delict had not occurred. When death occurs, 
the event not only brings about losses, but could also result in advantages that have 
the effect of reducing the overall loss suffered.1393 Consequently, when a third party 
intervenes and makes payments to the plaintiff out of generosity, benevolence or 
charity, the collateral source rule comes into play. This rule states that such payments 
are res inter alios acta and must be disregarded when quantifying the damages. One 
of the reasons behind this is the reluctance on the part of the law to allow the wrongdoer 
to benefit from the acts of kindness of another unrelated party.1394 The collateral source 
rule forms part of South African law, as well as Australian law.1395 In all jurisdictions 
where it is recognised, the collateral source rule has been fraught with difficulties and 
                                            
1392  Archibald v Attorney-General 1989 BLR 421 (HC); Shale 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Lesotho1.html (accessed on 19 July 2017). 
1393  Koch Collateral benefits (1993) chapter 11 par 11.1; Tilbury 1980 WALR 280 available at 
https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/1980/4.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2017); 
Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 141. 
1394  Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [60]. 
1395  See Compensation to Relatives Act 31 of 1897 (as amended); Luntz Assessment of damages 
(2006) par 5.11. 
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diversely applied. As a result, over the years, there has been a distinction between 
non-deductible and deductible collateral benefits,1396 and specific benefits have been 
expressly listed as non-deductible collaterals in some legislation,1397 with the hope that 
there would be little room to argue about which benefits are subject to deduction, and 
which are not. 
 
In South African law, the Assessment of Damages Act1398 specifically provides for the 
non-deduction of insurance money or pension, which had been or was expected to be 
paid out as a result of the death. Boberg1399 states that the existence of the collateral 
source rule cannot be doubted, and it must be determined casuistically to what benefits 
it applies. In addition, where the rule itself is without logical foundation, it cannot be 
expected of logic to circumscribe its ambit. The rule must also be seen in the context 
of being partially corrective of our “once and for all” rule, which of course carries the 
danger of under-compensation.1400 
 
In Australia, Luntz comments on the uncertainty of the law with regard to the collateral 
benefits rule,1401 and quotes Browning v War Office,1402 where Donovan LJ said that: 
“…in this field logic is conspicuous by its absence”. In the same case, Lord Denning 
MR said the following about the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate his losses: 
“He should, therefore, give credit for all sums which he receives in diminution 
of his loss, save in so far as it would not be fair or just to require him to do so. 
                                            
1396  See Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) paras 4.7.2 & 4.7.3. 
1397  See Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
1398  s 4 of the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
1399  Boberg Delict: Acquilian liability (1984) 479; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 
(GSJ) par [61]. 
1400  Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [62]. 
1401  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 5.11; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 
(GSJ) par [64]. 
1402  Browning v War Office [1962] 3 All E. R. 1089 (CA) 1093E-F; also see Fulton v RAF [2012] 
ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [64]. 
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The difficulty is to say when it is or not fair or just, to take the receipts into 
account.”1403 
 
However, in criticising a haphazard approach, Dixon CJ in National Insurance Co of 
NZ v Espagne1404 said the following: 
“Intuitive feelings for justice seem a poor substitute for a rule antecedent 
known, more particularly where all do not have the same intuitions.” 
 
Subsequent decisions have done little, if anything, to clarify the issue. Luntz1405 states 
that the courts have tended to confuse the issues further by using Latin tags such as 
res inter alios acta, which do no more than state conclusions, without offering guidance 
as to how these conclusions are reached.1406 In Griffiths v Kerkemeyer,1407 the court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, though the loss was actually 
borne not by the plaintiff himself, but by a third party who had no direct right of action. 
In Francis v Brackstone,1408 it was held that neither payments made by an employer 
who is contractually bound to do so, nor payments made on a voluntary basis, were to 
be set off. The former was likened to insurance benefits, whilst the latter were likened 
to charitable gifts. The Court in Hobbelen v Nunn1409 held that if a benevolent employer 
chose not to terminate a plaintiff’s contract of employment after he became disabled 
from working, the payments are still wages and not gifts, and the plaintiff may not claim 
for loss of earning capacity during the period he received such wages. This appears to 
have been based on the rationale that the voluntary aspect is that of the employer not 
terminating the employment contract, and if he does not do so, there is a contractual 
right on the part of the plaintiff to receive his wages. Luntz says that the reasoning is 
                                            
1403 Browning v War Office [1962] 3 All E. R. 1089 (CA) 1091D-E; also see Fulton v RAF [2012] 
ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [65]. 
1404  (1961) 105 CLR 569, 572. 
1405  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 5.11 
1406  Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [65]. 
1407  [1977] HCA 45; (1977) 139 CLR 161; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par 
[66]. 
1408  (1955) SASR 270; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [67]. 
1409  (1965) Qd R 105, 124; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [69]. 
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doubtful. In Volpato v Zachory,1410 Bray CJ held that the plaintiff could not recover 
damages for loss of earning capacity if he had received his wages by contractual right. 
The onus was on the defendant to show the true nature of the payments. If, however, 
the employer had paid the money voluntarily, there was to be no deduction. According 
to Luntz, the best that can be said for this approach can be found in the words of Sholl 
J in Johns v Prunell,1411 who states the following: 
“In general, the law seems…to have endeavoured to form a kind of moral 
judgment as to whether it is fair and reasonable that the defendant should 
have the advantage of something which has accrued to the plaintiff by way of 
recoupment, or other benefit as a result of the defendant’s infringement of the 
plaintiff’s rights.” 
 
The study has not brought forth any information relating to collateral benefits in terms 
of damages for loss of support in both Botswana and Lesotho.1412 Customary law does 
not provide for collateral benefits. While collateral benefits are taken into account in 
the assessment of damages in general law, they are unknown in customary law. 
 
4.7 Measurement of damages for loss of support in terms of the dependency 
action 
4.7.1 General 
In all comparative jurisdictions, the death of a breadwinner causes damage to his or 
her dependants,1413 and the damages for loss of support must be expressed in 
monetary terms.1414 The assessment of the amount of damages (compensation) is a 
very complicated process. This section deals with the various methods which are 
utilised to quantify the damages for loss of support which arise in dependency claims, 
                                            
1410  (1971) SASR 166; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) par [70]. 
1411  (1960) VR 208, 211; Fulton v RAF [2012] ZAGPJHC 3; 2012 3 SA 255 (GSJ) [71]. 
1412  For general application of collateral benefits, see Mamojaki v Klass [2007] LSHC 122; Mzwinila v 
Cbet Pty Ltd t/a Midweek Sun 2010 3 BLR 736 HC. 
1413  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7; Barnett & Harder Remedies (2014) 
184. 
1414  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 8.4. 
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the justification of the existing rules, and the possibility of introducing any future 
enhancements.  
 
The general principle in the calculation of damages is that the dependant, under the 
dependency action as far as support is concerned, should be placed in the position he 
or she would have occupied if the breadwinner had not been killed, in so far as can be 
done through the payment of money, and without undue hardship to the wrongdoer.1415 
Under the dependency action, there are various claims.1416 Some of these claims are 
typically assessed based on the concrete approach,1417 while others are assessed 
based on the comparative method.1418 In this section, attention is devoted to only the 
quantification of claims for loss of support, as is relevant to this study. 
 
4.7.2 Quantification of loss of support 
The most important instance where damages are payable upon the death of a person 
is where the dependants institute an action for loss of support resulting from the 
unlawful and negligent killing of their breadwinner.1419 The calculation of loss of support 
is not simply a straight-forward total of the monthly loss multiplied by the number of 
months of lost support. Instead, it requires careful consideration of what would have 
occurred in the future. Certain formulae have been laid down to ascertain the quantum 
of damages to be awarded for loss of support. The figures are referred to an actuary, 
who factors in inflation, discounting and various other contingencies, in order to arrive 
at a figure which, if invested at a market-related return, will provide support (out of both 
capital and interest) until the dependants are self-supporting. The process of assessing 
                                            
1415  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.2; Barnett & Harder Remedies 
(2014) 186. 
1416  Eg, medical expenses, funeral or cremation expenses, past loss of income; loss of support. 
1417  Eg, medical expenses, funeral or cremation expenses, past loss of income, etc. 
1418  Eg, loss of support. 
1419  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.2. 
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loss of support is concerned with subtracting the current patrimonial position of a 
dependant1420 from the hypothetical patrimonial position the dependant would have 
occupied if the breadwinner had not been killed.1421 The court, in the calculation of the 
loss of support, is directed by the deceased’s expected income. The standard formula 
applied by the courts1422 to calculate and determine the loss of support is as follows: 
 
Period of support1423 
The court will first determine the period during which the dependant has been deprived 
of support.1424 The period of support depends on the joint expectation of life1425 of the 
dependant and the breadwinner, the period within this joint expectation of life during 
which the breadwinner would have continued to earn an income1426 and during which 
the breadwinner, but for his or her death, would have devoted a portion of his or her 
income to the dependant.1427 
 
Income which the breadwinner would have earned1428 
The court will determine the breadwinner’s net annual income over the period of 
support, based on the actual earnings at the time of death,1429 nature of work,1430 
                                            
1420  Idem par 14.7.3. 
1421  Ibid. 
1422  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4; Fombad 
https://www.saflii.edu.au/au/journals/ (accessed on 12 March 2015). 
1423  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.1. 
1424  Idem par 14.7.4(a). 
1425  Expectation of life is established through actuarial evidence if the health and circumstances of the 
person in question were normal, and otherwise by means of medical evidence – Nochomovitz v 
Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1792 1 SA 718 (T) 722-724. 
1426  This period depends upon factors such as the person’s general state of health, nature of 
employment and expected retirement age, etc. 
1427  This period depends on the relationship between the dependant and the deceased-breadwinner. If 
the dependant is a spouse, the possibility of divorce or separation must be taken into account, as 
this could shorten this period. If the dependant is a child, the period of support ends as soon as the 
child becomes self-supporting. 
1428  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.2. 
1429  Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 962-964. 
1430  Chisholm v ERPM 1909 TH 297. 
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capabilities and prospects,1431 bonus1432 and overtime payment,1433 contingencies,1434 
inflation1435 and factors that would have increased the deceased’s income.1436 
 
Portion of the breadwinner’s income, which could have been devoted to the support of 
the dependant1437 
This is the amount that the dependant could actually have expected to receive from 
the breadwinner.1438 According to Kramer, in order to calculate the share of the claim 
for loss of support, the income of the deceased breadwinner is generally split between 
the different dependants, each adult receiving a two-part share, and each child a one-
part share.1439 This amount depends upon the relationship between the dependant and 
the deceased breadwinner, the needs of the dependant, and the actual amount of 
support the deceased provided to the dependant prior to his or her death.1440 For 
example, if the deceased-breadwinner left a dependant-spouse, the possibility of 
divorce or separation must be considered, as this could shorten the period of 
maintenance,1441 and therefore have an impact on the amount. If the deceased left a 
sickly child, this implies the allocation of a larger proportion of the income to the 
maintenance of such a child.1442 When a man is customarily married to more than one 
wife at the time of his death, all wives should be equally protected. Although the first 
wife does receive preferential treatment in respect of her relationship with the other 
wives towards their husband, the award for the loss of support is to be equally divided 
                                            
1431  Milns v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1010. 
1432  De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) 79. 
1433  Maasberg v Hurt 1944 WLD 2 10. 
1434  Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O) 467. 
1435  Mokoena v President Insurance 1990 2 SA 112 (W). 
1436  Khan v Padayachy 1971 3 SA 877 (W) 878. 
1437  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.3. 
1438  Ibid. 
1439  Kramer 2013 De Rebus 60. 
1440  Ibid. 
1441  This relates to the first step – period of support. 
1442  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.3. 
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amongst the surviving dependant-wives.1443 Seniority does not play a part in 
determining the amount that the first wife receives. 
 
Calculation of annuity1444 
The total calculated amount of loss of support which would have been devoted to the 
dependant must, in terms of an annuity calculation, be reduced to its present value 
(capitalisation or discounting),1445 which means that a capital sum must be calculated 
to purchase an annuity, which will produce periodic (annual) payments equal to the 
loss of support, and which sum will exhaust itself at the end of the relevant period. 
Actuarial evidence is imperative, but not absolutely critical, in the calculation of an 
annuity.1446 A net rate of interest is used for the purposes of capitalisation, and 
allowance must be made for inflation in the computation of an annuity.1447 This 
computed amount has to be adjusted in an equitable manner, in accordance with the 
general circumstances and contingencies of the case.1448  
 
Another important aspect of assessment of damages for loss of support is the role of 
the actuarial expert. In the next section, the issue of actuarial evidence will be 
discussed. 
 
4.7.3 Expert actuarial evidence 
South African courts readily consult and rely on actuarial opinion when determining 
monetary compensation (or when ‘assessing damages’) in lieu of loss of support. Du 
                                            
1443  Kerr 2006 Speculum Juris 4. 
1444  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.4. 
1445  Nochomowittz v Santam Insurance 1972 3 SA 640 (A) 645-646. 
1446  Southern Insurance Co Ltd v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 112. 
1447  Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 790; Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O) 466. 
1448  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.4.4. 
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Plessis1449 states that our courts rarely determine compensation without having had 
the opportunity to consider actuarial opinion, and such reliance places the South 
African actuarial profession in a respected position. The authors of Visser & Potgieter 
Law of Damages1450 deal authoritatively with the role played by expert opinion as 
follows: 
“An actuary is an expert witness whose opinion is merely part of all of the other 
evidence before this court, to be given greater or lesser weight according to 
the circumstances of the case. The calculations and evidence of an actuary 
often plays an important role.” 
 
Klopper,1451 in his authoritative legal book, states the following: 
“Of course, the actuarial report is only used as a base and does not in any 
way bind, the court’s inherent discretion to asses such damages.” 
 
Koch1452 observed that only in rare cases will compensation for loss of support be 
settled without the benefit of an actuarial report. Lowther mirrors this observation.1453 
An expert witness should provide independant assistance to the court by way of an 
objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his area of expertise. An expert 
witness should state the facts or assumptions upon which his opinion is based. He 
should not omit to consider material facts, which could detract from his concluded 
opinion. An expert witness should also make it clear when a particular question or issue 
falls outside his area of expertise.1454 The value of expert witnessing cannot be denied, 
but the court is not obliged to accept the evidence presented by the actuarial expert, 
and if the evidence of two or more experts differs, the court must attempt to reconcile 
the inconsistencies, or otherwise prefer the evidence of one expert above that of the 
                                            
1449  Du Plessis 
http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/48/2057/rinusduplessistheactuaryactingase
xpertwitnesscopy.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2017). 
1450  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.6.3. 
1451  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 177. 
1452  Koch Quantum year book (2018) 112. 
1453  Lowther 2011 SAAJ 106. 
1454  Koch 2011 SAAJ 126-127; Coopers (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Schädlingsbekämpfung mbH 1976 3 SA 352 (A). 
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other.1455 Actuarial evidence is used in the application and explanation of complex 
mathematical or actuarial calculations in respect of future loss,1456 which are applied 
to assess the current value of uncertain future losses.1457 According to Koch,1458 the 
original purpose of actuarial witnessing was to advise the court on an appropriate price 
for the issuing of a life annuity, which relates directly to the calculation of an annuity in 
determining damages for loss of future support. 
 
Taking contingencies into account in the assessment of damages1459 is one of the 
areas of potential conflict between the expert witnesses and the court. Making 
contingency adjustments lies within the subjective discretion of the court. It is, however, 
often impossible for the actuary to complete the calculations, without making 
suggested contingency adjustments. The reasoning behind the actuary's calculations 
should be of such a nature that the court can be convinced of their logic and fairness. 
The contingency adjustments suggested by the actuary should be handled by the court 
in exactly the same manner as the calculations themselves  they serve merely as a 
guideline to the court.1460 Contingency provisions fall squarely within the court’s 
discretion as to what is reasonable and fair. An actuary cannot give direct evidence on 
the issue of contingencies. It seems as if the courts are hesitant to allow expert 
evidence in respect of matters over which the court should make the judgment.1461 The 
court could argue that expert witnesses enter the domain of the court if they make 
suggestions regarding contingency adjustments, while the court itself has a wide 
                                            
1455  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
1456  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017); 
Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (O) 466-467. 
1457  Koch Quantum year book (2018) 75. 
1458  Idem 115-6. 
1459  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.6.7 above. 
1460  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
1461  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 6.7.3. 
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discretion in respect of the application of contingencies.1462 Consequently, actuaries 
should declare, in their report, the assumptions on which they based their calculations, 
and whether the contingency adjustments have been included in the calculations.1463  
 
Steynberg1464 has stipulated the following guidelines for actuaries and legal 
professionals in handling expert actuarial evidence:  
a) Actuaries should clearly indicate in their report the assumptions and premises on 
which they based their calculations, as well as the contingencies they have already 
provided for in their calculations.  
b) The actuarial calculations should be taken as the starting point or basis for the 
assessment of damages by the court in the case of future loss. 
c) The court is not bound to the expert actuarial calculations. 
d) When confronted with two conflicting expert reports or evidence, the court has the 
discretion to choose between the two, or to appoint an alternative expert. 
e) In assessing the final damages award, the court has a wide discretion to adjust the 
findings of the expert evidence. 
 
This thesis respectfully agrees with the guidelines provided by Steynberg. These 
guidelines are not only correct, but should be expanded and discussed further by the 
South African actuarial profession, since it has not made any practice-specific 
guidance available to its members acting as expert witnesses.1465 It is clear from the 
above that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to 
                                            
1462  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
1463  Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 792-793. 
1464  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
1465  Du Plessis 
https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/48/2057/rinusduplessistheactuaryactingas
expertwitnesscopy.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2017) 91. 
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be, the independant product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the 
exigencies of litigation. 
 
Similar to South Africa, in Australia, actuarial expert evidence, testimony and opinion 
lend appreciable assistance to the court when performing its task of assessing and 
quantifying damages.1466 Generally, the legal position and handling of expert witnesses 
in Australia is the same as in South Africa.1467 This in effect means that there can be 
no direct lessons derived from Australian jurisprudence in as far as expert witnessing 
is concerned. 
 
4.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter provided a comparative overview of the legal principles and elements of 
compensatory damages for loss of support under the dependency action in the law of 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Australia. There are remarkably broad 
similarities across all four comparative countries, with lively replication of legal 
concepts in the area of assessment of damages, as well as noteworthy concepts such 
as “damage”, “damages” and “compensation”. The South African definitions and 
understanding of these concepts are also the accurate versions of the definitions and 
understanding of these concepts under the laws of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia.1468  
 
In all comparative jurisdictions, the normal measure of damages for loss of support 
under the dependency action is concerned with subtracting the current patrimonial 
                                            
1466  See in general Ellis “The actuary as an expert witness” 2002 (This paper has been prepared for 
issue to, and discussion by, Members of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (IA Australia) at the 
March 2003 Horizons Session); Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence, NSW Law 
Society Journal, August 2000, 54 at 55; Australian Law Reform Commission, Background Paper 
No 6, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1999. 
1467  Luntz Assessment of damages (2006) par 9.2. 
1468  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.2 above. 
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position of a dependant1469 from the hypothetical patrimonial position the dependant 
would have occupied if the breadwinner had not been killed.1470 This follows from the 
principle that the compensation should put the dependant in the position he or she 
would have been, but for the unlawful and negligent death of his or her breadwinner, 
so far as can be done by the payment of money, and without undue hardship to the 
wrongdoer.1471 These rules of assessment and measure of damages for loss of support 
in terms of the dependency action are formulated in similar terms in all four 
comparative jurisdictions.1472  
 
The one area in which the Australian jurisdiction differs significantly from the 
comparative Southern African countries in this study is with regard to recoverable 
damages in terms of the dependency action. Although, the assessment of the amount 
of damages for loss of support and other related losses in terms of the dependency 
action is based on the principle of full compensation, the objective being, as stated 
above, to put the dependant in the position he or she would have been if the act that 
gave rise to the death of his or her breadwinner had not occurred at present, the 
recoverable damages under the dependency action in South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho is more limited than in the Australian law. It is therefore not sufficiently wide 
to cover all or most of the losses that a dependant could have suffered due to the death 
of his or her breadwinner.1473 There is a need to bring the laws of these three countries 
in line with the more persuasive position taken by Australia. 
 
                                            
1469  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.3. 
1470  Ibid. 
1471  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.2; Barnett & Harder Remedies 
(2014) 186. 
1472  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.3 above. 
1473  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4 above. 
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It was observed that the South African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian laws contain 
and apply a number of principles and rules in the acknowledgment of accountability for 
loss of support and other related losses. Such principles are uniform and applied in all 
comparative countries. However, these principles are foreign to customary law. 
Customary law jurisdictions have not necessarily developed or embraced mechanisms 
similar to the common law principles of assessment of damages for losses in terms of 
the dependency action; hence, the judicial process in the customary courts has its own 
shortcomings in this respect. It also does not differentiate in terms of the manner and 
cause of death of the breadwinner. 
 
This thesis notes that although customary law systems have valuable features relevant 
to the dependency action,1474 the application of customary law in the assessment of 
damages for loss of support also presents some challenges. The determination of 
delictual liability in customary law is in contrast to Western law. The general elements 
and principles for delictual liability and assessment of damages in terms of customary 
law have not been as clearly expressed as in South African common law.1475 In 
addition, the traditional awards granted where the breadwinner was negligently and 
unlawfully killed were matters of pence and chillies,1476 which undercompensated the 
dependants and failed to restore them to the positions they would have been in if there 
had been no wrongdoing committed against their breadwinner. Although the 
dependants under customary law have the principle of molato ga o bole,1477 this 
principle is poorly recognised and seldom utilised in the context and spirit of 
                                            
1474  “Go tsoša/tsosa hlogo” customary law principle. 
1475  Knoetze 2012 Speculum Juris 43-44. 
1476  According to Palmer Law of delict (1970) 19 & Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70, the maximum 
penalty for killing a breadwinner would be the payment of 10 cows. 
1477  See discussion on molato ga o bole in chapter 4 of this thesis, paras 4.6.2 & 4.6.3 above. 
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emphasising the traditional goals of reconciliation and reintegration in dispute 
resolution.  
 
Having examined the above issues regarding assessment of damages under the 
dependency action, in the final analysis, it is clear that the legislatures and courts of 
South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho must take a realistic, clear-headed, and practical 
approach to reforming the law, and should learn from countries such as Australia with 
regard to compensating the dependants fully. 
 
The next chapter will deal with the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (as amended) 
and Compensation for Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (as amended) as 
examples of social security legislations that have had a significant influence on the 
assessment of loss of support as a head of damages. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS PERTINENT 
TO THE ACTION OF DEPENDANTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Claims for payment of compensation for depriving dependants of support following the 
wrongful and negligent death of their breadwinners have received the attention of the 
legislature. This chapter presents a brief overview of the current leading social security 
legislative frameworks covering death claims or the dependency action for loss of 
support and funeral expenses in South Africa,1478 Botswana,1479 Lesotho1480 and 
Australia.1481  
 
In South Africa, the drive behind social security is to offer and secure an income, in 
order to replace earnings when they are interrupted by unemployment, sickness or 
accidents; to provide for retirement through old age; to provide against loss of support 
through the death of a breadwinner; or to meet exceptional expenditure associated 
with birth, marriage, death, or unemployment.1482 This is also an accurate description 
of the objectives of social security under the laws of Botswana,1483 Lesotho1484 and 
Australia.1485 This chapter proposes to broaden the conceptualisation of social 
security, by incorporating other elements of social security that are often omitted from 
discussions. Sources on social security policy in South Africa tend to focus on the 
social security aspect of social assistance to the poor, and often neglect the social 
                                            
1478  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.2 hereunder. 
1479  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.3 hereunder. 
1480  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.4 hereunder. 
1481  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.5 hereunder. 
1482  Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention (No. 102) adopted by the ILO in 1952. 
1483  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.3 hereunder. 
1484  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.4 hereunder. 
1485  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.5 hereunder. 
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security aspect of social insurance in respect of the dependency action for loss of 
support. This is also an accurate description of the status of discussions on social 
security policies or laws with regard to the dependency action for loss of support in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Australia. In all four jurisdictions studied, it seems that the only 
two sets of legislation where the dependency action can apply under social security 
(social insurance) are associated with road and workplace-related accidents. 
Consequently, in this chapter, only the road and workplace social security legislations 
will be discussed.  
 
The most important social security legislation in South Africa that regulates 
compensation for death as the result of injuries or diseases associated with the 
workplace is the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
(COIDA),1486 as amended. On the other hand, the framework for compensation for 
death due to a motor vehicle road accident is the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF 
Act),1487 as amended. A brief overview of the relevant provisions of these two legal 
frameworks, to the extent that they specifically relate to the claim for loss of support 
and funeral expenses, will be provided, and critical comments on these systems will 
be presented in this chapter. This will include changes brought about by the RAF 
Amendment Act (RAFAA),1488 and the proposed Road Accident Benefit Scheme 
(RABS) Bill.1489 The perspective that will be offered is therefore a relatively limited one, 
as the discussion will focus only on the important aspects related to a claim for loss of 
support and funeral expenses, as outlined in the RAF Amendment Act and the 
proposed Bill, examining its influence on future claims by the dependants of the victims 
                                            
1486  Act 130 of 1993. 
1487  Act 51 of 1996. 
1488  Act 19 of 2005. 
1489  Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017 - Government Gazette No. 36138. 
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of motor vehicle accidents. An overview, analysis and assessment of the COIDA 
claims process, coverage, and how employer contributions are determined in a claim 
for loss of support are also presented in this chapter. In addition, an analytical 
discussion of the calculation of compensation under both legislations is provided. 
Furthermore, the interrelationship between the RAF Act and COIDA is examined. 
Some recommendations are then made in light of the suggested legislative reforms 
and redrafting of the legislation, in order to align the two sets of legislation.  
 
This chapter also endeavours to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of the RAF 
Act, including its Amendment Act (RAFAA), the proposed Road Accident Benefit 
Scheme (RABS) Bill, as well as COIDA and its Amendment Act (Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Amendment Act (COIDAA)).1490 The past, present, 
and future of the RAF Act and COIDA systems are discussed, firstly, by looking briefly 
at the history of both systems and how they have evolved into their present status. 
Secondly, their present developments are discussed by viewing the systems in terms of 
the RAFAA1491 and COIDAA,1492 and how the developments have affected claims for 
loss of support and funeral expenses. The discussion focuses on the possibilities the 
future holds for us through the eyes of the proposed RABS Bill.1493 This chapter also 
reviews and discusses the social security systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Australia, 
to the extent that they specifically relate to the claim for loss of support and funeral 
expenses under the dependency action.  
                                            
1490  Act 61 of 1997. 
1491  RAFAA refers to Road Accident Fund Amendment Act. 
1492  COIDAA refers to Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Amendment Act. 
1493  Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill, 2017 - Government Gazette No. 36138. 
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The next section briefly discusses the nature of social security and the historical 
context of the establishment of the legal frameworks relating to road accident-related 
injuries and death, as well as work-related injuries, diseases and death in South Africa. 
 
5.2 South Africa 
5.2.1 Nature of social security 
The concept of social security is defined in the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) discussion paper as the protection that society provides for its members through 
a series of public measures, in order to offset the absence or substantial reduction of 
income from work due to various contingencies (i.e. sickness, maternity leave, 
occupational injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age or death of the breadwinner); to 
provide people with health care; and to provide benefits for families with children.1494 
The overall nature of the social security system in South Africa is unique in Southern 
Africa, in that the provision of social security flows from the Constitution of South 
Africa,1495 and is therefore enforceable.1496 The social security system consists of at 
least two common elements, namely social insurance and social assistance.1497  
 
Social assistance is a state-funded system, also referred to in South Africa as social 
grants, and is non-contributory and financed entirely from government revenue. This 
scheme is means-tested and the onus is upon individuals to prove that they are 
destitute.1498 Triegaardt and Patel1499 observe that social assistance is the most 
                                            
1494  Kaseke 2010 ISW 159-161. 
1495  See s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution; Kaseke 2010 ISW 160. 
1496  See Khosa v Minister of Social Development [2004] ZACC 11; 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); 2004 6 BCLR 
569 (CC). 
1497 Triegaardt https://www.dbsa.org/.../Accomplishments%20and%20challenges%20for%20partners 
(accessed on 22 September 2017); Kaseke 2010 ISW 160. 
1498  See in general Strydom Essential social security (2006) 10-12. 
1499  Triegaardt and Patel “Social security” in Patel (eds) Social welfare & social development in South 
Africa (2015) 124. 
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significant social security strategy. It is generally granted to designated groups, namely 
persons with disabilities (disability grants), older persons (old-age pension grants the 
largest social assistance programme), child support grants, and foster care grants.1500 
The social assistance provided to individuals is in the form of cash or in-kind, in order 
to enable them to meet their basic needs.1501  
 
Social insurance is provided to protect employees, victims of road accidents and their 
dependants, through insurance, against contingencies that interrupt income.1502 There 
are three social insurance schemes in South Africa, namely the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF),1503 the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Fund (in terms of COIDA)1504 and the Road Accident Fund (RAF).1505 The 
unemployment insurance scheme provides protection to workers, including domestic 
workers, in case of temporary unemployment. However, coverage is not extended to 
civil servants and non-South Africans in the event of temporary unemployment. The 
scheme covers temporary unemployment occasioned by termination of employment, 
maternity leave, illness and adoption.1506 Contributions come from both the employee 
and employer, and are paid into the Unemployment Insurance Fund.1507 The 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Fund reimbuses compensation 
for occupational injuries, diseases and death. The scheme is funded by employers’ 
contributions, which vary from employer to employer, depending on the risks inherent 
                                            
1500  Kaseke 2010 ISW 160; Triegaardt and Patel “Social security” in Patel (ed) Social welfare & social 
development in South Africa (2015) 129. 
1501 Triegaardt https://www.dbsa.org/.../Accomplishments%20and%20challenges%20for%20partners 
(accessed on 22 September 2017). 
1502  Ibid. 
1503  See Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. 
1504  See COIDA 130 of 1993. 
1505  See RAF Act 56 of 1996 as amended by the RAFAA 19 of 2005. 
Olivier “Social protection in SADC: Developing an integrated and inclusive framework - a rights-
based framework” in Olivier & Kalula (eds) Social protection in SADC: Developing an integrated 
and inclusive framework (2004) 21 26 35. 
1507  Kaseke 2010 ISW 161. 
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to their businesses. Domestic workers are not covered by this scheme. It pays 
compensation to work-related victims and their dependants. The third scheme, the 
Road Accident Fund, is not employment-based and is therefore financed by an 
obligatory fuel levy. The scheme provides protection against the risk of road-related 
accidents and pays compensation to victims of road accidents and their 
dependants.1508 
 
Olivier opines that South Africa has a fairly poor safety record on the roads, as well as 
in the workplace.1509 Consequently, most claims for loss of support under the 
dependency action occur as a result of work-related and road-related accidents and, 
as stated above, are omitted from discussions in sources on social security policy in 
South Africa. Most social security structures are concerned with securing consistency 
of support or income to the dependants of the employee-victims or road accident 
victims. In other words, social security (social insurance) attempts to provide a 
replacement for the loss of support to the dependants affected by such a loss, whether 
it is due to a motor vehicle accident or occupational injury or illness.1510 In South Africa, 
as stated above, a constitutional imperative exists regarding social security.1511 The 
South African Constitution1512 includes social security as one of the socio-economic 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.1513 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution states that 
everyone has the right to have access to social security, including, if they are unable 
to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance. The 
Constitution requires the state to ensure the progressive realisation of these rights by 
                                            
1508  Kaseke 2010 ISW 161-162. 
1509  Olivier et al Social security law: general principles (1999) 317-318. 
1510  Myburgh 2000 Law, democracy & development 43-44. 
1511  Ibid. 
1512  The Constitution. 
1513  See s 27 of the Constitution. 
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employing “legislative and other measures, within its available resources”.1514 It is 
evident that a more sensitive approach plays a decisive role in socio-economic 
matters.1515  
 
Against this theoretical background of the applicable principles of social security law, 
the next section provides a historical background to the social security legislative 
framework related to the dependency action for loss of support and funeral expenses. 
 
5.2.2 Historical background 
5.2.2.1 General 
It is important to familiarise readers with the historical background that gave rise to the 
social insurance legislative framework of the third party compensation system in terms 
of the RAF Act, and the workplace compensation system in terms of the COID Act. 
This is particularly important in light of current debates on the changes presently 
experienced1516 and projected for coming decades1517 in the third-party compensation 
system. An understanding of the historical context of both systems and the rights 
associated with them (for example, the action for loss of support) will assist in 
interpreting both systems within their technical settings. These systems must be 
understood in terms of their social and historical contexts. The history of the third-party 
compensation system can be of considerable value in efforts to understand the 
difficulties faced within the current system, while making us re-examine the existing 
approaches towards dealing with different claims, with a view to improving the lives of 
victims of motor vehicle accidents. However, this section does not attempt to provide 
                                            
1514  See s 27(2) of the Constitution. 
1515  Dekker 2009 Law, democracy & development 1 3. 
1516  Act 19 of 2005. 
1517  RABS Bill, 2017. 
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an extensive historical background to the introduction of social security laws and 
practices related to loss of support. In the next section, a brief overview of the road 
accident legislation will be provided. 
 
5.2.2.2 Road accident legislation: RAF Act and its predecessors 
5.2.2.2.1 Introduction 
Motor vehicle road accident legislation has always been the subject of heated debates. 
The widespread perception of a local crisis1518 regarding the Road Accident Fund 
(RAF) Act, and the recent changes brought about by the Road Accident Fund 
Amendment Act (RAFAA), are amongst the issues that have encouraged the 
positioning of the third party compensation system at the heart of the analytical and 
conceptual explorations in this thesis. Therefore, a brief background to the road 
accident system of social security is necessary, in order to contextualise the current 
tensions in the present system. 
 
5.2.2.2.2 Line of road accident legislation 
A detailed historical background to the early road accident compensation systems has 
been presented by Suzman and others,1519 as well as by Klopper.1520 In South Africa, 
the third party compensation system was established in the early 1930's.1521 Prior to 
1997, the system of compulsory motor vehicle accident insurance was governed by 
the following legislation: Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 1942;1522 Compulsory Motor 
                                            
1518  For example, Knowler www.timeslive.co.za/.../BREAKING-NEWS-Road-Accident-Funds-bank-
account-attached (accessed on 5 February 2017). 
1519  Suzman & Gordon Law of compulsory motor vehicle insurance (1954) 1; Suzman & Gordon Law 
of compulsory motor vehicle insurance (1970) 1; Suzman, Gordon & Odes Law of compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance (1982) 1. 
1520  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) par 4.1-par 5. 
1521  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) par 4.1. 
1522  Act 29 of 1942. 
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Vehicle Insurance Act, 1972;1523 Motor Vehicle Accident Act, 1986;1524 and Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act, 1989.1525 The third party compensation system was 
introduced as a direct consequence of the need to protect victims of motor vehicle 
accidents.1526 Legislation on third party compensation systems was established to give 
the greatest possible protection to, and to promote the socio-economic rights of, 
victims of motor vehicle accidents.1527 The greatest possible protection principle has 
been widely employed in defence of the rights of victims of motor vehicle accidents, in 
cases where their rights were somehow affected and/or endangered.1528 Klopper 
observes that the principle of greatest possible protection becomes clearer when the 
judgment of Ramsbottom JA in Aetna Insurance Co v Minister of Justice1529 is read 
carefully in context:  
“The obvious evil that it is designed to remedy is that members of the public 
who are injured, and the dependants of those who are killed, through the 
negligent driving of motor vehicles may find themselves without redress 
against the wrongdoer. If the driver of the motor vehicle or his master is without 
means and is uninsured, the person who has been injured or his dependants, 
if he has been killed, are in fact remediless and are compelled to bear the loss 
themselves. To remedy that evil, the Act provides a system of compulsory 
insurance. The scheme of the Act is that the owner of a motor vehicle must 
obtain a declaration of insurance from a registered company. Not only is the 
owner compelled to insure the vehicle – failure to do so is an offence – but all 
registered companies are compelled, subject to certain qualifications, to issue 
declarations of insurance in respect of a motor vehicle when the owner thereof 
has applied for the insurance of the vehicle in a prescribed form. The 
insurance insures for the benefit of any person who has been injured and of 
any person who has suffered loss through the death of a person who has been 
killed; such persons claim compensation direct from the registered 
company.”1530  
                                            
1523  Act 56 of 1972. 
1524  Act 84 of 1986. 
1525  Act 93 of 1989. 
1526  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) par 4.1. 
1527  See Mbele v RAF [2016] ZASCA 134 par 17; Law Society of South Africa & another v Minister for 
Transport & another [2010] ZACC 25; 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) par 40; Mvumvu & others v Minister of 
Transport & another [2011] ZACC 1; 2011 2 SA 473 (CC) 479 par 20; Engelbrecht v RAF [2007] 
ZACC 1; 2007 6 SA 96 (CC) par 23; Aetna Insurance Co v Minister of Justice 1960 3 SA 273 (A) 
285E-F. 
1528  Klopper 2014 THRHR 73. 
1529  1960 3 SA 273 (A) 285. 
1530  See also Engelbrecht v RAF 2007 6 SA 96 (CC); Mvumvu and others v Minister of Transport and 
another (7490/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 105, 2010 12 BCLR 1324 (WCC); (CCT 67/10) [2011] ZACC 
1, 2011 5 BCLR 488 (CC), 2011 2 SA 473 (CC) where the Constitutional Court acknowledged and 
applied this principle. This is in contrast with the judgment of Moseneke DCJ in Law Society of 
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On 1 May 1997, South Africa introduced its fifth principal Act, the Road Accident Fund 
Act (RAF Act).1531 In terms of this Act, the Road Accident Fund (RAF) is responsible 
for providing compulsory social insurance cover to all users of South African roads; to 
rehabilitate and compensate persons injured as a result of the negligent driving of 
motor vehicles; and to actively promote the safe use of all South African roads. Section 
3 of the RAF Act stipulates that “the object of the Fund shall be the payment of 
compensation in accordance with this Act for loss or damage wrongfully caused by the 
driving of a motor vehicle”. The fund only compensates third parties for bodily injury or 
death resulting from the driving of a vehicle. It is noteworthy that where the definition 
of driving is not met by the circumstances, the fund will not be liable. Furthermore, this 
fund excludes cover where the wrongdoer is not legally liable for the injury. If the 
wrongdoer is not legally liable, the RAF is also not liable. These relate to cover under 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA).1532  
 
Owing to apparent difficulties concerning the monetary sustainability of the RAF, the 
Road Accident Fund Act of 19961533 has been subjected to one major commission, 
known as the Satchwell Commission that prepared various extensive 
                                            
South Africa and others v Minister for Transport and another 2011 1 SA 400 (CC); 2011 2 BCLR 
150 (CC) par 40, where the principle is referred to but not applied. For other judgments where the 
principle was recognised, see Rose’s Car Hire (Pty)  Ltd v Grant 1948 2 SA 466 (A) 471; Op ’t Hof 
v SA Fire and Accident Insurance 1951 2 SA 353 (A); Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v 
Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd 1953 2 SA 546 (A); Aetna Insurance v Minister of Justice 
1960 3 SA 273 (A) 285; Van Blerk v African Guarantee and Indemnity 1964 1 SA 336 (A); Hladhla 
v President Insurance 1965 1 SA 614 (A) 623; Rondalia Versekeringsmaatskappy v Lemmer 1966 
2 SA 245 (A) 255; Da Silva and another v Coutinho 1971 3 SA 123 (A) 138; Commercial Union 
Assurance v Clark 1972 3 SA 508 (A); AA Mutual Insurance v Biddulph 1976 1 SA 725 (A); Webster 
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1977 2 SA 874 (A); Nkisimane v Santam Insurance 1978 2 SA 430 (A) 
435; Santam Insurance v Tshiva 1979 3 SA 73 (A); Maxanti v Protea Assurance 1979 3 SA 73 (A) 
82; Motorvoertuigassuransiefonds v Gcwabe 1979 4 SA 986 (A) 991; Workmen’s Compensation 
Commissioner v Santam Insurance 1949 4 SA 732 (C); Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council 
1994 3 SA 789 (A); President Insurance Co v Kruger 1994 3 SA 789 (A) 796E; Smith v RAF 2006 
4 SA 590 (SCA); RAF v Makwetlane 2005 4 SA 51 (SCA). 
1531  Act 56 of 1996. 
1532  For the historical background to COIDA, see chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.2.3 hereunder. 
1533  Act 56 of 1996 - see chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.3.1 hereunder for a detailed discussion on the 
RAF Act. 
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recommendations.1534 Although these recommendations were constitutionally 
challenged,1535 they were formalised in terms of the RAF Amendment Act of 2005,1536 
which came into operation on 1 August 2008. This Act has been described as an 
interim “scheme” and was found to not offend the Constitution.1537 Subsequent to the 
RAF Amendment Act of 2005, the Department of Transport (DoT) published the Road 
Accident Benefit Scheme Bill of 20131538 for comments. The Bill1539 was revised and 
published for further public comment on 9 May 2014. The period for comments on the 
Bill expired on 6 October 2014. The object of the Bill is to provide a new social security 
scheme for the victims of road accidents; to establish the new Road Accident Benefit 
Scheme Administrator (RABSA), which will replace both the Road Accident Fund 
(RAF) and the current compensation system administered by the RAF; to administer 
and implement the scheme; to provide a set of defined benefits on a no-fault basis to 
persons for bodily injury or death caused by or arising from road accidents; to exclude 
the liability of certain persons otherwise liable for damages in terms of the common 
law; and to provide for matters connected therewith.1540 
 
It is clear from the above discussion of the line of road accident legislations that the 
South African government assumed responsibility for economic security, in order to 
provide for its citizens by developing a series of RAF laws to assist the dependants or 
victims of road accidents. In this regard, the problem of economic security was seen 
                                            
1534  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 73; Report of the Road Accident Fund Commission of 2002, vol 1-3. 
1535  Law Society of South Africa and others v Minister for Transport and another [2010] ZACC 25; 2011 
1 SA 400 (CC); 2011 2 BCLR 150 (CC). 
1536  Act 19 of 2005 – see ch 5 of this thesis, par 5.3.2 hereunder for a detailed discussion on the RAF 
Amendment Act. 
1537  Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport and another 2011 1 SA 400 (CC); 2011 2 
BCLR 150 (CC) par 25, 46 & 53; RAF v Oupa William Lebeko [2012] ZASCA 159 par 4; RAF v 
Duma and three related cases (Health Professions Council of South Africa as Amicus Curiae) 
[2012] ZASCA 169 par [3]. 
1538  Notice 98 of 2013 in Government Gazette No. 36138 dated 08 February 2013. 
1539  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.2.5 hereunder for a detailed discussion on the RABS Bill. 
1540  See Department of Transport’s website: http://www.transport. gov.za/ (accessed on 12 May 2017). 
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as an issue affecting the dependants and victims of road-related accidents. Social 
insurance in the form of RAF legislations was regarded as the reasonable, practical 
alternative to radical solutions to the uncertainties created by the unemployment, 
illness, disability, or death of the breadwinner as a result of a road accident. These 
unavoidable aspects of road accidents are threats to the economic security of the 
dependants and victims of road accidents.  
 
Linked to the social security compensation cover system under the Road Accident 
Fund Act is the compensation cover in terms of the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA).1541 In the next section, the historical context of 
COIDA will be briefly discussed. 
 
5.2.2.3 Workplace compensation legislation: COIDA and its predecessors 
5.2.2.3.1 Introduction 
In South Africa, workers who are affected by occupational injuries and diseases are 
entitled to compensation. The legislation on compensation for occupational injuries and 
diseases has a history that dates back more than a century. The Compensation 
Commissioner Fund provides compensation to employees who are injured, contract 
diseases, or die during the course of their employment. The latest statute in a long line 
of national legislation dealing with occupational injuries, disease and death is the 
Compensation for Occupation Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA) of 1993, as 
amended in 1997 by the Compensation for Occupation Injuries and Diseases 
Amendment Act.1542 This Act determines how and by whom the fund should be 
administered, as well as the conditions for eligibility for compensation. 
 
                                            
1541  Act 130 of 1993. 
1542  Act 61 of 1977. 
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5.2.2.3.2 Line of workplace compensation legislation 
In South Africa, the first Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA) was passed in 1907.1543 
Prior to the passing of this Act, dependants of employees who died during the course 
of their employment had to institute a common lawsuit against the employer for 
negligence.1544 This Act was the first milestone in the field of statutorily enforceable 
compensation for mining-related occupational diseases, and set the tone for future 
legislation.1545 The purpose of the 1907 Act was to provide for and regulate the liability 
of employers to make compensation for personal injuries to workers.1546 The Act 
expressly preserved an employee’s right to institute a common law claim against the 
employer.1547 However, the employee had to elect whether to claim under common law 
or in terms of the Act.1548 The 1907 Act was followed by the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act of 1914.1549 The 1914 Act consolidated, amended and extended the law with regard 
to compensation for injuries suffered by workers in the course of their employment, or 
for death resulting from such injuries.1550  
 
The Act provided for the liability of the employer to compensate a worker who had an 
accident that resulted in incapacity or death, and allowed employees to choose 
between compensation in terms of the 1914 Act and compensation under the common 
law.1551 The employer and the employee could agree on an amount to be paid by the 
employer as compensation in respect of the permanent partial incapacity or permanent 
                                            
1543  Workmen’s Compensation Act 36 of 1907. 
1544  Ibid. 
1545  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [41]. 
1546  Ibid. 
1547  See ss 17 32(1) & (2) of Act 36 of 1907. 
1548  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [42]. 
1549  Act 65 of 1914. 
1550  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [43]. 
1551  See s 1 of Act 65 of 1914. 
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total incapacity of the worker due to the injury.1552 The 1914 Act also expressly 
preserved a worker’s right to claim common law damages from the employer, if such 
accident was caused by an act or default of the employer, or of some person for whose 
act or default the employer is responsible.1553  
 
This Act was amended by the Workmen‘s Compensation (Industrial Diseases) Act of 
1917.1554 The purpose of the 1917 Act was to amend the 1914 Act’s extended 
coverage, in order to provide for specified industrial diseases, including cyanide rash, 
lead poisoning or its sequelae, and mercury poisoning or its sequelae.1555 This Act 
entitled a worker to claim compensation if it appeared, based on a certificate granted 
by a medical practitioner, that he was suffering from a scheduled disease that caused 
incapacity, or that the disease was due to the nature of his work.1556 In addition, the 
Act provided that nothing in the Act should affect the rights of a worker to obtain 
compensation1557 in respect of a disease, other than a scheduled disease, since, in 
accordance with the meaning of the principal Act, the contracting of such disease is a 
personal injury caused by an accident.1558  
 
The 1917 Act was repealed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1934.1559 By 1930, 
workers, industry and government recognised the need for compulsory insurance.1560 
The 1934 WCA made insurance compulsory, through private companies rather than a 
state fund favoured by workers and trade unions. In terms of the 1934 Act, a worker 
                                            
1552  See s 32 of Act 65 of 1914. 
1553  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [45]. 
1554  Act 13 of 1917. 
1555  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [46]. 
1556  See s 1 of Act 13 of 1917. 
1557  This refers to compensation in terms of both common law and the Act. 
1558  See s 6 of Act 13 of 1917. 
1559  Act 59 of 1934. 
1560  Budlender Agriculture and technology: four case studies (1984) 19. 
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and an employer could agree in writing as to the compensation to be paid by the 
employer, following the injury in respect of which the claim for compensation had 
arisen.1561 The compensation paid in the case of permanent disablement, including 
permanent injury or serious disfigurement, was linked to the degree of disablement of 
the worker.1562 The dependants of the worker could obtain a determined amount if the 
latter died as a result of an injury or accident.1563 Section 4(2) of the 1934 Act provided 
that no liability for compensation should arise, except under and in accordance with 
the provisions of the Act in respect of any such injury. This was important, as it was 
the first time that the common law right of an employee was abolished.1564 Section 5 
of the 1934 WCA provided for increased compensation in instances where the 
employer was negligent, and a magistrate had the power to determine the additional 
compensation, in an amount deemed equitable.1565  
 
The 1941 Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 repealed the 1934 WCA.1566 The 
aim of the Act was to revise and harmonise the laws relating to compensation for 
disablement caused by accidents, or industrial diseases contracted by workers in the 
course of their employment, or for death resulting from such accidents and 
diseases.1567 The provisions of section 7(a) and (b) of the 1941 WCA capture the same 
aspects as section 35(1) of COIDA.1568 The section provided that: “From and after the 
fixed date: (a) no action at law shall lie by a workman or any dependants of a workman 
against such workman’s employer to recover any damages in respect of an injury due 
                                            
1561  See s 15(1) of Act 59 of 1934. 
1562  See s 48 of Act 59 of 1934. 
1563  See s 49 of Act 59 of 1934. 
1564  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [49]. 
1565  Ibid. 
1566  See s 109 of Act 30 of 1941. 
1567  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [50]. 
1568  Act 130 of 1993. 
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to accident resulting in the disablement or the death of such workman; and (b) no 
liability for consideration on the part of such employer shall arise save under the 
provisions of this Act in respect of any such disablement or death.” Section 27(1) of 
the 1941 Act provided that if, after the fixed date, an accident befell a worker, resulting 
in his disablement or death, such worker would be entitled to compensation in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 50 of the 1941 Act provided for the 
submission of a written notice by or on behalf of a worker to the employer, as soon as 
reasonably possible after the accident.1569  
 
The 1941 WCA was repealed in 1993 by COIDA.1570 This Act follows the same outline 
as the 1934 and the 1941 Acts. Section 35(1) of COIDA bars common law claims for 
damages against employers, and limits compensation to that which is payable under 
COIDA. The purpose of COIDA is to provide for compensation for disablement caused 
by occupational injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the 
course of their employment, or for death resulting from such injuries or diseases, and 
to provide for matters connected therewith.1571  
 
Section 10 provides for the establishment of the Compensation Board. Section 15(1) 
provides for the establishment of a Compensation Fund that will be funded, inter alia, 
by contributions levied from employers.1572 Section 22(1) provides for compensation to 
be payable to an employee who meets with an accident that causes his disablement 
or death, if the accident has arisen out of or in the course of his employment. Section 
56(1) provides for increased compensation. This applies if the employee meets with 
                                            
1569  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 paras [51]-[53]. 
1570  See Schedule 1 of COIDA. 
1571  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [56]. 
1572  See also s 15(2)(c) of COIDA. 
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an accident or contracts an occupational disease, which is due to, amongst others, the 
negligence of the employer, or an employee charged by the employer with the 
management or control of the business.1573 Section 67(1) provides for the calculation 
of compensation for a disease. This may be based on earnings at the time of the onset 
of the disease.1574 The dependants of an employee who died due to an occupational 
disease would essentially receive a lump sum of twice the monthly pension (a minimum 
of R4 600 as at 1 April 2010).1575 The dependants would also benefit from a monthly 
pension of 40% of the amount that would have been payable to the employee if the 
employee had been 100% permanently disabled.1576 Thirdly, the Director-General has 
to pay the employee’s funeral costs, subject to a maximum of R12 300 as at 1 April 
2010.1577  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the COIDA, RAF Act and their predecessor 
Acts were designed to improve and protect the economic and social positions of the 
dependants following the death of their breadwinner due to a motor vehicle accident, 
work-related accident, or a disease contracted in the workplace. A proper 
understanding of this historical background to the social security statutes relevant to 
the dependency action for loss of support and funeral expenses is essential, in order 
to ensure the correct approach to problems encountered in the interpretation and 
modern-day application of social security statutes to the action of dependants. Much 
of the past application of social security statutes forms the basis of the dependency 
action’s current application.  
 
                                            
1573  Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 3 par [58]. 
1574  See ss 65(1) and 67(1) of COIDA; Thembekile Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Limited [2011] ZACC 
3 paras [59] & [84]. 
1575  See s 54(1) (a) of COIDA, read with item 6 of Schedule 4:  To date, this amount has not changed. 
1576  See s 54(1) (b) of COIDA, read with item 7 of Schedule 4. 
1577  See s 54(2) of COIDA, read with item 10 of Schedule 4: This amount has still not changed. 
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The above discussion has reviewed and discussed the historical background to and 
interpretation of the dependants’ action in terms of social security statutes. It is against 
this background that the author now considers the material changes introduced by the 
RAF Amendment Act, in comparison to the provisions of the old RAF Act and the 
proposed RABS Bill. The discussion will focus on the provisions of all three legal 
frameworks, to the extent that they relate to the dependants’ claim for loss of support 
and funeral expenses. Reference will only be made to those changes that are directly 
relevant to aspects of the dependants’ action for loss of support and funeral expenses. 
 
5.2.3 Protection of the dependants of the road accident victim 
5.2.3.1 Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAF) 
This chapter notes that both the RAF Act and RAF Amendment Act are still relevant, 
applicable and concerned with providing death claims to the dependants of the 
deceased-breadwinner who was killed in a car accident, and allow the dependants the 
right of action to benefit from the estate of the deceased. The object of the enactment 
by parliament of laws governing death caused by or arising from motor vehicle 
accidents was to provide the victim of the road accident and his or her dependants with 
the “widest possible protection”.1578 This principle has been widely employed, and 
South African road accident victims have enjoyed full, specialised and equitable 
protection of their rights through legislation for six decades.1579 During these years, the 
legal principles relating to the rights of road accident victims have been largely 
identified, and adequately circumscribed and protected.1580 The RAF Act allows the 
                                            
1578  Aetna Insurance Co v Minister of Justice 1960 3 SA 273 (A) 285; Klopper 2014 THRHR 74; 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund v Radebe [1995] ZASCA 80; 1996 2 SA 145 (A) 152E-I; 
Pithey v RAF [2014] ZASCA 55; 2014 4 SA 112 (SCA); [2014] 3 All SA 324 (SCA) par [20]. 
1579  Klopper 2014 THRHR 73; Suzman & Gordon Law of compulsory motor vehicle insurance (1970) 
1; Suzman, Gordon & Hodes Law of compulsory motor vehicle insurance (1982) 1; Klopper Third 
party compensation (2012) 3. 
1580  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 3. 
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victim of a road accident and his or her dependants to claim damages from the RAF in 
full, where restrictions and/or exclusions do not apply. The compensation system under 
the RAF Act is adversarial in nature.1581 It is based on fault, indemnity, insurance 
principles, and common law (law of delict).1582  
 
Klopper observes that what parliament engineered with the RAF legislation was 
certainty of recovery of damages when a victim of a road accident exercises his or her 
common law rights, by substituting the original wrongdoer with a deep-pocket 
defendant (initially an insurance company, and more recently the RAF).1583 Klopper 
further opines that the basis of the right of the road accident victim has been and 
remains a common law right to claim damages, where damage or loss is suffered 
because of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle.1584 Klopper also states that a 
constitutional right is clearly not the absolute basis of a road accident victim’s claim for 
damages caused by or arising from the unlawful and negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle. This is because the common law right of a victim of a road accident was 
recognised and enforced long before the enactment of the Constitution in 1996.1585 In 
terms of the RAF legislation, the victim or dependant-claimant is required to prove that 
someone else was negligent, and that such negligence was the cause of the accident, 
which resulted in the death of his or her breadwinner. 
 
The claim for payment of compensation for depriving the dependants of support by 
wrongfully and negligently causing the death of their breadwinner is enforced by 
bringing a dependant action against the statutory third-party insurer in the case of 
                                            
1581  Manyathi https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2014/159.rtf (accessed on 12 May 2017); 
Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 6. 
1582  Botha v RAF [2013] ZAGPJHC 400; 2015 2 SA 108 (GP); Klopper 2014 THRHR 74. 
1583  Klopper 2014 THRHR 74. 
1584  Ibid. 
1585  Ibid. 
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motor vehicle accidents.1586 In terms of sections 17 and 21 of the Road Accident Fund 
Act,1587 an action for damages falling within the scope of the Act cannot be brought 
against the owner or driver of the motor vehicle, but must be brought against the 
authorised insurer, namely the RAF (Fund). While the Fund shares its goal of 
compensating victims for the incredible loss of a breadwinner with the dependants’ 
action, it is limited to death resulting from a motor vehicle accident.1588 In addition, its 
method of calculating rewards differs from those used in the law of delict. 
 
In terms of sections 17 and 21 of the RAF Act,1589 an action for damages falling within 
the scope of this Act is limited to injuries or death that resulted from a motor vehicle 
accident,1590 and cannot generally be brought against the owner or driver of the motor 
vehicle personally, but must be brought against the authorised insurer. All road users 
have a security safety net in the form of the RAF. The RAF system indemnifies the 
wrongdoer by stepping into his or her shoes. Consequently, the liability for payment of 
compensation for depriving the dependants of support, by wrongfully causing the death 
of their breadwinner, is enforced by bringing a dependant action against a statutory 
third-party insurer, which is the Road Accident Fund (RAF) in the case of motor vehicle 
accidents.1591 Although the RAF steps into the shoes of the wrongdoer, the latter is not 
absolved from all liability.1592 The wrongdoer is still liable for compensation not covered 
by the RAF compensation system. 
 
                                            
1586  Boberg et al Law of persons and family (1999) 297. 
1587  Act 56 of 1996. 
1588  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 2. 
1589  Act 56 of 1996. 
1590  Klopper Third party compensation law (2012) 2 9 16. Damage to a motor vehicle, as well as damage 
to clothing, spectacles, false teeth, or prostheses, unless occasioned by the accident and bodily 
injury, fall outside the distinct damage referred to in section 17(1) of the Act, and are not 
recoverable. 
1591  Boberg et al Law of persons and family (1999) 297. 
1592  The wrongdoer could still be sued for the balance of the damages and for the cost of the reparation 
of damage to the motor vehicle, etc. 
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For purposes of the dependency action, the scope and nature of the damage 
recoverable in terms of the original RAF Act were as follows: where the deceased 
sustained bodily injury in a motor vehicle accident and the pleadings were closed prior 
to his death,1593 the RAF compensation system was liable for the payment of unlimited 
damages, as well as for general damage (pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, 
disfigurement and disability), except where the passenger limitation1594 was applicable. 
The RAF was also liable to pay reasonable and necessary hospital, medical and 
related expenses resulting from the injuries sustained by the breadwinner prior to his 
or her death. The RAF compensation system was also liable for the unlimited actual 
loss of support, except in instances where the passenger limitation of R25000 applied, 
but its method of calculating the loss1595 differed from that used in the law of delict.  
 
The funeral costs are expenses linked to the death of the victim of a road accident. In 
terms of the RAF Act,1596 only the necessary actual costs to cremate the deceased or 
to inter him or her in a grave are recoverable from the RAF. In terms of the RAF Act, 
claimants who are paid compensation by the RAF are entitled to have their legal fees 
(on a party and party basis) paid by the RAF. This provision of the RAF Act imposes 
an automatic liability on the RAF to pay the party and party costs to claimants who are 
paid compensation.  
 
However, recently, significant and far-reaching changes were made to the RAF Act’s 
recoverable damage in relation to the dependency action.1597 These changes must be 
reconsidered in terms of whether they ensure consistency of support to the dependants 
                                            
1593  Sirdiwalla NO v RAF [2009] ZAKZPHC 45. 
1594  See s 18 of the RAF Act, 1996. 
1595  See RAF v Sweatman [2015] ZASCA 22; [2015] 2 All SA 679 (SCA); 2015 6 SA 186 (SCA). 
1596  Klopper Third party compensation (2012) 105 241; s 18(4) of the RAF Act, 1996.  
1597  See RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005. 
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of the road accident victim. The next section will focus on the amendments pertinent 
to the dependency action in terms of the RAFAA. 
 
5.2.3.2 Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005 (RAFAA) 
Prior to the amendments, the RAF Act provided victims of motor accidents and their 
dependants with the widest possible protection, except where limitations or exclusions 
applied. In principle, the dependants of the victim of a road accident could claim their 
damages from the RAF in full. The problem that arose was that the income derived by 
the RAF from the levy charged to motorists on the fuel that they purchased did not 
match the liabilities incurred by the RAF. For years, this funding deficit kept growing, 
despite rapid increases in the fuel levy every year.1598 Eventually, this predicament 
gave rise to the appointment of a commission of inquiry, which became known as the 
Satchwell Commission.1599 In its report of 2002, the Satchwell Commission1600 made 
many far-reaching recommendations.1601 For instance, the victims are now also 
required to waive their right to litigate against the wrongdoer1602 and to have their award 
limited to a prescribed amount (capped).1603 The liability of the RAF for hospital, 
medical and related expenses resulting from the injuries sustained by the breadwinner 
prior to his or her death is determined and limited on the basis of emergency medical 
treatment, and is paid according to a tariff based on the National Health Reference 
Price List. The non-emergency medical treatment is paid in accordance with the 
                                            
1598  Klopper 2014 THRHR 74. 
1599  RAF v Duma, RAF v Kubeka, RAF v Meyer, RAF v Mokoena (202/2012, 64/2012, 164/2012, 
131/2012) [2012] ZASCA 169; [2013] 1 All SA 543 (SCA); 2013 6 SA 9 (SCA) par [3]; Klopper Third 
party compensation (2012) 8. 
1600  The Road Accident Fund Commission was appointed in terms of the Road Accident Commission 
Act 71 of 1998. 
1601  For a more detailed account of these recommendations, see eg Law Society of South Africa v 
Minister for Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) par 41. 
1602  See s 9 of the RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005, which substituted s 21 of the RAF Act 56 1996. 
1603  See s 17(4)(c) of the RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005. 
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Uniform Patient Fee Structure for fees payable by full-paying patients, as prescribed 
by the National Health Act of 2003,1604 and as revised from time to time.1605 
 
Similar to the system of compensation administered by the RAF in terms of the RAF 
Act, the system of compensation established under the RAF Amendment Act is based 
on the requirement of fault. The RAF is only obliged to pay compensation if an injury 
or death is due to the negligent or other wrongful act of the driver or owner of a motor 
vehicle, or his or her employee, in the performance of the employee’s duties as an 
employee. In establishing fault, the common law rules of delict are applied. 
 
Another amendment is compensation that can be claimed for the loss of support. The 
annual loss of support cannot exceed the amount published in the Government 
Gazette. This amount is currently capped at R276 9281606 per annum, per 
breadwinner,1607 irrespective of the actual loss. Previously, no limitation was in place, 
and the actual income of a breadwinner was used to calculate this loss. In terms of the 
new amendments to the RAF Act,1608 in any loss of support sustained due to an 
accident that occurred after 31 October 2008, the total loss of support of all dependants 
(combined loss of support) of one deceased breadwinner will be limited to R276 9281609 
per year. The same formulae,1610 as explained above, will be applied. For example, if 
a deceased breadwinner husband is survived by a wife and three children, the total 
loss will be limited to the sum of R276 928 per year. This amount is adjusted quarterly 
                                            
1604  Act 61 of 2003. 
1605  See s 17(4B) (a) of the RAFAA, 2005. 
1606  As at 31 October 2018. 
1607  See s 17(4) (c) of the RAFAA, 2005. 
1608  RAFAA 19 of 2008. 
1609  Adjustment of statutory limit in respect of claim for loss of support as of 31 October 2018 – see 
Notice Board 145 of 2018 No 41996. 
1610  Over the years, our courts have accepted the formula for apportioning the income of a breadwinner 
according to the nature and number of dependants: 2 portions of the income are allocated to a 
spouse, and 1 portion is allocated to a child and indigent parent. 
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to allow for inflation. The limit will then be applied proportionally per dependant. In other 
words, each dependant’s claim will be reduced in proportion to the total of all claims, 
to bring the total claims within the limit of R276 9281611 As each child becomes self-
sufficient, this entitlement falls away and there are fewer portions by which to divide 
the lost income, and thus a greater share for the remaining dependants. There is no 
age limit on the period of support for the dependants, and only actual loss is 
compensated. Children are entitled to support until they are self-supporting. In 
determining the amount of the dependant’s loss of support, there is no fixed formula. 
The courts rely on assessments by actuaries, who base the calculation of the loss of 
support on assumptions.1612 The courts also make awards with reference to 
precedents, which differ in various jurisdictions.  
 
Dependants of deceased income earners above the current cap amount (R276 928) 
per annum will therefore not be able to claim their entire loss of support under the 
amended Act. Therefore, people earning in the higher income ranges will accordingly 
still only receive this amount, irrespective of the fact that a previously earned salary 
could have been much higher. Lastly, the limitation of the RAF’s liability to pay only the 
necessary actual costs of cremation or interment remains in the RAF Amendment Act. 
 
In 2013, the Road Accident Benefit Scheme (RABS) Bill was proposed to replace the 
Road Accident Fund Amendment Act (RAFAA), in order to address these issues. In 
the next section, the protection of the victim of a road accident and his or her 
                                            
1611  Taking a practical amount of R22000 per month as the income of a deceased breadwinner with 
a wife and 3 children, the split will look something like this: Dad = R6338 per month – falls away; 
Mom = R6338 per month – loss; Every child = R3169 per month – loss. 
1612  Steynberg https://www.sayas.org.za/per/article/view/2557/3661 (accessed on 12 October 2017). 
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dependants in terms of the proposed RABS Bill will be discussed, as well as how this 
proposed Bill will impact on road accident victims and their dependants. 
 
5.2.3.3 Road Accident Benefit Scheme (RABS) Bill of 2017 
The core strategy of the Road Accident Benefit Scheme (RABS) Bill is to provide for a 
new, no-fault benefit scheme and a new administrator called the Road Accident Benefit 
Scheme Administrator (RABSA), which will abolish and replace the current Road 
Accident Fund (RAF), as well as the compensation system administered by it.1613 The 
RABS compensation system is based on principles of social security and the social 
solidarity system.1614 The Bill was criticised on various aspects by the legal profession. 
 
The LSSA1615 questions where this abolishment of the fault base leaves the innocent 
road accident victim, who also contributes to the Road Accident Fund levy as a driver, 
commuter, passenger and/or consumer, and whose civil law right to be compensated 
for harm suffered because of another person’s fault has been completely abolished. 
The LSSA stressed that the abolishment of the common law right is an entirely different 
scenario for the Constitutional Court to consider and added that if the RABS was 
enacted with the abolition of common law rights, the LSSA would consider challenging 
the proposed section 29 of the Bill as unconstitutional.1616  
 
The BLA1617 highlighted the fact that a number of the provisions that are to be 
introduced by RABS will make it fundamentally impossible for victims of road accidents 
to be placed in the position they would have been in, had the accident not occurred. 
                                            
1613  See s 29 of the RABS Bill. 
1614  As stated in the chapter, the transformation of the scheme was recommended by the Road Accident 
Fund Commission in 2002, under the leadership of Judge Kathy Satchwell, and was ultimately 
endorsed by Cabinet. 
1615  LSSA stands for Law Society of South Africa. 
1616  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 6. 
1617  BLA stands for Black Lawyers Association. 
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What makes matters worse is that the victims of the road accident will not have 
recourse against the wrongdoer, as the common law right in this regard will be 
abolished.1618  
 
The LSNP1619 stated that there can be no question that the Bill seeks to impact severely 
on the enforceable common law and fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution, not only of all future road accident victims, but also of a multitude of 
stakeholders that are directly and indirectly affected by the injury and/or death of 
victims. The LSNP indicated that it should be borne in mind that section 29 of the Bill 
sought to strip the road accident victim of his common law remedies against the 
wrongdoer.1620 The LSNP also highlighted the fact that the direct effect of the Bill is 
that the victim of a road accident is completely deprived of his hitherto actionable 
common law right to enforce recovery of actual damage suffered due to the unlawful 
actions of another.1621  
 
A recent newspaper article1622 reported that the RAF bank account was attached due 
to the failure of the RAF to pay claims. It was also reported that if a no-fault system is 
introduced at the current level of funding, it will result in an even larger deficit, increased 
taxes, and could even lead to the drastic reduction of compensation to keep it afloat. 
The latter will defeat the object of social security.1623 which as stated above, is to 
replace a portion of the loss of support for the dependants who are affected by such a 
loss, whether it is due to a motor vehicle accident or occupational injury or illness.1624 
                                            
1618  See s 29 of the RABS Bill; Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 9. 
1619  LSNP stands for Law Society of the Northern Provinces. 
1620  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 13. 
1621  Idem 12. 
1622  Knowler http://www.timeslive.co.za/.../BREAKING-NEWS-Road-Accident-Funds-bank-account-
attached... (accessed on 12 May 2017). 
1623  Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention (No. 102) adopted by the ILO in 1952. 
1624  Myburgh 2000 Law, democracy & development 43 46. 
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According to the proposed no-fault system, it is irrelevant how the accident occurred. 
Questions related to who was at fault, or whether there has been contributory 
negligence on the part of the claimant, will not arise. The wrongdoer remains 
indemnified and is also entitled to claim if he or she has suffered any injuries arising 
from the road accident. The right to sue the wrongdoer for recovery of losses not 
covered by the RAF is abolished. For example, if passengers in a taxi are killed as the 
result of the negligent driving of the owner or driver of the vehicle, the dependants of 
the deceased have no remedy whatsoever against the taxi owner or driver. Both the 
owner and driver escape with no financial responsibility to make good the harm they 
have caused. The same goes for every motor vehicle driver or owner, even drunk 
drivers.  Although the law allows for them to be criminally prosecuted, the criminal side 
of the matter is never confronted. In practice, the matter is simply left at the civil claim 
level. 
 
In terms of the RABS Bill, everyone will be able to claim, but the Bill severely reduces 
the compensation recoverable, and removes the lump sum payments. The claimable 
damages are replaced with four prescribed classes of benefits, namely health care 
services (part A), income support benefit (part B), family support benefit (part C), and 
funeral benefit (part D).  For purposes of this discussion, the focus will only be on 
benefits that directly affect the dependency action for loss of support and funeral 
expenses. 
 
In terms of the Bill, as LSSA has noted,1625 the loss of support benefit is limited to a 
maximum of 15 years, regardless of the age of the dependants, or until the deceased 
would have been 60 years old, whichever period is the shorter. This maximum period 
                                            
1625  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 8. 
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of 15 years runs from the date of death of the breadwinner; no lump sum payment is 
payable for loss of support; children are only supported until the age of 18, regardless 
of whether the deceased would have supported that child longer; and no family support 
benefit is paid to a dependant who is not ordinarily resident in the country.1626 The 
writer is in agreement with LSSA and BLA’s view that this is an extraordinary and 
inexplicable provision, in that the exclusion does not apply to the residency of the 
breadwinner, but only to that of the dependant. If a breadwinner supports a child who 
is, for some or other reason, resident in another country (perhaps for study purposes, 
or a child in the care of a South African parent in terms of a divorce order, who may be 
resident overseas, but who is still entitled to child support), that child is denied any 
benefit, regardless of the fact that the deceased may have had a legal obligation to 
support the child, and did so. This appears to be an irrational exclusion and may be 
vulnerable to constitutional attack, especially as it affects the right of a child to support 
and discriminates against a child on arbitrary grounds.1627  
 
Furthermore, the use of age to limit compensation for loss of support is unfair and 
discriminatory. A minor’s entitlement to be supported is not age-dependant1628 and is 
constitutionally protected.1629 The age of 60 years is also discriminatory, as the COIDA 
of 1993 is not age-specific as far as the calculation of compensation is concerned.1630 
The central principle in South African law underlying a claim for loss of maintenance is 
                                            
1626  See ss 35(1) & (2)(a) read with s 39(1) & (2) of the Bill. 
1627  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 8-9. 
1628  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 25; also see Bursey v Bursey 1999 3 SA 33 (SCA). A child is defined 
by the COIDA of 1993 as: (d) a child under the age of 18 years of the employee or of his or her 
spouse, and includes a posthumous child, step-child, an adopted child and a child born out of 
wedlock; (e) a child over the age of 18 years of the employee or of his or her spouse, and a parent 
or any person who in the opinion of the Director-General was acting in the place of a parent, a 
brother, a sister, a half-brother or half-sister, a grandparent or a grandchild of the employee. The 
Bill does not define a “child.”  
1629  See Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others 2001 1 SA 
46 (CC); Klopper 2014 THRHR 25. See s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
1630  Klopper 2014 THRHR 25. 
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the duty to support, which the deceased owed to the relevant dependants.1631 The 
definition of dependants under the RABS Bill is very specific. The wording seems to 
suggest that only persons specifically mentioned in the definition1632 are subject to the 
requirement of a pre-existing duty of support. According to Klopper,1633 the definition 
should avoid specifics and merely state that a spouse is a person who was legally 
married to the deceased immediately prior to his or her death and includes life partners 
in a marriage according to religious rites, and live-in life partners, provided that such 
life partners were owed a legally recognised duty of maintenance by the deceased, 
regardless of how it was created.1634 
 
In terms of the Bill, a flat rate payment of R10 000 is made to either the family or a 
funeral director for funeral benefits.1635 The writer is in agreement with LSSA and BLA 
that this amount is inadequate to cover the funeral costs and is unreasonably low. The 
                                            
1631  Klopper 2014 THRHR 22; also see Davel Afhanklikes (1987) 69; Van der Vyver & Joubert Persone- 
en familiereg (1991) 629; Spiro The law of parent and child (1985) 403; Gildenhuys v Transvaal 
Hindu Educational Council 1938 WLD 260; Lambrakis v Santam Ltd 2000 3 SA 1098 (W). 
1632  See s 1 - definition of the RABS Bill: In terms of s 1 of RABS Bill, a "dependant" means- (a) any 
spouse of the deceased breadwinner; (b) any child of the deceased breadwinner; or (c) any other 
person who was dependant on the deceased breadwinner, provided such person is legally entitled 
to support from the deceased breadwinner and would have received such support had the 
breadwinner not died. 
1633  Klopper 2014 THRHR 22. 
1634  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 22; also see Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A); Ryland v Edros 1997 
2 SA 690 (C); Mlisane v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 1996 3 SA 36 (C); Santam Insurance v Fondo 
1960 2 SA 467 (A); Nkabinde v SA Motor and General Insurance 1961 1 SA 302 (D). In Govender 
v Ragavayah NO and others 2009 3 SA 178 (D) it was held that the word 'spouse', as used in s 1 
of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, includes the surviving partner to a monogamous Hindu 
marriage, and especially Amod v MMF 1998 4 SA 753 (CC), where it was held that on the facts of 
the case, a duty of maintenance was created. See also Verheem v RAF 2012 2 SA 409 (GNP); 
Paixăo and another v RAF [2012] 4 All SA 262 (SCA); 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) 106; Chauke v Santam 
Limited 1995 3 SA 74 (W); 1997 1 SA 178 (A); Prinsloo v Santam [1996] 3 All SA 221 (E); Matsiba 
v Santam 1996 3 SA 87 (T); 1997 4 SA 832 (SCA); Santam Limited v David Russel Mundy, Peter 
Viola and the Automobile Association (unreported CPD case no. 4427/95) reported in July 1998 
De Rebus 55; Day v Mutual and Federal [1998] 2 All SA 87 (SEC); 1999 4 SA 813 (E) reversed on 
appeal in Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Day [2001] 4 All SA 6 (A); 2001 3 SA 775 (SCA); 
RAF v Mbendera and others [2004] 4 All SA 25 (SCA); Mtamane v RAF 2002 4 SA 599 (N); RAF 
v Vogel 2004 5 SA 1 (SCA); RAF v Van den Berg 2006 2 SA 250 (SCA); Berry and another v Spe 
Security Patrol Experts and another 2011 4 SA 520 (GNP); RAF v Coleman (unreported case no 
A3045/2009) (GSJ); Jeffrey v RAF (2008/5396) [2012] ZAGPJHC 259; 2012 4 SA 475 (GSJ). 
1635  See s 40 of the RABS Bill. 
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legislator disregarded the cultural practices and customs of the majority of the citizens 
of the country, for whom funerals must be dignified. They bury their loved ones with 
love and dignity. Furthermore, a funeral is for the whole family and community  it is 
not a private ritual. At the majority of African funerals, the mourners must eat, and there 
must be a coffin and a tombstone. Under these circumstances, it is suggested that the 
appropriate award for funeral expenses should not be less than R25 000 per 
funeral.1636 This amount should also be increased on a yearly basis. Reasonable 
funeral expenses have been judicially interpreted to encompass much more than is 
apparently envisaged by this flat rate of R10 000.1637  
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the benefits payable in terms of the proposed 
RABS scheme bear no relationship whatsoever to the loss actually suffered by a victim 
of a road accident or his or her dependants. Section 41 dealing with benefit review 
contains the harsh provision that the Administrator may wholly or partially suspend, 
revoke or review a benefit, without a specific reference to subsection 2, which specifies 
the circumstances under which suspension, revision or revocation may occur.1638 The 
provision is one-sided and should allow for reasonable notice, incorporating reasons 
for such a step to the beneficiary, before it can be implemented. Furthermore, it may 
only be implemented after consideration of all representations made by the beneficiary. 
It must also be possible for a claimant to apply for a benefit review in cases where 
there are substantial changes in the circumstances of a road accident victim.1639 
 
                                            
1636  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 12. 
1637  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 20; also see Rondalia Versekeringsmaatskappy v Britz 1976 3 SA 243 
(T); Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90; Schneider v Eisovitch 1960 2 QB 430. 
1638  Klopper 2014 THRHR 26. 
1639  See in this regard ss 33 & 34 of the Constitution; Oosthuizen's Transport (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Road 
Traffic Matters, Mpumalanga 2008 2 SA 570 (T); Langa CJ v Hlophe 2009 4 SA 382 (SCA); Bullock 
NO v Provincial Government, North West Province 2004 5 SA 262 (SCA). 
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5.2.4 Protection of the dependants of a workplace victim  
Another important South African social security Act regarding the enforcement of the 
action of dependants for loss of support against an insurer is the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA).1640 The compensation cover in terms 
of COIDA1641 is comparable to the system under the third party compensation 
legislation1642 and the proposed RABS Bill.1643 These sets of legislation may differ in 
terms of the type of claimant they are protecting, but they address the same social 
value. 
 
COIDA came into effect on 1 March 1994. COIDA provides a system of no-fault 
compensation for employees who die or are injured in accidents that arise out of and 
in the course of their employment, or who contract occupational diseases. Conversely, 
negligence continues to play a role, since a worker is permitted extra compensation if 
he or she can establish that the injury or disease was caused by the negligence of the 
employer (or certain categories of managers and fellow employees).1644 The right to 
compensation is provided for in section 21 of COIDA: Any dependant of an employee 
who falls within the definition of the Act is entitled to compensation, irrespective of 
whether the employer of the breadwinner has registered or paid contributions.1645 In 
terms of the Act, if a person who falls within the definition of an “employee” dies or 
becomes disabled because of an accident that occurred in the scope of his or her 
employment, or contracts a disease in the scope of his or her employment, COIDA 
provides for the payment of benefits to him or her, or to his or her dependants. An 
                                            
1640  Act 130 of 1993. 
1641  Ibid. 
1642  RAF Act 56 of 1956; RAF Amendment Act 19 of 2005. 
1643  RABS Bill, 2013. 
1644  Myburgh 2000 Law, democracy & development 45. 
1645  Idem 49. 
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action for damages falling within the scope of COIDA cannot be brought against the 
employer personally, but must be brought against the authorised insurer, also known 
as the Compensation Commissioner.1646 
 
According to section 35(1) of COIDA, an employee (who was an employee in terms of 
COIDA) or his or her dependants may not hold the employer liable for damages arising 
from his or her injuries or death in the course of employment, if such injury or death is 
attributable to the employer’s negligence. In other words, if an employee (who is an 
employee for the purposes of COIDA) sustains injuries or is killed in a motor vehicle 
accident that can be attributed to the employer’s negligence, section 35(1) of COIDA 
would exclude the liability of such employer. This means that such an employee or his 
or her dependants have a claim for compensation in terms of COIDA against the 
Compensation Commissioner, as well as a third-party claim against the RAF1647 or the 
proposed RABS Bill. 
 
5.2.5 RABS Bill and COIDA 
It appears that in terms of section 28 of the RABS Bill, the Compensation 
Commissioner (COIDA) is not entitled to reimbursement by the Administrator (RABS) 
for compensation paid by the Compensation Commissioner to an employee who is 
killed or injured in a motor vehicle accident. However, the RABS Administrator is 
entitled to deduct any amount received by a dependant-claimant from the 
Compensation Commissioner, which is due to the dependant in terms of the RABS 
Bill. The scale of the Compensation Commissioner’s rights, in terms of section 36 of 
COIDA, to recover compensation paid by him from a negligent “third party” is not clear 
                                            
1646  See s 35(1) of the COIDA 130 of 1993. 
1647  Myburgh 2000 Law, democracy & development 56. 
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with regard to the RABS Bill. The question is whether the Compensation Commissioner 
is entitled to claim against a guilty motorist if the RABS Administrator is exempt. Where 
compensation is paid under the RAFAA to a dependant of an innocent road accident 
victim, the shortfall in compensation recovered by them due to the removal of the 
common law right is nowhere near as significant as the losses they will face under the 
regime proposed by the RABS Bill. Under the RABS Bill, dependants of road accident 
victims will receive, in many cases, severely condensed loss of support. The abolition 
of common law rights in this context is likely to be again challenged in the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, it is strongly advised that the government should reconsider the 
proposed abolition of the common law right of the injured road accident victim in the 
context of RABS, as presented in the current proposed Bill.1648 
 
The difference between the RABS Bill and COIDA is further highlighted in the formula 
for the calculation of loss of support. The benefit afforded in terms of the proposed 
RABS does not accord with the compensation for loss of support in terms of COIDA.1649 
The formula for calculating the compensation of dependants of employees who die 
because of an occupational accident or disease is contained in schedule 4 of 
COIDA:1650 Where death benefits have to be calculated, the surviving spouse receives 
a lump sum of twice the employee’s monthly pension, which would have been received 
if the deceased was permanently disabled, subject to a minimum of R5 109 and a 
maximum of R36 504. Where the deceased left a widow and child, the compensation 
that accrues is 40% of the monthly pension that would have been payable to the 
employee if he had been permanently disabled, with a minimum of R1 021 and a 
                                            
1648  Manyathi-Jele 2014 De Rebus 12. 
1649  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 18. 
1650  See s 47 of the COIDA; Myburgh 2000 Law, democracy & development 49. 
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maximum of R7 300 per month. The dependants thus receive both a lump sum and a 
monthly pension. RABS makes use of the average of the deceased income to 
determine compensation.1651 However, section 55(3) of the RABS Bill does not make 
any provision for the manner in which the average amounts are to be determined. The 
average or cap on income in the RABS Bill, in the context of the provision of 
maintenance, has an adverse effect on dependants and is probably contrary to the 
State’s constitutional obligation to ensure that children are adequately cared for.1652 
The writer agrees with Klopper that the use of averages to determine compensation is 
discriminatory and defeats the primary goal of compensation, namely to provide the 
widest protection possible to dependants of road accident victims, to the extent that 
the dependant does not burden society and/or place a strain on other social security 
benefits. The manner in which COIDA determines compensation cannot be ignored 
when framing benefits in terms of the RABS Bill, as this would be biased and prejudicial 
towards the dependants under the RABS Bill. COIDA uses the actual income of a 
deceased-employee, but restricts compensation to 75% of the actual earnings, with 
minima and maxima.1653 
 
Reasonable funeral expenses have been judicially interpreted to encompass much 
more than is apparently envisaged.1654 Furthermore, the reasonableness of the 
expenses is contradicted by the restriction of R10 000 in section 40 of the RABS Bill. 
In light of section 54 and item 10 of Schedule 4 of COIDA of 1993, which provides for 
a current funeral benefit of R13 716 (or the actual amount, whichever is smaller), the 
proposed limit of R10 000 is discriminatory. Provision must therefore be made for the 
                                            
1651  See s 55(3) of the RABS Bill. 
1652  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 18; also see Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Grootboom and others 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); ss 27(1)(c) & 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
1653  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 20. 
1654  Rondalia Versekeringsmaatskappy v Britz 1976 3 SA 243 (T); Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90. 
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amount to be increased, in order to make provision for rising funeral costs and 
inflation.1655  
 
The definition of a “child” is also lacking in the RABS Bill.1656 Section 1 of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005 defines a child as “a person under the age of 18 years.” The latter 
definition and the definition of “child” in COIDA should be incorporated into the current 
definition of a child under the RABS Bill.1657  
 
Another important element is the liability of the RABS Bill, which is problematic. Section 
28 of the RABS Bill does not contain wording which clearly determines the liability of 
RABS. As it stands, it is unclear, and a reading of the wording is therefore required to 
establish precisely when the RABS is liable. The liability created by the RABS Bill is 
based on no-fault. The redress that is enforceable in terms of section 36 of COIDA of 
1993 is based on common law delict, which implies fault. In terms of the RAF Act, the 
RAF replaces the wrongdoer, thereby rendering the former subject to section 36. In 
contrast, the RABS Bill contains no provision rendering it liable in its capacity as 
substituted wrongdoer, hence the RABS will not be liable in terms of section 36 of 
COIDA. A policy decision has to be made regarding whether wrongdoers may be held 
liable in terms of section 36, where the RABS has liability. If no liability has to be 
introduced, it must be done through the amendment of section 36 of the COIDA of 
1993.1658  
 
The manner of the calculation of benefits in the RABS Bill is long-winded and not in 
compliance with the objective of the setting of structured benefits. In this regard, the 
                                            
1655  Ibid. 
1656  The RABS Bill only defines a posthumous child. 
1657  For the definition of a child, see Klopper 2014 THRHR 23.  
1658  See Klopper 2014 THRHR 24. 
 316 
concise method employed by the COIDA of 1993 should rather be used as a 
template.1659 However, an aspect that has been neglected by COIDA is the position of 
the dependants of such a worker, who experience a significant loss of support.1660 
Currently, an employee’s dependants are only entitled to compensation where such 
employee died because of his or her injuries, or from a disease contracted in the scope 
of his or her employment. In cases of severe disability, relatives of the injured worker 
may have to take care of the injured relative, and this may have a negative effect on 
their own economic activities. Interestingly, section 28 of COIDA provides for payment 
of a long-term attendance allowance if an employee requires constant help. A certain 
degree of predictability is needed to encourage settlement and clarity of claims by the 
dependants of a severely disabled employee. These are areas where the unfair and 
discriminatory treatment of dependants of employees or victims of road accidents may 
only be resolved by a clear statutory amendment provision. 
 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that although COIDA, RAF Act and their 
predecessor Acts were designed to provide the dependants, following the death of 
their breadwinner due to a motor vehicle accident, work-related accident, or a disease 
contracted in the workplace, with the widest possible protection, the reality is that there 
are many limitations placed on this goal. Neither of these Acts can provide sufficient 
financial protection to the dependants of the deceased breadwinner. The Acts provide 
inadequate payouts, with no uniform approach in the assessment of "damage" suffered 
by the dependants. A move towards universal assessment of "damage" suffered by 
the dependants should be the first step towards integrating the two sets of legislation. 
                                            
1659  Idem 28. 
1660  Millard 2009 IJSSWC 47 51. 
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The discrepancy in awards of compensation granted by both Acts is capable of being 
corrected through an intelligent reform process, not via the introduction of the RAFAA 
and RABS Bill, which hopelessly exacerbate the financial situation of the dependants. 
The RAFAA and the RABS Bill actually work against the dependants, rather than 
protecting them. Their low and inadequate level of compensation, with RABS’ principle 
of complete non-accountability of the wrongdoers, defeat the objectives of the 
establishment of a comprehensive third-party compensation system. The 
government’s priority of saving money through the changes brought about by the 
RAFAA and proposed RABS Bill is clearly not aligned with the priniciple of the widest 
possible protection. 
 
The RABS’ abolishment of the common law right entirely protects the wrongdoer, at 
the expense of the deceased and his or her dependants, leaving the dependants with 
no right to compensation other than in terms of RABS. This makes it easier for 
wrongdoers, hence the increase in accidents. To add fuel to the fire, the wrongdoer, if 
injured in the same accident, receives exactly the same benefits.  
 
The loss of support for a surviving spouse is paid for a maximum of 15 years or until 
age 60, whichever period is the shortest, and a dependent child is only entitled to family 
support until age 18, regardless of whether the dependant wishes to further his or her 
education, or whether the deceased would have supported that child longer. These 
factors, coupled with the denial of any lump sum payments for loss of support, afford 
the dependants no prospect, whatsoever, of financial rehabilitation via the RABS Bill.  
 
The above discussion provided the background to the South African legal position on 
the workers and road accident victims’ compensation systems. The following 
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discussion focuses on the status of the workers and road accident victims’ 
compensation systems in Botswana and Lesotho. 
 
5.3 Botswana and Lesotho 
5.3.1 Workers’ compensation scheme 
As previously mentioned,1661 similar to South Africa, a statutory workers’ compensation 
scheme exists in both Botswana and Lesotho. The Lesotho workers' compensation 
scheme was established in 1977 under the Workmen's Compensation Act,1662 while 
the Botswana workers' compensation scheme was established in 1998 under the 
Workers' Compensation Act.1663 In most respects, both Acts are materially identical to 
the South African Workmen’s Compensation Act.1664 Both Acts provide for the 
compensation of workers for injuries suffered, or occupational diseases contracted, in 
the course of their employment, or for death resulting from such injuries or diseases, 
as well as for matters incidental and connected thereto. Should a worker be injured or 
die as a result of a work injury or disease, any person who is dependant upon the 
worker at the time of his or her death may be entitled to workers’ compensation 
benefits. The Acts state that an employer should insure his workers and himself in 
respect of all liabilities that he may incur under the provisions of the Act.1665 Both Acts 
further state that an employer who fails to do this will be found guilty of an offence, and 
is liable for a fine.1666 
 
                                            
1661  See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
1662  Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977. 
1663  Workers’ Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
1664  Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
1665  See s 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; s 2(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act 23 of 1998. 
1666  See s 2(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977; s 2(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act 23 of 1998. 
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In terms of regulation 2(1) of the Lesotho Workmen's Compensation Regulations of 
2014, the amount payable as compensation to a dependant of an employee who died 
because of an injury sustained at work, leaving the dependants wholly dependant on 
the worker's earnings, shall not exceed two hundred and forty thousand, five hundred 
Maloti (M240 500).1667 Regulation 2(2) provides that the amount payable by the 
employer for burial expenses of the deceased shall not exceed sixteen thousand, 
seven hundred Maloti (M16 700).1668 
 
In terms of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998, where death 
results from an injury or occupational disease under circumstances in which 
compensation is payable, the compensation to be paid shall be equal to such number 
of monthly earnings as may be prescribed by the Minister in terms of subsection (2). 
In terms of section 13(2), the Minister may prescribe the compensation payable in 
terms of subsection (1) in the case (a) where a worker leaves dependants who are 
wholly dependant upon his earnings; (b) where a worker leaves dependants who are 
only partially dependant upon his earnings; and (c) of reasonable expenses for the 
burial of the deceased worker.1669 According to the Botswana Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 23 of 1998,1670 a "dependant" of a worker means 
a widow or widower who at the time of the accident was married, in accordance 
with either the customary or statute law, to the worker; (b) where there is no 
widow or widower in terms of paragraph (a), a woman or man with whom the 
worker was at the time of the accident living as wife or husband; (c) a child of 
the worker or of his spouse and includes a posthumous child, a step child, an 
adopted child and a child born out of wedlock; (d) a parent of the worker or 
any person who was acting in the place of a parent; and (e) a brother or sister, 
grandparent or grandchild; who was at the time of the accident wholly or partly 
financially dependant upon the worker. 
 
                                            
1667  Currency Converter Results: M240500 = R241165.14 @ 15:50 on 9 August 2017 
http://www.exchange-rates.org/converter/LSL/ZAR/240500.00 (accessed on 9 August 2017). 
1668  Workmen's Compensation Regulations, 2014, submitted on Thursday, 04/16/2015. 
1669  See s 13 of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
1670  See s 2 of the Botswana Workmen’s Compensation Act 23 of 1998. 
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Unlike Botswana, the Lesotho Workmen’s Compensation Act does not expressly 
categorise the dependants. It only states that the dependants eligible to claim are those 
who are wholly or partially dependant on the deceased worker’s earnings.1671 
 
5.3.2 Motor vehicle accident compensation scheme (MVA) 
Botswana and Lesotho are two of the five countries1672 in Southern Africa that 
administer a fuel levy-funded motor vehicle accident compensation system. These 
accident compensation systems are administered by statutory bodies established 
through the respective Acts of Parliament, with the exception of Lesotho, which is 
outsourced to a private insurance agency for administration purposes. The motor 
vehicle accident compensation legislations for both Botswana and Lesotho1673 are 
clearly a repetition of the South African RAF Act 51 of 1996. South African judgments, 
which command a persuasive status in the two countries, have also been relied on 
where necessary.1674 Neither country has yet amended their MVA legislation in 
accordance with the new South African RAFAA, or the proposed RABS Bill. It is 
uncertain whether these countries will follow suit or not. Therefore, a claim by the 
dependants of the deceased is not limited, since both countries apply the law in 
accordance with the old RAF Act 51 of 1996. 
 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
The development of Botswana and Lesotho's road and work-related accident 
compensation systems has been shaped by South African law. Both their COIDA and 
MVA Acts are replicas of the South African Acts. Although Botswana and Lesotho 
                                            
1671  See s 2 of the Lesotho Workmen’s Compensation Act 13 of 1977. 
1672  The five countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and the kingdom of eSwatini (the 
old Swaziland – see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa/43905628 (accessed on 28 December 
2018)). 
1673  Order 26 of 1989. 
1674  Ailola 1991 CILSA 365. 
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followed and reproduced the South African Acts, neither country has yet amended their 
MVA legislation in accordance with the new South African RAFAA, or the proposed 
RABS Bill. The assumption to be made from this is that Botswana and Lesotho do not 
experience the same financial deficit in their third party compensation systems as is 
the case in South Africa, which begs the question how they managed to escape the 
same fate as South Africa? Could this perhaps indicate that the problem does not lie 
with the legislation itself, but in the management of the legislation? 
 
The above discussion provided the background to the Botswana and Lesotho legal 
position on the workers and road accident victims’ compensation systems. The 
following discussion focuses on the status of the workers and road accident victims’ 
compensation systems in Australia. 
 
5.4 Australia 
5.4.1 Workers’ compensation scheme 
The Australian system shares common features with South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho, as illustrated by a comparison of the social security systems in the four 
countries.1675 For instance, in New South Wales, there are two important legislations: 
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) (1987 Act) and Workplace Injury 
Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (1998 Act). The most 
recent amendments to the workers’ compensation scheme occurred in 2012 in terms 
of the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW): If a worker is 
injured or dies as a result of a work injury, any person dependant upon the worker at 
                                            
1675  Ibid. 
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the time of his or her death may be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.1676 In 
the Northern Territory, the Workmen’s Compensation Act (NT) provides for 
compensation to be paid to relations by blood, traditional marriage or custom, and there 
is specific provision for additional dependant traditional wives aged 16 or older. 
Dependant traditional wives aged below 16 are only eligible as “dependant 
children”.1677 
 
In all other Australian jurisdictions, a traditionally married spouse would only be able 
to rely on the rights given to de facto spouses (eg widows) pursuant to workers’ 
compensation legislation, with the use of a broad definition of “dependant”.1678 For 
example, section 6(1) of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) defines a 
“dependant” as: 
such of the worker’s family as were wholly or in part dependant for support 
upon the worker at the time of his death ... and includes ... a person so 
dependant who although not legally married to the worker lived with the worker 
as the worker’s husband or wife on a permanent or bona fide domestic basis. 
 
In some jurisdictions, a de facto relationship will only be recognised if the parties have 
lived together for a specified period,1679 or if there are children born of the relationship. 
These provisions are undoubtedly capable of benefitting traditionally married spouses, 
who would otherwise not qualify under the statutory criteria of dependency, although it 
is not clear whether they would allow compensation to be paid to more than one 
wife.1680 It is very hard to justify excluding traditionally married dependants from 
                                            
1676  The entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits is set out in s 9 of the 1987 Workers 
Compensation Act. S 9 provides that a worker who has suffered an injury (and in the case of the 
death of a worker, his or her dependants) shall receive compensation from the worker’s employer. 
1677  ss 6 & 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (NT), Second Schedule, especially par (1A) (b)(i), D, 
E. There has been no Northern Territory experience of claims by traditional wives under the Act: 
President, Workmen’s Compensation Tribunal, Submission 326 (29 April 1982). 
1678  Eg s 6(1) of the Workers Compensation Act, 1926 (NSW). 
1679  s 4AA of the Family Law Act, Australia; Family Law Australia https://www.diyfamilylawaustralia.com 
(accessed on 9 August 2017). 
1680  cf In re Fagan (1980) 23 SASR 454 464-465 (Jacobs J). 
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entitlements to workers’ compensation benefits. These benefits are an important form 
of protection for employees and their dependants.1681 To deny compensation to 
Aboriginal dependants because they practice different family traditions would be to 
deny Aboriginal employees an important aspect of their employment rights, and to shift 
the burden of dependency from the employer to the State (through the social security 
system). It would be even less justified, in that the Australian Worker’s Compensation 
Acts pay little attention to the forms or categories, as distinct from the fact, of 
dependency.1682 
 
A traditional marriage should be recognised as a “marriage” for all workers’ 
compensation purposes. Specific provision for traditional spouses, as in the Northern 
Territory, is a better way of ensuring that this right of traditional married couples is 
implemented in practice.1683 Existing provisions entitling putative or de facto spouses 
to workers’ compensation vary significantly between the states.1684 Unnecessary time 
limits are imposed and the position of plural (polygamous) wives (between whom 
compensation rights on death should be shared) is not clearly addressed.1685 In most 
jurisdictions, the legislation relating to dependants appears to be wide enough to 
include situations of polygamy (even though it may not have been envisaged by the 
drafters of the legislation), but specific provision for this situation should be made.1686 
In South Africa, although there are no specific provisions dealing with the sharing of 
the compensation money, it is common practice that the money will be divided equally 
amongst the polygamous wives. 
                                            
1681  Australian Law Reform: Compensation for Injury or Death  Aboriginal traditional marriage: areas of 
recognition https://www.alrc.gov.au/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
1682  Ibid. 
1683  Ibid. 
1684  Ibid. 
1685  Ibid. 
1686  Ibid. 
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5.4.2 Motor vehicle accident compensation scheme 
The most common claims for loss of support are due to accidents on the road.1687 Each 
state and territory in Australia has different laws on compensation of claims, with each 
state having its own third-party compensation policies. A compulsory third party (CTP) 
insurance policy provides cover for legal liability for personal injuries or death arising 
from the use of a motor vehicle. The insurance covers the relevant motor vehicle for 
accidents causing personal injury and/or death anywhere in Australia. The relevant 
authorities in terms of road accidents in Australia are New South Wales - Motor 
Accidents Authority; Northern Territory - Territory Insurance Office; Queensland - 
Motor Accident Insurance Commission; South Australia - Motor Accident Commission; 
Tasmania - Motor Accidents Insurance Board; and Western Australia - Insurance 
Commission of Western Australia. 
 
In the New South Wales state, claims for personal injury and death arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents that occurred on or after 5 October 1999 are dealt with under the 
provisions of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act of 1999 (NSW).1688 The relevant 
Queensland legislation is the Motor Accident Insurance Act of 1994 (Qld) (MAI Act). 
This Act does not provide for the payment of statutory or no-fault benefits. The 
legislation governs an entirely fault-based scheme. No compensation is paid to injured 
road users, unless they can prove that the injury was caused by the negligence of 
another person.1689 
 
                                            
1687  Comparison of Workers' Compensation Arrangements in Australia 
https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/.../ComparisonWorkersCompensationArrangementsAusNZ
2011.doc (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
1688  s 4 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act, 1999 (NSW). 
1689  See Motor Accident Insurance Act, 1994 (Qld) (MAI Act). 
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In South Australia, the government institution that provides third party injury insurance 
solutions for South Australians is the Motor Accident Commission. The institution offers 
coverage and compensation for people injured in road crashes, where the owner or 
driver of a registered motor vehicle, or a passenger, is at fault. The Motor Accident 
Commission (the Commission) was established pursuant to the Motor Accident 
Commission Act of 1992 (the MAC Act). The main function of the Commission is to 
provide compulsory third party (CTP) insurance for motor vehicle users in South 
Australia.1690  
 
The Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) is a Tasmanian government enterprise 
that operates a compulsory third party personal injury insurance scheme.1691 The 
Insurance Commission of Western Australia (Insurance Commission) is a statutory 
corporation or government trading enterprise owned by the State Government of 
Western Australia. The Insurance Commission has operated the Motor Injury 
Insurance Scheme in Western Australia since 1943.1692  
 
The Motor Accidents Compensation (MAC) Scheme provides personal injury and 
death cover for individuals and their families, which is included in their NT motor vehicle 
registration. The Motor Accidents (Compensation) (“MAC”) Act (NT) establishes a 
compensation scheme in respect of people who are injured or killed in motor vehicle 
accidents in the Northern Territory. MAC can provide benefits such as loss of support, 
medical, rehabilitation and financial support, in order to help people recover from 
                                            
1690  s 18 of the Motor Accident Commission Act, 1992 (the MAC Act) (SA); Motor Accident Commission 
https://www.audit.sa.gov.au/Publications/Annual-reports/2015-Reports/Annual-Report-by-
agency/Motor-Accident-Commission (accessed on 16 September 2017). 
1691 Motor Accidents Insurance Board (MAIB) (Tas) https://www.legalaid.tas.gov.au/referral-
list/listing/motor-accidents-insurance-board (accessed on 16 September 2017). 
1692  Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1943 (WA) sets out the scheme details; see Motor Injury 
Insurance https://www.icwa.wa.gov.au/motor-injury-insurance (accessed on 16 September 2017). 
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serious and sometimes permanent injuries caused by a road accident.1693 It is a no-
fault scheme, which means that an individual is covered, regardless of who caused the 
accident. However, some exclusions and reductions in benefits may apply if the driver 
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, was unlicensed to drive, or was involved 
in criminal or reckless conduct. A reduction may apply to some benefits if the injured 
person failed to wear a seatbelt or safety helmet where required by law.1694 MAC is a 
government-owned scheme managed by the Motor Accidents Compensation 
Commission (MACC), and administered on its behalf by the Territory Insurance Office 
(TIO).1695 The Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act (Northern Territory - NT) 1696 
specifically provides for benefits to be payable both to a de facto spouse and an 
Aboriginal traditional spouse. A “spouse” is defined in section 4 to include: 
(d) a person who was not legally married to the person but who, for a 
continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the 
relevant time, had ordinarily lived with the person as the person’s husband or 
wife, as the case may be, on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis, and 
who, in the opinion of the Board, was wholly or substantially dependant upon 
the person at the time: and 
(e) where that person is an aboriginal native of Australia — a person referred 
to in (a), (b), (c) or (d) or who is, according to the customs of the group or tribe 
of aboriginal natives of Australia to which he belongs, married to him. 
 
A traditionally married person under paragraph (e) above is in a better position than if 
he or she was forced to rely on the de facto relationship qualifications in paragraph 
(d).1697 The Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act of 1974 (NT)1698 applies to claims for 
loss of support arising from incidents other than motor vehicle accidents, and has 
similar recognition provisions for de facto relationships and traditional marriages. 
                                            
1693  Motor Accidents Compensation Scheme (NT) https://www.tiofi.com.au/car-insurance/macc/ 
(accessed on 13 September 2017). 
1694  See Motor Accidents (Compensation) (“MAC”) Act (NT) 
https://www.ntmacc.com.au/GeneralInformation.pdf (accessed on 16 September 2017). 
1695  Northern Territory Motor Accidents Annual Report 2015-2016 https://parliament.nt.gov.au/.../152.-
Annual-Report-2015-2016 (accessed on 16 September 2018). 
1696  s 4(d) & (e) of the Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act (NT). 
1697  According to the Northern Territory Insurance Office, in the first three years of the operation of the 
Act, there had been no claims involving Aboriginal traditional wives, Submission 330 (13 May 1982). 
1698  s 4(3)(e)(ii) of Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act of 1974 (NT). 
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Section 4(3)(e)(ii) provides that a person who, being an Aboriginal, has entered into a 
relationship with another Aboriginal that is recognised as a traditional marriage by the 
community or group to which either Aboriginal belongs, shall be treated as the wife or 
husband, as the case may be, of the deceased person. 
 
A similar approach is adopted in the Compensation (Commonwealth Government 
Employees) Act of 1971 (Cth),1699 which provides for compensation to dependants on 
the death of a Commonwealth employee. A dependant is defined to include a lawful 
spouse, as well as a woman who, throughout the period of three years immediately 
before the date of the death of the employee, although not legally married to him, lived 
with him as his wife on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis. In addition, an 
Aboriginal traditional spouse is specifically provided for: a “spouse” in relation to an 
aboriginal native, or a deceased aboriginal native, of Australia or of an external 
Territory, includes a person who is or was recognised as the husband or wife of that 
aboriginal native by the custom prevailing in the tribe or group of aboriginal natives of 
Australia, or of such a Territory to which that aboriginal native belongs or belonged.1700 
The point of this provision was explained by the Commonwealth Commissioner for 
Employees’ Compensation as “a special provision required to cover such cases 
because unless a tribal wife or wife by native custom could fulfil the requirements that 
a de facto wife had to meet, eg, cohabitation throughout a period of three years, then 
an incapacitated employee with a tribal wife or wife by native custom would, probably, 
be ineligible for the additional weekly compensation in respect of such a wife. 
Moreover, in the case of a compensable death of an Aboriginal employee, the wife or 
                                            
1699  This Act applies to an employee who sustained injuries or contracted a disease during the course 
of his or her employment. 
1700  s 5 of Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 (Cth). 
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husband would, probably, not have been eligible for compensation although she or he 
was, in fact, a dependant spouse.”1701 
 
In other Australian jurisdictions, traditionally married spouses would only be entitled to 
accident compensation benefits if they fell within the provisions covering de facto 
relationships or a qualification based on dependency.1702 For example, in South 
Australia, the Wrongs Act of 1936 enables a “putative spouse” to bring an action in 
respect of the death of a deceased spouse, if caused by the “act, neglect or default” of 
another person.1703 This legislation is unique, in that it also specifically provides for an 
apportionment of benefits (in such manner as the court thinks fit) if the deceased is 
survived by both a lawful spouse and a de facto spouse.1704 There is a five-year 
qualification requirement for a “putative spouse” under the South Australian Act. 
 
In Victoria, the Motor Accidents Act of 1973 (Vic) established a system of no-fault 
compensation for persons injured in road accidents. A “dependant spouse” is defined 
in section 3(1) to include a woman living with a man immediately prior to his death on 
a permanent and bona fide domestic basis, and who is wholly or mainly dependant on 
him for economic support.1705 No time qualification is specified for a de facto spouse. 
The parties to a traditional marriage should be able to claim compensation for death or 
injury, regardless of whether they fall within the definition of a de facto relationship. 
 
                                            
1701  Dwyer “Commissioner for Employees Compensation” Submission 327 dated 3 May 1982. 
1702  Not all States recognize de facto spouses. Western Australia does not, despite the 
recommendation of the WALRC to include de facto spouses: WALRC, Report on Fatal Accidents, 
(Perth, 1978), par 3.32. 
1703  s 3a of the Wrongs Act of 1936 (South Australia): definitions of “spouse” and “putative spouse.” 
1704  Wrongs Act of 1936 (SA): s 20(4) & (7) (action for wrongful death), s 23b (action by spouse for 
solatium). The apportionment provisions are ss 20(3) 23(b)(2) & (3). Under the Compensation 
(Commonwealth Government Employees) Act, 1971 (Cth), apportionment would be the 
responsibility of the Commissioner under s 45(3) & (4). 
1705  s 3(1) of the Motor Accidents Act, 1973 (Vic). 
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The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, in its report 
on The Effects of Asbestos Mining on the Baryulgil Community (1984), recommended 
that priority be given to legislation under the Commonwealth marriage power, providing 
recognition to Aboriginal marriages, at least for the purposes of actions for damages 
for loss of support by surviving dependants in cases of death caused by personal 
injury.1706 Where there is more than one spouse (whether a traditional spouse or a 
Marriage Act spouse) who is eligible to receive compensation, the compensation 
should be apportioned between them at the discretion of the court or authority 
responsible for paying the compensation.1707  
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
Similar to South Africa, Australian workers and road accident victims’ compensation 
systems originated because of the need to address the plight of workers, road accident 
victims and their dependants left destitute due to road accidents and work-related 
disabilities or death. The Australian road and work-related accident compensation 
systems share common features with South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. Statutory 
workers and road accident victims’ compensation schemes exist in all Australian states 
and territories. Like South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, the road accident legislations 
govern an entirely fault-based scheme. No compensation is paid to victims of road 
accidents, unless they can prove that the death or injury was caused by the negligence 
of another person. Unlike in South Africa, each state and territory in Australia has 
different laws on compensation of claims, with each state having its own third-party 
compensation policies. In South Africa, all provinces are governed by one and the 
                                            
1706  House of Representatives, Standing Committees on Aboriginal Affairs, Report: The Effects of 
Asbestos Mining on the Baryulgil Community, AGPS, (Canberra, 1984), 120. 
1707  The arguments outlined in par 5.4.1 dealing with workers’ compensation apply here as well; Carney 
2010 Sydney Law Review 196. 
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same third-party compensation legislation. Similar to Botswana and Lesotho, Australia 
has not yet amended their MVA legislation towards a no-fault system. 
 
5.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has discussed selected social security legislations pertaining to a 
dependency action for loss of support and funeral expenses in all four comparative 
countries. It has been indicated that all four countries have developed social security 
legislations, though the legislations lack universality, despite their common objective 
of protecting the dependants of a deceased, who was unlawfully and negligently killed. 
In South Africa, there is not one specific statutory law comprehensively dealing with 
the dependants’ action for loss of support and funeral expenses.  
 
Social security legislations that deal with the dependency action are fragmented. 
Although there is a clear interrelationship between the RAF Act and COIDA, major 
differences exist insofar as the two pieces of social security legislation regulating the 
dependency action or claim for loss of support and funeral expenses are concerned. 
The two sets of legislation address similar issues, but there is no uniform approach in 
the assessment of "damage" suffered by the dependants, and the awarding of benefit 
structures and entitlements, which is seen as one of the greatest hurdles to overcome 
in addressing this matter. This area of social security demands that there be more 
unity, in order to provide every dependant of the victim of workplace or road-related 
accidents with the same platform, no matter how rich or poor they are. This will help to 
inculcate a feeling of equality amongst these dependants. When the legislations are 
uniform, the claimants will approach them more confidently. Therefore, there is a clear 
need for some degree of alignment between the different laws, and their integration 
within the broader dependency action and social security framework. A lack of 
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alignment between the two sets of social insurance legislations may lead to duplication 
of payments, which could seriously reduce the financial soundness of the respective 
public insurance systems, thereby putting a strain on the revenues from which social 
securities are paid. 
 
A move towards universal assessment of "damage" suffered by the dependants should 
be the first step towards integrating the two sets of legislation. Although the object of 
the RAF compensation system was to provide the victim of road accidents and his or 
her dependants with the widest possible protection, the reality is that the RAF can no 
longer provide extensive financial support for victims and their dependants. Therefore, 
even if the RAF does pay out, the amount will probably be insufficient to cover the full 
extent of the damage or losses suffered. This gap between the pay-out and the true 
expenses could be vast. It is thus vital to address this financial gap. The government’s 
priority of saving money through the changes brought about by the RAFAA and 
proposed RABS Bill is not aligned with the widest possible protection principle, and 
this has influenced the “pay-out-amount” to claimants in an unprofitable way. 
 
The proposed RABS compensation system is a product of the perception of limiting 
the scope of protection that the RAF compensation system is providing, under the 
pretense of cutting costs. Invariably, the very same costs that are cut (if at all) are not 
cut, but rather shift to the dependants or victims, who are supposed to be protected by 
the system. The changes in terms of the RAFAA and proposed RABS Bill actually 
leave the victim with the financial duty to supplement the compensation provided by 
the RAF with an effective personal insurance policy, in the event that they are involved 
in an accident. Consequently, each road user now has the increased burden of 
financially preparing for the possibility of a serious motor vehicle accident, and the 
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potential repercussions of such an accident, which range from injury or disability to 
death. Every road user has to ensure that he or she has adequate personal accident 
insurance cover, disability insurance, life insurance, health insurance, funeral cover, 
and unemployment insurance due to incapacity or temporary loss of income due to 
injury. Road users should consider consulting a financial planner to assist them in 
planning their estate and determining the levels of insurance required, in order to avoid 
being over-insured or under-insured when such an unfortunate accident occurs. 
 
Since the RAF Act, the proposed RABS Bill and COIDA do not provide full cover, 
victims of road accidents and their dependants, as well as employees and their 
dependants, should be allowed to sue the wrongdoer and employers directly (also for 
general damages, such as pain and suffering). Logically, if the employer or wrongdoer 
is sued directly, any amount paid out by the compensation system should be deducted 
from any damages claimed, as the principle should remain that the road accident 
victim, employee, or his/her dependants should not receive more than their actual loss 
or damage. Despite the fact that the goals of the RAF compensation system are 
honourable, the system has culminated in escalating costs over the years and has 
been insolvent for years. In addition, efforts to cut the costs and return it to financial 
stability were unsuccessful, and it remains to be seen whether the proposed RABS Bill 
will be any different. 
 
Findings and recommendations are often considered to be the most important part of 
a research study. Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated exclusively to this topic. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, the summary of the contributions of this thesis, its possible 
impact, challenges, recommendations and important directions for future research are 
discussed.  
 
6.2 Summary of important findings and necessary recommendations 
This section provides a summary of the main focus area and the objectives, as well as 
the problems addressed in this study. 
 
6.2.1 Primary focus and objectives of this study 
The primary focus of this study was on establishing the traditional values in the action 
of dependants under customary law,1708 and assessing to what extent the affirmation 
of indigenous values in the dependency action has been effected by the South African 
courts and the legislature. In order to make this determination, four objectives were 
identified and researched for this study: Firstly, a brief historical background to the 
need for the action of dependants was provided. Secondly, the traditional values in the 
action of dependants were established and a determination was made as to whether 
the South African courts and legislature have affirmed indigenous values in the 
common law dependency action, and incorporated them into our legal system. Thirdly, 
a detailed comparison was made of the dependency action as applied in three different 
jurisdictions in Africa, and in a fourth comparative country rich with indigenous values, 
namely Australia. Finally, the study considered important principles that South Africa 
                                            
1708  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.2. 
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should bear in mind in its development of the action’s jurisprudence within a 
comparative African context. 
 
Objective 1: Historical background 
In chapter 2, this study probed the introduction and progression of the action of 
dependants under common law within the relevant historical context in all four 
comparative countries.1709 The study found that there were similarities in the historical 
development of the action of dependants in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia. All four comparative jurisdictions have historical links dating back to colonial 
times. The law on the dependency action in all four comparative countries has been 
greatly influenced by Roman-Dutch law and English law.1710 The study also found the 
objective of the action to be the same in South Africa,1711 Botswana,1712 Lesotho1713 
and Australia.1714 The study has shown how the introduction of the action was 
necessary to deal with the protection of dependants whose breadwinner had been 
negligently and unlawfully killed, and resulted in the development of the dependency 
action into a legal scheme, which encompassed deliberations of fairness to safeguard 
justice for such dependants. The shared civilian ancestry means that many features of 
the four systems are similar, although South Africa has seen notable modern 
developments, which cannot be traced back to Roman-Dutch or English law.1715  
 
 
                                            
1709  See chapter 2 of the thesis. 
1710  See chapter 2 of the thesis, paras 2.2 & 2.3. 
1711  See chapter 2 of the thesis, par 2.4.  
1712  See chapter 2 of the thesis, par 2.5. 
1713  Ibid.  
1714  See chapter 2 of the thesis, par 2.6. 
1715  Eg, recognition of customary law and full marriage rights granted to the South African LGBT 
community. Many developments took place under the new constitutional order in South Africa to 
give customary law and its underlying values a rightful place in South African law, but there is still 
a lot of work in the future, particularly in the customary law domain. 
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Objective 2: Traditional values and incorporating customary law 
This study was inspired by a simple curiosity to discover the traditional legal values of 
the dependency action.1716 The central problem addressed in this thesis is that the 
available sources on the dependency action in South Africa do not mention the 
presence or absence of traditional values in African/customary/indigenous law 
pertaining to the dependency action.1717 This is an inaccuracy in our legal system and 
can lead to distorted assumptions, namely that customary law does not provide 
protection to dependants of a breadwinner who suffered a wrongful death. Africa prides 
itself on having a rich cultural diversity, which has to be reflected in our current legal 
system.1718  
 
The study established that customary law does recognise a dependant’s right and 
action to claim damages from the person responsible for his or her breadwinner’s 
death.1719 The customary law dependency action is known as go tsoša/tsosa hlogo”in 
the Sepedi/Sotho/Setswana languages.1720 It is a well-established and recognised 
practise in customary law and has always been part of the legal system of African 
people of Southern Africa.1721 At the centre of this customary law principle lies a 
dependency claim for loss of support in the case of the wrongful death of a 
breadwinner. The go tsoša/tsosa hlogo principle provides an African understanding of 
the dependency action and can be applied to enlighten its Western counterpart. Similar 
to its Western counterpart, it gives the dependants under customary law the right to 
claim for loss of support where their breadwinner is unlawfully and negligently killed. 
 
                                            
1716  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.2. 
1717  Ibid.  
1718  Maithufi & Bekker 2009 OBITER 164 170. 
1719  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.4.3.2. 
1720  Ibid. 
1721  Ibid.  
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Many features of this customary law action of dependants are similar to the common 
law roots of the dependency action.1722 The study has established that both African 
and Westernised law provide rules concerning the dependency action for loss of 
support, and compensation for such loss. Botswana and Lesotho inherited their law 
from South Africa and still follow the South African law and cases, hence the action of 
dependants in Botswana and Lesotho is mostly the same as in South Africa,1723 and is 
legally enforceable. The death of a breadwinner who had a duty to support the 
dependants undoubtedly causes loss to such dependants, irrespective of whether it is 
under customary law or civil law.1724 When one observes the aim of the dependants’ 
claim for loss of support due to the unlawful and negligent killing of the breadwinner 
under customary law, it is also to place the dependants in the same financial position 
they would have been if their breadwinner had not been killed.1725
 
In this sense, the 
customary law remedy of go tsoša hlogo/go tsosa hlogo has a purely delictual point of 
departure, namely damages in the case of wrongful conduct.1726 
 
In spite of this commonality between the customary and common law action of 
dependency, there are important differences, which should be kept in mind, especially 
with regard to the general principles relating to the assessment and quantification of 
compensation (damages) for loss of support owing to the death of a breadwinner under 
the dependency action.1727 In determining delictual liability and compensation under 
customary law, in contrast to Western law, the general elements and principles for 
delictual liability and assessment of damages in terms of customary law are not as 
                                            
1722  See the discussion on the nature and principles of the action in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1723  See chapters 2, 3 & 4 of this thesis. 
1724  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.6.2; chapter 3 of this thesis, paras 3.4.1.2 & 3.5.2. 
1725  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.7; chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.3. 
1726  Ibid. 
1727  See chapter 4 of the thesis, paras 4.6.1-4.6.9. 
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clear as under common law in South Africa.1728 This can be ascribed to the fact that 
conflict resolution under customary law puts emphasis on reconciliation and restoration 
objectives with the purpose of restoring peace within the society.1729 Accordingly, there 
is no clear distinction between criminal law and the law of delict under customary law, 
as it is in its character to generalise, which is in contrast with the nature of common 
law, which is to comprise specialised rules and habitually refined dissimilarities 
between the two systems.1730 However, the law of delict under customary law, offers 
compensation for the violation of any right representing material value, which can be 
attained by a household leader. This denotes reparation for damage (harm) to the 
dependants of the deceased, who was unlawfully and negligently killed.1731 
 
Customary law damages can also be regarded as being in contrast to common law 
punitive damages, which are awarded to a plaintiff in addition to compensatory 
damages. The award for damages under customary law is limited to punitive damages. 
Concepts such as compensatory damages are strange and unfamiliar to customary 
law. Consequently, customary law is inadequate of the essential principle discussed 
here, namely that the law entitles the dependants to be awarded damages for the full 
measure of their losses, as best as it can be calculated in monetary terms. Therefore, 
it is concluded that customary law damages applied independently and exclusively are 
considered an inadequate and even unjust remedy for the loss of support, because it 
will in most cases lead to under-compensation of the dependants. 
 
  
                                            
1728  See chapter 4 of the thesis, par 4.2. 
1729  Ibid. 
1730  Ibid. 
1731  Ibid. 
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Objective 3: Comparative research 
It was imperative to explore the heart of African-ness with regard to the dependency 
action in more detail, as well as to determine whether comparative law has anything to 
offer in this respect. Accordingly, the study critically examined the action of dependants 
in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho from an African perspective. It then compared 
this to its application in Australia, a country that is known for its recognition and 
inclusion of indigenous Australian customary law.1732 
 
In chapter 3, the study observed, among others, the nature, objectives, principles and 
valid requirements for the dependency action.1733 It found the action to be a flexible 
delictual remedy in nature, which can be adapted to modern conditions. This appears 
to be the accurate version of the nature of the action throughout the four countries 
being studied in this research.1734 The study also found the objectives and valid 
requirements for the action to be the same under the laws of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Australia.1735 South Africa initially rejected the recognition of customary law, but has 
now moved on, with customary law being admitted and recognised in all its aspects.1736 
The non-recognition of customary law in Australia is unsurprising, because in both 
jurisdictions, namely South Africa and Australia, the law was greatly influenced by 
European colonisation. Colonial law has not, until recently, acknowledged the 
Aboriginal heritage, relationship to land, languages, and culture.1737 
 
                                            
1732  See chapters 2-5 of this thesis. 
1733  See chapter 3 of the thesis. 
1734  See chapter 3 of the thesis, paras 3.4.2 & 3.4.3.  
1735  Ibid. 
1736  See ss 33 35 of the interim Constitution; ss 30 31 39 211 of the Constitution. 
1737 The Federal Government’s “Act of Recognition” and Aboriginal customary law. 
https://unlearningtheproblem.wordpress.com/.../the-federal-governments-act-of-recognition-and-
aboriginal-customary-law/ (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
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Recently, the Australian legal system has made some attempts to recognise Aboriginal 
customary law. It may be said that in an unsystematic, indirect, piecemeal way, 
Australian law does now allow for the recognition of Aboriginal customary traditions 
and laws. This type of acknowledgement is limited and is usually a reaction to an 
explicit circumstance or necessity.1738 There seems to be no reason in principle why 
Aboriginal customary law should not be given a wider recognition in Australia. Although 
the Native Title Act 1993 is a statute that developed through common law, it is a piece 
of legislation in terms of customary law that gives recognition to the indigenous 
Australian societies’ systems of law. Unlike in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, 
the recognition of customary law is a comparatively slow-moving area of law in 
Australia, and it is questionable whether full recognition of customary law will occur in 
the near future. It will be of the utmost value for our sister jurisdiction, Australia, to learn 
from South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho in terms of the developments that took place 
under customary law. 
 
Objective 4: Future developments 
In Australia, contrary to the position in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, each state 
seems to have a law dedicated to the dependency action,1739 though the absence of 
traditional legal values in their respective laws on the action is unfortunately evident. 
                                            
1738 Calma https://www.humanrights.gov.au/.../speeches/integration-customary-law-australian-legal-
system-tom-calma (accessed on 8 August 2016). 
1739  For instance, ss 23 & 28(2) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory); Fatal 
Accidents Act 1950 (Western Australia); Supreme Court Act 1995 (Queensland); Civil Liability Act 
1936 (Southern Australia); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Compensation to Relatives Act 
1897 (New South Wales); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tasmania); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 
1974 (Northern Territories); Wrongs Act 1958 (Victoria); s 57 of the Acts Amendment (Equality of 
Status) Act 2003 (Western Australia); s 83 of the Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 
(Queensland); s 60 of the Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De Facto Relationships Act 2003 
(Northern Territory); sch 1 of the Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tasmania); 
s 4 of the Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Victoria); sch 2.3 of the Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (New South Wales). 
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The fragmented collection of legislation on dependency actions1740 in South Africa, 
Botswana and Lesotho, which only partly regulates and deals with the action of 
dependants, does not allow for a holistic recognition of the dependency action. It will 
therefore be of paramount importance for South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho to adopt 
the Australian approach and draft comprehensive legislation which specifically 
addresses all matters relating to the action of dependants, from both customary and 
civil law perspectives, in one piece of legislation. 
 
6.2.2 Problems addressed 
This thesis attempted to make a contribution in addressing the complex problems of 
the dependency action. Five specific problems or issues were identified1741 and 
addressed1742 in this thesis: 
 
Problem 1: Vested rights 
In Chapter 3, the study reassessed those issues of the dependency action, which affect 
the rights of dependants. In particular, the study considered the question of the vested 
rights given by the action.1743 The issue is whether a claim for damages for loss of 
support arising out of the unlawful and negligent death of the breadwinner is 
necessarily a dependant’s action, or whether, in some circumstances, such a claim 
must take the form of a breadwinner’s action instead.1744 The study found that the 
infringement of the dependants’ right to support is a wrongful act committed against 
the dependant and not the breadwinner. It is an infringement of the rights of the 
dependant. In other words, the legal duty is in favour of the dependant and not the 
                                            
1740  See chapter 2 of this thesis, paras 2.4.4 & 2.5.5; chapter 5 of this thesis. 
1741  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.2. 
1742  See chapters 2-5 of this thesis. 
1743  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.1. 
1744  Ibid. 
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breadwinner.1745 The effect of the independent nature of the action is that any defence, 
which is personal to the deceased, does not operate against the dependant.1746 The 
dependency action for loss of support belongs to the dependants, not to the deceased 
person, although it is administered through the deceased’s estate.1747  
 
Problem 2: Injured breadwinner 
Another question examined in chapter 3 is whether the dependants of a breadwinner 
who is injured (not killed) in a wrongful and culpable manner should, as in the case of 
death, be able to claim for loss of support with the Aquilian action.1748 The study 
revealed that the dependants are granted an action for loss of support if the injured 
breadwinner and a third party acted negligently and are regarded as joint wrongdoers 
against the dependants.1749 The Apportionment of Damages Act speaks of “injury to or 
death of any breadwinner”. Due to the fact that the wording of the Apportionment of 
Damages Act now covers this issue, the dependants should have a claim, irrespective 
of whether the breadwinner is injured or has died.1750 The decision in De Vaal NO v 
Messing should therefore not be seen as an obstacle to extending the action of 
dependants where the breadwinner is only injured.1751 As stated in the thesis, 
Botswana and Lesotho are very reliant on South African law in all their legal areas. 
Though the provisions of the Apportionment of Damages Act were written for South 
African law, the position is generally similar under Botswana,1752 Lesotho1753 and 
                                            
1745  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.1.  
1746  See Jameson’s Minors v Central South African Railways 1908 TS 575. 
1747  Hedley Death and tort (2007) 252. 
1748  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.4.1.2. 
1749  Ibid. 
1750  Neethling & Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 285. 
1751  Burchell Delict (1993) 236. 
1752  See Apportionment of Damages Act 32 of 1969 – Botswana. 
1753  The arguments outlined in chapter 2, par 2.6.5.3 dealing with the Apportionment of Damages 
legislation apply here as well. 
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Australian1754 law. It is clear that the inconsistency in the treatment of dependants of 
the injured breadwinner is unjustifiable under the dependency action and should not 
be tolerated in the post-constitutional dispensation, as it would be in the public interest 
to pursue a more comprehensive approach towards such dependants. 
 
Problem 3: Classes of dependants 
Chapter 3 also scrutinised the circle of eligible dependants under the dependency 
action.1755 The study demonstrated that the common law has been developed to 
recognise that a duty of support can arise, in a given case, from the fact-specific 
circumstances of a proven relationship, which shows that a binding duty of support can 
be established by one person in favour of another. Moreover, a culturally embedded 
notion of “family”, defined as being a network of relationships of reciprocal nurture and 
support, informs the common law’s appetite to embrace, as worthy of protection, the 
assumption of duties of support and the reciprocal right to claim support by persons 
who are in relationships akin to that of a family.1756 This norm is not narrow-minded, 
but is instead likely to be universal. It certainly is consistent with both the norms derived 
from the Roman-Dutch tradition, as alluded to by Cachalia JA in Paixăo v RAF,1757 and 
the norms derived from African tradition, as exemplified by the spirit of Ubuntu 
mentioned by Dlodlo J in Fosi v RAF.1758 These important developments do not, 
however, indicate that the action of dependency in South Africa has developed into a 
general remedy for the wrongful and negligent killing of the breadwinner. It has not 
advanced to this level yet.1759  
                                            
1754  See chapter 2 of this thesis - the arguments outlined in par 2.5.3.4 dealing with the Apportionment 
of Damages legislation apply here as well. 
1755  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5. 
1756  Taljaard v RAF [2014] ZAGPJHC 229; 2015 1 SA 609 (GJ). 
1757  [2012] ZASCA 130. 
1758  2008 3 SA 560 (C). 
1759  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5. 
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The list of categories of dependants may expand further in the future, owing to South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy, which promotes a culture of respect for basic human 
rights1760 and the norm of public accountability.1761 In South Africa, there is an unlimited 
circle of persons entitled to sue for loss of support where their breadwinner was 
unlawfully and negligently killed, including the LGBT1762 societies.1763 Australia, like 
South Africa, recognises same-sex relationships and recently it gave same-sex 
couples the right to marry. A law legalising same-sex marriages was passed by 
Parliament on 7 December 2017 and received royal assent the following day (8 
December 2017).1764  
 
The law of wrongful death in Botswana, Lesotho and Australia tends to define the class 
of eligible dependants narrowly.1765 The wrongful death remedy provides for exclusive 
classes of beneficiaries, thereby limiting recovery to those classes of dependants.1766 
The legal recognition of the rights of LGBT societies in Botswana and Lesotho seems 
unlikely to happen. The law in Botswana and Lesotho performs the function of 
prohibition through the criminalisation of homosexual activity, and attempts to organise 
relationships in the public and private sphere.1767 This implies that a surviving 
homosexual partner cannot institute a claim for loss of support in the case where his 
or her partner was wrongfully and negligently killed, as these relationships do not 
legally “exist” in Botswana.1768 The Botswana Constitution does not make any 
                                            
1760  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 
1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) par [11]. 
1761  Davel https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/handle/2263/6760 (accessed on 17 September 2016) 151. 
1762  LGBT stands for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals. 
1763  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5.4.  
1764  Yaxley http://www.abc.nt.au/news/2017-12-08/same-sex-marriage-legislation (accessed on 12 
December 2017). 
1765  See chapter 1 of this thesis, par 1.4.2.3; chapter 2 of this thesis, paras 2.5.5.5 & 2.6.3.5. 
1766  See chapter 3 of this thesis, par 3.5. 
1767  See chapter 2 of this thesis, paras 2.5.5.6 & 2.6.3.5. 
1768  See chapter 2 of this thesis, par 2.5.5.5.  
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reference to a right or protection from discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation.1769 It will be valuable for Botswana and Lesotho to learn in this respect from 
South Africa and Australia, and to keep abreast of the shifting public perceptions which 
have necessitated the rectification of what has become an unacceptable position in 
common law. 
 
Problem 4: Damages claimable under the dependency action 
Furthermore, the study explored and addressed the assessment of compensation 
(damages) in respect of the action of dependants for loss of support in chapter 4 of the 
thesis. The study observed remarkably broad similarities across all four comparative 
countries, with lively replication of legal concepts in the area of assessment of 
damages, as well as noteworthy similar concepts such as “damage”, “damages” and 
“compensation”.1770 The South African definitions and understanding of these concepts 
is also the accurate version of the definitions and understanding of these concepts 
under the laws of Botswana, Lesotho and Australia.1771 In all comparative jurisdictions, 
the normal measure of damages for loss of support under the dependency action is 
concerned with deducting the present patrimonial position of a dependant from the 
supposed (hypothetical) patrimonial position that the dependant would have been in 
had the breadwinner not been killed.1772 This follows from the principle that the 
compensation should put the dependant in the position he or she would have been, 
but for the unlawful and negligent death of his or her breadwinner, so far as can be 
done by the payment of money, and without undue hardship to the wrongdoer.1773 It 
                                            
1769  Ibid. 
1770  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.2. 
1771  Ibid. 
1772  Ibid. 
1773  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of damages (2012) par 14.7.2; Barnett & Harder Remedies 
(2014) 186. 
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was also observed that the South African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian laws 
contain and apply uniform principles and rules on the assessment for loss of 
support.1774 
 
The one area in which the Australian jurisdiction differs significantly from the 
comparative Southern African countries in this study is with regard to recoverable 
damages in terms of the dependency action. Although the assessment of the amount 
of damages for loss of support in terms of the dependency action is based on the 
principle of full compensation, the objective being, as stated above, to put the 
dependant in the position he or she would have been if the act that gave rise to the 
death of his or her breadwinner had not occurred at present, the recoverable damages 
under loss of support in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho is more limited than in 
Australian law.1775 It is not sufficiently wide to cover all or most of the losses that a 
dependant could have suffered due to the death of his or her breadwinner.1776 There 
is a need to bring the laws of these three countries in line with the more persuasive 
position taken by Australia. The legislatures and courts of South Africa, Botswana and 
Lesotho must take a realistic, clear-headed, and practical approach to reforming the 
law, and should learn from countries such as Australia in terms of compensating the 
dependants fully. The comparative analysis reveals that non-pecuniary damages for 
loss of spousal consortium and a child’s parental consortium, as well as pecuniary 
damages for loss of future savings or inheritance, are treated differently by South 
African, Botswana, Lesotho and Australian courts.1777 Australian law recognises 
compensation for patrimonial damages for loss of future savings or inheritance, and 
                                            
1774  See chapter 4 of this thesis, paras 4.3 & 4.6. 
1775  For example, unlike in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, the law in Australia allows for a loss 
of savings or inheritance – see chapter 4 of this thesis, paras 4.4 & 4.5. 
1776  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4. 
1777  See chapter 4 of this thesis, paras 4.4 & 4.5. 
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non-patrimonial loss accruing to the dependants of a deceased-breadwinner,1778
 
unlike 
the law in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho. 
 
Death represents the deprivation of a number of possible and even probable future 
enjoyments, yet the South African, Botswana and Lesotho wrongful death action does 
not attempt to redress all these losses. There have not been any good explanations 
provided as to why non-patrimonial losses and patrimonial loss of future savings or 
inheritance are not compensated in Southern African law. Indeed, the fact that the 
dependants have been deprived of these types of losses seems to have escaped the 
notice of our legislature. The current denial of compensation for non-patrimonial 
damages and patrimonial damages for loss of future savings or inheritance is 
unacceptable and prejudicial to the larger group of dependants.1779 It is recommended 
that an award should be made in South African law to acknowledge the non-pecuniary 
loss and pecuniary loss of future savings or inheritance suffered by the dependants 
due to the death of their breadwinner. An award of damages, even if small, can have 
a consoling effect where a child loses a parent or a parent loses an infant child, or a 
partner loses his or her spouse. The amount of compensation could be fixed at a 
conventional sum and the right to such compensation can also, for example, be limited 
to a child whose parent(s) was killed in an accident (unnatural death). 
 
Problem 5: Social security legislative frameworks 
Furthermore, the study analysed selected current social security legislative 
frameworks covering death claims or the dependency action for loss of support and 
                                            
1778  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4.2. 
1779  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.4. 
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funeral expenses in South Africa,1780 Botswana,1781 Lesotho1782 and Australia.1783 The 
study found that all four countries have developed social security legislations, though 
the legislations lack universality, despite their common objective of protecting the 
dependants of a deceased, who was unlawfully and negligently killed. In South Africa, 
there is no specific law dealing with the dependants’ action for loss of support and 
other related expenses, e.g. funeral expenses. Social security legislations that deal 
with the dependency action are fragmented. 
 
Although there is a clear interrelationship between the RAF Act and COIDA, major 
differences exist insofar as the two pieces of social security legislation regulating the 
dependency action or claim for loss of support and funeral expenses are concerned. 
The two sets of legislation address similar issues, but there is no uniform approach in 
the assessment of "damage" suffered by the dependants, nor the awarding of benefit 
structures and entitlements, which is seen as one of the greatest hurdles to overcome 
in addressing this matter.1784 This area of social security demands more unity, in order 
to provide every dependant of the victim of workplace or road-related accidents with 
the same platform, no matter how rich or poor they are. A lack of alignment between 
the two sets of social insurance legislations may lead to duplication of payments, which 
could seriously reduce the financial soundness of the respective public insurance 
systems, thereby putting a strain on the revenues from which social securities are paid. 
Usually, if the RAF pays out, the amount will probably be inadequate to cover the full 
extent of the damage or losses suffered. The fissure concerning the “pay-out amount” 
and the genuine expenses could be massive, and it is thus vital to address this financial 
                                            
1780  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.2. 
1781  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.3. 
1782  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.4. 
1783  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.5. 
1784  See chapter 5 of this thesis, paras 5.2.3.1 & 5.2.4. 
 348 
gap. The government’s priority of saving money through the changes brought about by 
the RAFAA and proposed RABS Bill is not aligned with the widest possible protection 
principle, and this will prejudice the “pay-out-amount” to claimants in an irrational 
manner.1785 The proposed RABS compensation system is a product of the perception 
of limiting the scope of protection that the RAF compensation system is providing, 
under the guise of cutting costs. The costs that are cut should rather be transferred to 
the pockets of the dependants or victims, who are supposed to be protected by the 
system. 
 
The changes in terms of the RAFAA and proposed RABS Bill actually leave the victims 
with the financial duty to supplement the compensation provided by the RAF with an 
effective personal insurance policy, in the event that they are involved in an accident. 
Consequently, each road user now has the increased burden of preparing financially 
for the probability of a severe motor vehicle accident, and the possible consequences 
of such an accident, which range from injury or disability to death. Every road user has 
to safeguard that he or she has sufficient personal accident policy cover, life policy, 
disability policy, health policy (medical aid), funeral cover, and unemployment 
insurance, in the event of inability or provisional loss of remunerations owing to injury. 
Road users should contemplate consulting a financial advisor to help them in the 
preparation of their estate and establishing the levels of insurance premium required, 
in order to evade being under-insured or over-insured when such an unfortunate 
accident occurs.1786 
 
                                            
1785  See chapter 5 of this thesis, paras 5.2.3.2 & 5.2.3.3. 
1786  See chapter 5 of this thesis, par 5.5. 
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In addition, the victims of road accidents and their dependants, as well as employees 
and their dependants, should be allowed to sue the wrongdoer and employers directly 
(also for general damages, such as pain and suffering).1787 Logically, if the employer 
or wrongdoer is sued directly, any amount paid out by the compensation system should 
be deducted from any damages claimed, as the principle remains that the road 
accident victim, employee, or their dependants should not receive more than their 
actual loss or damage. Despite the fact that the goals of the RAF compensation system 
are honourable, the system has culminated in escalating costs over the years and has 
actually been insolvent for years. The efforts to cut the costs and return it to financial 
stability were unsuccessful, and it remains to be seen whether the proposed RABS Bill 
will be any different. 
 
6.2.3 Summary of findings 
The following is a brief list of the most important findings made in this study: 
(i) The study found that the violation of the dependants’ right to support is an 
unlawful and negligent act committed directly to the dependants but not the 
breadwinner. 
(ii) The dependants should have a claim, irrespective of whether the 
breadwinner has died or is injured. 
(iii) The study demonstrated that the common law has been developed to 
recognise that a duty of support can arise, in a given case, from the fact-
specific circumstances of a proven relationship, which shows that a binding 
duty of support can be established by one person in favour of another. 
                                            
1787  Ibid. 
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(iv) It is recommended that an award should be made in the South African law 
to acknowledge the non-pecuniary loss and pecuniary loss of future savings 
or inheritance suffered by the dependants due to the death of the 
breadwinner. 
(v) The study found that all four comparative countries have developed social 
security legislations, though the legislations lack universality, despite their 
common objective of protecting the dependants of a deceased, who was 
unlawfully and negligently killed. Unlike Australia, in South Africa, Botswana 
and Lesotho, there is no specific law exclusively dealing with the 
dependants’ action for loss of support and funeral expenses. Social security 
legislations dealing with the dependency action are fragmented. 
(vi) It is of paramount importance for South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho to 
adopt the Australian approach and draft one comprehensive piece of 
legislation which specifically addresses all matters relating to the action of 
dependants, from both customary and civil law perspectives. 
(vii) The shared civilian ancestry of the four comparative countries means that 
many features of the four systems are similar, although South Africa has 
seen notable modern developments, which cannot be traced back to 
Roman-Dutch or English law, for example, the recognition of the rights of 
same-sex partners and customary law. 
(viii) Although the study found the action of dependants to be a flexible delictual 
remedy in nature, which can be adapted to modern conditions, blatant 
discrimination against homosexuals remains rife throughout Botswana and 
Lesotho. Same-sex couples have no legal recognition, as a result, the rights 
arising, on the death of a same-sex partner, to claim for loss of support 
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where the deceased partner was wrongfully and unlawfully killed is 
unavailable to them. It is suggested that Botswana and Lesotho should 
adopt the South African and Australian approach and recognise same-sex 
relationships. 
(ix) Customary law recognises a dependant’s right and action to claim damages 
from the person responsible for his or her breadwinner’s death and the 
customary law dependency action is known as go tsoša/tsosa hlogo in 
Sepedi/Setswana/Sesotho languages. 
(x) Customary law lacks the conceptual structure of modern law of damages 
concepts and the courts do not distinguish clearly between civil and criminal 
cases. This can be credited to the fact that traditional customary conflict 
resolution reinforces the aims of reconciliation and restoration, and not 
awarding the fullest possible compensation to the victim. 
(xi) Customary law damages applied independently and exlusively are 
considered an inadequate and even unjust remedy for the loss of support, 
because it could lead to under-compensation of the dependants. 
(xii) The common law provision for funeral-related expenses under the action of 
dependants is entirely inadequate when compared with the customary law 
approach to funerals and related ceremonies. The blanket ignorance or 
denial of African funerary rites and cleansing ceremonies by the dependency 
action and social security legislations are discriminatory, symbolises the 
legislator’s failure to respect and recognise African burial rights and 
cleansing ceremonies, and forces African communities to follow the rules 
regarding funeral expenses that are laid down for them in terms of western 
views. This blanket denial or ignorance of funerary rite expenses needs to 
 352 
be revised so that it recognises cultural practices, treats all cultures equally, 
and is in line with the current legal developments in a democratic South 
Africa. All the expenses related to the cultural rites of mourning and 
cleansing ceremonies, as well as all costs related to the administration of 
the deceased’s estate should be expressly included in the assessment and 
quantification of damages under the dependency action, as well as in related 
social security legislations.  Consequently, the proposed single, combined 
action of dependants should expressly integrate these expenses. 
(xiii) Unlike in South Africa, the recognition of customary law is a comparatively 
slow-moving area of law in Australia, and it is questionable whether full 
recognition of customary law will occur in the near future. It will be of the 
utmost value for our sister jurisdiction, Australia, to learn from South Africa, 
with regard to the developments that took place in customary law. 
Corresponding to Botswana and Lesotho where recognition of customary 
law is also limited in respect of other personal aspects, for example LGBT’s 
rights. The experience in Australia, Botswana and Lesotho confirms the 
need to broaden the recognition of customary law in all their aspects, such 
as in South Africa. 
(xiv)  Although customary law is also of great value in Australia, customary law is 
recognised only in certain circumstances. The absence of traditional legal 
values in its law on the dependency action is clear. 
 
6.3 Critical emerging challenges 
An important question posed in this study regarding the dependency action under 
customary law was whether or not African traditional legal rules and values on the 
action of dependants, when established, should be integrated with the common law 
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dependency action. There can be no doubt that the South African Constitution 
recognises the importance of customary law1788 and the harmonisation of traditional 
values with common law. It is also important to note that although customary law 
systems have valuable features relevant to the dependency action,1789 the application 
of customary law in the assessment of damages for loss of support also presents some 
challenges: “the calculation of loss of support is not simply a straight-forward total of 
the monthly loss multiplied by the number of months of lost support. The figures are 
referred to an actuary, who factors in inflation, discounting and various other 
contingencies1790 to arrive at a figure which, if invested at a market- related return, will 
provide support (out of both capital and interest) until the date when the deceased 
would have stopped working, and thus ceased to support his dependants. For further 
support after this date, the dependants (eg, widow) must make provision out of the 
compensation for post-retirement support.”1791 The customary law action of 
dependants has not necessarily developed or embraced a mechanism similar to the 
common law principles of assessment of damages for loss of support, hence the 
judicial process in the customary courts has its own shortcomings in this respect. 
 
As stated above, under customary law, compensation has a habit of looking ahead, 
with the aim of restoring peace within the society.1792 Consequently, the traditional 
awards granted where the breadwinner was negligently and unlawfully killed were 
matters of pence and chillies,1793 which undercompensated the dependants and failed 
to restore them to the positions they would have been in, had there been no wrongful 
                                            
1788  See ss 31 39(2) 185 & 211 of the Constitution. 
1789  “Go tsoša/tsosa hlogo” customary law principle. 
1790  See chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1791  Ibid. 
1792  See chapter 4 of this thesis, par 4.2. 
1793  According to Palmer Law of delict (1970) 19 and Poulter Legal dualism (1979) 70, the maximum 
penalty for killing a breadwinner would be the payment of 10 cows. 
 354 
act committed against their breadwinner. Although the dependants under customary 
law have the principle of molato ga o bole,1794 this principle is poorly recognised and 
seldom utilised in the context and spirit of emphasising the traditional goals of 
reconciliation and reintegration in dispute resolution. 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the incorporation of the customary law action of 
dependants into the common law action, in its current state of lack of assessment 
principles of damages, would result in the unfair treatment of dependants under 
customary law and complications could therefore arise. The main goal of the action of 
the dependants is the protection of the rights of the dependants, whether under or 
outside customary law. It is submitted that a well-planned and structured legislation 
addressing the customary law action of dependency in respect of assessment of 
damages should first be drafted in order to bring the customary law dependency action 
in line with the provisions relating to the common law dependency action. However, 
the action of dependency should be flexible and sensitive to the existing principles and 
practices of customary law, by taking into account the traditional laws and customs of 
cultural groups, the study cautions that these customs should not contradict the 
protective spirit of the common law action of dependants. Therefore, the thesis 
recommends that there should be, through legislation, only one dependency action, 
and that customary law can be respected in individual cases. 
 
6.4 Brief concluding remarks on the study 
In this concluding chapter, several recommendations have been proposed to help 
establish the correct cultural knowledge, understanding and interpretation of the action 
of dependants, as presented in this thesis. The thesis provides the setting within which 
                                            
1794  See chapter 4 of this thesis, paras 4.6.2 & 4.6.3 for the discussion on molato ga o bole. 
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suggestions are made for future research. By including the customary notion of go 
tsoša/tsosa hlogo in the existing dependency action as an instrument for restorative 
justice, an opening would have been created for the incorporation of African traditions 
or values into the South African common law action of dependency, though setbacks 
from customary law can be very challenging. Therefore, an investigation into the 
factors that can hinder the incorporation of the traditional values of the action of 
dependants within the common law action could be a research topic on its own. Future 
studies in this area should explore in detail the barriers to the integration of customary 
and civil law dependency actions. Future studies should also focus more on the 
unification of both actions for the culmination of a single dependency action tailored to 
fit the whole nation and all its different cultures and religions. 
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